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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 March 2006
Most economic historians would agree that nation size plays an important role in economic growth, but they typically treat it as an exogenous variable. The Size of Nations suggests that this assumption may not be as innocuous as one might think. Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore try to explain where national political boundaries are drawn. Their premise is that greater size leads to economies of scale in the provision of public goods and policies, but also exacerbates heterogeneity in the preferences for public goods and policies. An example is national defense: it is less costly to pay for an army when the costs are spread over a larger number of people; however, there will be more people who prefer their tax dollars to be spent on something else.
One of the main achievements of the book is to show how the costs and benefits of nation size influence the formation of political boundaries. For example, the authors use economic theory to explain what type of boundaries could emerge under various political regimes. In chapter 3 they consider a model where individuals (or regions) choose whether to secede from a political unit. They show that individuals with far different preferences from those of the center will want to secede because the benefits from economies of scale are outweighed by the loss in utility from consuming too much or too little of the public good. An implication is that voting may not yield the “optimal” nation size, because partition raises the cost of providing the public good. The authors extend their theory to consider how transfers from the center can keep individuals from seceding. They also consider the case where a dictator has to ensure that some fraction of subjects do not prefer to secede. They show that as this necessary fraction increases, dictators limit the extent of their territory, and thus nations will be smaller.
Alesina and Spolaore use their theoretical framework to develop two propositions. The first argues there will be more small countries when there is higher world trade. The idea is that the benefit of a large internal market diminishes when trade barriers are low; moreover, small countries have a greater incentive to promote trade by lowering tariffs. Therefore, free trade and small nations reinforce one another. The second proposition is that there will be more small countries when there is greater peace in world. Their notion is that enhanced security is an important benefit of size only when there are threats of outside invasion. Thus, as the world becomes more peaceful, regions with different preferences over public goods will find it less costly to secede.
How does Alesina and Spolaore's theory fit with the history of nations, trade, and conflict? The authors address this question in chapter 11, where they compare the predictions of their model with the historical record, beginning with the rise of European city states in the twelfth century and ending with the breakup of the Soviet bloc around 1990. They make a convincing case that their theory is broadly consistent with history. For example, they draw on the work of Douglass North and Robert Thomas (The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) and point out that city states had difficulties surviving between 1500 and 1750 because warfare was more frequent and defense costs rose substantially (pp. 178–83). As another example, they build on William Riker (Federalism, New York: Little Brown, 1964) and interpret the German Unification of 1871 as a response to external threats and rising international tariffs (p. 185).
Alesina and Spolaore admit that their historical analysis only scratches the surface, and stress that “historians could do more and better” (p. 223). In my view, there are a number of areas where historians could add to the discussion. For example, Alesina and Spolaore argue that the Dutch Republic managed to survive in the early modern period by taking advantage of trade opportunities in the Indies and America (p. 181). Was this the case, or did internal factors within the Dutch Republic matter more? They also argue that colonialism represented a “brilliant” solution for Europe, because it provided military and economic benefits while the denial of representation to the colonies reduced the costs of heterogeneity (p. 191). How did Europeans address the costs of heterogeneity? Was it simply through force, or where other devices employed?
Alesina and Spolaore also provide evidence for a positive correlation between the number of countries and the share of trade in world GDP. Perhaps Cliometricians can go further by establishing the causal relationship between nation size and trade. Lastly, the authors acknowledge their theory is silent on dynamics, or transitions in nation size (p. 222). Historians could add much to this discussion by analyzing the collapse of empires and the unification of countries.
The Size of Nations should be accessible to a broad audience. It is well written and it limits technical discussion to appendices and labeled sections. The theoretical relationships identified here could influence a number of topics in economic history, particularly the relationship between state formation, trade, and conflict. The book will, one hopes, produce a fruitful interaction between economic theory and economic history.