It is a difficult task for a scholar to take an established concept—particularly one wedded so closely to another scholar's work—and elaborate and embellish it into an original contribution to the literature. The two books reviewed here vigorously accept this daunting challenge. Dangerous Times? takes up John Mueller's concept of the obsolescence-of-major-war, while Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations centers on “smart power,” itself deriving from Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. At the outset, the reader hopes for the best: new theoretical developments and an expanded or more properly specified empirical domain of application for the concept. At the worst, the reader prepares for the substitution of new terminology for the old conceptual language and the kind of simplistic empirical application one might use when teaching the original concept to students. These books fulfill both sets of reader expectations, providing some new theoretical developments while also oversimplifying complex concepts through new terminology.
Christopher Fettweis's book is quite clearly an homage to John Mueller, described in the Acknowledgments as “America's most important living intellectual.” My initial suspicion was therefore that there would be little in the way of conceptual development beyond the ideas Mueller set out in his previous work. Mueller (1989) argued in Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War that major war, much like slavery and dueling, has increasingly become normatively unacceptable in the developed world. Fettweis notes that although the “obsolescence-of-major-war argument has won new supporters over the last two decades, its theoretical and empirical development has stalled” (p. 9). His project is, therefore, to overcome these limitations.
Theoretically, the main contribution seems to be the incorporation of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's model of norm development into the argument (“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 [Autumn 1998]: 887–917). This model outlines the life-cycle processes of a norm, from “emergence” leading to a tipping point of “cascade” and eventual “internalization,” whereby norms are a taken-for-granted part of society. While this model lends additional intellectual coherence to the obsolescence-of-major-war argument, it does not change the basic account of the demise of dueling and slavery provided by Mueller and repeated by Fettweis on pages 28–33, or that of the norms of war covered in Chapter 2.
Empirically, Fettweis sets out to compare the obsolescence-of-major-war “vision” to the visions of the future expressed by neorealism and constructivism. Rather than focus on specific predictions or forecasts, Fettweis suggests that a better test of competing theories is to compare “visions” or “sets of predictions … logically extrapolated from the core tenets of a theory” (p. 63). He then focuses on what he deems to be the two major visions of the future offered by the discipline. Neorealism's vision is distilled into a combination of predictions from Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Christopher Layne: Unipolarity cannot last, multipolarity will soon emerge, the NATO alliance will come to an end, nuclear proliferation would increase, and the new international system will be more violence prone, with the probability of future major war. Constructivism's vision seems to match that of Mueller precisely: Major war will be absent in the developed world, a return to multipolarity is unlikely, nuclear proliferation should not increase, NATO will likely remain in place, and the expanding peace of the North will spill over to the South. This first stab at an empirical test primarily serves a theoretical goal of situating the obsolescence-of-major-war argument within constructivism. Setting aside the problems with creating very stylized versions/visions of neorealism and constructivism that Fettweis acknowledges, the stale empirical debate this sets up between the two visions fails to engage the reader.
The chapters dealing with resource wars and the implications of a great-power peace are more engaging and push the obsolescence-of-major-war argument a bit further than previous applications. The chapters on grand strategy and foreign policy could serve as nice teaching tools for undergraduates learning about this argument and how to apply it. In general, Dangerous Times? makes some effort at fleshing out the theoretical underpinnings of the obsolescence-of-major-war argument, though none of it is especially novel. Situating the argument within a stylized version of constructivism is not particularly helpful, nor is the comparison to a stylized version of neorealism. Empirically, this book did not affect my beliefs about the validity of the argument one way or the other, though the applications and extensions in later chapters are more useful and seem particularly appropriate for an undergraduate audience.
Giulio Gallarotti's Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations definitely aspires to grander aims. This book intends to develop a theory of power building on the idea of “smart power,” which is itself a combination of the use of traditional hard power resources and Nye's soft power. Gallarotti relabels smart power as “Cosmopolitan power,” both of which seem largely to reflect Nye's original contention that hard power is not appropriate in all situations for the United States or other states attempting to achieve their ends in the international realm. In this sense, Cosmopolitan power is portrayed as an ideal approach for achieving national influence during the era when major war seems to be largely obsolete.
