Saul Dubow has produced an important, detailed overview of the most contentious period of South Africa's history when the country was ruled through the racially discriminatory policy of apartheid. In Apartheid 1948–1994, Dubow seeks to examine power ‘from above’, how it was used, and how it was opposed. While he includes enough recent work to expand our understanding of apartheid society, his focus is clearly on the state, its operations, and its opponents.
Dubow is no stranger to the history of racism, segregation, and apartheid in South Africa. Over the past twenty years, he has been a prolific scholar and an important contributor to the field. Therefore, much of this book is well-covered ground for those familiar with his work. In fact, Apartheid 1948–1994 reads somewhat like a synthesis of his previous works. What is new here is his reach beyond the early formation of apartheid policy to analyze apartheid in practice. What was apartheid? How was it practised? And how did it survive until 1994?
Dubow levels most blame for the scope and brutality of apartheid at Hendrik Verwoerd, the prime minister who is most often seen as the ‘architect’ of apartheid. There can be little doubt that Verwoerd indeed fashioned many longstanding policies even before becoming prime minister when he served as Secretary of Native Affairs. He was, no doubt, a zealot who elaborated an unbelievable justification for apartheid as separate development, or ‘good neighborliness’, but Dubow cites a more personal motivation for the elaboration of controls over blacks as the desire to ‘set up a great Black empire under his supreme dictatorship’ (60, 68). While it is doubtful that Dubow would argue that point too strongly, he avoids answering how Verwoerd could have succeeded in his policies and plans had the weight of white society not also supported his vision. Dubow suggests that, had the assassination attempt in April 1960 (one month after the Sharpeville massacre) been successful, South Africa would have abandoned Verwoerd's policies and taken a different path, however he provides no evidence for this belief. Indeed, the country was in the midst of a panic over capital flight and desperate to restore an appearance of calm through the use of force, individual arrests, and the banning of organizations. Dubow has elsewhere expanded on his thesis, instead arguing that communism was the main bone of contention between black and white at the time and that the country could have taken itself out of the Cold War dynamic without Verwoerd.Footnote 3 But in the context of the development of apartheid, this conjecture does not explain how the system continued.
Perhaps the most frustrating segment of the book is the treatment of apartheid's final years under the presidency of P. W. Botha. Dubow first recounts ‘Botha's Social Reforms’, such as the deracialization of sports, and repeal of the Immorality Act, Mixed Marriages Act, and even the pass laws. These were certainly not insignificant changes. Surprisingly for a historian, however, Dubow mixes up his chronology in such a way to foreground these actions out of sequence with the pressures that produced such reform as well as much of the controversy and duplicity in Botha's actions. What Dubow omits from the prelude to the reforms includes: the formation in 1979 of the infamous Vlakplaas unit that began kidnapping, torturing, and killing African opponents; the introduction of the 1984 constitution that made clear that Africans were to be represented only through their ‘independent homelands’; the international withdrawal of capital that began immediately following the implementation of the constitution in 1984; and the government enactment of a State of Emergency in 1985 to create the appearance of calm. It was only at this point that Botha's reforms – insignificant compared to the foregoing atrocities and injustices – were instituted. At the same time the country launched military raids into Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Botha went on to covertly bomb the headquarters of COSATU in 1987, and the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches in 1988 before suffering a stroke in 1989 that ended his career. And yet, in analyzing the turn to violence by the African opposition in the late 1980s, Dubow quotes De Tocqueville: ‘experience teaches that the most critical moment for bad governments is the one which witnesses their first steps towards reform’ (205), suggesting that the reforms opened the door to violence rather than the other way around. And he later notes, ‘A critical failure was the government's inability to explain clearly what its reforms were intended to achieve – rather than the grievances it hoped to relieve’ (241). This is assuming that the government had any credibility whatsoever by the late 1980s.
There is much in this book that specialists will find interesting and useful. Saul Dubow is an accomplished historian, engages in fascinating research, and he always provides tantalizing food for thought. Nevertheless, Apartheid 1948–1994 does not provide us with a clear understanding of the evolution of apartheid from a dangerous political slogan to the perverse social engineering that characterized the creation of the ‘independent homelands’, the forced removal of at least 3.5 million people, and the deaths and incarcerations of thousands. At its core, this book fits among earlier interpretations of apartheid that eschewed economic or social explanations, focusing instead on the political. Without the larger context of South Africa's turbulent history, we are left with a sad story of personal weakness and ideological blindness.
