Since the Ottoman state's expansion into the Balkans in the mid-14th century, it was engaged in the difficult balancing act of developing a system of provincial administration that would represent the will of the sultan while maintaining the good will of the subject population. This effort became increasingly difficult in the 18th century, when ayan (local notables) and other provincial forces, such as members of the Janissary Corps, emerged as a source of provincial leadership at the expense of central government control. Faced with this new challenge, the Ottoman state vacillated between two often contradictory paths: recognizing ayan as the administrators of the region they inhabited or appointing an individual whose loyalty and sole source of legitimacy resided with the sultan.

The challenges faced by both the central government and centrally appointed provincial officials are illustrated clearly in late 18th-century Belgrade. This article examines the attempt by Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) to circumvent the various obstacles to centralized rule in the paşalık (district) of Belgrade by appointing Filibeli Şinikzade Hacı Mustafa Pasha, a relatively untested administrator, as the muhafız (military governor) of the paşalık. The threats of neighboring ayan, attempts to reclaim political and economic power by the janissaries, the growing dissatisfaction of the Serbian population with the lack of regional security, and other sociopolitical challenges in Belgrade during Hacı Mustafa Pasha's administration (1793–1801), although unique in many respects, are indicative of the tumultuous nature of provincial administration during this period of Ottoman history.

Hacı Mustafa Ağa was appointed the military governor of Belgrade in July 1793.Footnote ¹ Very little is known about him prior to this appointment besides the fact that he was an ayan from Filibe (Plovdiv)Footnote ² and held positions with the central government in Istanbul and as the bina emini (construction supervisor) in Belgrade.Footnote ³ No mention is made in any source of how much personal power he wielded as an ayan or whether he had a personal militia or was allied with a greater ayan. Thus, it must be assumed that prior to these appointments by the central government he was a rather insignificant ayan and bureaucrat. Hacı Mustafa's personal history seems at first perplexing, because this background appears to be at odds with the contemporary trend in provincial appointments.Footnote ⁴ However, the logic behind the appointment becomes much clearer when viewed in the context of the sultan's reform efforts, specifically the creation of a new modern army, the Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order). Just as the sultan's modern military unit was an attempt to break from the corrupt and politically dangerous Janissary Corps, Hacı Mustafa Pasha represented the new Istanbul-produced provincial official. The sultan failed in both of these reform efforts, and indeed the alliance of ayan and the janissaries ultimately resulted in the deaths of Hacı Mustafa Pasha and the sultan himself.

In both Ottoman and Serbian sources, the pasha is portrayed as the protagonist, if not a quasimartyr, of the struggles that took place in the region of Belgrade around the turn of the 19th century. Matija Nenadović, an Orthodox priest from a leading Serb family who witnessed some of these struggles, glorified Mustafa as the Srpska majka (Serbian mother),Footnote ⁵ while numerous Ottoman state documents, as well as the state-oriented Ottoman chronicler Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, presented him as a loyal provincial official carrying out the orders of the central government. In addition to the works of Nenadović and Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, this study examines imperial decrees to Belgrade and other Balkan provinces, letters from Belgrade to the sultan decrying the aggressive actions of neighboring ayan and local janissaries, and the central government's responses to these letters, all stored in the Hatt-ı Humayun collection. The authors of these sources had little sympathy for the rebellious ayan, Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha, whose raids plagued Hacı Mustafa Pasha throughout his time in Belgrade, or for the janissaries and their associates who allied themselves with Pasvanoğlu.

The decentralization of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century was largely due to the series of costly military campaigns against the Habsburgs, Persians, and Russians. Most notably, the two campaigns against the Russian empress Catherine the Great from 1768 to 1774 and from 1787 to 1791 not only revealed the inability of the Ottoman state to match the growing military might of its northern neighbor but also exposed its reliance on provincial elites (ayan) in times of war. These wars, along with the transformation of the revenue and land-tenure system that had begun in the late 16th century, were largely responsible for the emergence of the ayan as the true power brokers in the provinces by the end of the 18th century.Footnote ⁶ The unprecedented devastation and high costs of the conflicts, in terms of political capital, resources, and lost territory, forced the central government to rely on provincial notables for the provision of supplies and troops.Footnote ⁷ As a result, numerous ayan were rewarded by the sultan with titles and important positions.Footnote ⁸

One key to understanding center–periphery relations in the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th and early 19th centuries is to realize that the ayan encompassed a very diverse group of individuals. In simplified terms, they can be divided into two major categories. The first category was the powerful local notables whom the Porte co-opted into service but who were often selective in their obedience to the sultan's orders. Individuals such as Ahmet Ağa Çapanoğlu in Yozgat and Canikli Ali Pasha in TrabzonFootnote ⁹ owed their initial position to the central government but were bureaucrats turned rebels. The second category was composed of those who gained power based on the control of economic resources and maintained it through ties to the local community. The best example of this group would be the Karaosmanoğlu family of Saruhan. Hacı Mustafa Pasha does not fall into either of these categories; rather, he was one of a small group of officials from minor ayan families who served the central government through tasks such as collecting taxes, maintaining law and order, and, less important, administering to local needs. Individuals in positions such as that of Mustafa Pasha never generated the wealth, local community ties, or military power to operate independently of the central government even if they had desired to do so.

