Humanitarian military interventions in other countries have traditionally been highly controversial projects requiring a convincing justification. In the past two decades, a powerful framework has evolved, called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), constituting an effective source of legitimacy through the protection of vulnerable civilians in crisis situations. In particular, the protection of “women and children” in war zones forms one of the basic building blocks of the discourse legitimizing contemporary international interventionism (Carpenter Reference Carpenter2013; Enloe Reference Enloe2000).Footnote 1 Based on this assumption, this work critically analyzes how the legitimacy of the military operation was constructed during the 2011 crisis in Libya, using the discourse of sexual(ized)Footnote 2 violence as a weapon of war. The empirical part focuses on various discursive strategies used prior to the intervention and demonstrates their legitimization effect on an otherwise disputable NATO military campaign while strengthening the identity of the alliance as a security provider.
In international politics, there appears a clear tendency to use the rape-as-a-weapon-of-war narrative to emphasize the strategic nature of violence. The legitimacy of contemporary interventionism is based exclusively on the principle of protection of civilians from clearly defined and internationally recognized criminal acts (Evans Reference Evans2009).Footnote 3 Sexual(ized) violence in armed conflicts perfectly serves the strategic efforts of actors aiming to legitimize a military intervention. Rape, often used as a synonym for the wider problem of sexual(ized) violence, attracts enormous attention among the public and civil society, as well as in the media and among policy makers.Footnote 4 As a result, politically motivated, systematic rape becomes a powerful source of legitimacy when applying use of force under the auspices of R2P.
Privileging the rape-as-a-weapon discourse inevitably leads to the marginalization of other victims and of violent sexual acts that do not fit the narrative, which contradicts the very basic R2P premise of apolitical humanitarian protection. The case reflects the exclusive emphasis put on particular groups indicated as the “barbaric rapists” depending on the political motivations to defeat the ruling government. Although various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) usually report more complex patterns of sexual(ized) violence, political representatives, as well as the media, tend to portray the situation with a clear attempt to legitimize the protectionist intervention.
In effect, hegemonic discourse on sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war reproduces the Western power-based international order, which rests on the principle of the deployment of civilizing missions to third countries. The intervening states construct the legitimacy of their actions through delegitimization of non-Western cultures, stereotyping them as uncivilized, essentially violent, and thus failing to protect “their” women and children. Therefore, the implementation of an R2P conception based on protection from widespread and systematic sexual(ized) violence must be challenged through a deeper analysis of the relevance of legitimization arguments within both local and international contexts.
The contribution of our critical analysis is twofold. First, it provides an empirical analysis of a particular case study to show the specific discursive frames referring to sexual(ized) violence while calling for external intervention to provide protection of civilians. Although we are grounding the conclusions in a single case, the legitimization strategies can be traced in other cases and thus could be used in further research. Second, the critical reading of Western masculine superiority indicated by contemporary liberal interventionism has wider implications for contemporary debate on prevention of sexual(ized) violence and protection of civilians in more general.
METHODOLOGY
The analytical part of the article is based on the method of critical discourse analysis (CDA), disseminated through the works of Wodak (Reference Wodak1996; Wodak and Meyer Reference Wodak and Meyer2001), Fairclough (Reference Fairclough2003), van Dijk (Reference van Dijk1998), and van Leeuwen (Reference van Leeuwen2008).Footnote 5
Our methodological framework follows Fairclough's three-level model of analysis (Reference Fairclough1989, 26). At the lowest (micro) level, the formal aspects of the text (depicted in the official documents or formal statements of relevant organizations, states, and their individual representatives) are explored to identify the attempt to legitimize a policy—in this case, the deployment of military operation. Fairclough (Reference Fairclough1992, 160–61) uses the term “categorical modality” and argues that it is an effective means to justify a political ideology because the speaker is presenting subjective opinions as an objective and given fact.Footnote 6 The verbal voice (passive or active) is also essential as it reflects the responsibility of the speaker for the justified action (Rativoi Reference Rativoi, Johnstone and Eisenhart2008). If the speaker wishes to present an intervention as unproblematic, acceptable, and needed, the concrete actor is concealed either through the uncertain “we” or use of the passive voice (e.g., “civilians must be protected”).
