Huang & Bargh (H&B) draw an analogy between the role that “selfish” genes play in Dawkins's account of evolution and “selfish,” unconscious goals play in organizing behavior, and on this basis, propose a novel hypothesis about the proximate properties of unconscious goals. We argue that H&B's analogy risks the misleading impression that there is some kind of positive evolutionary evidence for their proximate hypothesis. Nevertheless, we find the proximate hypothesis is plausible in its own right and suggest an alternative way that its evolutionary significance can be defended without relying on the problematic analogy. Our alternative rests on two related ideas: First, to better understand the conflict between unconscious goals and conscious states, we can study the emergence of conscious thought and effortful control in childhood. This places more emphasis on developmental processes rather than on teleological metaphors. Second, developmental processes are central to the best available current evolutionary theories – in particular, theories that link evolution across multiple levels. H&B's admirable attempt to situate complex human behaviors into an evolutionary framework would be better served by these newer ideas.
H&B use Dawkins's “selfish-gene” metaphor to highlight their views about the functional organization of a person's unconscious goals. They also use the metaphor to ground their original proximate hypothesis, namely, that (in humans at least) goals are discrete mental states that give themselves their own “ends.” But the only thing that H&B's goals and Dawkins's metaphorical view have in common is that both have their ends immanently. That is, for H&B, at least some unconscious goals are not given their ends from exogenous sources, like a higher-order conscious self, other goals, or environmental states. Yet, the commonalities between the two theories end with this structural similarity. Once an end is achieved, a goal does not necessarily recreate motivation for the same end, whereas no matter how many times they replicate, genes continue to “want” to do so by Dawkins's lights. Furthermore, unlike genes, there are no biochemical laws that specify when and under what conditions goals will be active; goals do not lay dormant for generations and only become active when “paired” with other goals. Genes do not compete with one another to produce developmental inconsistencies analogous to the behavioral “inconsistencies” that H&B find so striking. On these grounds, the analogy with Dawkins's is more misleading than helpful.
But there is a deeper problem. Resting their theory on this analogy risks making it appear that there is an argument from evolutionary premises to a conclusion stating the unconscious goal theory. There can be no such argument. This follows from the familiar distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations (Alcock Reference Alcock2001). Proximate explanations refer to organisms' “internal” properties, structural, and causal pathways that obtain during the life span of an organism, and they largely exhaust the types of explanations used in psychology, physiology, biochemistry, and neuroscience. By contrast, ultimate explanations refer to the environmental “external” factors, the causal influence of which is spread over generations, and as a result ultimate explanations are central to evolutionary biology and other historically focused sciences.
Proximate and ultimate explanations stand in a many-to-many relationship. Knowing the correct ultimate explanation for a trait or behaviour does not normally yield any meaningful inferences about which proximate explanations of the behaviour is correct; and the same is true in the other direction (Fedyk Reference Fedyk2014). Here is the intuitive case for this: imagine a pattern of behaviour that is adaptive for some species in some environment, like cooperating with conspecifics. Then list several different proximate causes of the pattern of behaviour, like inherent prosociality or reputation management. Natural selection will not care which of these causes is the right one, and so generally speaking there is no inference from the fact that a pattern of behaviour is adaptive to any particular proximate conclusion. This is what explains the methodological separation of the psychological and biological sciences. More importantly, it also means that it is not possible to argue from ultimate explanations (e.g., genes replicate across generations) to proximate conclusions (e.g., goals are immanently selfish).
There is, however, much to be gained by exploring the evolutionary significance of unconscious goals. There is also much to be gained by better understanding why such goals persist in the face of our conscious abilities to metalize, plan, and deliberate, as well as our conscious skills (e.g., executive functions). To find proximate causes for H&B's most interesting examples of the conflict, we should trace its emergence, as unconscious goals of children begin to conflict with their developing abilities for conscious thought, effortful control, and self-regulation. Research on children's understanding of agency and intentionality, including their emerging beliefs about actions as free, autonomous choices, is especially relevant to H&B's aims (Kushnir Reference Kushnir, Xu and Kushnir2012). This research helps us understand the influence of conscious goals on an organism that has already developed many unconscious goals. Importantly, this research can be undertaken without relying upon ultimate explanations.
That is not to say that these proximate explanations, once confirmed, cannot be linked up with equally well-confirmed ultimate hypotheses. If proximate causes for many of the phenomena described in this target article are better understood in developmental terms, then they are also better framed by more recent accounts that link evolution across multiple levels (genetic through social) and, as a result, have development as a central explanatory category (Jablonka & Lamb Reference Jablonka and Lamb2005; West-Eberhard Reference West-Eberhard2003) . These theories use developmental explanations to emphasize the interaction of organisms with their environments. Concepts such as plasticity and niche construction become central. These ideas comport with our understanding of emerging consciousness in children, a process we know to be incredibly environmentally sensitive. Children learn about their minds and the minds of others through conversation, social interaction, and active cultural participation. In other words, our conscious abilities and skills are learned in environments that have evolved to support them.
