The work before us, along with the recent one by Dustin Sebell, The Socratic Turn (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), may evidence a long overdue reassessment of what we call the pre-Socratics and the sophists. Although I use these terms owing to their familiarity, it is always worth reminding ourselves that these bodies of thought are largely the construction of later interpretation and scholarship based on what was widely accepted as the intellectual triumph of classical natural right over ancient skepticism.Footnote 1 That victory is not presented by Plato as self-evident or certain in his Socratic dialogues. Socrates does not always use the term “sophist” in a pejorative way, and he shows some of them, notably Protagoras, more respect than others. In my view, Socrates is presented in the dialogues as attempting to enlist some of them to act as rhetorical intermediaries in the pursuit of virtuous-character formation through their greater insight into demotic speech, with mixed results. The pre-Socratics did not of course realize that this was to be their place in posterity, since they did not know they were pre- anything. Moreover, in contrast with a great deal of modern scholarship, there is no hard and fast distinction between these two sets of thinkers, pre-Socratics and sophists. Gorgias, for example, usually classed as a sophist, was the pupil of Empedocles, usually classed as a pre-Socratic. Many of those writings normally designated as being by sophists are permeated with the cosmological speculations of those normally designated as the pre-Socratics. Socrates himself makes this clear when in the Theaetetus he says that all “the wise in succession” with the exception of Parmenides, and including Heraclitus, Empedocles, Homer, and certainly Protagoras, believed that nature was the “offspring” of “flow and motion,” that “nothing ever is but is always becoming,” that things sprang unfathomably into being, or as the Athenian Stranger puts it in his summation of this whole pedigree in Laws X, “according to chance” and “out of necessity.”
Bartlett several times refers to Socrates as “prophesying,” concluding with the suggestion that Socrates's study of nature is in some manner prophetic, although not as “ordinarily understood.” That raises the question, how is it ordinarily understood, and how is Socrates's version different? Presumably Socrates's prophecies are not like prophecy in revealed religion, for example when God reveals himself to Moses on Mount Sinai. Mantikos in ancient Greek is often associated with a Dionysian loss of self-awareness, cognate with a word for madness. If we widen “prophecy” to include revelation in general, perhaps Plato points us toward what appear to be symbolic accounts of what incentivized Socrates to philosophize in his new manner, the Socratic “turn”—a dawning awareness of the importance of piety in human life (the Delphic quest), or Socrates's claim that he was initiated into the rites of eros by the seeress Diotima (from Mantinea, which also contains the root for “prophet”), who told him that if he was willing to look at men's eros for honor, which apparently up until that point he was not, he would experience “wonder” until he was guided by her to reflect on its hierarchy of ranked objects.
In both cases, the love of wisdom—the search, as Strauss puts it, for knowledge of the eternal order of the whole—is based upon some anterior drive or experience, a kind of revelation. In this sense, Plato might be said to anticipate and answer Nietzsche's charge that philosophy, the search for knowledge based on the principle of noncontradiction, is a “prejudice” that cannot account for its true motives—honor, rage, revenge, making life bearable, all conduits of the will to power. Whereas Nietzsche presents past philosophers such as Plato as unaware of their own genuine motives, Plato offers us several different possible perspectives on how Socrates accounted for his own motivation to pursue philosophy. When he relates that Diotima placed correct opinion in between lack of understanding and prudence, analogous to the in-between position of eros between the ugly and bad and the beautiful and the good, and to the place of the demon as the intermediary binding together the human and the divine, putting the parallels together, it seems that the demonic man is led by eros to hit upon “what is” through correct opinion, which can then be further clarified according to logos. In other words, correct opinion is the erotic intuition of the “look” or form of the phenomenon in which the phenomenon participates. That is arguably a direct link between correct opinion—the subject matter for Socratic dialectic—and a kind of demonic revelation.
If we assume this interpretation to be correct, or at least plausible, it nevertheless leaves some puzzling questions. For, even if Socrates's philosophizing is incentivized by some anterior drive—revelation, wonder, eros—and even if its very subject matter, correct opinion, is a kind of revelation, the way in which that philosophizing is subsequently executed would appear to be precisely as Nietzsche describes it: the way to learn more about nature and human nature is to look for permanent patterns that do not contradict themselves—in other words, the forms. Only that makes it possible to distinguish between seeming and being, between opinion and knowledge. That quest inevitably makes it impossible for Socrates to understand piety and the holy as revelatory and unfathomable. The gods, he argues in the Republic, are not to be viewed as persons, as “wizards” who change their own natures. The gods, as Timaeus says, are literally “apathetic,” without feeling. They cannot be prayed to or swayed by sacrifices. They never change, and they do not intervene in human affairs. When Euthyphro answers Socrates's question about what piety is by describing a series of pious acts, Socrates upbraids him—what we want is the holy “in itself,” its idea, not a list of sporadic instances. The pious is not pious because the gods love it, but because it is pious. The gods are subordinate to a higher and reasonable reality. They do not mix in human and political affairs. In the theology of the best regime, as Benardete puts it, Socrates “desanctifies the city in the name of the sanctity of the gods.”
I would argue that if there is any kinship between ancient thought and revealed religion, that kinship is actually much more evident in the thought of the pre-Socratics and the sophists. Common to their understanding is the premise that nature is self-originating, sheer possibility. The paradox whereby, according to Laws X, things emerge from nature as motion “according to chance” (unfathomably and unpredictably) and “out of necessity” (whatever they turn out to be, they must be that) has a kinship with the biblical mystery wherein God says “I am that/what I am.” This mystery centers on the way in which Creation is both what God lets issue through him and at the same time his imposition of form on matter to make it what it is. Just as with the pre-Socratics’ view of nature as motion, God's creation is subject to no higher criterion of rationality (unlike the demiurge of the Timaeus). The resemblance ends, of course, over the fact that the God of revealed religion, while completely mutable, is a person, whereas the “great motions” (Laws X) of nature for the pre-Socratics are impersonal, albeit also completely mutable.
Moreover, there is no conception in the sophists’ or the pre-Socratics’ understanding of nature that it can be reshaped or recreated by the external application of the human will. The notion of a will that can stand outside of nature and recreate it is a conception of the Abrahamic God that is borrowed and transferred to human agency by the modern project for the conquest of nature begun by Machiavelli and Bacon, and that is why modern skepticism is categorically distinct from ancient skepticism (as Strauss says of Hobbes, the modern project can be characterized as optimism premised upon skepticism). German historicism beginning with Hegel attempted to synthesize the conquest of nature with the teleological evolution of humanity culminating in the end (fulfillment) of history. Not surprisingly, as Hegel's successors such as Nietzsche and Heidegger jettisoned the doctrine of the progress of history—a synthesis of skepticism with rationality—and therewith the authority of reason in the West itself, they turned away from the classical era admired by Hegel and followed the pre-Socratics down into the vortex of sheer possibility anterior to the self or to any positive historical structures, a recessional movement into origination that included the taste for the tragic. That is why the greatest modern scholar of the pre-Socratics is Heidegger, who directly echoed Heraclitus's evocation of nature as war or strife. The following fragment from Gorgias might almost have been written by Heidegger himself: “Being is unrecognizable unless it succeeds in seeming, and seeming is weak unless it succeeds in being.”