The identification of the legitimization efforts is followed by an analysis of the strategic discursive practices internalized by the international community. Here, Fairclough (Reference Fairclough1992, 180) embraces Michel Foucault's term “orders of discourse,” implying that the systems of communication interlinking various formulations, genres, and meanings are shared within a particular social structure. These include argumentation strategies aimed at justifying an action through reference to a widely acknowledged source of legitimacy.Footnote 7 Discourse analysis of the legitimization strategies of political actors is based on foregrounding gender and ideal-typical gender-related attributes—in this case, female innocence, vulnerability, suffering, and helplessness.
The third level of analysis critically reflects on the effects of the discursive strategies. These first construct a strong legitimacy of post–Cold War liberal “messianism,” enhanced by the relatively recent turn to gender-based protectionism. As a secondary effect, the hegemonic position of the intervening states is reproduced and further strengthened through the reaffirmed noble identity of selfless savior. The clearest example of such identity (re)construction is NATO's image as a most prominent global security provider. These effects are typically indicated by the supportive assessment of R2P interventions and their architects in the mainstream academic debates, as well as their relatively uncritical acceptance by the global civil society.
From the boom in research and rape “tourism” (Autesserre Reference Autesserre2012) to the fetishization of conflict-related sexual(ized) violence (Meger Reference Meger2016), studying this controversial topic has become an increasingly ethically problematic academic endeavor (Wibben Reference Wibben2016). Like many others who are engaged in critical feminist scholarship studying gendered harms (Baaz and Stern Reference Baaz and Stern2013), we feel the unease when discussing rape in war. This research does not aim to dispute the tremendous suffering of the survivors but rather to critically read and interpret the dominant gendered legitimizing discourse of military mission deployment. We argue that these missions in effect only serve to (re)legitimize the hegemonic Western powers instead of delivering actual protection to the affected civilians. Thus, continuous critical rereading and challenging of the protectionist arguments, however uncomfortable that may be, is key to the emancipatory objective of the critical feminist research (Shepherd Reference Shepherd2013; Sjoberg Reference Sjoberg2015).
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS AND R2P: CRITICAL FEMINIST DISCUSSION
The current hegemonic discourse that rape constitutes a weapon of war not only has been replicated by a large number of scholars but also has remained an unchallenged assumption of the majority of policy makers (Baaz and Stern Reference Baaz and Stern2009, Reference Baaz and Stern2013). The argumentation that rape indeed constitutes a weapon suffers from several limitations and may in reality damage those it seeks to protect. The following section critically discusses the problems of the rape-as-a-weapon discourse in relation to R2P.
In many academic and popular accounts, the biological possession of the male sexual organ makes that individual a potential rapist. From Brownmiller's (Reference Brownmiller1976) assertion that men rape simply because they can, there has been a fundamental shift to modern accounts of the weaponization of the penis and its use as a strategic/tactical tool in armed conflicts (Buss Reference Buss2009). Sexual violation of women's bodies, carrying the nation's essence and culture, as well as biologically reproducing the group, becomes a terror tactic, forcing major population displacement and leading to genocide (Card Reference Card1996). Drawing a clear distinction from peacetime (or so-called everyday) rape, which is classed as being a sexual act, rape in war becomes an asexual weapon used to inflict physical and psychological trauma on a target group. This understanding of the “strategicness” (Baaz and Stern Reference Baaz and Stern2013) of sexual(ized) violence clearly leads to the logical conclusion that rape can be eliminated or at least managed.
The feminist debate on the securitization of rape and sexual(ized) violence is rather complex (Kirby Reference Kirby2013). Although most authors acknowledge that putting sexual(ized) violence on the global security agenda represents a positive development, there is an acute unease about the way rape, as a weapon, is articulated and acted on (Baaz and Stern Reference Baaz and Stern2013).Footnote 8 Criticizing the fact that it is men as a collective category that are considered to bear moral responsibility for rape in war, Kirby (Reference Kirby2013) challenges the notion of such moral judgment of men as collective beneficiaries of war rape. This kind of collective blame is specifically what we were able to trace in the discourses analyzed here, in which local men are portrayed as bestial/brutal not as individual rapists but rather as a backward, uncivilized patriarchal “collectivity.” Baaz and Stern (Reference Baaz and Stern2013, 19) support Kirby's arguments, seeing the rape-as-a-weapon storyline as “essentializing and deterministic as well as overtly negative towards men as such.” We agree with all these critiques, and we add that the primacy of rape in war narratives serves the purpose of legitimizing military interventions while strengthening calls for immediate action.
