Since the publication of George Marsden's Fundamentalism and American Culture, religious historians have explained the most important schism of the early twentieth century as a profound division between Fundamentalists and Modernists.Footnote 1 On one hand liberal Protestants, largely college educated, embraced university research and scientific “modernity.” This included the new biblical scholarship that evaluated the Scriptures within the fallible context of human history, as well as the Social Gospel and the theory of human evolution. On the other hand Fundamentalists rejected “modernity,” the idea of linear time animated by human progress. This included human evolution and societal perfectibility, the value of scientific research, and the need to revisit traditional Protestant belief in light of new scholarship. In their rejection of the impetus to build a more perfect Zion so that Jesus might return, these Christians embraced premillennial dispensationalism. They stopped emphasizing the need for “social salvation,” and focused upon evangelistic revivals.
Scholarship throughout the last thirty years has sharpened this narrative. We now know, for example, that many premillennial dispensationalists and revivalists were dedicated to caring for the poor and needy, even if their primary goal was to save individual souls. Both men and women worked as itinerant evangelists. Pre-schism evangelical women preached within revivals, worked as Bible teachers, and ran rescue missions; and they did so alongside their social betters working in the public sphere for temperance and women's suffrage. The rise of scriptural literalism coincided with fears about women's participation in the public sphere. Fundamentalists of the 1920s actively undermined women's authority as Bible teachers and sought to replace women evangelists with college-educated clergy and professional social workers.Footnote 2 Yet, scholars have largely continued to embrace Marsden's framework.
Matthew Bowman's The Urban Pulpit and Priscilla Pope-Levison's Building the Old Time Religion are two excellent examples of new research that revisits the roots of the divide between mainline Protestants and adherents to “Old Time Religion,” paying close attention to orthopraxy—the application of beliefs to personal and institutional practices. They also provide us rich new glimpses of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century religious life.
Bowman examines the co-emergence of liberalism and fundamentalism within New York City as mutually constitutive movements that responded to the “capitalist, commercialized world of new New York” (195). Through a holistic evaluation of churches, preachers, and their congregations, Bowman convinces us that these groups adopted aspects of modernity and stood firmly against others; the factions clashed most directly not over modernity but over evangelistic methodology in a rapidly growing city. He recovers the evangelical history and goals of liberal Protestants in the early twentieth century, and insists that the term “evangelical” is the right one. Large churches with attached gymnasiums, offices, and classrooms, he argues, need to be understood as their pastors and ministry boards described them—missions to sanctify urban space and evangelize the unchurched.
According to Bowman, the gospel of “social salvation” was neither a dilution of, nor alternative to, evangelism. Rather, it represented a “sacramental theology” that Protestants developed in light of the increasingly disordered city. Liberal Protestants “invested social work with spiritual power to convert by speaking of it in the same typological terms with which they described worship.” Moreover, large church complexes in poor neighborhoods made a statement in themselves. They “articulated a way in which these rites would save the city: the conversion they promised would bring not only individual salvation, but order to the divided community by making it Christian” (129). It was the Social Gospel, not the later Fundamentalist movement, which gave birth to Deaconesses: young women evangelists who knocked on doors of church neighbors and invited them to worship. According to Bowman, the liberal Henry Sloan Coffin rejected biblical literalism in favor of an ineffable concept of Christ and a sacramental theology of worship; he “believed that worship could heal the class divides that plagued his congregation“(146).”
The book is convincing in the claim that liberal Gilded Age Protestants should be understood as evangelicals. The more controversial question is whether the turn away from direct evangelism and the requirement of a profession of faith represented a significant break with evangelical traditions. When one defines “evangelicalism” as Mark Noll has, as a set of qualities and attributes that recur within the Protestant tradition, Bowman's argumentation appears weak. Within Noll's taxonomy of the faith, evangelicals can change their beliefs about evangelism and move away from the tradition.Footnote 3
Yet, Bowman's work suggests that such categorization has limited utility. Bowman follows Charles Coe, for example, a theologian who professed his belief in the importance of evangelism for personal conversion from the beginning of his career, but ultimately concluded that revivalism was “too clumsy and blunt a tool for so delicate a process” as redeeming and restoring the Kingdom of God while also redeeming and restoring individuals. (197–98). While earlier scholars might have argued that Coe turned away from evangelicalism toward something new, Bowman convinces us that the progression from evangelicalism to “liberal evangelicalism,” as he frames it, was deliberate and full of faithful consideration. Meanwhile, Fundamentalists who readily condemned Broadway also adapted and refined the modern theatrical and sensational aspects of commercialism within their preaching. They condemned research science, but took hold of the modern ideas about the knowability and communicability of all truths, including the meaning of the Word of God.
Bowman is not alone in noting that liberalism and fundamentalism were both modern permutations of Protestantism, but his work describes the denominational splintering of the era with the complexity that it deserves. His account of the era's crisis of “sacramental theology” with regard to evangelism and communion proves that the close study of theology has a great deal to offer American religious history.
Priscilla Pope-Levison's Building the Old Time Religion also participates in the “theological turn” current in American religious history, and affirms that the “Fundamentalist/Modernist” binary no longer stands. Her source material and methodology is similar to Bowman's in that she not only follows the biographies and sermons of Progressive Era women preachers, but analyzes their theologies and missiologies, and the institutional goals of their ministries. Yet she sees the fissure between the “liberal evangelical” and revivalistic world as less deliberate than pragmatic: neither liberals nor Fundamentalists made much space for women within their divinity schools and training institutes. Building upon the tradition of “deaconesses,” women intent on a public expression of their faith carved out spaces as revivalists on the city streets and among the poor. In the 1900s and 1910s, women built Bible colleges, vocational training institutes, a new religious denomination, and rescue missions dedicated especially for women.
