I. Introduction
In this paper I want to argue for a reading of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples and Political Liberalism that brings out the unified vision they share and thus takes seriously and gives content to Rawls’s claim that the former carries forward the project of the latter. Footnote 1 Political Liberalism articulates Rawls’s reworking of his ideal theory stability argument from Part III of A Theory of Justice, a reworking needed to better square the argument with the fact that inevitably and always the citizens of a liberal democracy will be divided by reasonable doctrinal disagreement or pluralism. Footnote 2 As presented in A Theory of Justice the stability argument is an argument from moral psychology. Most of this moral psychology carries forward to Political Liberalism. However, it appears in Political Liberalism in different light and contributes to a stability argument of a different sort.
In this essay, I draw on the moral psychology underwriting the revised stability argument of Political Liberalism in order to draw out previously unnoticed features of The Law of Peoples and thereby to shed light on the vision uniting the books. Briefly, Political Liberalism aims to establish the thesis that under the favorable conditions of ideal theory a liberal democratic polity could be stable for the right reasons even though in the course of their moral development intelligent citizens of good will, even under the favorable conditions of ideal theory, will inevitably freely settle on diverse doctrinal understandings of themselves and the world they share. The Law of Peoples is most explicitly aimed at articulating and defending the principles and aims of a sound liberal democratic foreign policy and so completing the ideal theory vision of liberal democratic justice set out in A Theory of Justice. But I argue that it implicitly and perhaps more fundamentally completes the stability argument given in Political Liberalism. It does this by showing, under the favorable conditions of ideal theory, that a liberal democratic polity could be stable for the right reasons even though in the course of their own moral development some, perhaps many, of the bodies politic with which it will inevitably have to interact will, even under the favorable conditions of ideal theory, inevitably settle on doctrinal understandings neither liberal nor democratic of themselves as bodies politic or the larger world they share with other bodies politic.
The Law of Peoples acknowledges that even under the favorable conditions of ideal theory a liberal democracy will face in its external relations not only other bodies politic, intelligent and of good will, embodying conceptions of justice less than fully or perfectly liberal and democratic but also bodies politic embodying conceptions of justice that are simply neither liberal nor democratic and so at best only minimally reasonable or not fully unreasonable. The Law of Peoples aims to show that a liberal democracy may remain stable for the right reasons even though the range of doctrinal diversity and reasonable disagreement it will face in its external or international relations to other bodies politic ready and willing to interact with it on reasonable terms is much wider than that faced internally by its citizens, similarly ready and willing to interact with one another on reasonable terms, in their domestic political relations to one another.
The Law of Peoples completes the stability argument first set forth in A Theory of Justice and then revised in Political Liberalism by extending it to potential external sources of instability inevitable even within ideal theory. To be sure, in A Theory of Justice Rawls recognized (mainly in his brief discussion of just war and conscientious refusal) some obvious potential external sources of instability, e.g., the possession by most bodies politic of military forces, the fragility of treaty obligations between bodies politic already possessed of the power to make law for themselves, the porousness of borders to population migration, and so on. Footnote 3 But not until his turn to Political Liberalism, and then The Law of Peoples, did Rawls clarify his thinking regarding external stability issues. He distinguished between external sources of instability inevitable even under the favorable conditions of ideal theory and external sources of instability familiar from our lived experience under conditions of non-ideal theory. The former includes the diverse doctrinal self understandings of the bodies politic, otherwise intelligent and of good will, with which a liberal democracy must inevitably interact. The latter includes, inter alia, the problems of just war and populations too impoverished to constitute themselves as bodies politic.
I begin by reviewing the stability argument presented in A Theory of Justice, paying special attention to the three stage account of moral development upon which it draws. I then review the revised stability argument deployed in Political Liberalism, paying special attention to the relationship between the doctrinal diversity and reasonable disagreement that necessitates it and the three stage account of moral development set out in Theory. Turning then to The Law of Peoples, I show how Rawls’s characterization of the benevolent absolutism, the well-ordered decent people, and the well-ordered liberal democratic people maps on to both this three stage account of moral development and the doctrinal diversity and reasonable disagreement central to Political Liberalism. I then propose a reading of The Law of Peoples that has it carrying forward to the international domain, and so to potential external sources of instability, the account given in Political Liberalism of how a liberal democracy might remain stable for the right reasons notwithstanding its inability to eliminate as a potential internal source of instability active citizens apparently ready and willing to cooperate on reasonable terms notwithstanding their being at, and affirming diverse comprehensive doctrines that reflect or express, different stages of moral development.
Central to this reading is the idea that in both Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples Rawls is speaking as someone and to persons whose comprehensive doctrinal understanding of self and world, and so whose commitment to reasonable political relations, embodies and expresses the third of his three stages of moral development, a morality of principle. Rawls aims to demonstrate for himself and his audience that their commitment to liberal democracy ought not be shaken by the fact that even under the conditions of ideal theory some, perhaps many, of those with whom they must inevitably interact may not, in the absence of illegitimate force or coercion, join them in this third stage of moral development, let alone share with them their comprehensive doctrinal understanding of self and world.
To put the matter another way, Rawls’s later work concerns the fact that even under favorable conditions the free exercise of reason permits diverse and potentially stable comprehensive doctrinal reflective equilibria embodying and expressing different stages of moral development. Rawls missed, or missed the full import of, this fact in A Theory of Justice. His later work aims to show that having taken it on board he still sees no reason to give up on his or our commitment to liberal democracy. The fact of ineliminable doctrinal disagreement embodying and expressing different stages of moral development both within and between polities ought cause neither political alarm nor regret among those who have settled fully into a doctrinal understanding, and so a commitment to liberal democracy, that embodies and expresses a morality of principle.
To be sure, I see no reason to think that Rawls retreats in his own thinking from the idea that it is only at the third stage of moral development that persons most fully and completely realize themselves, or the idea that liberal democracy and something like a comprehensive Kantian or Millian doctrinal understanding of self and world are the condition, embodiment and expression of persons so realized. What I take him to be arguing, plainly stated, is that it is unreasonable to hope for a world hospitable to liberal democracies and to persons so realized unless these persons and the liberal democracies to which they belong recognize that reasonable political cooperation stable for the right reasons is possible even between persons and polities affirming diverse comprehensive doctrines and standing at different stages of moral development. Regardless of their doctrinal understandings or stage of moral development, persons and polities able to honor reasonable terms of cooperation ought not to be objects of political disrespect or targets of coercive reform. This is the core meaning of liberal toleration.
II. Stability and Moral Psychology in A Theory of Justice
Moral psychology aims at understanding the moral experience of persons. This experience is constituted by moral feelings, attitudes and sentiments; moral deliberation, judgment and motivation; and moral development. Moral psychology aims at understanding this experience neither as a general psychological phenomenon nor as neural activity in the brain, but rather as distinctively moral. A person’s psychological experience is distinctively moral when it cannot be identified or explained without reference to moral concepts, principles or values. The psychological experience of resentment or indignation is thus distinctively moral, whereas the psychological experience of fear is not.
Importantly, there are no inner phenomenal states or felt feelings necessary or sufficient to the psychological experience of moral feelings, attitudes or sentiments. It is enough that a person sincerely report having the feelings in an appropriate context (e.g., not on stage as an actor in a play), behave in a manner consistent with their report (e.g., if one reports feeling guilty, then one typically makes an apology), and provide the right sort of explanation (e.g., if one reports feeling guilty, then this is typically explained by reference to some wrongdoing toward another). Because inner phenomenal states or felt feelings are neither necessary nor sufficient to moral feelings, moral psychology is not limited in its subject matter to the moral experience of natural human persons. It may extend to any agent capable of appropriately expressing, regulating and explaining itself in moral terms. There is nothing peculiar about extending moral psychology from individual persons to peoples or bodies politic organized and resourced such that they are able to express, regulate and explain themselves in moral terms. Any agent, whether natural human being or, say, a corporate body, able to express, regulate and explain itself in moral terms we may and typically do refer to as a person.
Moral psychology is not simply general empirical psychology extended to a particular subject matter, the moral experience of persons. Nevertheless, it is, for Rawls, informed and constrained by general empirical psychology. There ought to be no conflict, and indeed there ought to be non-reductive continuity, between our best moral psychology and our best general empirical psychology.
Of course, in one sense all of Rawls’s work is an exercise in moral psychology: an attempt to understand our ‘sense of justice’ as a moral sentiment and to determine whether, once brought into reflective equilibrium, it might underwrite a basic social structure, a shared social world, capable of sustaining itself and the moral sentiment it embodies and expresses. But Rawls’s most explicit appeals to moral psychology appear in the stability argument from A Theory of Justice. There he deploys a theory of moral development to argue that persons raised within a society the basic social structure of which embodies and expresses justice as fairness may be expected normally and naturally to acquire a sense of justice sufficiently focused and well-rooted in their overall psychological make-up to ensure that in general they will reliably voluntarily do as justice requires, whether that is complying with the law or working for its reform. To be sure, policing will be required both to help assure citizens that they may rely on others and to deal with occasional acts of injustice. Similarly, educational efforts may be required. But Rawls’s key thought is that given just institutions, and without excessive policing or indoctrination, it is perfectly normal and natural for persons to acquire a reliably regulative sense of justice of the sort necessary to the stability of such institutions. Footnote 4
Of course, the stability of such institutions requires also that those who have so acquired such a sense of justice understand and experience this fact about themselves as congruent with their good or their success or self-realization as rational agents in the most basic sense. There must be a stable reflective equilibrium between their sense of themselves simply as rational agents and their sense of themselves as having been socialized, even if normally and naturally and without indoctrination, into their particular sense of justice. Further, that this equilibrium obtains for each of them must be an object of public knowledge. The public trust essential to cooperation stable for the right reasons depends on persons having no good reasons to doubt that the sense of justice they share is generally congruent with each of their deepest and most fixed senses of themselves simply as rational agents. Footnote 5
The point here is not that persons must understand and experience, and know that others similarly understand and experience, their sense of justice to be congruent or in stable reflective equilibrium with their determinate conception of their own good—their actual life plan. As Rawls notes, for persons possessed of a reliably regulative sense of justice congruence between it and their determinate life plan or conception of their own good is more or less guaranteed. Footnote 6 Rather, the point is that persons must understand and experience their having acquired a reliably regulative sense of justice as congruent or in stable reflective equilibrium with their good even when they bracket their determinate conception of the good or actual life plan and think of their good in the most basic or enduring sense, that is, in terms of their good or success or self-realization simply as rational agents. Indeed, not only must they so understand and experience their reliably regulative sense of justice, they must also know that others, and others must in turn know that they, do so as well. To put it in other terms, the reflective equilibrium within which each person’s sense of justice is incorporated must be publicly known to incorporate their most basic or general sense of their self-interest or self-realization. The reason for this is that if this is not publicly known, then citizens will find themselves unable to escape prisoner’s dilemma worries about whether they can rely on others to remain just. Unable to see clearly into the hearts and minds of others, and concerned that others deep down may resent having, or feel in some sense alienated from, their sense of justice, citizens may find themselves unwilling fully to trust others; they may fear that others may, given the right circumstance, abandon justice without shame or regret for the sake of some other not irrational interest or for the sake of realizing some other not irrational ideal or conception of themselves. Of course, one might appeal here to a Hobbesian leviathan capable of securing public trust by visibly and publicly aligning justice and self-interest, the reasonable and the rational—all the way down, as it were. But Rawls worries that even if this were a feasible option, it may well be a cure worse than the disease. His congruence argument is meant to establish a superior alternative. It is meant to show that in a society governed by justice as fairness, citizens will know of one another that they have no reason to regret or to wonder if others regret having been socialized into the sense of justice they each normally and naturally acquired, or to be in any sense alienated or wonder if others are in any sense alienated from themselves as oriented by this sense of justice. If publicly verifiable, this internal psychological congruence accomplishes the same end as a leviathan. If feasible, it would appear a cure better than the disease for which it is fashioned.