The R2P framework is invoked in cases of large-scale and systematic violence against civilians.Footnote 9 According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), the nature of violence that might constitute international action and especially military intervention (the just-cause threshold) would be indicated by (1) large-scale loss of life and/or (2) ethnic cleansing. Particularly the second condition accounts for gender-based violence but limits the applicability of R2P to “the systematic rape for political purposes of women of a particular group (either as another form of terrorism, or as a means of changing the ethnic composition of that group)” (ICISS 2001, 33). In short, the strategic and political incentive for such violence becomes a necessary precondition for any action.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome introduced four specific situations that constitute a universal responsibility to act: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.Footnote 10 These atrocity crimes were adjusted by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Article 7), which included sexual violence in the crimes against humanity, committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”Footnote 11 Thus, sexual(ized) violence was only implicitly integrated through the reference to the Rome Statute, at the same time preserving the exclusive relevance of strategic and politically motivated rape.
The most fundamental problem with R2P is the lack of conceptual as well as operational clarity regarding the systematic nature of sexual(ized) violence committed in armed conflicts. While explaining the rationale behind military intervention, the actors refer to the emotional narratives within humanitarian emergencies rather than to formal procedures of international law. The R2P framework has become a very powerful normative concept since the very general idea of protection could hardly be contested—in contrast to the use of military force—especially when advocating the safeguarding of the “fairer” sex. The argument is that regardless of insufficient confidence of whether sexual(ized) violence in armed conflicts can be effectively prevented or stopped,Footnote 12 there is an automatic expectation regarding the positive effects of external involvement.
In many instances, “women and children” becomes a synonym for “civilian.” Carpenter (Reference Carpenter2006, 31) demonstrates how the civilian protection regime is gender essentialist, and women and children are automatically presumed to be civilians on the basis of sex, age, and possible disability. Through this universal conceptualization of innocence and vulnerability, associated with the female association with nurturing and protection of children, women have been automatically awarded claim to protection (Carpenter Reference Carpenter2006).
Kinsella (Reference Kinsella2011, 9), critically analyzing the gendered construction of innocence, argues that “the massacre of women and children signals a worse crime than the massacre of civilians.” She then shows how the category of women, based on their biological sex, is always accepted as civilian—this status being based on their sex difference to noncivilian others (16). On top of that, the laws of humanitarian protection are built on a Eurocentric discourse on civilization, in which global South nations are portrayed as unable to recognize and implement the protection of civilians (17). In our analysis, there is a highly visible rhetorical pairing of the narrative on the imminent need for gendered protection being considered a measure of civilization, which stands in stark contrast to sexual(ized) violence being used as a weapon of war by barbaric/savage “Other” masculinities (Abu-Lughod Reference Abu-Lughod2013; Kirby Reference Kirby2012; Moghadam Reference Moghadam2014). Often, rape is said to be worse than death, classifying as the worst breach of the civilian protection regime.
Within academic circles, there has been a very limited debate on the gender aspects of R2P. In 2012, the journal Global Responsibility to Protect published a special issue on R2P and sexual/gender-based violence. Most of the contributors concluded that more attention should be paid to the protection of women from systematic and large-scale violence while uncritically accepting the R2P conception as such (Bond and Sherret Reference Bond and Sherret2012; Davies and Teitt Reference Davies and Teitt2012; Skjelsbæk Reference Skjelsbæk2012). In contrast to these normatively oriented studies, this article provides a feminist critique of the discursive practices within the R2P framework, demonstrating its use of the enhancement of Western masculine hegemony.
“LIBYA'S BUTCHER”: THE FRAMING OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR
The analytical part of this article focuses on the NATO armed intervention in Libya to illustrate the process of legitimization under the auspices of R2P, specifically critically analyzing the protectionist discourse around gendered violence. Our critical feminist view reveals fundamental limitations of the sexual(ized) violence narrative, namely: (1) presentation and interpretation of rape as a weapon of war; (2) selective condemnation of forces loyal to Moammar Gadhafi that were collectively responsible for sexual(ized) violence; and (3) protectionist argumentation stressing the urgency of intervention as envisioned by the morally superior NATO. After carefully examining the discursive strategies, we critically reflect on the effects regarding the mainstream positive perception of the intervention and the unproblematic credibility of the interveners.