While evangelical women revivalists did reject the mainline churches of their youth, Pope-Levison suggests that this turn is better understood as an embrace of the new doctrines of Pentecostalism. The women she follows wanted to spread the gospel of rebirth in Christ; to sanctify believers to complete Holiness, allowing them to choose a life without sin. When most started this work, few institutions believed in the need for continued revival of the Holy Spirit. The women Pope-Levison follows, such as Martha Moore Avery (a socialist-turned-Catholic convert), Emma Ray (an African American Methodist), and Iva Durham Vennard (a white Methodist), were neither wealthy nor college educated. Yet each carved out a space for spiritual renewal, and “transformed the quintessential expression of American Christianity—evangelism—from an itinerant practice into the grand task of institution building” (4).
Pope-Levison's work expands our understanding of Progressive Era evangelicalism. She distinguishes between Holiness-Pentecostalism and Fundamentalism. She shows an “Old Time Religion” not built by a deliberate rejection of scriptural criticism, modernity, or progress but originating as a branch of the women's movement. Progressive Era revivalists were inspired by maternalist impulses similar to those of their social betters who ran settlement houses and lobbied for social reform. Some preached publicly on their antipathy toward feminism and woman's suffrage and opposed Progressive politics. Others supported the Equal Rights Amendment and the National Women's Party (55, 95).
Also much like middle-class reformers, evangelical revivalists managed full schedules and poured their energies into institution building on behalf of the underserved. Women revivalists' lives challenged patriarchal notions about marriage, property ownership, women's intellectual acumen, and leadership as they preached to large crowds in small towns and big cities. “Moderns” among Protestant women, they helped inspire the later celebrity empire of Aimee Semple McPherson. Pope-Levison sees the shift in the 1920s, ‘30s and ‘40s to replace women Bible teachers and evangelists with men as a tragic turn that coincided with the end of many reform-driven initiatives at the end of the Progressive Era. Her work suggests that it was not dispensationalism—or any rejection of liberal evangelicalism or modernity—but the desire for sanctification that gave rise to the twentieth century “Old Time Religion.”
In addition to their similar emphases on theologies of salvation, sanctification, and redemption, both new books represent an “institutional turn” in U.S. religious history. In Pope-Levison's picture of the Chicago Evangelistic Institute, for example, it was not just preaching on the imminent end of the world and need to be baptized in the Holy Spirit that made it relevant. Rather, the institute stayed alive by maintaining a budget and cultivating a teaching faculty, and these efforts, orchestrated almost entirely by women, paved the way for a Fundamentalist movement of the next generation. Likewise, Bowman's wealthy New York City churchgoers doubted the virgin birth and the miracles, but their support for the Consumer League and the Fair Labor Standards Act expressed their Christian beliefs that the poor should not be exploited.
The institutional histories of churches and Christian training institutes provide a richer picture of the theologies of evangelism, the sacraments, and salvation than the writings of individuals alone. And liberal evangelicals and Fundamentalists had a great deal in common on the theological level. The “crisis” within the denominations, if we still want to use that term, was in evangelical strategy and the relative priority of individual evangelism as it compared to holistic spiritual education.
Below the surface of these terrific theological histories are stirring questions of lived religion—questions that historians will need to address. In their large church complexes and dedication toward social work, did most liberal evangelicals intend to solve the problem of poverty and bridge the class divide, or only to allay it? Any long-term solution to the reality of low wages and long work hours would undermine the entire profitability of the businesses that prominent Protestants owned and invested in. To what extent were theological convictions to save the city from commercialism reflected in changes within Protestant business practices? When they directed ministries toward the urban poor, did liberal evangelicals intend that Polish, Jewish, and Italian immigrants, and migrant African Americans, might, with some education and spiritual formation, become social and intellectual equals with them within their churches? Or was the sacramental community that they sought to build only a spiritual one? Put more simply, how deeply did their “sacramental theology” reach within the lives of liberal evangelicals in New York City?
We might ask similar questions of the new denominations, institutes, rescue missions, and Bible colleges built by revivalist women. Many poor followers of these revivalists were children of Protestants who had fallen away from church attendance. Yet, white Protestants were a minority within the ranks of the poor and working classes. To what extent was the desire to build resources for underserved white Protestants inspired by the desire to match the organizational resources of the Catholics and Jews? If these revivalist women were similar to other maternalist “moderns” in their interest in public speaking and institution building, did they also share visions of Anglo and white superiority? How did their attitudes toward race, culture, and Catholicism fit into their motivation for spreading the Pentecostal messages of complete sanctification? How did non-Protestants among the urban poor respond to them?
While historians of Catholicism have been in dialogue with urban and ethnic historians for decades, historians of Protestantism have been slower to contextualize the faith in social and urban space. Until recently, early twentieth-century historians exploring Protestant interactions with the urban poor have been largely limited to research on Home Missions, settlement houses, and social work; and this conversation has had limited theological context. Bowman and Pope-Levison locate more sites, and varieties, of evangelism. As Protestant history merges with social history, we are learning that partnerships between Protestantism and Progressivism were controversial not because they were unusual, but because they were inevitable.
