The title of this book is somewhat misleading. Issing’s brainchild does not really describe or analyze the birth of the euro in depth. It rather deals with the origins of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy strategy in the broadest sense of the word, and its implementation. By doing so the author balances between economic thought, institutional history and monetary policy analysis. Between 1998 and 2006 Issing was Chief Economist and member of the Executive Board of the ECB and in that position he played a decisive role in setting out the new institution’s monetary policy strategy. Despite having been an eyewitness, Issing tells the reader very little about the debates and controversies within the ECB’s governing bodies. He usually provides a short overview of the main policy options available in the academic literature or practiced in other central banks. Then he explains why the ECB chose certain objectives and policy instruments and not others. By stressing his personal involvement in the process, Issing at several occasions allows the book to take an apologetic turn. Implicitly, it is clear that the ECB in many ways continued the policies practiced by the Deutsche Bundesbank for decades.

The book starts with the run up to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the subsequent preparations for monetary union. The author correctly reminds us of the skepticism among many academics concerning the viability of the project at the time and of the many uncertainties that surrounded the start of the ECB. Would the new institution because of its multinational composition fall prey to indecisiveness and confusion? Would the value of the newly created euro collapse against other major currencies? Issing also recalls the origins of the so-called 3% norm for public deficits and the 60% ceiling for public debt stated in the Maastricht Treaty and later on reiterated in the Stability and Growth Pact (1997).

Issing then provides an overview of the main decision-making bodies within the ECB and their responsibilities. He also explains carefully why price stability became the ECB’s prime objective and its importance not just for the economy but for the population at large. The author also considers why other possible aims, such as exchange rate stability or employment growth, were not taken up. Another constant in the book is Issing’s defense of the ECB’s independence. He clearly defines the meaning of the concept of ‘independence’ in this particular case, and the responsibilities that it creates for the ECB vis-à-vis its stakeholders, ranging from the European institutions to the ordinary citizen of the Euro area. Transparency, communication and accountability are key-elements in this perspective and Issing explains how they are made operational by the ECB.

The author is obviously worried about the asymmetric set-up of the European Monetary Union. Monetary policy is in the hands of a supranational authority – the ECB – while fiscal and budgetary policy is still very much controlled by the individual member states. The recent reform – or better, weakening – of the Stability and Growth Pact is for him an indication that budgetary restraint is not high on the political agenda these days. Large budgetary deficits in some member states can indeed pose a threat to the ECB’s objective of price stability.

All this is certainly not new. It can be found in other publications on the ECB or EMU, but Issing brings all these elements together in a coherent framework that is, in general, also accessible for readers with only a basic knowledge of economics. He strongly defends the ECB’s strategic options and policies, which he himself forged to a considerable extent.

Otmar Issing does not have a humble personality. But at the same time he was one of the last high-ranking officials of a generation of Germans that personally experienced the Second World War and its aftermath. For this generation – and the book testifies to this – European integration was often not just an economic or monetary process but a mission. The new generation of German leaders and officials clearly lacks this perspective and, more openly than ever, pursues national self-interest. Barely a few years after his retirement, we are already missing personalities such as Otmar Issing.