The 2011 crisis in Libya was unprecedented both in terms of the conclusive interpretation of the ongoing violence and the firm international response.Footnote 13 The official discourse of rape as a weapon of war fit with the notion of a state manifestly failing to protect its most vulnerable—women. This was supported by the metonym “Gadhafi responsible for mass rapes,” invoking the widespread and systematic nature of violence and further preventing more complex and specific analysis of the individual responsibility for all reported crimes. This was demonstrated through reference to two prominent stories: the gang rape of a Libyan woman, Eman al-Obeidi, by Gadhafi loyalists and the alleged distribution and use of Viagra in the state army.Footnote 14
In March 2011, the global media started to report on widespread violence in Libya while calling for an urgent international response. Rape gained prominent media attention with the two cases triggering a one-sided interpretation of violence. As soon as April 2011, the stories had permeated the official United Nations (UN) structures and were further adopted by key political representatives.
The first major story was presented by Al Jazeera,Footnote 15 following reports by a Libyan doctor, about Viagra—branded a weapon of war—found in the pockets of dead soldiers. The doctor said it surely had been used to facilitate rape, although he did not provide any further evidence that it had been distributed in the army, used on a mass scale, or used specifically to sexually abuse opposition supporters. The Viagra “proof” was then used often as an argument supporting the charges against Gadhafi, especially after the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, announced an ongoing investigation into this suspicion.Footnote 16
Moreno Ocampo made a firm public statement during a press conference at the UN that rapes were being orchestrated by Gadhafi as part of his repression politics. He indicated that the ICC probably would add new charges to those issued against Gadhafi and his son Saif al-Islam.Footnote 17 Moreno Ocampo was one of the first official representatives to confirm the use of Viagra as a tool of mass rape, comparing with to a machete.Footnote 18 In an interview for CNN, he talked mostly about investigating alleged reports gained on the ground, yet these were presented as verified facts. He argued that the most effective way to stop rapes would be to arrest Gadhafi.
This came at the same time that international criticism of the intervention was mounting, mainly based on reports of collateral damage and unintended targeting of civilians, casting a shadow on the protectionist argumentation. The Viagra story and the ICC's definitive statement revitalized the legitimacy of the mission. NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced at the end of May that NATO would continue its campaign until the defeat of Gadhafi's forces.Footnote 19
The second key incident was the emotional testimony of Eman al-Obeidi in front of international reporters followed by a series of interviews, articles, and calls for action. In particular, CNN eagerly covered the event, presenting it as a “story of a woman in need” who urgently needed protection: “a desperate Libyan woman burst into the building frantic to let the world know she had been raped and beaten by Moammar Gadhafi's militia.”Footnote 20 In the following months, al-Obeidi's name was used by the media, NGOs, and political representatives as a symbol of oppression against an innocent woman, a hero not afraid to speak out and resist the regime, hunted prey seeking protection and security.Footnote 21
The turning point in the official UN position was a speech given by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, at the UN Security Council meeting in April 2011, in which she referred to the case of al-Obeidi. She criticized the Security Council for the absence of explicit condemnation of sexual violence in Libya and did not hesitate to assess the crimes as political and security matters:
[G]iven the way sexual violence spans the history of war, it should be automatically and systematically included in protection measures. The Council has recognized that sexual violence is used by political and military leaders to advance political, military and economic ends … If we allow the lack of hard data to justify inaction, it will always be too late. … I urge the Council to use its influence to ensure that any ceasefire agreement reached in relation to Libya or Côte d'Ivoire also entails the cessation of sexual violence as a tactic of war.Footnote 22
Instead of providing solid evidence, she referred to a single case, which became a media blockbuster: “Although most of these reports of rape remain unconfirmed—and are even brutally silenced—they have arrested the attention of the world. The name of Eman al-Obeidi is known to all.”Footnote 23 It is precisely the UN Security Council that serves as the most powerful platform for legitimization, with its audience being the most influential political actors. On top of that, the international media cited Wallström's statement, significantly widening the audience reached.Footnote 24
While NATO officially justified Operation Unified Protector as an attempt to stop state-organized violence in general,Footnote 25 some member-state representatives explicitly referred to sexual(ized) violence incidents. The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, condemned widespread human rights abuses during an April UN Security Council meeting, at which she also argued that Gadhafi was supplying his troops with Viagra to encourage mass rape.Footnote 26 During the debate, several countries and particularly China and the Russian Federation opposed the way NATO implemented Resolution 1973. There was also a debate on the moral equivalence of human rights abuses perpetrated by Gadhafi and the rebels. Obviously, the U.S. ambassador used the argument to counterbalance any doubts about the legitimacy of the NATO response. Also, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made a public statement on the United States’ deep concerns about the wide-scale rape, referring to the al-Obeidi case:
Since Eman al Obeidi bravely burst into a hotel in Tripoli on March 26 to reveal that Qadhafi's security forces raped her, other brave women have come forward to tell of the horrible brutality they have experienced. … Qadhafi's security forces and other groups in the region are trying to divide the people by using violence against women and rape as tools of war.Footnote 27
This statement shows an attempt by Clinton to generalize the story despite a lack of concrete evidence. When talking about the perpetrators, Gadhafi's forces are specified as opposed to vague “other groups,” implying a general responsibility of the regime rather than individual soldiers and their commanders.
