With US President Donald Trump's criticism of the new US embassy in London as “lousy,” and with the UK's concerns over the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA (the Iran nuclear deal), one would be forgiven for thinking that the US–UK special relationship is not that “special” anymore. But was it ever that special? Based on Andrew Mumford's new book, Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance, the answer would appear to be a no. Mumford acknowledges that much has been written on the special relationship. Building on Alex Danchev's categories of “specialness,” Mumford defines his approach as “termo-functionalist”; that is, both terminalist (considering the special relationship as a myth, a useful Cold War fiction) and functionalist (identifying some common interests and pragmatic agreements between the two countries without the romanticism) (9). Mumford is also clear in suggesting that – contrary to much literature on the topic – his work will not focus on conventional warfare but on US–UK involvement in small wars and counterinsurgencies.

The book explores eight cases of British and American involvement in counterinsurgencies from the early British involvement in Palestine to the recent US–UK friction in the war on terror. From the analysis some key themes emerge. First, the US and the UK often engaged in subterfuge and told the other partner what it wanted to hear. Here Mumford shows how the UK often relied on the US's Cold War myopia portraying local (and colonial) conflicts as anticommunist campaigns (51–52). Second, US domestic politics and electoral necessities – particular the need to win the vote of large diaspora communities – often drove the type and extent of US support for British ventures (148–50). Third, and here perhaps is the book's greatest contribution, having reviewed the historical record Mumford casts a critical eye on the alleged British counterinsurgency tradition. Such tradition became a key precedent for the “COINdinistas” of the early 2000s. Soldier scholars like Nagl and Petraeus often identified British successes in Malaya and other regions as models for the war on terror. As Mumford convincingly argues, this was extremely problematic. The identification of these models was based on a superficial analysis of the British experience. Furthermore, the alleged British expertise in counterinsurgency created mistrust and misperception between the two allies. On the US side, it created heightened expectations regarding what the UK could achieve, especially in Iraq. On the UK side, it engendered both contempt for the perceived lack of American expertise in the realm of irregular warfare (173), and an unwillingness to admit problems in the UK's approach. As Mumford writes, “the volume of British irregular warfare experience” was “equated to competence,” creating a British “mind-set of superiority,” which conflicted with the complexities and difficulties on the ground (175). The British struggle in Iraq and poor performance in Afghanistan ended American illusions and reduced Britain to the role of providing a “nodding agreement” for American decisions (191). As Mumford concludes, the special relationship was not special, but asymmetric at best. “Friction, faction, and frustration” prevailed (200).

The risk with such a high number of case studies and such a long time frame is that of sacrificing detail. The book, however, provides a convincing analysis of the cases, relying on a structured and focussed comparison. The book uses three common lenses, and asks similar questions: what were the political attitudes towards the conflicts in the three countries? How reciprocal was military assistance? And what was the level of intelligence cooperation? In this context, perhaps the chapter on Vietnam represents a missed opportunity. Here the analysis discusses more the lack of British support for the American conventional effort and not the American and British approaches to the “other (Vietnam) war” and its counterinsurgency campaigns like CORDS and Operation Phoenix. The book, however, provides a much-needed corrective to two resilient myths: the myths of specialness and the counterinsurgency myth. It will appeal to a wide range of scholars and experts on US–UK relations and foreign policy, strategic studies and counterinsurgency, as well as intelligence scholars. Mumford's engaging and no-holds-barred writing style makes the book an interesting read for the general public as well.