This book originates from the 2010 Mary Flexner Lectures of Bryn Mawr College. Butler focuses on the growing attention afforded to the form and effects of public assemblies and demonstrations, particularly their political potential. She does not engage with central concerns in democratic theory, but is conscious that debates about popular demonstrations tend to be understood as either governed by fear of chaos or radical hope for the future, or a combination of both. She marks these tensions to underscore from the beginning the disjunction between the political form of democracy and the principle of popular sovereignty, as they are not the same thing (2). Crucially, an important argument in thinking about transient and critical gatherings is that bodies assembling matter. “Embodied actions of various kinds signify in ways that are, strictly speaking, neither discursive nor prediscursive. In other words, forms of assembly already signify prior to, and apart from, any particular demands they make” (8).
Significantly, Butler is interested in the overlap between forms of linguistic performativity and forms of bodily performativity. “The specific thesis of this book is that acting in concert can be an embodied form of calling into question the inchoate and powerful dimensions of reigning notions of the political” (9). In what may be referred to as Butler's ongoing phenomenological turn, she wants to claim that when bodies assemble in public spaces (including virtual ones) they assert a plural and performative right to appear, one that situates the body in the center of the political field. This encapsulates a bodily demand for a more livable life (one of Butler's central concerns in her published work for over a decade) in an era of increased austerity and precariousness. Politically, Butler situates these concerns in the increasing dominance of neoliberal market rationality where many populations are denied the right to a livable life. She cites a meeting of the Tea Party in the United States, where Congressman Ron Paul suggested that those who cannot pay for health insurance or choose not to be left to die. His assertion was greeted with shouts of joy. For Butler, something has been going wrong for a long time. Paradoxically, neoliberal market rationality demands self-sufficiency as a moral ideal at the same time as it undermines public forms of support for individuals to live a livable life.
A question often posed to Butler is how she moves from a theory of gender performativity to a concern with precarious lives? Butler's earlier well-known work was concerned with queer theory and the rights of sexual and gender minorities. Her more recent work marks a shift as now she is interested more generally in how certain social conditions or war create populations that are ungrievable. Her current focus is upon how alliances form between populations and groups deemed disposable and how precarity operates as a mediating term as the basis of alliance between groups who may not have much in common. For Butler, “precarity designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support more than others, and become differentially exposed to injury, violence and death” (33). One constant over her body of work is that identity politics has failed to provide an understanding of what it means, politically, to live together across differences often in circumstances of unchosen proximity (27). Butler combines the theoretical frameworks of performativity and precarity to consider how the right to appear provides a basis for a coalitional framework.
More generally, Butler engages with the work of Arendt and Levinas and states this is “not accidental” (105), as both challenge the classic liberal conception of individualism (111). It seems to her that something different is happening when people from different parts of the globe are morally outraged by events and actions in other parts of the globe where there is no shared language or physical proximity. “In such cases, we are seeing and enacting the very activity of bonds of solidarity that emerge across space and time” (100). The images of the suffering of others sometimes operate as an ethical solicitation that comes from outside and Butler wants to suggest that these ethical obligations are not based upon consent or based on contracts or agreements we deliberately enter into. She also wants to contest the idea that ethical obligations only arise among those bound by established communities within borders, unified by the same language, constituting a people or a nation (103). Butler attempts to negotiate “the multilocality and cross temporality of ethical connections we might rightly call global” (105) and develop a version of cohabitation that follows from this. Butler reads Levinas “against himself” for the political potentialities of a global ethics beyond religious and cultural communities.
Butler takes issue with Arendt's understanding of the public/private realms suggesting the private is not the opposite of the political, but is part of its definition (206). Specifically, Butler disagrees with Arendt's claim that the needs of the body belong in the private sphere. As well, she challenges Arendt's claim that human beings are properly political when they emerge into the public realm as speaking beings, where the space of appearance forms the basis for political action. For Butler, appearance includes visible presence and spoken words but it can also include networked representation and concerted acts of silence (172). “The performative power of the people does not first rely on words. Assembly only makes sense if bodies can and do connect in some way, and then speech acts that unfold from there articulate something that is already happening at the level of the plural body” (174). She makes the broad existentialist claim that everyone is precarious based on their social existence as bodily beings that depend on each other for sustenance and shelter. Further, our precarity is dependent upon the organization of economic and social relationships and their relation to sustaining infrastructures and social and political institutions. “My point is not to rehabilitate humanism but, rather, to struggle for a conception of ethical obligation that is grounded in precarity” (119).
In the final chapter, Butler takes up a question posed by Adorno: how does one lead a good life in a bad life? She is specifically interested in the relationship between morality, and ethics more generally, and social and economic theory. Overall, this book provides a point of departure for a new politics of the body that starts with an understanding of the link between human dependency and interdependency, one that accounts for a relation between precarity and performativity. Moreover, it provides a rethinking of contemporary new social movements and their relationship to radical democratic struggles, extending Butler's work on the development of an antihumanist human who depends on other bodies for social survival more generally.