Al-Obeidi received more media attention in May 2011, when she managed to escape Libya. CNN stressed the role of the French embassy and the personal involvement of President Nicolas Sarkozy, once again using her as a representative of all Libyan women: “The lady who came to symbolize the Libyan struggle is now getting for the first time the help she so long craved.”Footnote 28 In other words, she had to leave the country to find shelter, which was provided by the civilized West—this time by French diplomats and later by the United States, guaranteed personally by Clinton.Footnote 29
With the exception of Human Rights Watch, which used similar language while calling for international intervention,Footnote 30 other human rights NGOs adopted a sober, more cautious approach. Amnesty International publicly admitted that its investigation did not confirm any indicators of rape as a weapon of war.Footnote 31 This was supported by the critical assessment of the International Crisis Group in response to uncorroborated rape allegations:
[M]uch Western media coverage has from the outset presented a very one-sided view of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime's security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no real security challenge. (ICG 2011, 9)
In February, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the violence in the country and demanding an immediate inquiry; later, in June 2011, the International Commission of Inquiry published its report on Libya. The independent inquiry presented a balanced picture regarding the responsibility for sexual(ized) violence and did not advance any verified evidence for systematic and widespread rape. The report indicated that suggestions in the international media about the spread of Viagra pills among the Kata'ebFootnote 32 troops were “speculative.”Footnote 33
In contrast to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry presented to the Human Rights Council, the international media never focused on the rape incidents reported by Gadhafi loyalists or migrants, which did not fit the frame of the oppressive state responsible for violence. Although there were longer-term patterns of sexual violence based on racial discrimination against non-Arab populations as well as opportunistic rapes committed as a result of a lack of police control, those cases would have distracted from the simple, clear, and attractive image of the “Libyan butcher.”Footnote 34
The analysis of both official and unofficial discourse on rape in Libya shows a clear tendency to discredit the Gadhafi regime and present the opposition as innocent, suffering victims. Despite the repeated disavowal of a regime change policy, the protectionist discourse in favor of Western military intervention reflected a clear attempt to overthrow the ruling elite and support the rebels.Footnote 35 This was effectively implemented by NATO as well as UN representatives but even more visibly by the Western media. At the same time, the discourse on rape as a weapon used strategically by the Gadhafi forces and supporters served as a powerful source of legitimacy for the military intervention. However, the conclusions regarding sexual(ized) violence were based on selective emotional testimonies rather than complex and objective fact-finding missions. Finally, there was a consistent emphasis on the sensitiveness of rapes in the Libyan—Islamic—society because of the uncivilized and unjust treatment of victims, which required an intervention of the Western “unified protectors.” Overall, the argument on widespread and systematic violence against the most vulnerable provided a convincing justification for the NATO military operation. Despite the emphasis put on preventive and nonmilitary measures within the R2P framework, the Libyan case shows the capability of Western states to interpret crisis situations in line with their political preferences.
The impact of strong legitimization was visible throughout March 2011, just before the NATO operation was launched. According to a Washington Post-ABC News Poll, by mid-March, 45% of American respondents approved how the Barack Obama administration was handling the situation in Libya (34% disapproved and 21% had no opinion on the matter).Footnote 36 The support of the public increased by the end of the month according to another national CNN survey, which concluded that “seven in ten Americans are confident that the U.S. will be successful in protecting civilians from Gadhafi's forces and three-quarters think that Gadhafi will be removed from power.”Footnote 37 In contrast to the period prior to the operation, the performance of the allied forces was perceived more critically, with figures dropping significantly in surveys undertaken in May and June 2011.