In A Theory of Justice Rawls drew on a ‘thin theory of the good’ and the so-called Aristotelian principle to argue that all persons possessed of the reliably regulative sense of justice cultivated in a society governed by justice as fairness would understand and experience their acquiring and possessing it to be congruent with their good as rational agents in the most basic or fundamental sense and, further, they would know of each other that what was true for each of them was true for all. Everyone would have, know they had, and know that others had, a sense of justice in stable reflective equilibrium with their sense of themselves and their most fundamental or basic interests as rational agents. The point here is not that they would understand or experience their sense of justice as deriving from or as justified in terms of their rationality alone. Rather, it is that they would understand and experience their having acquired and remaining faithful to their sense of justice as neither an obstacle nor a threat to their most basic good, success or self-realization simply as rational agents.
As is now well-known, Rawls came to think that this second step of his stability argument in A Theory of Justice, the so-called congruence argument, was inconsistent with the fact of diversity or reasonable disagreement with respect to comprehensive moral, religious and philosophical doctrinal understandings of self and world. It seemed to presuppose a rough convergence with respect to comprehensive doctrinal understandings of the self, at the very least his ‘thin theory of the good,’ the Aristotelian principle, and the nature of various human capacities and their exercise. But this, Rawls came to see, was unreasonable to expect in a just liberal democracy, or in any free society. And so the congruence argument had to be revised or replaced.
To be clear, the diversity or reasonable disagreement relevant here is not simply that which holds between citizens and their determinate life plans or conceptions of their own good as the particular individuals they are. It is rather that which holds between citizens who have fundamentally different understandings of what it means to be and to succeed or realize oneself as a rational agent in the most basic sense. This is the sort of diversity or reasonable disagreement that, when publicly recognized, tends to cause citizens to wonder whether they or others have reason to regret having been socialized into or to feel alienated from their otherwise effective regulative sense of justice. And this is the sort of wonder that, if not answered in the right way, engenders instability. And then we face the choice between instability, on the one hand, and stability achieved only through coercion, deception, manipulation and so on, on the other. To avoid this Hobson’s, or better Hobbesian, choice, this wonder must be answered. If it cannot be, then liberal democracy stable in the right way is a pipe dream.
To fix this problem with the congruence portion of his overall stability argument in A Theory of Justice, Rawls introduced in Political Liberalism a number of new ideas and arguments. These were intended, when taken together, to justify, albeit by a different route, more or less the same conclusion reached in A Theory of Justice: in a society the basic structure of which is faithful to justice as fairness, or at least a close liberal relative, persons ready reasonably to cooperate with one another politically on mutually acceptable terms will find, and will each publicly know that they each and all so find, albeit each for their own distinctive doctrinal reasons, their acquired sense of justice to be congruent or in stable reflective equilibrium with their good or interest simply as rational agents, or at least sufficiently congruent to support the public trust necessary to maintain their political cooperation. As sufficient public evidence for this congruence Rawls offers not a single congruence argument drawing on the thin theory of the good and Aristotelian Principle, but rather an argument for the possibility of an overlapping consensus as a publicly verifiable fact.
To understand fully the revised stability argument of Political Liberalism, one must understand the relationship between the reasonable doctrinal pluralism from which emerges its necessity and the account of moral development Rawls presents in A Theory of Justice. Accordingly, I turn next to that account of moral development and then to its relationship to reasonable doctrinal pluralism.
III. Rawls’s Account of Moral Development
In A Theory of Justice Rawls presents his account of moral development mainly to argue that it is reasonable to think that in a society governed by justice as fairness persons will naturally and normally acquire a reliably regulative sense of justice. He presents it as a reasonable moral psychology, not as an empirical theory. On the account he presents, human beings are normally born with two basic capacities, a capacity for rationality and for reasonableness. At birth, these are bare capacities. They develop over time in and through social life. And as they do, they underwrite claims to, and so also to the material and social conditions of, their active exercise. Human beings are not born persons. Rather they become persons. Given the right conditions, they do so naturally and reliably. These conditions are essentially social. Justice is the reciprocal realization and alignment or attunement to one another of human beings as persons within a shared social world. One might say that it is the process or activity of practical reason animating and realizing itself as a community of persons within humanity. Justice is the activity of persons knowing, approving and sustaining their own becoming.
This process or activity begins with the newborn infant possessed of, among other things, the two moral powers, as bare capacities, but actively animated by only non-moral natural desires and instincts, what Rousseau called amour de soi in its most basic form. The hungry infant cries. The cold infant cries. Initially, it experiences and expresses only basic animal needs. Typically, the parent responds, unconditionally, by endeavoring to meet the newborn’s needs and by displaying pleasure at evidence that they are being met (the parent smiles when the crying stops). Over time, the infant comes to experience, if not understand, this as parental love. And over time this affective experience of parental love typically engenders in the infant child a love for her parents. Love begets love. In due course, the child’s internalized awareness of her parents’ love for her gives rise to a primitive sense of herself as a source of valid claims on them and to a need for their respect and recognition of her as such. Not only does she have needs, but her needs matter. Indeed, she matters. And from her parents, she seeks recognition of this fact. At the same time, the infant’s love for her parents soon gives rise to new desires to please and not to disappoint them. She finds their approval and meeting their expectations pleasant. Within this context, one marked by parental affection and care, the child’s internalized sense of her own unconditional value or worth, her need for recognition, and her desire to secure her parents’ approval and meet their expectations, the child develops and exercises new capacities, for movement, control over her environment, interaction, and so on. From this she and her parents naturally delight. As she develops and exercises her capacities, her parents undertake to coordinate her activity for her own benefit, often helping her to achieve what seems to them to be her aims, and making use of incentives and prompts, eventually even rewards and punishments, as needed. The child’s capacities to identify ends and advance them intelligently begin to come online. As she complies with her parents’ commands or directives, perhaps initially because she loves and wants their approval, she finds that doing so is not incongruent with her good. Compliance seems to be consistent with her self-development and realization. Slowly, she begins to hear her parents’ commands or directions as neither merely imperative nor merely instrumentally rational given her desires, but as normative in a kind of proto-moral sense. She is drawn toward wanting to obey for its own sake. This is because she experiences complying with her parents’ commands or directives as normally advancing her and their good. And so doing has the effect of deepening and strengthening the expressions of reciprocal recognition and affection between them. This desire to obey for its own sake steadily displaces the need for external incentives, parentally imposed punishments or offered rewards. Across wider domains of the child’s activity, her parental directive or command is enough.
This transition to a sort of proto-moral normativity is not initially and never simply a matter of the child’s rational self-interest alone, though it is always congruent with it. It depends on her trust in and love of her parents, which in turn depends on their having unconditionally loved and cared for her at birth. She wishes to affirm and sustain her relationship of reciprocal affection with them for its own sake. As she develops she will experience as unpleasant failing to do as directed or commanded by her parents, even if she is not caught or punished. She will experience her parents trust in her as pleasant in itself. We (or she) will not need to refer to moral principles, values or concepts to explain these feelings. The child’s feeling of displeasure upon disobedience is not yet a proper instance of her feeling guilt or shame. But it is also a feeling not fully intelligible as a response only to a set-back of rational self-interest.
Rawls characterizes this stage of moral development as a proto-morality of authority. While initially manifest as obedience tied to punishment and reward, and then as obedience rooted in love and loyalty, this proto-morality of authority eventually tends to manifest as instrumental bargaining and exchange. As the child’s capacities—linguistic, cognitive, kinesthetic, and so forth—continue to come online and develop, and as she continues to delight in their so doing, she will begin to express her sense of herself as a source of valid claims on others by seeking from them, in the first instance from her parents, some reason that she could freely accept for complying with their directives or commands. Not yet in a position to understand or appreciate moral reasons, the only reasons she could freely accept are reasons of self-interest. Thus, the proto-morality of authority develops soon enough into a “morality” of self-interested bargaining and exchange. The feelings, attitudes and sentiments characteristic of this further development of the proto-morality of authority can still be identified and explained without any reference to moral concepts, principles or values—the child bargains with her parents to advance her own good unconstrained or unfiltered by any antecedent commitment to the common good. Any link between bargaining and mutually advantageous exchange is accidental. But given the nature of the family as a cooperative undertaking a link between bargaining and mutually advantageous exchange is often present. And it is the catalyst through which the proto-morality of authority normally and naturally yields eventually to a genuinely moral stage of moral development.
Though the proto-morality of authority ordinarily so yields, it is neither eliminated nor destroyed. It remains within the moral nature of all persons. Properly circumscribed by background conditions of mutual recognition and affection, it may in one form or another remain à propos to certain circumstances (e.g., emergency situations or conditions of radical asymmetries in ability and vulnerability). But as persons age and mature and in any moderately developed social setting these circumstances are typically isolated and rare.