Theoretically, Gallarotti also turns to the three leading paradigms of international relations: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. Cosmopolitan power “envisions the optimization of national influence deriving from a balance among sources of power” from these three paradigms (p. 5). Hard power derives from realism, which emphasizes the ability to coerce others to achieve your goals. Soft power derives from neoliberalism and constructivism, which, he claims, emphasize the admiration and respect achieved by acting in accordance with behavioral standards that allows for states to “endear” themselves to others in order to achieve their goals. Cosmopolitan power thus contains “three main signature processes”: soft empowerment, or the ability to cultivate influence through soft power; hard disempowerment, or the inappropriate use of hard-power resources that actually weakens the initiating state; and diversification, or the optimization of power through the use of hard- and soft-power resources. The primary theoretical recommendation is that states engage in diversification in order to appropriately use both soft- and hard-power resources in pursuit of their goals.
Gallarotti, much like Fettweis, feels compelled to situate his argument in grand theory. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to demonstrating that classical and modern realists did not support the use of hard power to the exclusion of soft-power resources. Curiously, these discussions are labeled “crucial-case textual analyses,” whereby Cosmopolitan power is assessed against the canon of realist thinkers, not against empirical evidence. This is much the same approach as Fettweis used in comparing his “visions” on a theoretical level, rather than empirically. In both cases, the reader is left wondering why this exercise seems so important. The discipline's paradigms and theoretical traditions contain enough scholarship to allow a reconstruction that fits nearly any presentist need. Cosmopolitan power is therefore deemed consistent with the realist tradition, just as the obsolescence-of-major-war argument is made consistent with constructivism.
Gallarotti does move beyond this exercise to provide several chapters of empirical illustrations. Chapter 4 examines Great Britain's role in promoting free trade and the classical gold standard in the nineteenth century, as well as the role of the United States in promoting dollarization in the twentieth century. These are meant to be cases of “soft empowerment,” whereby the endearing example set by Great Britain and the United States serve as models to be emulated by other states. This chapter seems to gloss over important differences between interest and legitimacy as motivating factors, as Alexander Wendt (1999), drawing upon Hedley Bull, notes in his Social Theory of International Politics. States internalize norms and adjust their behavior at varying levels: At the most shallow level, they do so for fear of coercion as in a Hobbesian (realist) world; at an intermediate level, they do so out of their own interest as in a Lockean (liberal) world; and finally, at the most profound level, they do so because the norms are seen as legitimate as in a Kantian (constructivist) world. Most of the discussion about soft empowerment in Chapter 4 is actually interest based, rather than legitimacy based, as the terms “endearment” leading “emulation” used by Gallarotti would seem to suggest. Fettweis similarly conflates the distinction between interest- and legitimacy-based internalization in his analysis.
The Chapter 5 case study of hard disempowerment predictably focuses on the George W. Bush era, when the naked use of force and abandonment of soft-power strategies ultimately produced counterproductive results for the United States. Chapter 6 returns to the contemporary US foreign policy environment and makes the case for soft empowerment. Paired together, these two chapters would be excellent for courses on US foreign policy and grand strategy, much like those in the Fettweis book. Gallarotti's conclusion ultimately makes an abbreviated case for a new paradigm of cosmopolitan politics, or “Cosmopolitik.” Cosmopolitan power is by design a combination of power sources described in the existing paradigms, and so it is not entirely clear how Cosmopolitik will differentiate itself, given the limited description. This book's theoretical aims on building a theory of power were not quite achieved as promised, and so the establishment of a new paradigm only adds unnecessary hubris.
These two books illustrate some of the best and least desirable qualities in contemporary scholarship. The best qualities include the attempts to provide strong theoretical foundations for the conceptual arguments made by each author, as well as the empirical applications and recommendations for grand strategy and foreign policy. The least desirable quality is the continued devotion to the “isms”—a point reiterated by David Lake in his recent International Studies Association presidential address. The obsolescence-of-major-war and cosmopolitan power concepts do not need a reconstructed foundation in a grand theoretical tradition when they can stand on their own with middle-range theoretical constructs. Despite similar detours through the “isms,” both books offer interesting explications and applications of tried-and-true concepts in international relations.
