After Socrates, the most prominent figure in Plato's dialogues is the intensely ambitious and politically notorious Alcibiades. In ancient Athens, it was rumored that Socrates corrupted Alcibiades, and this suspicion may have contributed to Socrates's conviction. Socrates's apparent failure to educate the problematic Alcibiades raises questions about the purposes and effectiveness of Socratic education. Nonetheless, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to Plato's dialogues about Socrates's interaction with Alcibiades. Ariel Helfer's Socrates and Alcibiades: Plato's Drama of Political Ambition and Philosophy offers an exceptionally valuable analysis of Socrates's evolving relationship with Alcibiades in the First Alcibiades, the Second Alcibiades, and the Symposium.
One reason why Plato's account of Socrates's association with Alcibiades has received far less attention than it merits is that the First Alcibiades and the Second Alcibiades were dismissed as spurious by nineteenth-century scholars who claimed that these dialogues lack the subtlety of argument that is characteristic of a genuinely Platonic work. While recent scholars have begun to accept the authenticity of the First Alcibiades, the Second Alcibiades has remained under a darker cloud. Helfer's careful and substantive analysis of both dialogues on Alcibiades demonstrates before our eyes that the earlier, dismissive view of these works is superficial and that both offer the thoughtful reader a wealth of political and philosophic insight. Helfer's approach to the dialogues is fresh and illuminating in part because it does not focus solely on how Socrates's various arguments fit into any grand theory of Platonic doctrine. Instead, it draws our attention to what Socrates and Alcibiades are thinking at each stage of the drama, helping us to recognize what is at stake in the conversation for each character. After offering several possible explanations of what Alcibiades and the often-ironic Socrates may be thinking at each stage of their conversations, Helfer weighs the evidence and judiciously explains what in Alcibiades leads him toward and what holds him back from a Socratic education. The reader comes away with the strong impression that this is how Plato hopes attentive thinkers will read his dialogues.
While the book contributes to our understanding of Socratic education, it is also guided by substantive questions about the nature of ambition that will interest serious students of politics. The book begins by asking what ambition seeks, what seems to satisfy it, and what is likely to elevate or debase it. Observing that modern thinkers tend to understand ambition as a passionate desire for individual fame, wealth, and influence, Helfer reminds us that, in the classical past, ambition was also associated with noble devotion to public service and, more broadly, with a powerful desire to lead a life of virtue. Socrates and Alcibiades explores not only what leads Alcibiades to live his life in politics rather than in philosophy but also why Alcibiades's political life became so morally and politically problematic.
Analyzing the First Alcibiades, Helfer shows that Socrates first approaches Alcibiades by offering to teach him what he needs to acquire the greatest political power. Socrates's true goal, however, is to lead Alcibiades to think through the convictions that underlie his political ambitions and to turn him away from politics so that he might take up the philosophic life. Socrates believes that if he can lead someone with a good nature to lead the same life that he lives, then this would help to confirm that his way of life is a great good or that it is a truly healthy way of life. In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates leads Alcibiades to raise important questions about justice and especially about the relation between what is noble to what is good for him in the hope that Alcibiades will become aware of his ignorance and feel a need for intensive self-examination. Midway through the dialogue, however, Socrates begins to suspect that Alcibiades is incapable of pursuing these questions and of leading a Socratic life. Consequently, Socrates begins to teach edifying lessons to Alcibiades, all the while hoping that Alcibiades might still recognize the need to question these teachings and undertake a Socratic education. No matter how Alcibiades may turn out, Socrates stands to learn about the nature of ambition from observing how Alcibiades responds to their conversations.
The Second Alcibiades and Symposium shed more light on why Alcibiades cannot undertake the philosophic life. The Second Alcibiades opens with Alcibiades about to pray to the gods to support his aspirations to tyranny. Wanting to head off the dangers that this poses to Alcibiades and to others, Socrates tries to persuade him not to pray to the gods until he gains greater clarity about what is truly good for him. Helfer argues that Alcibiades is open to the prospect of tyranny because Socrates has shaken his respect for the judgment of the Athenian people and diminished his reverence for democratic law. At this point, Socrates tries to restore Alcibiades's respect for the Athenian demos by alerting him to how a prudent leader could use rhetoric to guide the demos. While Socrates strives to give Alcibiades safer and more responsible beliefs about democratic leadership, he also invites Alcibiades to question what is truly good for him and to ask what the gods should condone, in the hope that Alcibiades will occupy himself in thinking through these questions and lose interest in seizing political power. Alcibiades, however, cannot bring himself to examine his most deeply held moral concerns. Paradoxically, he remains open to tyranny not because Socrates is debunking his moral beliefs but because Alcibiades's “powerful sense of moral obligation” prevents him from raising questions about these obligations and thus from thinking cogently about what is good for him (118).
After reflecting on Alcibiades's appearance at the end of the Symposium, Helfer offers several reasons why the ambitious Alcibiades enters politics rather than lead a Socratic life. Even though Alcibiades has acknowledged that it is better to be honored by a wise man such as Socrates than by the Athenian people, he cannot shake his “addiction” to the applause of the many (183). In addition, Alcibiades's abiding concern with the noble makes him want to be a political benefactor to the Athenian people (185). In the end, Alcibiades's ambition is a desire for a tangled web of goods, including fame, power, honor, and the noble, each of which can seem to be the summum bonum. According to Helfer, the desire for these goods, along with the belief that one has the power to attain them, is ambition (186), and Socrates cannot undermine it. Alcibiades's ambition turns him toward politics because it offers him goods that philosophy seems unable to supply. Lacking Socrates's “peculiar eros for wisdom,” Alcibiades can neither lead a philosophic life nor unlearn what Socrates has taught him about the limited wisdom of the demos (188). In the end, Alcibiades does not want to rule Athens as a tyrant. He still wishes to serve his fellow citizens, but he tries to do so without being restrained by respect for their opinions and without being limited by democratic law (190).
Helfer sheds very valuable light on the soul of the ambitious political animal. He makes a convincing case that whoever wants to understand political ambition needs to study Plato's analysis of Alcibiades. Whoever wants to understand Plato's analysis of Alcibiades needs to read Helfer's book.