In an attempt to centralize state power and wrest control of the provinces from the ayan and other local forces such as janissary garrisons, Sultan Selim III undertook a number of reforms. Among these was the creation of the Nizam-ı Cedid. His unusual move of appointing a relatively unknown individual to the increasingly important position of military governor of Belgrade should also be seen in this context.

OTTOMAN BELGRADE TO 1793

The location of the city of Belgrade at the conjunction of the Sava and Danube Rivers has long made it a center of trade and a strategic defensive site for various Balkan states.Footnote ¹⁰ Both the city and the paşalık of Belgrade underwent considerable change over the course of the 18th century. After the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the city became an important Ottoman frontier fortress delineating the border with Austria, and it witnessed an influx of Muslims who had abandoned their homes north of the Danube after that territory was lost to the Habsburgs. But when the Habsburgs advanced to Belgrade in 1718, many of its Muslim inhabitants left; it remained under Austrian possession until 1739. By the late 18th century the paşalık had a sizeable Serb and Christian majority, with Muslims residing almost exclusively in the towns and cities.

The Serbian population consisted mainly of reaya (peasants) who resided throughout the rural regions of the paşalık but also included clergy and merchants living in Belgrade and other towns as well as the knezes (Serbian chiefs), who acted as intermediaries between the reaya and the Ottoman administration. The Muslim inhabitants of the paşalık included artisans and shopkeepers as well as military personnel, namely, janissaries and yamaks (irregulars associated with the janissaries).

The two decades of Austrian rule had a profound impact on the paşalık of Belgrade, or Kingdom of Serbia, as it was called in official Austrian documents. In many ways, it was a time of great oppression for the Serbs; in 1720, the city was decreed a German city, requiring all inhabitants not German and Roman Catholic to move outside the city walls.Footnote ¹¹ At the same time, the Austrians strengthened Serbian local government, organized a Serb militia, and encouraged trade between Serbia and Austria, contributing to the emergence of a Serbian middle class. When the Ottomans reclaimed Belgrade in 1739, they sought to continue these reforming trends “in the interest of law and order.”Footnote ¹²

In the years following the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade, Istanbul sent a large number of janissaries to serve in the Belgrade garrison and gave land to sipahis (landholding cavalrymen) in the Serbian countryside. Although the janissaries were sent to help stabilize the region, they became a source of instability and tension as they tried to acquire personal property by seizing land from the Serbian reaya.Footnote ¹³ In 1762, reacting to the destructive acts of the janissaries in the paşalık, the military governor ordered all janissary inns between Belgrade and Nish to be destroyed.Footnote ¹⁴ However, this was only a minor setback for the janissaries. Because Belgrade was a prime frontier fortress, the state could not afford to completely remove the Janissary Corps, whose main function was to garrison the empire's fortresses.

Belgrade suffered immensely during the war with Austria from 1788 to 1791. After the city was destroyed by Habsburg canons, which left all of the houses and other buildings burned to the ground, there was no place for the city's inhabitants to take shelter; for this reason it was believed they were forced to surrender it to the Austrians.Footnote ¹⁵ When the citadel was retaken by the Ottomans, it was discovered that some yamaks had handed over the fortress to the Austrians in order to safeguard their own property.Footnote ¹⁶

In 1791, Ebubekir Pasha was appointed the military governor of Belgrade. He was a very capable administrator who quickly made an impact on the region. As he neared Nish on his way to Belgrade, word of his arrival struck fear into the hearts of the janissaries and their supporters within the paşalık, leading many of those who had been responsible for handing over Belgrade to the Austrians during the war to flee.Footnote ¹⁷ However, Deli Ahmed Pasha, an Enderun ağası (palace eunuch), who along with Makbul Hüsnü Efendi had seized a great deal of property and abused the Serb reaya upon the withdrawal of Habsburg troops, prepared himself for the new military governor's arrival.Footnote ¹⁸ He greeted Ebubekir Pasha with a group of around 500 janissaries and yamaks,Footnote ¹⁹ preventing the pasha from immediately carrying out his first duty as military governor, which had been the execution of this rebellious traitor. Unfortunately for the eunuch, he was executed shortly thereafter when Ebubekir Pasha had him shot as he was ascending a staircase alone.Footnote ²⁰ The military governor sent the rebel's head to the sultan, and much of the disruption in the paşalık came to an end as Deli Ahmed's men either fled or accepted the suzerainty of Ebubekir Pasha.Footnote ²¹ The latter was then able to institute Sultan Selim's order forbidding “Muslims” from residing outside of towns in the paşalık of Belgrade. This most likely referred to the janissaries and yamaks, whose farms were seized.Footnote ²² In addition, taxes on the reaya were fixed and to be collected by Serb knezes rather than by Ottoman officials.Footnote ²³ In August, all yamaks were expelled from the region.Footnote ²⁴ In order to prevent any future claims on lands in the paşalık of Belgrade, Şeyhülislam Ahmed Mekkî Efendi issued two fetvas that stated the yamaks held no right to private property in Belgrade or surrounding districts.Footnote ²⁵ The yamaks protested but received no sympathy from the sultan, who stated, “They are not permitted to approach the vicinity of Belgrade . . . If one of them enters the citadel [kale], [he] will not be able to escape my wrath. . . .”Footnote ²⁶

