Daniel Bell’s The China Model, provides a synthesis of normative political theory and empirical research on the current state of China’s political economy. In Chapter 1, Bell cleverly dismantles the democratic ideal—specifically the West’s commitment to the institution of one person, one vote—by demonstrating its flaws in practice with a critique of the greatest champion of democracy of all, the United States. He in turn makes the case in Chapter 2 that political meritocracy is not only best suited for China, given its political cultural traditions, but is also a model that has performed, at least in China, better than democracy has elsewhere.

Political meritocracy, for Bell, entails a system of selecting the smartest, best qualified, and most virtuous politicians to lead a large and complex nation such as China. Normatively, Bell argues this is a theoretically superior way to select political leaders because it mitigates the problems of “irrational” voters and near-sighted politicians he sees in democracy. Empirically, Bell hinges his claim in favor of political meritocracy on the phenomenal socio-economic development that China has experienced since the start of the reform period.

But Bell is not naïve. He recognizes the “gap” between the ideal of political meritocracy and the realities of how it is practiced in China, thus establishing an empirical baseline from which to evaluate China’s development since the end of the Mao era. His book makes an important contribution to the empirical study of China by asking: Just how big is this gap? Bell points to economic growth and the fact that since the reform period began in the late 1970s hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty as proof the gap may not be as large as China’s critics often conclude. He also rightly points out that China’s political system has not been rigid and that it has undergone significant reform; indeed, today’s China is not Mao-era China. However, by establishing such a lofty baseline—that is, the ideal performance of a theoretical political meritocracy—Bell’s analysis also points to many areas in which China’s political economy is very problematic. Bell, to his credit, acknowledges these empirical realities. Inequality is growing. Administrative schemes such as the hukou system are proving difficult to reform. Political sycophantism, more than merit, is critical for promotion in the one-party state. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector needs to be reformed. Local governments are saddled with huge amounts of debt. Corruption remains rampant. And citizen mobilization is on the rise.

While Bell concedes the myriad challenges China’s political economy currently faces, his defense of political meritocracy hinges on the claim that this gap between ideal and reality is narrowing. Yet I see little evidence of this in Bell’s interpretation of the current situation. In Chapter 3, for instance, he acknowledges corruption in Chinese politics, the ossification of the leadership ranks, and the challenges of sustaining political legitimacy. But he also seems to be suggesting things are getting worse, not better, under political meritocracy. He writes: “Equally obvious, however, some problems in China—corruption, the gap between rich and poor, environmental degradation, abuses of power by political officials, harsh measures for dealing with political dissent, overly powerful state-run enterprises that distort the economic system, repression of religious expression in Tibet and Xinjiang, discrimination against women—seem to have become worse while the political system has become more meritocratic” (p. 173). It thus seems difficult to claim the gap between ideal and reality in China’s political meritocracy has narrowed or is expected to improve, when trends, by Bell’s own admission, suggest things have actually “become worse.” It is not clear to me how this is evidence of either the theoretical or empirical superiority of the Chinese model of meritocratic authoritarianism.

And yet The China Model makes a compelling case that popular support for the government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains very high today. Bell provides a battery of survey results which show how Chinese citizens view the government and the CCP favorably. He predicts that a democratic opposition would have difficulties making a case that it is a better alternative than the CCP.

So then, let me take Bell’s argument to one possible logical end: What would happen if democratic elections were held today in China? Bell provides a very convincing case that the CCP would win such elections, and likely win quite comfortably. This is precisely the argument Dan Slater and I make in our 2013 Perspectives on Politics article (“The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia,” Perspectives on Politics 11:3, 717–33), in which we present an alternative route to democracy—democracy through strength. Theoretically speaking, conceding democracy from a position of strength is incentive-compatible for authoritarian regimes precisely because they can expect to politically survive, and even thrive, in democracy. Empirically, we show in our article that democracy through strength has in fact been the modal pathway to democracy in most Asian cases, including Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia; and in our forthcoming book we suggest that we are seeing the same thing occur in even the most unlikely cases, such as Myanmar.

Bell would surely have some responses to this argument. First, as he says, the CCP “will not enact reform likely to lead to the party’s demise” (p. 180). He is absolutely right that the CCP will not choose a reform path that contributes to its own defeat, just as the conservatives in Japan did not concede a democratic constitution in 1946 to lead to their demise nor did the KMT in Taiwan concede democracy to hasten its own political obsolescence. As Slater and I stress, conceding democracy is not tantamount to conceding defeat. Therefore, it is possible—and even very likely, given Bell’s defense of the CCP’s record and the popular support it apparently enjoys—that the Chinese ruling party could concede democracy without any threat of it giving up power. Second, Bell acknowledges our argument in a footnote, and he responds to it by noting how democratic elections would undermine political meritocracy because the CCP would have to hew to the electorate rather than cultivate and select the best leaders for the long-term (see footnote 56, p. 286). It is not clear, however, why the CCP could not both maintain a meritocratic system to promote within its ranks the best, most virtuous and most skilled leaders and contest elections at the same time. In fact, it would seem to me the CCP’s meritocratic institutions would select the best leaders with the most compelling long-term visions for China,which is what would get them elected. And finally, Bell might ask why the CCP would concede democracy now, when it remains so powerful, so popular and when there is no immediate threat to its political survival. That is precisely the point Slater and I make: Conceding democracy from strength ensures the ruling party a far better fate than conceding reform when the party is weak, de-legitimated, unpopular, and when it has no other choice but to give up power. Democracy through strength, we contend, ensures democratic parties their political longevity, as we see with the LDP in Japan and the KMT in Taiwan. We do not see this political longevity in nations where the ruling party is forced to concede when weak, such as in the former Soviet Union.

The political science literature, especially the strand concerning political transitions, has by and large tended to approach the China case by anticipating either the regime’s durability or its coming collapse. For those who see the durability of China’s authoritarian regime—and I would include Bell’s defense of the China model as part of that camp—China will not, and need not, democratize because the regime is unlikely to collapse. On the other hand, those who foresee the regime’s collapse expect tumultuous political reform. In both camps, China’s political future will be determined by the possibility (or impossibility) of a crisis and collapse scenario. It seems, however, that Bell’s arguments for the China model portend a possible alternative scenario, one in which the virtues, strengths and confidence generated by the CCP’s meritocracy might in fact compel the party to concede democracy, rather than resist it.