Huang & Bargh (H&B) draw an analogy between the role that “selfish” genes play in Dawkins's account of evolution and “selfish,” unconscious goals play in organizing behavior, and on this basis, propose a novel hypothesis about the proximate properties of unconscious goals. We argue that H&B's analogy risks the misleading impression that there is some kind of positive evolutionary evidence for their proximate hypothesis. Nevertheless, we find the proximate hypothesis is plausible in its own right and suggest an alternative way that its evolutionary significance can be defended without relying on the problematic analogy. Our alternative rests on two related ideas: First, to better understand the conflict between unconscious goals and conscious states, we can study the emergence of conscious thought and effortful control in childhood. This places more emphasis on developmental processes rather than on teleological metaphors. Second, developmental processes are central to the best available current evolutionary theories – in particular, theories that link evolution across multiple levels. H&B's admirable attempt to situate complex human behaviors into an evolutionary framework would be better served by these newer ideas.
H&B use Dawkins's “selfish-gene” metaphor to highlight their views about the functional organization of a person's unconscious goals. They also use the metaphor to ground their original proximate hypothesis, namely, that (in humans at least) goals are discrete mental states that give themselves their own “ends.” But the only thing that H&B's goals and Dawkins's metaphorical view have in common is that both have their ends immanently. That is, for H&B, at least some unconscious goals are not given their ends from exogenous sources, like a higher-order conscious self, other goals, or environmental states. Yet, the commonalities between the two theories end with this structural similarity. Once an end is achieved, a goal does not necessarily recreate motivation for the same end, whereas no matter how many times they replicate, genes continue to “want” to do so by Dawkins's lights. Furthermore, unlike genes, there are no biochemical laws that specify when and under what conditions goals will be active; goals do not lay dormant for generations and only become active when “paired” with other goals. Genes do not compete with one another to produce developmental inconsistencies analogous to the behavioral “inconsistencies” that H&B find so striking. On these grounds, the analogy with Dawkins's is more misleading than helpful.
But there is a deeper problem. Resting their theory on this analogy risks making it appear that there is an argument from evolutionary premises to a conclusion stating the unconscious goal theory. There can be no such argument. This follows from the familiar distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations (Alcock Reference Alcock2001). Proximate explanations refer to organisms' “internal” properties, structural, and causal pathways that obtain during the life span of an organism, and they largely exhaust the types of explanations used in psychology, physiology, biochemistry, and neuroscience. By contrast, ultimate explanations refer to the environmental “external” factors, the causal influence of which is spread over generations, and as a result ultimate explanations are central to evolutionary biology and other historically focused sciences.
Proximate and ultimate explanations stand in a many-to-many relationship. Knowing the correct ultimate explanation for a trait or behaviour does not normally yield any meaningful inferences about which proximate explanations of the behaviour is correct; and the same is true in the other direction (Fedyk Reference Fedyk2014). Here is the intuitive case for this: imagine a pattern of behaviour that is adaptive for some species in some environment, like cooperating with conspecifics. Then list several different proximate causes of the pattern of behaviour, like inherent prosociality or reputation management. Natural selection will not care which of these causes is the right one, and so generally speaking there is no inference from the fact that a pattern of behaviour is adaptive to any particular proximate conclusion. This is what explains the methodological separation of the psychological and biological sciences. More importantly, it also means that it is not possible to argue from ultimate explanations (e.g., genes replicate across generations) to proximate conclusions (e.g., goals are immanently selfish).
There is, however, much to be gained by exploring the evolutionary significance of unconscious goals. There is also much to be gained by better understanding why such goals persist in the face of our conscious abilities to metalize, plan, and deliberate, as well as our conscious skills (e.g., executive functions). To find proximate causes for H&B's most interesting examples of the conflict, we should trace its emergence, as unconscious goals of children begin to conflict with their developing abilities for conscious thought, effortful control, and self-regulation. Research on children's understanding of agency and intentionality, including their emerging beliefs about actions as free, autonomous choices, is especially relevant to H&B's aims (Kushnir Reference Kushnir, Xu and Kushnir2012). This research helps us understand the influence of conscious goals on an organism that has already developed many unconscious goals. Importantly, this research can be undertaken without relying upon ultimate explanations.
That is not to say that these proximate explanations, once confirmed, cannot be linked up with equally well-confirmed ultimate hypotheses. If proximate causes for many of the phenomena described in this target article are better understood in developmental terms, then they are also better framed by more recent accounts that link evolution across multiple levels (genetic through social) and, as a result, have development as a central explanatory category (Jablonka & Lamb Reference Jablonka and Lamb2005; West-Eberhard Reference West-Eberhard2003) . These theories use developmental explanations to emphasize the interaction of organisms with their environments. Concepts such as plasticity and niche construction become central. These ideas comport with our understanding of emerging consciousness in children, a process we know to be incredibly environmentally sensitive. Children learn about their minds and the minds of others through conversation, social interaction, and active cultural participation. In other words, our conscious abilities and skills are learned in environments that have evolved to support them.