Some of the janissaries and yamaks expelled from Belgrade went to Bosnia, while others found their way to Vidin, where they came into contact with the increasingly powerful brigand leader and ayan Pasvanoğlu Osman.Footnote ²⁷ It is probable that the yamaks and janissaries of Belgrade had heard of Pasvanoğlu's exploits during the war with the Habsburgs and of the raids he launched into Wallachia and Serbia shortly after the 1791 Peace of Sistova ending the war. Moreover, his father Ömer had served as the ağa of the thirty-first division of the Janissary Corps in Belgrade during one of his periods of exile from Vidin. Thus the Pasvanoğlu legend had been planted in Belgrade well before the rise of the son Osman. His standing was strengthened in 1794 when he was proclaimed the ağa of the Janissary Corps in his beylik.Footnote ²⁸ The former soldiers of Belgrade joined Pasvanöglu Osman's militia, with major consequences for the history of the paşalık.

The relationship that Pasvanoğlu developed with the janissaries was not unique among ayan in the Balkans. Others, such as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and Kara Feyzi, had established mutually beneficial arrangements with members of the Janissary Corps. The janissaries, although no longer very useful for the ayan in the campaigns against the Habsburgs and Russians, were an influential and powerful force in Balkan urban centers. Possessing arms and maintaining a network of alliances with other inhabitants of the cities, especially artisans, the janissaries were an indispensable ally for individuals who sought to usurp or maintain control of a given region.Footnote ²⁹ Moreover, the judicial and tax immunities of both the janissaries and the ayan provided them with a shared incentive to oppose reforms efforts that would strip away these privileges. For the janissaries, an alliance with some ayan offered a chance to maintain their privileged position, especially given the resistance by numerous ayan to Sultan Selim's Nizam-ı Cedid, or even to reunite the janissaries with their former landholdings. The bond between janissaries and a particular ayan could be strengthened by the latter's background, for example, a personal affiliation with the Janissary Corps. For these reasons, the Ottoman state and its provincial officials in the Balkans faced a unified threat from the ayan and janissaries.

FROM CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISOR TO MILITARY GOVERNOR

Ebubekir Pasha was rewarded for his success returning Belgrade to peace and prosperity through his appointment as the vali of Bosnia. The short term of Ebubekir's successor as military governor was far less glorious. Pekmezci Mehmed Pasha, the mutassarıf (sanjak governor) of Çirmen, overturned many of the reforms enacted by Ebubekir Pasha and consented to the return of the janissaries and yamaks from neighboring regions. Istanbul responded by replacing him with Hamamcızade Ahmed Pasha, who despite his actions against the yamaks in the paşalık ran afoul of the Serbian knezes.Footnote ³⁰ Instead of being reassured that peace and prosperity would continue, the knezes were informed by the new military governor that the sultan had pardoned those janissaries and yamaks who had been exiled and that they were returning to reclaim their property. Fearing a return to the former state of chaos and oppression, Aleksa Nenadović, knez of Valjevo, consulted with his friend, Hacı Mustafa Ağa, the construction supervisor of Belgrade. Mustafa Ağa advised the knez to circulate a petition among the knezes protesting the return of the janissaries and yamaks, which he would make sure reached the sultan.Footnote ³¹ In fewer than fifteen days after the issuance of the petition Ahmed Pasha was removed from office and replaced by Mustafa Ağa himself.Footnote ³²

Hacı Mustafa Ağa was appointed as military governor in July 1793 with the rank of mirmiran (pasha with two horsetails), and a few days later he was elevated to the rank of vizier (pasha with three horsetails).Footnote ³³ In comparison, the military governor of Filibe, Ömer Ağa, who was later called upon by the sultan to give military assistance to Mustafa Pasha, never received such prestigious titles.Footnote ³⁴ However, the previous individuals to hold this post in Belgrade had all held the title of pasha and some even the loftier title of vizier.Footnote ³⁵ It may have been that such prestigious titles were seen as necessary not only to command such an important fortress but also to obtain the respect of the inhabitants of the district. This task may have been more difficult in Belgrade than in many other regions because of its large contingent of janissaries and because its reaya possessed a rather unique opportunity for causing disruption. It was common for them to cross the nearby border into Austria, where the Habsburgs organized them into Freikorps for military campaigns against the Ottomans. As many as 18,000 Serbs may have participated in the Freikorps in the war from 1788 to 1791, during which they seized all the land between the Timok and Drina rivers.Footnote ³⁶

Prior to his arrival in Belgrade as construction supervisor, Hacı Mustafa Pasha was a kapıcıbaşı (chief gatekeeper of the palace) and affiliated with the irâd-i cedid, a treasury that had been recently established to fund the Nizam-ı Cedid.Footnote ³⁷ His duties as construction supervisor were connected to the construction of various buildings in the district; however, unlike a mimar (architect) he did not actually design facilities or direct their construction, but rather managed the expenses, among other financial duties.Footnote ³⁸ Thus, it appeared that his background was in financial matters rather than administration.