Consider again the child who has entered into the self-interested bargaining stage of the proto-morality of authority. Typically, her parents (or others), often delighting in her display of developing capacities, will press their side of the bargain. In this way the child, her capacities—linguistic, kinesthetic, cognitive and so forth—now more fully developed, will be steadily drawn first into bargaining for the sake of exchange and then into more enduring forms of cooperative activity with others from which she and they will manifestly benefit and through which she and they will come to feel new affection for each other. If she regularly exchanges in a mutually advantageous way with her parents she will eventually find herself cooperating with them on more and complex matters. As she does, she will come to love them not simply as an (erstwhile) benevolent ruler, but as partners in a cooperative relationship for their mutual advantage. Likewise, her parents will no longer love her only as their vulnerable and needy child, but also as a recognized fellow member of the family so understood. In this context of reciprocal recognition and affection within a cooperative undertaking, what had previously presented as self-interested bargaining is transformed into a morality of exchange for mutual advantage. Bargains come to carry normative force, drawing the child’s willing compliance irrespective of further inducements, insofar as they are publicly seen to be voluntary and to further mutual advantage.
Bargaining repeatedly is often easily recognized to be less advantageous to all than settling on a mutually acceptable shared practice. Accordingly, rules begin to emerge providing the soil from which enduring mutually acceptable role-mediated, rule-governed cooperation arises. Cooperation in this context further enriches feelings of love and trust. These feelings extend now to the family as a cooperative undertaking. And so the child comes to desire and take pleasure in the good of the family as a whole. The proto-morality of authority here yields finally to the morality of associative cooperation for the common good.
Over the course of this process what Rousseau refers to as amour propre begins to assert itself. No longer confined to a context of her parents’ benevolent recognition of and response to her amour de soi, and increasingly situated in a new context of (increasingly complex) cooperative interdependence within and beyond the family, the child is challenged to maintain a secure sense of her own value within a new context of relational interdependence. Of course, she still loves and wants to please her parents and to sustain relations of reciprocal recognition and affection within the context of their benevolent care. But she now wants also recognition and respect as a full partner within new cooperative contexts of interdependence. This she receives from her cooperative partners provided that she and they—initially parents and family members, later classmates, teammates and coworkers—are able together to understand and accept shared terms of their cooperation for the sake of their common good.
These terms will typically include role-specific rules and responsibilities organized as a hierarchical cooperative structure. Parents no longer rule their children as if the latter were still fully dependent or unable to cooperate, but parents nevertheless retain special powers and privileges within and for the sake of the family and its good. Children are fully cooperating members, but are not their parents’ equals; likewise with teachers and students, coaches and players, owners and employees, priests and parishes, and so forth. Within these cooperative undertakings, each participant comes to experience and understand that others, by fulfilling their role-specific responsibilities, contribute to her good by providing her with not only reliable access to goods she could not secure on her own but also an opportunity further to develop and exercise her capacities in new and more complex ways. Participants thus come to trust and feel affection, perhaps even love, for those with whom they cooperate and so to desire to advance their good. This they will see that they are able, and so will want, to do by reciprocally fulfilling their role-specific responsibilities within the cooperative undertaking, even when so doing may at the moment seem not to be in their immediate interest. In this way, participants eventually come to experience and understand their role-mediated responsibilities as morally normative. They naturally and normally feel shame or guilt when they fail to live up to their responsibilities and blame or resent others when they similarly fail. These new feelings are properly moral; they cannot be identified or explained without referring to the moral notions of reciprocal role-mediated responsibility and the common good.
At this stage, the child as a developing person experiences and understands herself as rational and responsible, as a reliable and full participant in a given and decent cooperative undertaking or shared form of life. So long as she feels immediately and powerfully the connection between this shared form of life, her own good, and the common good, and so long as she is confident that others feel likewise, her amour propre, enlivened as she entered into the morality of association, may remain satisfied and need not become a source of social pathology. Notwithstanding her social interdependency, she and her cooperative partners are able to face one another openly, without shame, pride or envy, as separate and independent, albeit asymmetrically situated, rational and responsible persons. She is able to sustain her sense of herself as a self-authenticating source of valid claims on others. There need be no conflict between her amour de soi and her amour propre.
At this stage, the child as a developing person experiences and understands justice as her alignment and attunement to others as rational and responsible within role-mediated cooperation for their common good. Role-mediated cooperation underwritten and faithful to a common good conception of justice is an important developmental achievement. But as Rousseau recognized, this condition, should it arise, is not likely to last. As forms of social cooperation proliferate in number, in complexity, and in dynamic interaction with one another, developing persons will find themselves needing to reconcile the sometimes conflicting demands arising out of different cooperative undertakings. They will also find themselves cooperating with others who they neither know personally nor engage face to face and thus for whom any affection they might have will be quite abstract. Moral experience in this context is likely to move in two opposing directions.
First, conflicting demands will sometimes, perhaps often, be reconciled by extending hierarchical authority and role-mediated structures beyond their natural normative domain. This will tend to undermine whatever affection, even if abstract, that might have run between those participating in the relevant cooperative schemes. And it will tend to create unwelcome opportunities for pride, envy, shame and other expressions of misalignment within the social economy of amour propre. Rousseau drew on this tendency to explain many of the social pathologies he found characteristic of Enlightenment France.
But moral experience may sometimes move in a second direction: conflicting demands may sometimes, perhaps often, present opportunities for and encourage deliberation oriented not around established hierarchical structures, role-mediated responsibilities or immediately felt affections, but around the idea of cooperation for the common good in general, irrespective of particular social roles, hierarchical structures or immediately felt affections. This sort of deliberation will tend to cultivate in those engaged in it moral and cognitive capacities the exercise of which they will find satisfying. Under favorable conditions, persons oriented by a morality of association within an increasingly complex and dynamic social world might find themselves not only steadily drawn toward this new sort of moral experience and to new affections for those who join them, but also increasingly able to push, purposefully or otherwise, institutional development in a direction consistent with this experience.
Given favorable conditions and perhaps a bit of luck, a morality of association will normally and naturally develop such that persons increasingly experience and understand themselves as rational and responsible not in reference to specific role-mediated responsibilities, but rather in reference to their undifferentiated status as cooperative contributors to the common good, an equal status they share and to which they might publicly appeal in resolving social conflicts. If and as social conflicts are so resolved persons will find their affections for others cut free of particular social roles. They will value and seek to contribute to the good of others simply as cooperators provided others seem ready to return the favor. To be sure, though in a developmental state of transition, the morality of association will still expresses itself at this stage in terms of rationality, responsibility and a common good conception of justice. But rationality and responsibility are increasingly cut free of the differentiated social roles and hierarchical structures with respect to which they had previously been experienced and understood. And the common good is increasingly cut free of any particular substantive cooperative aim. In this way the stage is set for further moral development, a transition to the morality of principle.
Within a morality of association persons understand and experience themselves as rational and responsible persons oriented by a common good conception of justice. But like the child who begins to press her parents to interact with her in ways that she can judge for herself as congruent with her good as a rational agent, persons within the morality of association in its most complete expression are likely to begin to press their cooperative partners to interact with them in ways they can judge for themselves to be congruent with their good as rational and responsible persons. They will insist, as the child eventually does vis à vis her parents when she begins to pursue self-interested bargaining, on being recognized, just by virtue of being rational and responsible, as a self-authenticating source of valid claims on others. Parents, teachers, coaches, political rulers and others enjoying role-differentiated hierarchical authority will face a choice: either permit cooperative relations to develop in new ways, or fall back on instrumental inducements or coercion to maintain the status quo.
The latter is unlikely to work out. As persons press their cooperative partners to resolve conflicts in ways that recognize and respond to them as rational and responsible cut free from determinate social roles or hierarchical authority, and perhaps advance a common good cut free of any particular substantive conception, they will develop and exercise new capacities. And in this they will delight. So delighting, they will begin to press for the social and material conditions necessary to their continuing to develop and exercise these capacities. And these conditions will increasingly come to dominate their understanding of the common good. In this way too, the stage is set for further moral development, a transition to the morality of principle.
The morality of association is neither eliminated nor destroyed by the morality of principle. As with the proto-morality of authority, it remains within the moral nature of all persons. In particular circumstances and properly circumscribed by background conditions of cooperation for a determinate common good, it may in one form or another remain à propos (e.g., in families, in many voluntary associations such as churches and universities, and so on).
As with the transition from the proto-morality of authority to the morality of association, so too with the transition from the morality of association to the morality of principle: the way forward is cleared by new relations and forms of affection. As persons develop and exercise the intellectual and moral capacities involved in bringing to their increasingly complex and dynamic shared social world an order that answers to demands arising from their abstract and shared and equal status simply as participants in cooperation, and as they find the development and exercise of these capacities rewarding, they will be drawn into new patterns of moral experience and will acquire new forms and relations of affection for others who join with them in this. They will find themselves affectively disposed in positive ways for those who either do or seem ready to engage with and support them in their exercise of these capacities. So disposed, they will come to find their moral compass pointing, at least in the first and most general case, toward only terms of cooperation with others that others could reasonably accept, provided that others appear reciprocally to be guided by the same sort of moral compass.
Under favorable conditions, persons travelling together with this common moral compass will come to experience and understand themselves as not simply rational and responsible participants in particular cooperative undertakings aimed at particular goods they happen to hold in common but as rational and reasonable persons capable of co-authoring as free equals a cooperative social world for the sake only of the common good of their jointly realizing and sustaining themselves as rational and reasonable. The morality of association will retain its hold here and there within civil society, but a new morality of principle will take hold with respect generally to social life as a whole. As it does, it will alter the social economy of amour propre. Persons will no longer find their amour propre satisfied by their public recognition and respect as a rational and responsible teacher, parent, student, or child. They will find it satisfied only by their public recognition and respect as free and equal, rational and reasonable, independent cooperators. If it is not so satisfied, they will be prone to pride, envy, humiliation and shame and the various social pathologies these feelings tend to engender.
Within the morality of principle, role-mediated responsibilities arising out of cooperation for this or that determinate common good are absorbed and framed by principles that any and all persons could publicly accept and affirm from their shared point of view as rational and reasonable, free and equal persons. Acting contrary to these principles will engender feelings of guilt, shame or regret inexplicable without reference to the principles themselves. Here the moral feelings, attitudes and sentiments finally root themselves in soil that fully transcends actually existing social conventions serving the common good and the associational feelings of love, trust and affection generated between those actually participating within them. They root themselves in a shared public reciprocal recognition of the normative authority of, and a love, trust and care for, the free, considered, conscientious judgment of persons as rational and reasonable, free and equal.
