No war in the prerevolutionary English-speaking historical landscape appears more studied and understood as does the Seven Years' War (or French and Indian War in North America). Tomes pertaining to the campaigns of Frederick the Great, Clive in India, the Plains of Abraham, and the like have been produced over the centuries, often repetitive and derivative in nature. It appears on the surface we know all the important characters, issues, and arguments, with little room for historiographical imagination or reinterpretation. In fact, Sir Julian Corbett's two-volume England in the Seven Years': A Study in Combined Strategy (London, 1907) stood for decades as the standard strategic and operational account of Britain's larger war because of its use of archives and its deftness of analysis. Daniel Baugh's recent offering on the larger Anglo-French conflict, even more grounded in archival sources and exhibiting new insight into old, settled questions, should stand as the topic's modern reimagining.

The book is organized into sixteen chapters and follows a standard chronological narrative (it also contains seventeen maps of various theaters of war). One vexing problem for historians is the war's inclusive dates. It is, after all, the Seven Years' War, but Baugh, with good reason, argues for the 1754–63 timeframe over the more Euro-centered 1756–63 dates. The Anglo-French conflict does begin in earnest, even if not formally via war declarations, as early as 1754. When war broke out in 1756 with the French attack on Minorca and Frederick of Prussia's invasion of Saxony, the overlapping conflict, and obligations of its participants, tied together war in Europe and war on the periphery like never before. In addition, it is the Anglo-French maritime conflict that is at the heart of the narrative and analysis. Battles are not ignored, but neither are they the main hooks upon which Baugh's analysis rests. Rather, it is the logistics of the maritime war that begs an understanding, because the strategy for both sides and the relative success of achieving operational and strategic goals rested more on the transport of men and material than on the sporadic battles and tactical formations used in famous engagements. Therefore, engagements and battles are contextualized by the transport and logistics emphasis. In fact, for Baugh the larger Anglo-French war was a “war on water,” and that is where it is ultimately decided.

Admirably, Baugh does not rely on consensus or what he terms “settled questions” to inform his synthesis. For instance, on the issue of the origins of the North American conflict, he questions the accepted notions of British and French policies, whether they were guided by merchant concerns or a rational geopolitical understanding of colonial relations. Rather, he concludes that British policymakers in London felt little pressure from mercantile or landed interests in Virginia, nor were French decision makers in Versailles guided by a rational understanding of the situation. Because of the lack of records that inform us of the ideas and arguments of Louis XV's cabinet and because multiple foreign policies emanated from Versailles (albeit from different sources), Baugh concludes that French policy was guided by errors, illusions, and a poor grasp of the reality of the situation in the disputed region of North America. It is refreshing when historians dispense with the notion that high-level decisions of governments are made within the context of rationality and self-interest, when in fact the blundering of statesmen, the inability to understand the dynamics of far-off places, and the dysfunction that grips cabinets and governing bodies, because of personalities, fear, and competition for favor and posts, often overshadow and/or undermine the rational pursuit of national interest. For Baugh these individuals (their character, personalities, and life experiences) do matter, whether they make decisions that turn out to be the correct ones or are guided down the wrong path by the inability to grasp the realities of power or because of the lack of information to make such decisions.

There is much to commend, and much to review, in this important book. Historians may disagree with certain arguments and new analyses of the “settled questions,” but Baugh clearly revives historiographic vigor in a topic that is often looked upon as the study of battalions and bayonets, or badges and buttons, by nonspecialists. As such, Daniel Baugh's study of the Anglo-French struggle in the Seven Years' War stands alongside Franz A. J. Szabo's The Seven Years' War in Europe (Harlow, 2008), Jonathan R. Dull's The French Navy and the Seven Years' War (Lincoln, 2005), and Fred Anderson's Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (New York, 2000), which form the modern canon on this war. With respect to narrative, analysis, research notes, and bibliographies, these works are now the starting point for students and scholars who wish to delve into the wide-ranging and imposing conflict, which served as a pivot between the early modern and modern eras.