There are two important factors that help to contextualize the appointment of Hacı Mustafa Pasha. The first factor was that he was a product of the central government at a time when the administration of the provinces was slipping from its hands and coming increasingly under the control of the ayan. Although the sultan made appointments to various administrative posts in the provinces, such as muhafız and mutasarrıf, these roles were often assumed, whether de jure or de facto, by local notables who controlled tax farming in the region and who secured their positions with sizeable militias. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Balkans, where figures like Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of Janina, Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha of Vidin, Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail Ağa of Rusçuk (Ruse), Dağdevirenoğlu of Edirne, Tokatcıklı Süleyman Ağa of Gümülcüne, Yıllıkzade Süleyman Ağa of Silistre, Nazır Ahmed Ağa of Ibrail, and Buşatlı Mahmud Pasha of Scutari dominated political, social, and economic affairs in their respective districts. Many of these were strategically important regions at or near the empire's frontier. During the 18th-century wars with Russia and Austria, the empire was especially dependent on such individuals, who had the capacity to provide both men and supplies to defend the empire.

One indication that Hacı Mustafa Pasha was an official dependent on the central government was that he lacked a personal militia, unlike the well-armed ayan in the surrounding areas. Placed in a rather volatile situation, with exiled janissaries and yamaks desiring the return of their former property, Mustafa Pasha did not have the means to combat such disruptive elements, as did powerful ayan when appointed as officials in a given district. His first assignment upon becoming military governor was thus to establish a garrison force (yerli neferat) to replace the exiled soldiers.Footnote ³⁹ A nizamname issued on 22 June 1793 stated that soldiers must always be present in Belgrade and that those who were not present for the annual roll call must be replaced. It also stated that the central government would provide the salaries for these soldiers.Footnote ⁴⁰ The figure given for the number of well-disciplined sekban under Mustafa Pasha was 1,000.Footnote ⁴¹ As will be seen, these troops were not sufficient to withstand the continuous attacks from the exiled janissaries and yamaks aided by their new patron, Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha.

Despite a lack of military strength sufficient to confront the extremely powerful ayan in neighboring regions, it was apparent that the Porte had a great deal of trust in the abilities of Mustafa Pasha.Footnote ⁴² Although his post as construction supervisor was the only administrative position he had held in the provinces, he did possess one attribute that was not found among many ayan, especially those in the Balkans: consistent loyalty to the central government. I have argued elsewhere that the ayan, although great opponents of centralized governance, never challenged the sultan himself or sought independence.Footnote ⁴³ Nevertheless, their pursuit of their own interests had a damaging effect on the Ottoman state, and loyalty was thus a strongly desired characteristic of provincial officials. Yet when the cost of loyalty was lack of sufficient military power to maintain security and stability in a given region, loyalty became a more questionable investment: Sultan Selim was forced to grapple with this issue when appointing the new military governor of Belgrade.

The second factor that helps to explain Hacı Mustafa Pasha's appointment was his relationship with the inhabitants of the paşalık of Belgrade. As stated previously, very little information exists about him prior to his appointment as military governor. He is not mentioned in any of the official Ottoman documents I examined. However, his previous posts in Istanbul and his position as construction supervisor in Belgrade are mentioned in some Serbian sources, which make frequent reference to Mustafa Ağa as a very well-liked individual who commanded a great deal of respect from the Serb community.Footnote ⁴⁴ The previously mentioned discussion between Aleksa Nenadović and Mustafa Ağa demonstrates that the latter was an individual who had the sympathy of important elements of the local population. In time, Mustafa Pasha further endeared himself to the Serbs, receiving the moniker Srpska majka (Serbian mother), for his concern and compassion for those under his governance, and he stands out in the works of generations of Serbian historians as an exception to their typical portrayal of the Ottomans as oppressive tyrants.Footnote ⁴⁵

The key to success of provincial officials during the 18th and early 19th centuries was the support of the local community. All ayan needed the backing of the inhabitants of their region. Although at times rivalry among ayan and their tendency to allow bands and soldiers loyal to them to raid territories under the control of rivals brought instability, an ayan's true basis of power came from the local population. Without popular support an ayan would be prone to intervention by either the central government or another ayan responding to appeals from the local community. In order to mobilize this base, individuals used their power and influence to represent the interests of their community against those of neighboring areas or, more commonly, the central government. This was most notably seen in the reaction against Sultan Selim's Nizam-ı Cedid. By defending local interests and identifying themselves with their subjects, ayan were able to enhance their position locally as well as in relation to the central government. The inability to win the support of important segments of the local community rendered officials, particularly those sent by Istanbul, vulnerable and unable to ensure the security and productivity of the reaya, especially when the state was unable to provide these officials with sufficient financial and military resources.

Mustafa Pasha was much loved by the reaya and the locally influential, albeit militarily and politically weak, Serbian knezes. However, he was frequently unable to gain the support of the individuals who possessed military strength in the region, that is, the ayan, janissaries, and yamaks. His lack of roots in the region and of a sizeable personal militia that would have enabled him to use brute force to stabilize the area, as well as the inconsistent nature of the sultan's policies and reforms, were equally destructive to Mustafa Pasha and the state as a whole.