Rational and reasonable persons oriented by a morality of principle recognize no further court of appeal beyond their considered conscientious judgments in stable reflective equilibrium. With respect to their shared social world as a cooperative undertaking, they seek to the greatest extent possible to organize it around principles capable of reflecting, expressing and sustaining (and perhaps expanding) convergence in such judgments. In due course, they come to desire and to delight in a shared social world that embodies and expresses both principles they publicly affirm in reflective equilibrium as well as a conception of themselves as rational and reasonable, free and equal.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argued that in a society the basic structure of which is faithful to justice as fairness, it is reasonable to suppose, at least in the context of ideal theory, that citizens will naturally and normally acquire a reflectively stable sense of justice expressed and governed by the principles of justice as fairness. He further argued, in his congruence argument, that as between these citizens it will be public knowledge both that their having so acquired this sense of justice is not something they have any reason to regret and that its regulative force in their lives is not something that they experience in any way as alien. Thus, Rawls concluded, given institutions faithful to justice as fairness, it is reasonable to think that a sense of justice expressing and governed by justice as fairness could reliably function as a psychological substitute for Hobbes’ leviathan, underwriting the public trust necessary to escape the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Before proceeding to discuss the problem with the congruence argument in Theory, the problem that led Rawls to Political Liberalism and that contributes much to framing The Law of Peoples, I want to note a few too often overlooked things about the foregoing account of moral development. Moral development begins with, and depends throughout on an expanding circle of, natural feelings of love, trust and affection. These arise in accord with a principle of reciprocity according to which we love, trust and care for those who manifestly love, trust and care for us. We come to experience others loving, trusting and caring for us only in and through determinate social interactions. While we are all born with the capacity for a morality of principle, that capacity is neither brought online nor developed apart from active participation first in relations of love and care and eventually in a more or less complete, and increasingly complex and dynamic, system of role-mediated social cooperation with determinate others oriented toward a common good. To be sure, once we reach the morality of principle our sense of moral obligation and duty reaches beyond those with whom we have realized determinate social interactions as well as the particular determinate common good realized with them. But it so reaches by virtue of a now general or abstract love or affection for, and a trust in, moral personality and community as such.
Of course, the particular or concrete love, trust and affection we feel for those with whom we enjoy realized and active social relations will continue to shape our sense of moral obligation and duty: As Rawls notes, speaking from the point of view of the morality of principle, while it is always wrong to lie merely for personal gain, it is worse to do so to friends and compatriots, worse perhaps still to do so to one’s parents. The proto-morality of authority and the morality of association are absorbed within but neither eliminated nor destroyed by the morality of principle.
Moral development is not driven by reason, on Rawls’s account. To be sure, reason plays a role. But by itself, it cannot drive moral development. The transition from the proto-morality of authority to the morality of association presupposes as common ground between parent and child an appreciative understanding of, and a desire for associational cooperation for, the common good that is absent from, and so not rationally articulable to the child within, the proto-morality of authority. To be sure, as the child’s capacities develop, the proto-morality of authority, oriented as it is by love and loyalty, is experienced as an unwelcome limit. But the child’s path to the morality of association beyond that limit is lit by parents and others facilitating or at least not obstructing a particular sort of shared experience, appreciation and understanding of responsible, role-mediated cooperative relations others. This necessarily involves the parent giving up the authority of benevolent rule and, together with the child, risking a new cooperative relationship, one within which new affections might arise, and from them new forms of moral experience and self-understanding.
Likewise, the transition from the morality of association to the morality of principle presupposes as common ground between persons responsible to determinate and hierarchical social roles an appreciative understanding of and desire for fair or just cooperation between free equals that is absent from, and so not rationally articulable to them within, the morality of association. Again, to be sure, as they develop and exercise their capacities in an increasingly complex and dynamic social world, persons will experience their morality of association as an unwelcome limit. But the path to a morality of principle beyond that limit is lit by those among them who, regardless of social position, somehow facilitate, permit or at least do not obstruct access to a particular sort of new shared experience, one within which new affections might arise, and from them new forms of moral experience and self-understanding. This will involve some yielding of role-mediated authority and risking new cooperative relationships. As with parents yielding their benevolent authority over their children, neither rationality nor morality can account for this yielding. Yet, if undertaken, new forms of interaction and new affections may emerge. With these in place, reason may then enter to complete and seal the transition, fixing a new moral orientation in shared understandings. But reason by itself can neither launch nor complete the transition.
Nothing in Rawls’s account is inconsistent with persons developing a morality of principle in a society not yet organized as, and so neither embodying nor expressing a principled commitment to, fair cooperation between free equals. To be brought online, developed and exercised, the morality of principle requires that persons find themselves in a complex and dynamic social world characterized by a need to resolve conflicting claims arising out of different cooperative undertakings. But these conditions are often met in a social contexts not yet organized as fair cooperation between free equals.
Of course, once a person develops a morality of principle, she will likely eventually press against her larger and more complete social world, her polity, claims to the material and social conditions of its exercise. But here she may face unfavorable conditions. Powerful persons may answer her claims by extending and entrenching hierarchical roles beyond their natural normative domain. Appeals to ideals of reasonable cooperation between free equals may be ignored. Thus, the morality of principle neither presupposes nor inevitably leads to a social world organized as fair cooperation between free equals.
But under favorable conditions, it may take hold of at least some persons in any sufficiently complex and dynamic social world. Once brought online, of course, the morality of principle requires a particular sort of social world if all those within it are to develop and exercise their capacity for a morality of principle. The same point may be made with respect to the transition from the proto-morality of authority to the morality of association. In both cases, the relevant moral capacities do not require in order to emerge within a population what they require once they have emerged in order to be developed and exercised across the population. Once new moral capacities come online, even if only here and there in a population, social change is inevitable, at least if justice—the reciprocal constitution of persons and their ongoing alignment and attunement to one another within a shared social world—is to be secured and maintained.
Finally, in A Theory of Justice Rawls clearly presented a morality of principle as not only congruent with each person’s good as a rational agent in the most basic sense but also as the highest or most complete and adequate stage of moral personality. For this he drew fire from many quarters. Of course, as already suggested, there is no reason to think that Rawls’s own views on this changed. But Rawls did come to see that in a free society some, perhaps many, persons ready and willing to cooperate politically on principles reasonable from the point of view of a morality of principle may not see a morality of principle as the highest or most complete and adequate stage of their moral personality. They may never experience or understand their success as rational agents, their self-realization at the most basic level, in terms of their becoming free and equal, rational and reasonable, tout court. Politically reasonable persons may reasonably reject the picture of moral development Rawls presents in Theory, at least insofar as it is taken to include a commitment to the morality of principle as the highest or most complete stage of development. This does not mean that in his stability arguments, whether in Political Liberalism or in The Law of Peoples, Rawls must altogether do without the picture of moral development presented in Theory. It means only that he must recognize that persons, natural or corporate, need not think of their fullest or most complete moral realization in terms of a morality of principle in order reliably to be politically reasonable.
IV. Congruence, Reasonable Pluralism and Political Liberalism
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s congruence argument presupposed that persons living in a society governed by justice as fairness would share not only a sense of justice oriented by justice as fairness but also a more general or comprehensive doctrinal understanding of self and world in terms of which they could publicly assure one another that this shared sense of justice was, for each of them, congruent with their rational good or self-realization in the most basic sense. This, of course, seemed to presuppose a degree of doctrinal convergence with respect to rationality and self-realization not likely to obtain in a free society. There are many ways to integrate in reflective equilibrium justice as fairness into a larger network of beliefs and commitments. Not all involve fully taking on the morality of principle as a conception of one’s rational good or self-realization in the most basic sense. Indeed, one might embrace in reflective equilibrium justice as fairness while continuing to understand and experience one’s most rational good or self-realization most basically in terms of a morality of association. For example, many conservative Christians adhere to more or less comprehensive religious doctrines of this sort. God is and has the authority of their father. Yet they cooperate with God as full members of his family. And they seem ready and able to accept and honor reasonable political principles, such as those specified by justice as fairness. Insofar as they are able to understand their accepting and honoring such principles, and so realizing themselves as free and equal citizens, to be congruent with their good or self-realization as rational agents, it will not be in the fashion of persons who adhere to, say, a Millian or Kantian comprehensive philosophical doctrine.
Of course, Rawls knew, since it is plain to common sense observation, and since Kohlberg and others from whom Rawls drew reported, that in the real world few persons, even in North America and Western Europe, actually achieve in their sense of justice, let alone comprehensively across the full range of their moral commitments and practices, a morality of principle. But Rawls had in A Theory of Justice supposed that under conditions of ideal theory it was not unreasonable to expect that all or nearly all persons living in a society governed by justice as fairness would naturally and uniformly acquire not only a shared sense of justice but also a more or less shared comprehensive doctrinal understanding of self and world embodying and expressing a morality of principle. The plausibility of both Rawls’s congruence argument and the wide, general and full reflective equilibrium to which A Theory of Justice aspired depended on this assumption.
Within a few years of publishing A Theory of Justice, Rawls came to see that this assumption was unreasonable. Even under the favorable conditions of ideal theory it was unreasonable to think that all persons would naturally and reliably settle in reflective equilibrium on both a shared sense of justice as fairness and a more or less comprehensive doctrinal understanding of self and world oriented across the board by a morality of principle. Even if all settled on a more or less shared sense of justice as fairness, inevitably some would incorporate this sense of justice in reflective equilibrium within one or another more or less comprehensive moral, religious and/or philosophical doctrine oriented mainly by a morality of association. From their point of view, if having and acting on a sense of justice oriented by justice as fairness is congruent with their rational good or self-realization in the most basic sense, it is most definitely not because their rational self-interest or self-realization extends to developing into a morality of principle generally and across the board. Thus, Rawls came to see that the congruence argument from Part III of A Theory of Justice could no longer serve to establish congruence as a public fact for all citizens. While it might work for those with Millian or Kantian more or less comprehensive doctrinal understandings, it could not work for all citizens ready and willing politically to cooperate reasonably.
