This monograph is based on Benjamin R. Young's 2018 doctoral dissertation and investigates “North Korea's place within the Third World” (p. 1). This fits into a recent trend in Cold War studies that emphasizes small state agency. Through this lens, Young critically examines North Korea in a de-westernised way, by treating the country as an independent actor rather than a Soviet-Chinese puppet state.
Young's central argument is that Third Worldism, a form of socialist internationalism which sought to dismantle western economic and political hegemony over postcolonial states (Nash, Reference Nash2003, 95), formed an important part of North Korea's foreign policy and national identity construction. This allowed Kim Il Sung to establish economic and political relationships with emerging postcolonial states, export his Juche ideology and personality cult, and bolster North Korea's international recognition vis-à-vis South Korea.
However, there is a problem with Young's definition of “Third Worldism.” Young initially defines it as “a global movement that opposed white supremacy, capitalism, and Western cultural domination” (p. 2), but later simplifies it to “global commitment to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism” (p. 4). Using “white supremacy” seems more of an attempt to fit into current left-wing phraseology in academic-political-media circles than explain North Korean Third Worldism specifically.
Official North Korean publications and archival materials are the main primary sources used in this study. While these are all useful, especially as recently declassified archival sources enable studies to look beyond the official North Korean narrative, Young neither offers his critical opinion of these sources, nor presents a methodological framework for analyzing or triangulating them.
There is also a lack of attention given to exploring secondary literature. Young briefly discusses Juche, but he does not examine its developmental stages or historiography. Furthermore, Young states that some scholars view Juche as a “sham doctrine” (p. 7). However, those well acquainted with this subject will know this phrase is directly lifted from B. R. Myers (Reference Myers2010, 1), which should have been cited.
Chapter One explores the origins of North Korea's Third World policy, 1956–1967. Specifically, it discusses North Korea's relations with Indonesia, Cuba, and Vietnam. Indonesia taught Kim Il Sung that autocracy was the key to longevity in power, as Sukarno's guided democracy was unsustainable (p. 25). Furthermore, the Cuban Missile Crisis taught Kim Il Sung that Russia could not be relied on in times of crisis (p. 28).
An interesting point made in this chapter is about the problems North Korean diplomats encountered in other countries from having to “toe the party line on cultish leader worship” (p. 19). This presented a twofold problem. First, North Korean diplomats were occupationally constrained by their dogmatic adherence to state ideology, most things were credited to the greatness of Kim Il Sung. Second, their overbearing fanaticism negatively impacted the formation of genuine political and economic alliances.
Chapter Two explores the globalization of Kim Il Sung's personality cult and failed public diplomacy campaigns in the years 1968–1971. The four public diplomacy campaigns examined are newspapers, photo exhibits and film screenings, sponsored trips to North Korea, and the establishment of friendship societies. These campaigns proved costly for North Korea and yielded few results, as the personality cult was difficult to apply to non-Korean contexts. However, the explanation of these campaigns sheds new light on North Korean segyehwa (globalization), beyond the traditional examination of North Korea's interaction with Russia's eastern bloc or Mao's Sinosphere.
Chapter Three examines “one of the most successful periods” (p. 13) in North Korea's Third World policy: the years 1972–1979. Rather than promote Kim Il Sung's personality cult abroad, North Korean Third Worldism exported Juche instead because “Juche, with its messages of self-reliance and self-strengthening, appealed to many in the decolonising world” (p. 79). North Korean builders abroad projected its success as a postcolonial nation. Juche conferences were held abroad, and North Korea joined the Non-Aligned Movement. However, this chapter is very narrowly focused, many points are underdeveloped, and it does not consider important external factors that influenced North Korea's foreign policy during this time.
Citing a 1985 CIA document, Young states that North Korea became the first communist government to default on its debt, in 1974 (p. 72). Even though the CIA document credits “a plunge in nonferrous metal prices and sharply increasing oil prices” as the reason (CREST 1985); why North Korea defaulted, how much debt it had, and to which country it owed money is not explored.
One reason Young may not have explored this in more depth is because it would have contradicted his previous statement that North Korea treated big nations with imperial pasts, Japan and Britain, with “suspicion and distrust” (p. 3). However, according to the CIA report, it was to these former imperial nations that North Korea owed the most (CREST, 1985). In addition, Young should have cited a more appropriate, contemporaneous primary source, as the CIA produced a similar report in 1975 (CREST, 1975).
Young also states Vietnam War fatigue provided a good opportunity for North Korea to push for reunification in the 1970s (p. 74). However, other significant international factors like global détente in the 1970s, the North–South 1972 Joint Communique, and the UN debate on the Korea Question were not considered.
Chapter Four analyzes Kim Jong Il's emergence and influence in the years 1980–1983. Young uses the 1983 Rangoon Bombing to argue Kim Jong Il put North Korean Third Worldism on a “more terroristic path” (p. 96). This chapter also explores the mass games that North Korea exported, which “expressed North Korean anti-colonial solidarity and articulated Pyongyang's core values in an artistic format” (p. 100), enticing key African figures like Robert Mugabe and Idi Amin.
Chapter Five examines North Korea's Africa policy, identity crisis, and the self-reliance façade in the years 1984–1989. North Korea trained Zimbabwe's Fifth Brigade, which tortured and murdered tribes opposed to Robert Mugabe (p. 126). To rival Seoul's 1988 Summer Olympics, North Korea hosted the 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students. However, pro-democracy protests proved disastrous for this event (p. 144). Young rounds off by stating “by the early 1990s, North Korea no longer saw itself as a developmental model and internationalist champion of the world's anti-colonial peoples. Instead, it became an ultranationalist monarchy intent on developing nuclear weapons as a means of survival” (p. 148).
Overall, this book's concept is ambitious and original, but, unfortunately, it falls short in several ways. The lack of critical analysis with primary sources and lack of engagement with secondary literature means this work assumes a lot of prior specialist knowledge. However, the book glosses over selected case studies and neglects valuable contextual information. This does not fit a specialist readership.
Furthermore, this work would have benefitted from extra proofreading to ensure all sources are accurately acknowledged and appropriate primary source selection. This book is recommended as supplementary reading for those with established knowledge of North Korean history and ideology, rather than core reading for students.