BELGRADE, 1793 TO 1801

One of Hacı Mustafa Pasha's first acts as the military governor of Belgrade was to attempt to remove the janissaries from his domain. He had Kara Ismail, a janissary ağa, executed because his followers, thirty to forty in number, were ravaging the Serbian countryside, seizing land from the reaya.Footnote ⁴⁶ Upon the death of their leader, these janissaries fled to Pasvanoğlu, described by Prota Matija Nenadović as the leader of “all the evil refugees” and the reason that “all evildoers of the Turkish Empire collected at Vidin.”Footnote ⁴⁷ For the next eight years, Hacı Mustafa Pasha was engaged in a constant struggle with Pasvanoğlu and his followers within Belgrade and throughout Rumeli.Footnote ⁴⁸

Before engaging Pasvanoğlu on the field of battle, Hacı Mustafa Pasha attempted to win the trust of his neighbor to the east and thereby avoid future conflicts. Following a tradition in the Ottoman Empire of newly appointed officials exchanging gifts with their subordinates and colleagues, Hacı Mustafa Pasha gave Pasvanoğlu a carriage with six horses and received eighty purses (bourse) of money in return. However, sensing that the gift was intended just to appease him, rather than recognize his actual position and authority within Vidin, Osman launched a massive attack on the paşalık of Belgrade. This raid included a great deal of pillaging and the taking of captives and forced Hacı Mustafa Pasha to reimburse Pasvanoğlu seventy-two purses of the earlier gift.Footnote ⁴⁹ It was very clear that Hacı Mustafa Pasha would be required to face Pasvanoğlu with force if there were to be peace and stability in Serbia.

Anticipating future attacks by Pasvanoğlu, the Porte began to supply Hacı Mustafa Pasha with additional soldiers. In early 1794, Ömer Ağa, the military governor of Filibe, and Mehmed Ağa of Tatarpazar were ordered to send 300 and 100 troops, respectively, to assist Hacı Mustafa Pasha in Belgrade.Footnote ⁵⁰ Around the same time, the sultan granted Mustafa Pasha the muhassıllık (tax-collecting privilege) for the region, further enhancing his economic base,Footnote ⁵¹ as well as assistance to repair the city's fortifications.Footnote ⁵² As expected, the troubles with Pasvanoğlu soon resumed. In a letter to the Porte dated 5 July 1795, Osman, the tatar (courier) of Hacı Mustafa Pasha, complained that the janissaries who had been banished from the paşalık of Belgrade were involved in a series of raids in the area around Pozorofça (Passarowitz) and that Pasvanoğlu was providing these banished ones (matrudlar) with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies for raiding the Belgrade countryside.Footnote ⁵³

The ability of Pasvanoğlu to launch dangerous strikes against Belgrade was facilitated by the many contacts he had established with people inside the paşalık. He had formed an early alliance with Çelebi Mustafa Ağa, the former kul kethüdası (deputy commander of the janissaries), and the four orta subayları (battalion commanders). In mid-summer 1795, Çelebi Mustafa Ağa coordinated an attack on Belgrade with his janissaries and the assistance of a contingent of Pasvanoğlu's soldiers, forcing Hacı Mustafa Pasha, along with the city's inhabitants and soldiers, to take shelter within the inner fortress of the citadel.Footnote ⁵⁴ The seriousness of the situation was not known by central Ottoman officials until a series of letters sent by the Wallachian kapı kethüdası (governor's aide) arrived in Istanbul, complaining of Pasvanoğlu's continuous raids into Wallachia, which disrupted trade, lines of communication, and agriculture, as well as of the immediate threat he posed to Belgrade.Footnote ⁵⁵ Upon receiving these letters in late 1795, the sultan ordered the Rumeli vali to send some of the forces under his command, along with those of neighboring ayan, to Belgrade to aid Hacı Mustafa Pasha. However, these soldiers were sent too late, leaving the military governor to battle Pasvanoğlu's men with his existing forces.

After Mustafa Pasha led a swift and courageous charge (arslan gibi) from the inner fortress, a large number of the eşkıya (brigands) were killed and wounded. Those who survived Mustafa's onslaught hurried back to Vidin to regroup.Footnote ⁵⁶ However, Çelebi Mustafa Ağa was captured and executed, while the members of the four Belgrade battalions who had aided Pasvanoğlu's attack on the city that they were supposed to defend were transferred to Sinop. They were replaced with four new units from the Morea, Menekşe, and Hanya in Crete.Footnote ⁵⁷

Since these attempts to subdue Pasvanoğlu with small local forces had been unsuccessful, the sultan ordered all the troops that had been sent to Belgrade to move toward Vidin to join Gürcü Osman Pasha, the vezir of Keşan, who had replaced Pekmezci Mehmet Pasha as muhafız of Vidin. In July 1795, while Gürcü Osman Pasha was preparing to assume his new post, Pasvanoğlu readied the recently defeated brigands to launch another attack on Belgrade, and a group of Pasvanoğlu's men went across the Danube to Kalafat, provoking a response from the Wallachian hospodar (prince). Mehmed Pasha of Gorgoşefe, the nephew of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, and some other local ayan joined Gürcü Osman Pasha, converging on Vidin and surrounding the city.Footnote ⁵⁸

Unable to combat such a force, Pasvanoğlu sent a petition (arzuhal) to the sultan, along with one from the former muhafiz, Pekmezci Mehmed Pasha, a judicial decree (ilâm) from the kadı of Vidin, and petitions signed by the people of Vidin pleading for mercy.Footnote ⁵⁹ Pasvanoğlu's petition contained a litany of promises, such as to refrain from assisting the brigands and yamaks who kept attacking Belgrade and Wallachia, to respect the integrity of the surrounding lands, to obey the orders and requests of the muhafiz of Vidin, and to pay fines of 57,000 akça for the damage done by the yamaks. Upon accepting the petition, the sultan appointed Pasvanoğlu the muhassıl (tax collector) of Vidin,Footnote ⁶⁰ giving him greater prominence and legitimacy than he had had previously.Footnote ⁶¹