Within Political Liberalism the crucial pluralism to address is not between persons affirming diverse comprehensive doctrines within the morality of principle, e.g., more or less comprehensive Kantian, Millian, Thomistic and perhaps even Deweyean liberalisms. Citizens drawn to any of these doctrines will likely share enough within their different comprehensive doctrinal views of self and world to support a public argument applicable to all showing their acquired sense of justice to be congruent with their good as rational agents. None have reason to regret or feel alienated from themselves as embodying and expressing a morality of principle. To be sure, Kantians, Millians, liberal Thomists and Deweyeans affirm different comprehensive doctrines. There is a kind of reasonable doctrinal disagreement between them. And it may lead them to settle on slightly different liberal conceptions of justice. But this sort of reasonable disagreement does not undermine the general thrust of the congruence, or more generally the overall stability, argument from Part III of A Theory of Justice.
Of course, Rawls’s argument in Part III of A Theory of Justice would have been stronger and clearer had it explicitly addressed this sort of diversity between liberal comprehensive doctrines. As presented, and especially when read in light of the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness offered earlier in the book, Rawls seems to suggest in Part III of A Theory of Justice that those living in a society governed by justice as fairness will come over time to share in a more focally specific, essentially Kantian, wide, general and full reflective equilibrium. But his considered view at the time of A Theory of Justice would appear to be better characterized by the claim that those living in a society governed by justice as fairness will come over time to a wide, general and full reflective equilibrium focally specific only in that its range is limited to understandings of self and world properly characterized as comprehensive doctrinal liberal moralities of principle.
What is new with Political Liberalism is Rawls’s recognition that within a society governed by justice as fairness some, perhaps many, citizens will affirm in reflective equilibrium more or less comprehensive doctrinal understandings of self and world that express a morality of association, and yet may perhaps still be ready and willing reasonably to cooperate politically on fair terms with fellow citizens as free equals, at least with respect to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. The question Rawls takes up in Political Liberalism, implicitly from the point of view of the comprehensively liberal Kantians, Millians, Thomists or Deweyeans more or less satisfied for their own part with the stability argument given in Part III of Theory, is what to do about the fact that the free and just society they seek will inevitably include a permanent and potentially substantial segment of the population of the sort exemplified by many conservative, even fundamentalist, Christians in the United States.
These citizens often believe that there is no salvation outside the Church and thus in their social life associate primarily with fellow believers where they adhere to practices, values and role-mediated responsibilities neither liberal nor democratic. Accordingly, they experience and understand themselves and their world generally in terms of a stage two morality of association. Anything that threatens to encroach upon their success or self-realization as rational and responsible children within God’s family will be regretted or experienced as an alien force. Their comprehensive doctrinal commitments provide no framework for thinking of their success or self-realization as rational agents in terms of their developing fully and completely into a morality of principle. Nevertheless, these citizens are often open to reasonable political cooperation with others as free equals—at least at the level of constitutional essentials and basic justice. And they often seem able to take on in reflective equilibrium justice as fairness as a self-contained, self-standing and limited political commitment.
The central problem of Political Liberalism is the reasonable disagreement between those who affirm these comprehensive doctrines, dominated by a morality of association, and those who affirm comprehensive liberal doctrines, dominated by a morality of principle. What Rawls aims to show is that he and the other comprehensive liberals to whom he implicitly addresses himself need not view the permanent presence of these citizens in a liberal democracy as a fundamental obstacle to its political justice or stability. If offered the opportunity with recognition and respect, and without any disdain, these citizens could join their comprehensively liberal compatriots in sustaining a reasonable liberal democratic political regime. To be sure, their comprehensively liberal compatriots will need to offer them a public justification for the principles of justice as fairness that takes no sides with respect to the relationship between success or self-realization as a rational agent and the morality of association and the morality of principle. They will also need to acknowledge and accept the political implications of reasonable disagreement, rooted in different doctrinal understandings of self and world, with respect to liberal political conceptions of justice. This will mean articulating a political conception of liberal legitimacy and of public reason, at least with respect to constitutional essentials and basic justice. Finally, to establish that they need not all remain prisoners of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, they will need to offer public grounds for thinking that all politically reasonable citizens might converge in an overlapping consensus, or at least a constitutional consensus, focused on the family of generically liberal political conceptions of justice. This sets Rawls’s agenda in Political Liberalism.
Rawls advances this agenda all the while reminding himself and his comprehensively liberal compatriots that they should resist any and all temptations to use political power to push a more comprehensive liberal morality of principle onto those oriented by doctrinal understandings of self and world that express a morality of association. Not only is such a use of political power a betrayal of liberal commitments, but it misunderstands the nature of moral development. Those doctrinally oriented primarily by a morality of association and those doctrinally oriented primarily by a morality of principle think in different terms about what it means to succeed or self-realize as rational agents. But they both agree that it involves moral development as persons in community with others. Within the context of Political Liberalism, the lesson of liberal toleration is this: even if we are comprehensive doctrinal liberals committed to a morality of principle, we need politically to agree with others only on those crucial issues necessary for us, via the making of legitimate law with at least prima facie moral force, to cooperate institutionally in a way that enables each party to the cooperation to pursue her own good in her own way, not only at the level of determinate individual life plans but at the level of conceptions of moral personality that constitute success or self-realization as a rational agent. There is no sure path to a comprehensive doctrinal liberalism oriented by a morality of principle that begins with reason or force. If persons presently oriented by a morality of association are to find their way, they will do so as a result of affections and mutual trust generated in and through shared political activity liberal and democratic in nature. Insofar as they evidence a readiness and willingness to join in that activity on political terms publicly acceptable to all, even if only with respect to constitutional essentials and basic justice and while rejecting a comprehensive doctrinal liberalism, comprehensive liberals should invite them to do so and should recognize them as full participants in the liberal democratic project.
V. Benevolent Absolutisms, Decent Consultation Hierarchies and Liberal Democratic Peoples
Though it seems to have gone largely unnoticed in the literature, Rawls account in The Law of Peoples of benevolent absolutisms, decent consultation hierarchies and liberal democratic peoples closely tracks his theory of moral development as set out in A Theory of Justice and as deployed in a new way within Political Liberalism. As already noted, nothing in Rawls’s understanding of moral psychology precludes its extension to peoples. And Rawls’s discussion in The Law of Peoples of the amour propre of peoples evidences his readiness to so extend it.
Just as Rawls presents his moral psychology, explicitly in A Theory of Justice and implicitly in Political Liberalism, from the point of view of a liberal morality of principle, so too does he in The Law of Peoples. There he represents a liberal democratic people as embodying and expressing through its basic social structure and public political morality and culture a liberal morality of principle, albeit one publicly justified without reference to any particular comprehensive doctrine and confined to the political domain. As seen from its point of view, a benevolent absolutism embodies and expresses through its basic social structure and public political morality and culture a morality of authority. Subjects express their basic needs, which their ruler undertakes (in the ideal, unconditionally) to meet by benevolently coordinating their activity. Their ruler manifestly delights in seeing their needs met. This draws subjects to love and want to please their ruler in return. Given a ruler successful at coordinating the activity of his subjects to meet their basic needs, his subjects will develop and come to enjoy the exercise of their own capacities, for self-directed labor, planning, organization and so on. Wanting out of affection to please their ruler, and finding their so doing congruent with their good, subjects will come to hear his directives or commands as normative in the fashion of the proto-morality of authority. Footnote 7
Within any enduring benevolent absolutism, the family as an ongoing intergenerational undertaking will become a stable element of the social order and will cultivate and support the moral development of its members, often to fairly advanced stages of the morality of association. Over time, family leaders will naturally begin to press their ruler into bargaining with them over the directives and commands to which they and their family lines are subject, wishing to confirm, and to have their rulers publicly acknowledge, that their compliance is in their family’s interest and consistent with its and its members expanding need for self-respect or amour propre. A benevolent ruler, like a good parent, will accept such challenges and answer them by risking and facilitating a transition from coordinating the activity of subjects to cooperating with family lines as ongoing intergenerational undertakings. This transition will carry in its wake new forms of social love, care and trust. Increasingly bound together by new affections, rulers and the leaders of family lines will then complete and seal the transition to a morality of association as they engage one another in the activity of giving reasons, especially when conflicts arise, thereby rendering mutually intelligible and acceptable to them as rational and responsible their new cooperative shared social world. Persons who in their political relationships previously understood themselves as benevolent rulers and loyal subjects, but who were nevertheless each already morally oriented toward experiencing and understanding themselves as rational and responsible members of ongoing familial associations, come now to experience and understand one another in their political relations as, most basically, fellow members, rational and responsible, of a cooperative body politic. To be sure, as within the family, they may face one another in the body politic not as free equals but as responsible occupants of particular social roles, perhaps hierarchically ordered in service of a determinate substantive common good. Nevertheless, they will face one another as full members in a cooperative political undertaking oriented to their common good and subject in their reasoning about it to a shared conception of justice. The benevolent absolutism and their political status as merely loyal subjects they leave behind as they enter the well-ordered decent republic and take on a new political status as citizen.
Prior to this transformation, the “law” within a benevolent absolutism has no prima facie moral force as such. It embodies and expresses only the proto-morality of authority. Assuming a benevolent ruler, subjects may feel uncomfortable or displeasure when they violate his directives or commands, even if undetected or unpunished. After all, they will likely experience and understand official directives and commands as normative. But (neither) they (nor we as liberal democratic peoples observing them) need make any reference to moral concepts or principles or values to explain or understand their doing so.
One consequence of the fact that the “law” within a benevolent absolutism has no prima facie moral force is that only ties of particular affection and trust, generated in the first instance by the ruler’s benevolence, bind ruler and subjects together into anything like a whole. As with families the children of which are very young this may be morally sufficient to underwrite a duty on the part of others, say the citizens of a liberal democracy as outside observers, not to interfere. So long as the parent or ruler remains benevolent—meeting the children’s or subjects’ basic needs and posing no serious obstacle to the natural and normal further development or exercise of their capacities—outsiders have no reason to interfere and insiders have a right to protect their valued relationships. But also, as with families the children of which are very young, so too with benevolent absolutisms, outsiders, say the citizens of a liberal democracy as outside observers, have no duty to recognize or respect these relations as ongoing, intergenerational, undertakings binding members through genuinely moral obligations to one another. Familial bonds carry genuine moral force when family members—say, teens and young adult children and their parents—are each and all participating in the family as an ongoing intergenerational cooperative undertaking. The genuine moral force of familial bonds depends on the family as a benevolent absolutism being but a temporary and episodic moment in the ongoing life of the family as an enduring inclusive cooperative association. Similarly, the members of a polity are bound together by bonds carrying genuine moral force only to the extent that the morality of authority or benevolent absolutism is at most a temporary episodic phenomenon, confined to appropriate circumstances, in the ongoing life of the polity as an ongoing, inclusive, intergenerational cooperative undertaking.
Here is another way to view the fact that the “law” in a benevolent absolutism has no prima facie moral force. The proto-morality of authority is structurally incapable of framing or underwriting the reciprocal self-constitution of persons as persons. To be sure, it may constitute a necessary preliminary condition. But it is not sufficient. It may be sufficient for relations of human love and affection. But assuming that persons only come into existence as persons by virtue of mutually aligning and attuning themselves to one another within shared activity, the family sustained over time as a cooperative undertaking oriented by a morality of association would seem to be, in the normal case, the minimally sufficient activity within which persons self-realize together as persons. If the prima facie moral force of law is rooted in its relationship to a shared activity of persons reciprocally self-constituting as persons, then this force shows itself only as the benevolent absolutism and the proto-morality of authority yields to the constitutional republic and the morality of association.
Now within any benevolent absolutism, as families achieve an ongoing, intergenerational existence as cooperative undertakings, family leaders, on behalf of their familial communities, will naturally chafe against the limits of a political proto-morality of authority and will press their benevolent rulers in a manner similar to the developing child pressing her parents. By so doing, they may effectively secure for their families recognition as something like corporate moral persons, and they may transform the political relationship between families and their members, on the one hand, and their benevolent absolutist ruler, on the other. In this way, familial leaders pressing their absolute ruler for recognition of their family’s status and interests may transform not only themselves but their family members from subjects to citizens. (It is perhaps no surprise that throughout the 1960s and in the first edition of Theory Rawls presented agents in the original position as representatives of familial lines.) The result of this developmental process is an ongoing intergenerational inclusive cooperative political undertaking within which both family lines and their members, on the one hand, and political rulers, on the other, face one another as each and all responsible to and cooperating through new determinate political roles functionally serving their common good. Having reoriented their political relationship within the morality of association, family lines and members, on the one hand, and political rulers, on the other, together constitute a polity—if things go well, a well-ordered and decent constitutional republic—the structure of which will reciprocally constitute, and so carry prima facie moral force for, them as rational and responsible persons.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting the ambiguous space between ideal and non-ideal theory occupied by the benevolent absolutism in The Law of Peoples. Strictly speaking it belongs to neither. While the subjects in a benevolent absolutism may experience and understand themselves within their families as moral persons, at least rational and responsible, in their political relationships across families or with their political ruler they experience or understand themselves only as interacting rational subjects, albeit fit for coordination and capable also of affective ties and loyalties. Politically speaking, neither families, nor their members, experience or understand themselves as full and responsible participants in one and the same cooperative political undertaking oriented to their common good. And certainly they together constitute no self-legislating polity. So long as they remain politically oriented by a proto-morality of authority within a benevolent absolutism, their political interaction does not yet give rise to the sort of moral experience identifiable and understandable only through moral concepts, principles and values. The benevolent absolutism thus falls, for political purposes, outside of ideal theory. Though its members may be constituted through life in the family or civil society as persons, they are not constituted through their political relations as persons. The benevolent absolutism is not a form of shared political activity within and through which persons reciprocally self-constitute as persons.
But the benevolent absolutism also falls outside of non-ideal theory. It lacks neither the material nor the human resources needed to develop itself into a well-ordered polity. It is not burdened by unfavorable conditions. Assuming familial lines develop as ongoing intergenerational undertakings, there is nothing further needed, certainly no external aid needed, to underwrite its transformation into a decent constitutional republic. Nor—assuming that it is peaceful—is the benevolent absolutism an outlaw state. It subjects’ basic needs are met and their activity is coordinated in a manner normally conducive to their natural moral development. Of course, if the ruler of a benevolent absolutism fails to answer in appropriate fashion the inevitable demands for recognition, say from the leaders or representatives of family lines, denying opportunities for consultation and blocking the path toward gradual transformation into a decent constitutional republic, the benevolent absolutism may become an outlaw state and lose all claims to non-interference, just as parents do when they refuse, notwithstanding the development of their, say, teen-age children, to risk a new consultative relationship with their children and permit and facilitate the family’s transformation into a decent cooperative association.
As with the family, so too with the benevolent absolutism: Given favorable conditions, it naturally and reliably develops on its own from a benevolent system of coordination into a decent cooperative association. Of course, as a cooperative association the decent constitutional republic emerges as a more complex, dynamic, complete and enduring community between persons than any family line. It is the condition, necessary and sufficient, to human beings reciprocally realizing themselves outside and across family lines in an enduring way as rational and responsible persons.
The basic social structure and public political morality and culture of a decent constitutional republic will embody and express a morality of association. Within such a polity, the law has prima facie moral force; it underwrites a more or less complete social world within which members reciprocally constitute, and so bind and are bound to, one to another as rational and responsible participants in a shared political undertaking. While not self-legislating in the fashion of a liberal democracy, it is a self-legislating cooperative political community of rational and responsible persons. Over time citizens, rulers and ruled alike, experience and understand their law in terms of a public common good conception of justice to which they appeal to orient and guide their activity when publicly consulting and reasoning with one another in political life.
The fully inclusive decent constitutional republic oriented by a common good conception of justice must secure formal equality under the law for all participants and provide meaningful opportunities for input into (including rights to dissent within) a consultative political procedure oriented around the exchange of reasons. But it need not be liberal or democratic. Civic standing and legal obligations, and the right to provide input into the political process, may be highly mediated by, even experienced and understood in terms of, differential responsibilities rooted in determinate perhaps hierarchical social roles (or even identities associated with family lines or tribes or religious affiliation), and these may stand as obstacles to the realization and so exercise of the full range of liberal and democratic rights. Further, depending on background (historical, demographic, etc.) conditions, the common good served by political cooperation and informing the public conception of justice in a decent constitutional republic may be widely if not universally experienced and understood by citizens in terms of a dominant comprehensive moral, religious or philosophical doctrine—a shared conception of self and world underwriting a more or less complete (and decent) form of life and so a determinate substantive conception of the common good. Indeed, this seems a not uncommon historical development: rulers and ruled share broadly, as rational and responsible persons, a common good conception of justice reflecting a shared comprehensive doctrinal view of self and world and thus a substantive determinate conception of their common good.
Within the fully inclusive decent constitutional republic, members will reciprocally experience and understand one another as rational and responsible participants in a decent shared cooperative undertaking. They will feel themselves bound to one another by affective ties of civic friendship and loyalty. They may not experience or understand one another as each the self-same rational and reasonable, free and equal, co-author of their cooperative undertaking. And they may think of justice—their alignment or attunement to one another—within their cooperative undertaking as inseparable from a determinate substantive common good. Yet, the fully inclusive constitutional republic is, like the family as an ongoing intergenerational cooperative association, fertile soil for further moral development and learning.
Whether this development and learning take place will depend, of course, on the social and political experience of persons within the polity. To be sure, there will be dissent and political reform and compromise within any decent constitutional republic. This is normal and to be expected in all societies. But dissent, reform and compromise are all consistent with enduring stability within a morality of association. Whether the sort of moral development and learning that is characteristic of a transition to a new form of political community, one oriented by a morality of principle, takes place will turn on whether citizens face practical problems or challenges that they cannot successfully address without being drawn to new forms of activity, forms of activity within which they come in to experience, understand, value and engage one another in new ways. To put the point another way, whether a decent constitutional republic remains stable will be a function of whether its members find themselves able over time, as they face challenges and solve problems, to sustain their commitment to it, in reflective equilibrium. There is no a priori reason to think enduring stability is a property of all decent constitutional republics, but there is also no a priori reason to think it impossible that some particular decent constitutional republic, its basic institutions and public political culture embodying and expressing a political morality of association, could remain stable as such, without undue coercion, deception, manipulation, etc., indefinitely.
Any number of problems or challenges might threaten to destabilize a decent constitutional republic embodying and expressing a morality of association: dramatic economic changes—for example, the introduction of factory production and a dramatic shift in the role and size of property-less citizens socially valued for their essentially fungible labor power; dramatic changes in religious understandings and institutions—for example a reformation followed by civil wars of religion and then a modus vivendi between competing sects; dramatic changes in scientific knowledge leading to large shifts in how the human experience is understood; a dramatic shift in reproductive practices—for example, a sharp drop in the number of children women must bear to sustain the family as an ongoing intergenerational cooperative undertaking; a dramatic loss of cultural confidence suffered as a consequence of total defeat in a military conflict followed by unsettling exposure to new cultural and political possibilities; or simply the steady accumulation of cultural drift toward a very different form of life. Developments such as these may make it very difficult for the inclusive and well-ordered but hierarchical or role-mediated constitutional republic to sustain itself as stable, within its morality of association, through ordinary reform and compromise. As citizens, rulers and ruled alike, work together to sustain their constitutional republic in the face of such potentially destabilizing forces, they may be drawn to new forms of interaction, to new sorts of affections, to more complex forms of political dialogue and deliberation, to more fully developed moral capacities, and to new demands for recognition and new possibilities for shared public understandings.
Over time they may be drawn, perhaps first in smaller but then in larger social contexts, to cooperating in ways that advance, and that they come to see as advancing, their common good simply as reasonable persons, prior to or apart from their role-mediated responsibilities. And in this context they may come to feel some affection for and trust in one another apart from their responsible functional role-mediated contributions to a more sharply defined substantive common good. As they deliberate and dialogue, they may be drawn toward social contract thinking and toward experiencing and understanding one another as the free and equal, rational and reasonable, co-authors of their cooperative undertakings, even perhaps of their society’s basic structure. With their morality of association, their wide, general and full reflective equilibrium and the institutions that embody and express it, increasingly unstable, they may move toward liberalization and democratization, perhaps first uncertainly and even somewhat accidentally but over time more confidently and purposefully. Whether they will be successful—yielding a liberal democracy that might itself be stable in the long run—will depend on many things, but not least whether they are able to find their way toward a social world and a conception of justice responsive, in a new context, to not only their amour de soi but also their amour propre.