Despite the promises made by Pasvanoğlu, within a few months his raids on Belgrade resumed.Footnote ⁶² Hacı Mustafa Pasha was forced to go on the offensive, sending his deputy, Hüseyin Pasha, to Vidin, not only to strike a blow against Pasvanoğlu but also to execute the latter's ally, Poriçeli Köse Mustafa, who had been leading raids on Belgrade since his expulsion from the city several years before. The sultan's decree ordering this attack explicitly stated that the people of Vidin, who were seen not as the enemy but rather as the victims of Pasvanoğlu, were to be spared.Footnote ⁶³ Since he was well informed about all activities within Belgrade, Pasvanoğlu was prepared for the attack and easily turned it away.

It had become apparent by the beginning of 1797 that Hacı Mustafa Pasha did not have the means to stop Pasvanoğlu's assaults. In spite of this, the paşalık of Belgrade appeared to be quite prosperous under Hacı Mustafa Pasha. The historian Leopold Ranke, who tended to be very critical of the Ottomans, noted in 1829 that due to Mustafa Pasha's efforts to maintain a stable and secure region, Serb trade with Austria flourished, generating more that 1,300,000 florins (130,000 sterling) annually.Footnote ⁶⁴ In 1797, this prosperity was threatened by the increasing raids of Pasvanoğlu-supported bandits and former yamaks from Belgrade.

The sultan exhibited greater confidence than ever in Hacı Mustafa Pasha by appointing him as the vali of Rumeli, the highest administrative position in the Balkans, in order to fight the brigands who were terrorizing the kazas (subdistricts) of Tirnovo, Selva, Lofça, and Plevne, as well as the region of Niğboluin in June 1797.Footnote ⁶⁵ The ironic aspect of this appointment was that Hacı Mustafa Pasha was selected to do the one task at which he had been largely unsuccessful in Belgrade. As Mustafa Pasha pursued the notorious bandit leader Kara Feyzi in the region of Filibe, Pasvanoğlu extended his authority eastward at the expense of Tirsiniklioğlu Ismail Ağa of Rusçuk.Footnote ⁶⁶ Hacı Mustafa Pasha's failure to defend these regions led the sultan to replace Mustafa as vali with the much more powerful Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, who with the assistance of Mustafa Pasha and Tirsiniklioğlu was able to rout Pasvanoğlu's forces near Şumnu (Shumen). This defeat in the east turned Pasvanoğlu's attention back to the west, where he renewed his offensive. Despite success in Pozorofça and Semendire,Footnote ⁶⁷ Pasvanoğlu met defeat in Belgrade. Hacı Mustafa Pasha, who had returned to Belgrade after his short stint as vali with greater prestige and apparently greater military support, was able to capture more than 150 of Pasvanoğlu's men along with their flag and ammunition late in the summer of 1797.Footnote ⁶⁸ Mustafa Pasha, the Belgrade Kaymakam (deputy governor) Osman Pasha, and the Izvornik Mutasarrıf (administrator) Hasan Pasha were presented with honorary gifts of furs and coats (kürkler ve kaputlar) by the sultan for this victory.Footnote ⁶⁹

The career of Hacı Mustafa Pasha reached another high point when he was reappointed as the Rumeli vali on 24 November 1797.Footnote ⁷⁰ At the same time, a series of fermans were issued to begin preparations for a massive assault on Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha's stronghold in Vidin.Footnote ⁷¹ On 9 December the sultan called on every available soldier in the region to join the campaign.Footnote ⁷² Within one month, all sipahis in Rumeli were summoned to join Hacı Mustafa Pasha.Footnote ⁷³ This unsuccessful campaign has been recounted elsewhere.Footnote ⁷⁴ However, it is worth noting here that the massive assault, which reportedly included between 80,000 and 100,000 troops under Mustafa Pasha and Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha against Pasvanoğlu's 40,000 to 50,000 men,Footnote ⁷⁵ increased Pasvanoglu's prestige within the empire and internationally.

The ramifications of the failed siege of Vidin were the removal of any real check on Pasvanoğlu in the Balkans, especially in the paşalık of Belgrade and southern Wallachia. Meanwhile, the empire as a whole, and the Balkans in particular, were tremendously affected by the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, which forced the sultan to transfer many resources that had been utilized in the Balkans against individuals like Pasvanoğlu. The exiled janissaries and yamaks took advantage of this situation and began to reestablish themselves in areas throughout the paşalık, forcing Mustafa Pasha to build up a larger force in Belgrade without aid from Istanbul. In the summer of 1799, Hacı Mustafa Pasha was rather successful in his campaigns in the Kraina; however, the following March, Ranko Lazarević, the knez of the important fortress town of Šabac, was killed by a group of janissaries who had forced their way into the town. Aleksa Nenadović, one of the leading knezes, told the military governor, “We knezes are devoted to your service and the sultan's, and it is our duty to give you service from legs [sic; feet] to knees and arms to elbows. But we will no longer endure it if we are to be killed in the sultan's market-place by an oppressor. . ..”Footnote ⁷⁶ Hacı Mustafa Pasha soon avenged the death of the slain knez and “so frightened all the Janissaries that the very name Janissary could not be said aloud in the whole paşalık.”Footnote ⁷⁷ Those janissaries who did survive Mustafa's attack fled across the Sava to Bosnia.