A liberal democracy constitutes and sustains its citizens, one and all, as, politically speaking, the free and equal, rational and reasonable, co-authors of the basic institutional structure of their shared world. Its citizens remain, of course, responsible to various social roles. The morality of association is neither eliminated nor destroyed. But in their fundamental political relations one to another, and in their relationship to political power or rule, liberal democratic citizens stand all in one and the same relationship, both to one another and to their body politic. Their public political reasoning, at least with respect to constitutional essentials and basic justice, is oriented by this experience and self-understanding. Eventually they come to recognize no further court of appeal in political matters beyond their free, considered conscientious judgment as rational and reasonable. Their law embodies and expresses a public conception of justice according to which the common good for the sake of which they cooperate is simply fairness or justice, their reciprocal constitution, alignment or attunement to one another in their cooperative pursuit of the development and exercise, at least politically, of their capacities as rational and reasonable. More particular determinate substantive conceptions of their common good are subordinated to their pursuit of fairness or justice in this sense. Over time their allegiance may be drawn to their shared public principles or conceptions of justice as fairness, drawing in their wake and so expanding their ties of civic friendship and affection with compatriots, which increasingly come to embody and express recognition and affection for others simply as, politically speaking, rational and reasonable persons.
If the benevolent absolutism is the manifestation of familial affection and rational self-interest within a proto-morality of authority, and the decent constitutional republic is the manifestation of civic affection and rational self-interest within cooperative relations of role-mediated responsibility for the sake of a substantive common good, the liberal democracy is the manifestation of universal affection and rational self-interest within reasonable cooperative relations for their own sake. Like the decent constitutional republic, the liberal democracy is a self-legislating community. But unlike it, the liberal democracy is a self-legislating community the members of which are able to face and engage one another with their moral capacities developed and exercised in ways that are no longer tied to particular and contingent goals, relations or felt affections. It captures and expresses, at least politically, the potentially universal reach of moral personality and moral community.
That Rawls’s account of the benevolent absolutism, decent constitutional republic and liberal democracy tracks his account of moral development from A Theory of Justice ought now to be clear enough. Given this account, it ought not to surprise that Rawls argues in The Law of Peoples that there is, looking only to internal structures, a difference between the neither reasonable nor unreasonable (benevolent absolutism), the incompletely or partially reasonable (the decent constitutional republic), and the fully or nearly fully reasonable (liberal democracy), on the one hand, and the culpably unreasonable (outlaw state) and excusably unreasonable (burdened society), on the other. The benevolent absolutism, the decent constitutional republic and the liberal democracy embody and express moments in the moral development of persons that, at least in the case of natural human persons, Rawls characterizes as normal and necessary. The decent constitutional republic and the liberal democracy embody and express genuinely moral moments, rather than pre-moral preliminaries, in this process. Both embody and express shared political activity in and through which participants reciprocally self-constitute as political persons, as rational and responsible citizens in the case of the constitutional republic, and as rational and reasonable citizens in the case of the liberal democracy. Footnote 8
VI. The Unity of Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples: Liberal Democracy, Stability and Toleration
Rawls aims fundamentally in his work to vindicate reasonable hope for liberal democracy as an enduring form of life. To do so he aims first to articulate and defend within the public reasoning of persons oriented to and by this form of life reasonable political principles and an attractive ideal of liberal democracy. He then aims, second, to make a case for the stability of a society faithful to these principles and animated by this ideal. In A Theory of Justice he addressed primarily potentially destabilizing internal forces—new technologies, greater knowledge, episodic criminality and injustice, shifting cultural patterns, the prisoner’s dilemma type risks persons assume when they trust one another in political life, and so on. In Political Liberalism, convinced that the argument from A Theory of Justice was incompatible with the reasonable doctrinal pluralism characteristic of any liberal democracy, even under favorable conditions, he recast the stability argument from A Theory of Justice, most notably replacing the so-called congruence argument with an argument from overlapping consensus.
Political Liberalism aimed to show that liberal democracies can be stable, at least under conditions of ideal theory. This stability is achieved despite the inevitable presence of citizens and groups oriented by more or less comprehensive doctrinal understandings that embody and express a morality of association, citizens and groups disinclined to experience or understand a general or comprehensive development into a morality of principle as congruent with their success or self-realization as rational agents. It is achieved by way of a publicly visible convergence or overlapping consensus (perhaps initially on constitutional essentials, only later reaching matters of basic justice) on a free standing political conception of justice sufficient to sustain a legitimate liberal and democratic political order.
Of course, Political Liberalism introduces more than the argument from overlapping consensus. But the argument from overlapping consensus is its centerpiece; many of the other notions introduced—for example, the idea(l) of public reason and the liberal principle of legitimacy—were arguably already implicit in A Theory of Justice and were made explicit in Political Liberalism only because the new context—stability via the public fact of an overlapping consensus rather than a single publicly recognized congruence argument—made it necessary to work them out in detail. Now, even if Political Liberalism succeeds in (re)vindicating the stability of liberal democracy in the face of the internal forces threatening instability that can be expected even under conditions of ideal theory, it makes no attempt to vindicate the stability of liberal democracy in the face of external forces similarly threatening instability. Of course, A Theory of Justice made some effort on this front, gesturing toward a law of peoples. But the effort in no way addressed the matter of comprehensive doctrinal pluralism, often ranging beyond doctrinally expressed moralities of principle to include doctrinally expressed moralities of association, between persons prepared to cooperate with one another on reasonable or fair terms. Political Liberalism addresses this matter as it pertains to political cooperation between natural human persons within a liberal democracy. The Law of Peoples addresses it as it pertains to political cooperation between liberal democracies and other bodies politic as corporate persons. Together the two volumes show that as a political undertaking liberal democracy can endure without compromise notwithstanding the fact that it is unreasonable to suppose that without coercion or indoctrination there will ever be widespread agreement on what constitutes the fullest or most complete development or expression of moral personality, or any general ideal of the realization of human selves as persons.
As with the argument advanced in Political Liberalism, the stability argument in The Law of Peoples draws on many of the same ideas. It proceeds from the point of view of a liberal democratic people secure in a basic social structure and public political culture that embodies and expresses, albeit only politically and not comprehensively, a morality of principle. It argues for the possibility of a kind of international overlapping consensus that includes among its participants bodies politic the basic social structure and public political culture of which embody and express a morality of association. It suggests an idea(l) of international public reason to guide the making of law within the international order. Though made primarily through treaty-making, adjudication and reflective affirmation of customary practice, rather than through legislating, this is law recognizable as legitimate by those subject to it and capable of imposing on them legal obligations with prima facie moral force. It provides reasons for thinking that those subject to such a system of law will find both their amour de soi and their amour propre satisfied, and that so satisfied they will content themselves with peaceful and law-governed interaction.
Further, while drawing on the stages of moral development set out in A Theory of Justice, the argument in The Law of Peoples, like the argument implicit in Political Liberalism, steers clear of presenting the stages in a hierarchical fashion that would express disrespect. The difference between comprehensive doctrines embodying primarily a morality of association and those embodying primarily a morality of principle is treated as just that, a difference: as persons and groups seek to align themselves one to another, there is no a priori reason to think that they must inevitably settle into a more or less comprehensive wide, general and full reflective equilibrium the center of gravity of which is in a morality of principle.
Now, because The Law of Peoples extends the stability argument from Political Liberalism it takes seriously the possibility that, even under the favorable conditions of ideal theory, some, perhaps many, persons may be ready, willing and able peacefully and reasonably to cooperate in their political relations, at least with respect to the most pressing matters, on terms intelligible and acceptable from a morality of principle point of view, and yet continue, in a more or less wide, general and full reflective equilibrium, to affirm and orient themselves in other matters by a comprehensive doctrinal understanding of self and world (moral, religious or philosophical) embodying and expressing primarily a morality of association. And because The Law of Peoples extends the stability argument from Political Liberalism to external sources of instability, it necessarily takes seriously the possibility of a liberal democratic people, the political moral psychology of which, as a body politic, expresses a morality of principle, interacting with other bodies politic, the political moral psychology of which may express a morality of association (or even a proto-morality of authority, as in the case of a benevolent absolutism).
Recall that the stability argument in Political Liberalism is given implicitly from the point of view of a citizen oriented by one or another more or less comprehensive doctrine embodying and expressing a morality of principle. Yet it takes seriously as a potential source of internal instability the existence of candidate compatriots oriented by one or another comprehensive doctrine that embodies and expresses mainly a morality of association and thus who, setting aside the question of their political status and readiness to cooperate as citizens, experience and understand themselves primarily as rational and responsible. Addressing himself primarily to those citizens already oriented by doctrines embodying and expressing a morality of principle (the Kantians, Millians, liberal Thomists, Deweyeans, etc.), Rawls aims in Political Liberalism to convince them that they have good reasons to, and no good reasons arising out of instability concerns not to, recognize and cooperate fully in the political domain with compatriots committed in their doctrinal self-understandings to a morality of association but otherwise apparently ready to cooperate politically on reasonable terms. Indeed, it is not too much of a stretch to read Political Liberalism as urging doctrinally comprehensive liberals to extend (respectfully and without any disdain) an invitation to those falling within the jurisdiction of their body politic and oriented generally by a doctrinal morality of association (often religious) and related self-understanding (as rational and responsible) to reasonably cooperate politically with them as free and equal citizens.
Now, compare the argument in The Law of Peoples. It is given implicitly from the point of view of this same more or less comprehensively liberal citizen, but now speaking on behalf of her body politic. Given Political Liberalism, she assumes her body politic embodies and expresses, even if in only a political way, a liberal democratic public political (but not comprehensive) morality of principle. Of course, she recognizes and accepts as compatriots those among her fellow citizens whose understanding of themselves and their world is primarily shaped by one or another comprehensive morality of association, provided they accept and honor reasonable terms of political cooperation with her and others as free and equal citizens. From this point of view, The Law of Peoples then takes seriously, as a source of external instability analogous to the reasonable doctrinal pluralism addressed in Political Liberalism, the existence within the international order of bodies politic oriented in their understandings of self and world, and so their domestic political affairs, by one or another comprehensive doctrine that embodies and expresses a morality of association. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls is speaking primarily to those bodies politic already oriented by one or another political conception of liberal democracy as a political morality of principle (the British, the French, the Japanese, the Dutch, the Israelis, the Indians, etc.). He aims to convince them that they have good reasons, and no good reasons arising out of instability concerns not, to recognize and cooperate fully in the international political domain with other bodies politic committed in their public political culture to a morality of association but otherwise apparently ready to cooperate with liberal democratic peoples politically on reasonable terms as free equals. Indeed, it is not too much of a stretch to read Law of Peoples as urging liberal democratic peoples, who experience and understand themselves as rational and reasonable, to extend (respectfully and without disdain) an invitation to cooperate politically as free equals—articulated simply by his list of eight principles—to those bodies politic also falling within the jurisdiction of international law, but who, oriented generally by a political morality of association, experience and understand themselves as primarily rational and responsible. In both Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples Rawls urges liberals to extend an invitation that embodies and expresses both a generosity of spirit and a principled liberal commitment to toleration.