The success against the janissaries in the paşalık came at a price. Because Mustafa Pasha had not been able to counter the forces of Pasvanoğlu with the meager resources available to him, and lacking the economic means to raise a private militia that could supplement his state-funded troops, he proposed an increase in taxes, which was quickly denounced by the knezes. The reaya had experienced a large tax increase just a couple of years earlier and could not afford this new expense. The knezes, however, offered Mustafa Pasha the option of arming the Serbs themselves in lieu of another tax increase. According to this plan, the knezes would recruit from their villages men who were responsible for their own supplies and equipment and would not receive a salary from the state.Footnote ⁷⁸ Accepting the proposal, Hacı Mustafa Pasha ordered that a crier should announce in the marketplace of every town and village:

For the first time in centuries, Ottoman reaya were allowed by the state to bear arms and defend themselves. Mustafa Pasha's monumental step of arming the Serbs, along with his success in Šabac, made him the main target of the janissaries remaining in the paşalık as well as those in Vidin and Bosnia.

The new Serb militia of Belgrade was soon tested, after Pasvanoğlu captured three cities in the paşalık—Pozorofça, Čupria, and Semendire—without much resistance and as he closed in on Belgrade. The only response from the Porte was to place restrictions on Albanian and Bosnian travel to Pasvanoğlu's territory.Footnote ⁸⁰ As Pasvanoğlu's men neared Belgrade, they encountered Hacı Mustafa Pasha's main troops, which were unable to resist for long. It was at this point that the muhafız requested the assistance of his Serb supporters. The knezes from the western part of the paşalık pushed the invaders away from the city, and then Knez Birčanine pursued them to the border of the paşalık of Vidin while Aleksa Nenadović remained in Belgrade to protect Hacı Mustafa Pasha. To discourage immediate reprisals from Pasvanoğlu and other groups in Bosnia, the Serb militia was not demobilized for several months.Footnote ⁸¹

The arming of the Serbs led religious conservatives to undermine the authority of Hacı Mustafa Pasha. The mufti of Belgrade issued a fetva stating that it was against Islamic law to drive the janissaries and yamaks, who were Muslim, from their land and possessions in favor of the Serbs.Footnote ⁸² This order was reinforced when Istanbul ordered Mustafa Pasha to readmit the janissaries in the paşalık even though they had been exiled by a ferman issued several years before and had aided Pasvanoğlu, who had been dubbed a “godless/faithless traitor/rebel” (hain bi-din tagi ve bagi) by the state.Footnote ⁸³ In the fall of 1800, Hacı Mustafa Pasha, a loyal servant of the sultan, allowed the return of the janissaries, who initially did not seek the restoration of rights over their former property but rather were content with their appointments in the customshouses and the court.Footnote ⁸⁴ However, by the end of 1800 they began to pressure the military governor for better payFootnote ⁸⁵ and to acquire property by seizing it from the reaya.Footnote ⁸⁶

The presence of a large number of janissaries and yamaks in the paşalık as well as the support they received from Vidin made it difficult for Hacı Mustafa Pasha to defend the entire region adequately. It was at this point, if not earlier, that his insufficient military power—which was largely due to Sultan Selim's inability to support his reform-minded officials adequately— became apparent. His reliance on a small state-supported army, in addition to the armed Serbs who resided in villages throughout the paşalık, frequently left Hacı Mustafa Pasha in a very vulnerable state. This was never as true as in September 1801, when he sent his son, Derviş Bey, with most of the paşalık's military force to head off a group of janissaries, yamaks, and other brigands who had been dispatched from Vidin to invade the paşalık. With few soldiers to defend the city, the janissaries located there began to seize control. On 6 September, Derviş Bey realized that he had fallen into Pasvanoğlu's trap and sent an urgent message to the Rumeli vali explaining that rebels had entered Belgrade's citadel, killed the captain of the garrison, and demanded to make Belgrade a semi-autonomous city like Vidin.Footnote ⁸⁷

As Derviş Bey hurried back to Belgrade, Hacı Mustafa Pasha called for the assistance of the knezes. Both the Serbian militia and Derviş Bey, who was with Mustafa Ağa, the mütesellim of Niş, arrived too late. The rebels, led by Küçük Ali, Ağanlı Hüseyin Alemdar, Molla Yusuf, and Kör Osman (in other sources he is replaced by Foçoğlu Mehmed Ağa)Footnote ⁸⁸ had stormed the citadel, imprisoned the military governor, and executed him on orders from Pasvanoğlu.Footnote ⁸⁹ The city came under these four janissary leaders, who claimed the title dayı, the same title used by local janissary leaders in North Africa.

A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE ADMINISTRATION OF BELGRADE

The death of Hacı Mustafa Pasha was only the beginning of the end for the Ottoman paşalık of Belgrade. But it did bring to a close an interesting and tumultuous administration. From the time of his appointment as military governor until his execution at the hands of rebels, Hacı Mustafa Pasha was engaged in a struggle to make the paşalık of Belgrade a secure and stable region for its inhabitants. Based on his close relationship with the Serbian knezes and his “motherly” concern for the reaya, it appeared that Hacı Mustafa Pasha was successful in providing justice and stability to the region for most of his tenure. However, one must ultimately question his suitability for the post, considering that for the Ottoman state, the military governor of Belgrade was not only to look after the inhabitants but also, and more important, to safeguard this very strategic frontier fortress city. His failure to eliminate the threats to Belgrade's security led to the loss of the city, first to the dayıs and, ultimately, to the Serbs themselves. It may not be fair to place all of the blame on Hacı Mustafa Pasha, since not even a massive campaign that included ayan and troops from Istanbul and throughout the Balkans could dislodge the source of problems in the region, Pasvanoğlu. But by appointing an individual who was relatively weak in terms of military resources, though not in terms of personality or intellect, the Porte undermined its very intention in the region: to establish a strong, secure Belgrade.

When one examines other frontier or strategically located provinces within the empire at this time, Belgrade appears to be an unusual case. In Arab provinces such as Mosul and throughout Anatolia and the Balkans, local leaders either did not need significant state aid to safeguard their position and the region, or the state had little difficulty in supplying the officials with the necessary support. In order to provide security in Mosul, an important province on the frontier of both Persia and the Caucasus, the position of governor was dominated by a single family, the al-Jalilis.Footnote ⁹⁰ By the late 17th century, the al-Jalilis had established themselves as a wealthy and powerful family through their control of resources that provided the Ottoman state with supplies and troops in times of war and helped to maintain security in the region.Footnote ⁹¹ Although the al-Jalilis largely neglected their official responsibilities after the humiliating defeats suffered by the state at the hands of the Russians in the late 18th century, they were still honored with the title of vali, generally at the rank of vizier.

In Anatolia, the 18th century witnessed the emergence of provincial dynasties such as the Karaosmanoğulları of Saruhan, the Çapanoğlu of Çorum-Yozgat, and the Caniklizâde of Trabzon, who had origins as local notables. All of these families rose in prominence as they acquired greater revenue through tax-farming privileges, and their members were ultimately to be appointed by the sultan to various posts in the provinces in reward for recruiting and supplying troops to the Ottoman military during the wars with Russia in the second half of the century. Despite the mixed record of loyalty of some members of these families, especially the Caniklizades, they continued to be pressed into service and acknowledged by the central government as provincial governors.Footnote ⁹² The relationship between the provincial notables and the sultan benefited the former more than it did the latter, for the notables received much-needed legitimacy through their titles and appointments while not always acting in the best interest of the state. However, in most cases the sultan had little choice but to continue governing the provinces through these very powerful and deeply rooted families.

The Balkans presented a different set of challenges for the Ottoman state. Provincial administration, especially in many of the most strategically important areas along the Danube River and the Adriatic Sea and Black Sea coasts, was largely in the hands of the ayan who had assumed their positions over time through the acquisition of economic and military power. The extent of ayan control of the Balkans was apparent in the appointment of the vali of Rumeli. By the end of the 18th century, the position was usually filled by a powerful ayan from the region or an individual dependent upon him, rather than by an independent official with strong ties to the central government.Footnote ⁹³

In light of the governance of other frontier regions, one can only assume that the sultan had visions of Hacı Mustafa Pasha successfully reestablishing central control over strategically important Belgrade at the expense of the powerful ayan of the region. Rather than placing the district in the hands of an individual who had the power to maintain stability in Belgrade, while making it part of his own personal domain, as was occurring in other parts of the empire, Sultan Selim made a logical decision to appoint a trusted official. This appointment was not an individual attempt to transform provincial administration; rather, the designation of an individual like Hacı Mustafa Pasha was to be complemented by the creation of a modern and centralized military unit, that is, Nizam-ı Cedid. However, just as with his failed military reforms, the sultan's appointment of Hacı Mustafa Pasha came to a tragic end. What was unforeseen by the sultan was the massive resistance on the part of both the janissaries and, more important, the numerous ayan who harnessed the discontent of the janissaries. The devastating invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 and the increased activities of the Wahhabis in the Arabian peninsula at the turn of the century also prevented the sultan from providing the necessary support to his loyal official in Belgrade.

Two decades after the murder of Haci Mustafa Pasha, Sultan Mahmud II, after slowly removing the ayan from power throughout the empire, began to appoint provincial officials who possessed all the attributes that had made Mustafa Pasha so attractive to Selim III. However, these new officials, unlike Mustafa Pasha, were supported by a strong central government led by a powerful autocrat. Hacı Mustafa Pasha's administration struggled with two major issues that were to play an important role throughout the late Ottoman Empire. First, there was the attempt by the central government to reestablish more direct control over the provinces. Second, there was the growing need for individuals and the state to have the support of the local community. By the end of the 18th century, local support was vital to administer the provinces successfully. The policies of Mahmud II to eliminate the influence of the ayan on provincial and imperial politics, together with his destruction of the Janissary Corps in 1826 and subordination of the bureaucracy, among other reforms, recentralized authority in the hands of the sultan, albeit at the cost of many lives. These reforms came too late to spare Hacı Mustafa Pasha from his bloody fate or to maintain the paşalık of Belgrade under direct Ottoman rule; in 1815, it became a semi-autonomous principality administered by a Serb, Prince Miloš Obrenović.