Here it is worth noting that the similarities extend also to the treatment of the proto-morality of association. Neither Political Liberalism in the domestic case, nor The Law of Peoples in the international case, urges its liberal audience to invite those oriented primarily by a proto-morality of authority to join as fully recognized free and equal participants in the activity of political cooperation on reasonable terms. And both encourage liberals to leave well-enough alone and let the normal and natural processes of moral development unfold, provided that the exercise of authority is benevolent.
Notwithstanding these important and all too often overlooked parallels, there are important differences between Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples. Three stand out. The first is that the reasonable pluralism addressed by The Law of Peoples is wider than that addressed by Political Liberalism. As Rawls notes in Political Liberalism, even if fully just, every polity, as a determinate social world, constrains possibilities. Not only is there only so much social space, as it were, for various doctrines, world views and forms of life to flourish, but as citizens engage in the activity of reasoning with one another when shared activity of one sort or another threatens to run off the rails, the various points provisionally fixed as constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice within the basic social structure will register for them as among the least eligible candidates for revision in the cause of their maintaining a web of commitments in wide, general and full reflective equilibrium. There will be a tendency, then, once liberal democracy is constitutionally secure, for citizens to gravitate toward reflective equilibria embodying and expressing doctrinal understandings of self and world at least consistent with constitutional liberal democracy, even if sometimes still more generally oriented by a morality of association point of view.
Turning to The Law of Peoples, unless we have reason to think, or we simply stipulate dogmatically, that only constitutional liberal democracies are ready, willing and able to cooperate internationally on reasonable or fair terms, or that only liberal democracies merit recognition within the international order as (corporate, artificial) persons (bodies politic with a genuinely moral psychology), then it seems the fact of reasonable pluralism or disagreement as between polities, even under conditions of ideal theory, will be wider than that between natural human persons within a liberal democracy. Not only will there be more social space, as it were, for various doctrines, world views and forms of life to flourish, but when their shared activity threatens to go off the rails the persons affirming and adhering to those doctrines and world views and living those forms of life will not all be reasoning with one another within a web of commitments subject to any special gravitational force exerted by the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice provisionally fixed domestically within a liberal democracy. Indeed, some will be reasoning within such a web of commitments that includes domestic legal obligations, even constitutional commitments, with some prima facie moral force. These will exert on their reasoning process some non-trivial gravitational force. Yet they may be such that they would be constitutionally disallowed in a liberal democracy. The result is likely to be within and between bodies politic ready to cooperate on reasonable terms a range of developmental paths and diversity profiles that is, generally speaking, fairly wide, indeed significantly wider than one would expect to find looking only within and between liberal democracies similarly oriented toward their external relations. In the international context, then, the fact of reasonable pluralism would appear to be, to this extent, more challenging than in the domestic context.
This appearance is somewhat misleading. Structurally, the international situation is the same as the domestic. Within the domestic contexts of constitutional liberal democracies, some persons (Kantians, Millians, etc.) will affirm more or less comprehensive doctrines that embody and express primarily a morality of principle, others a morality of association (conservative Christians, for example). As between only the former, the possibility of just and stable cooperation oriented by justice as fairness is readily established within the framework set out in A Theory of Justice. The more difficult question taken up in Political Liberalism is whether the latter might also, if offered to them, accept and honor, as more than simply a modus vivendi, the reasonable terms of cooperation that Kantians and Millians and others committed comprehensively to a liberal morality of principle are already prepared to accept and honor between themselves. If so, the latter and the former might together be able to sustain a politically liberal constitutional liberal democracy stable in the right way. The constitutional liberal democracy they sustain will embody and express in its basic structure and public political culture not a comprehensively liberal but rather a more limited politically liberal conception of justice and of persons as citizens. But even as so limited, any such conception of justice and of citizens will still embody and express, if only partially and politically, a morality of principle. Accordingly, in an international context limited to all and only constitutional liberal democracies, the problem of just and stable cooperation between polities is in this sense analogous to and no more difficult than that between Kantians and Millians and others committed to a liberal morality of principle in the domestic context. The relevant parties face the problem together within a space defined by their shared commitment to liberal political moralities of principle. A world of all and only liberal democratic peoples presents no more of an international diversity challenge than the intranational diversity challenge presented by a single liberal democracy the members of which are all and only Kantians and Millians. But, like Political Liberalism, The Law of Peoples takes up a more difficult question: is it possible that bodies politic, perhaps neither liberal nor democratic but manifestly ready and willing politically to cooperate with liberal democracies on reasonable terms, might also accept and honor as more than simply a modus vivendi terms of cooperation already accepted as reasonable by liberal democratic peoples? Thus, though the international context involves a wider scope of reasonable disagreement than the domestic context, the issue raised by that disagreement is structurally the same: Is it possible for persons oriented as persons by a morality of principle to cooperate politically on terms they judge reasonable with persons oriented in the main by a morality of association but apparently ready and willing to cooperate? Notwithstanding the wider scope of reasonable disagreement in the international context, this question is no more challenging in the context of The Law of Peoples than in Political Liberalism. Indeed, two features of the context of The Law of Peoples may make it less challenging.
The first is that The Law of Peoples concerns relations between persons, bodies politic with a genuinely moral psychology, facing one another as already self-legislating and independent wholes each with an internal constitution sufficient to their reasonably engaging one another as free equals in their external relations and with any need for amour propre they might have antecedently satisfied and in need only of being preserved intact. The domestic context, whether of A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism, concerns relations between persons, natural human beings with a genuinely moral psychology, who do not yet similarly face one another as self-legislating and independent wholes and whose needs for amour propre are therefore not antecedently satisfied. Indeed, the point of their domestic political agreement or charter is to underwrite a shared form of life within which they are each and all constituted and so find their amour propre satisfied as self-legislating and independent wholes. (This, by the way, goes some distance toward explaining Rawls’s denial of the claim that justice between bodies politic requires an analogue to the domestic difference principle: Imagine the reaction of a self-respecting but not particularly wealthy pastoral people being told that as a matter of justice in their external relations with other peoples they will be receiving mandatory wealth transfers from more wealthy industrialized peoples; imagine Rousseau’s Geneva being told that justice demanded that it receive wealth transferred from Paris. The situation is, of course, quite different in the domestic case: the unskilled laborer and the entrepreneur confront one another as self-legislating wholes only within their shared domestic political structure without which there would be no social economic positions identifiable as unskilled laborer or entrepreneur.)
The second feature of the international context of The Law of Peoples that helps to make the reasonable disagreement between peoples less of a challenge than that between citizens in Political Liberalism is this. Because peoples face one another as self-legislating wholes they do not need and likely will not be willing to agree to a public charter constituting a new single world state within which their antecedent independence is dissolved and reconstituted in a new form. To be sure, they need and will be willing to agree to terms governing their making law together to govern their relations to one another. But consensus over this law-making activity will not require consensus on a constitutionally authorized legislative body or more broadly on a complete conception of basic justice for a body politic. It will require consensus only on general terms of peaceful federation, on norms governing the making of and obligation to abide by treaties, on the legal force of longstanding custom, and so forth. Thus, while The Law of Peoples argues like Political Liberalism for a kind of overlapping consensus, the object of the consensus is the principles of the law of peoples understood as a kind of charter for a loose federation of self-legislating peoples, not the essentials of a constitutional charter or principles of basic justice of the sort applicable to the domestic context within which person and polity are reciprocally constituted as self-legislating.
VII. Conclusion
In Political Liberalism, Rawls undertakes to demonstrate that it is not unreasonable to hope for a just and stable constitutional liberal democracy notwithstanding the fact that the basic social structure and public political culture of a just constitutional liberal democracy cannot be relied upon, without illegitimate force or oppression, to ensure that within the domestic context no citizens, otherwise reasonable in their external political relations to one another, will affirm and adhere to more or less comprehensive doctrinal understandings of self and world oriented by a morality of association. Rawls speaks implicitly to those committed as a matter of a liberal morality of principle to constitutional liberal democracy but who may find themselves tempted to put the power of the state in service of the doctrinal moral development of their fellow citizens, aiming to push them into a liberal morality of principle. Rawls aims to remind these liberals of their principled commitment to liberal toleration and of their liberal generosity of spirit.
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls aims to complete the project of Political Liberalism. He aims to show that it is not unreasonable to hope for a world hospitable to just and stable constitutional liberal democracies notwithstanding the fact that fair terms of cooperation between them cannot be relied upon, without illegitimate force or oppression, to ensure that within the international order no bodies politic possessed of moral personality and otherwise politically reasonable in their external political relations will affirm and adhere to a public political culture and conception of justice oriented by a morality of association. Rawls speaks implicitly to those peoples committed as a matter of a liberal public political morality of principle to constitutional liberal democracy but who may be tempted to put the power of their state in service of the doctrinal moral development of their fellow bodies politic on the international stage, aiming to push them into a liberal public political morality of principle. Rawls aims to remind these liberal democratic peoples of their principled commitment to liberal toleration and of their liberal generosity of spirit.
Rawls does not argue that merely decent constitutional republics embodying a morality of association, or benevolent absolutisms embodying a proto-morality of authority, will remain stable. Even in a world without constitutional liberal democracies these political forms may prove unstable, for their members will generally develop in ways that lead to dissent and calls for reform that will have to be met if justice is to be maintained as the alignment or attunement of persons to one another in the activity of their reciprocal self-constitution. What Rawls does argue is that given reasonably favorable background conditions there is nothing standing in the way of decent constitutional republics and benevolent absolutisms naturally developing, liberalizing and democratizing, as a result of their own internal activity. Whether this development terminates in a world of all and only constitutional liberal democracies will turn on many contingencies. In a world that includes some constitutional liberal democracies, one of these contingencies is whether they can remain faithful to their principled commitment to toleration and continue to show their generosity of spirit as they interact with others on the international stage.