In the United Kingdom, the situation was quite similar, with a 56% majority support for the intervention in its initial stage. Respondents were specifically asked whether it was possible to protect Libyan civilians only by removing Colonel Gadhafi, and again, 54% agreed (16% thought Gadhafi could remain in power and 30% were not sure).Footnote 38 The public support was even stronger in France—66% backed military action by March 22, 2011.Footnote 39
After a careful examination of the public opinion surveys in the three leading states initiating military operation, there was a pervasive support for the urgent need to protect civilians in Libya, including otherwise controversial regime change policy. Although the surveys did not focus on the more specific issue of sexual(ized) violence, since it was a significant part of the official and media argumentation, we assume that the legitimization strategies discussed earlier significantly contributed to the effective protectionist discourse.
In the academic reflections on the legitimacy of the R2P-based intervention in Libya, there was a strong consensus on the accomplishment of the just-cause threshold (Goldstein Reference Goldstein2011; Patrick Reference Patrick2011; Pattison Reference Pattison2011; Thakur Reference Thakur2011; Weiss Reference Weiss2011). Although there were fundamental issues raised with regard to the implementation of the NATO operation, such as the disproportionality of air strikes to humanitarian objectives (Bachman Reference Bachman2016; Zambakari Reference Zambakari2016), mission creep involving a regime change policy (Zenko Reference Zenko2016), the absence of ground troops providing direct assistance to civilians (Nygren Reference Nygren, Engelbrekt, Mohlin and Wagnsson2014; Sörenson and Damides Reference Sörenson, Damides, Engelbrekt, Mohlin and Wagnsson2014), and generally very disputable humanitarian outcome (Kuperman Reference Kuperman2015; Lamont Reference Lamont2016; Vilmer Reference Vilmer2016), scholars mostly approved of the decision to protect oppressed Libyans. The liberal community of R2P proponents went so far as to portray Libya as a role model for the future (Hehir and Murray Reference Hehir and Murray2013; Thakur Reference Thakur2011; Weiss Reference Weiss2011).
Again, although the reviews were more concerned with the protection of civilians in general, some made explicit references to the issue of sexual(ized) violence while concluding that the intervention was justified (Adams Reference Adams2011; Fermor Reference Fermor2012–13; Norooz Reference Norooz2015). The platform of prominent NGOs unified within the International Coalition for the R2P presented a synopsis of the international response to the crisis in Libya and the ICC prosecutor's statement: “On 8 June 2011 Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo confirmed that the Libyan government had used rape and sexual violence as tools of war and repression to target people against the government” (ICR2P 2011). It further concluded that the normative aspirations of R2P had been accomplished in Libya, though there were operational problems of the NATO military campaign. The director of the Global Center for R2P, Simon Adams, also believed intervention was legitimate, arguing,
[T]here were also widespread allegations that loyalist forces were guilty of the “murder, rape and sexual torture” of Misrata's residents. Doctors testified to “military sanctioned rape” of women and girls as young as fourteen. Given the extensive nature of war crimes perpetrated in Misrata, it was clearly within the UN's “all necessary measures” mandate for NATO to attack Gadhafi's forces encircling the city. (2012, 10)
Understanding R2P-based military intervention as an appropriate response to sexual(ized) violence is a very troubling effect of the wider problematic perception of the “just” cause in Libya.
In June 2016, NATO published a framework report on “Relations with the United Nations.”Footnote 40 It maintained that the UN authorized operations deployed by NATO, such as Operation Unified Protector in Libya, as clear indicators of shared priorities, including “the protection of civilians, including children, in armed conflict, and combating sexual and gender-based violence” (emphasis added). Accepting the protectionist rationale for intervention in Libya inevitably strengthens the role of NATO on the global stage. In their article for Foreign Affairs titled “NATO's Victory in Libya—The Right Way to Run an Intervention,” Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis (Reference Daalder and Stavridis2012) argue the alliance succeeded in protecting civilians and demonstrated that it remained an essential source of stability. Taking into account the highly disputed outcomes of the NATO involvement in Libya, all legitimacy rested on the highly effective framing of the widespread and systematic violence, including rape. This is a problematic development since the protectionist discourse disseminated by the Western officials, academics, and the media is powerful enough to put aside fundamental problems of military campaigns and their generally limited humanitarian potential.
CONCLUSION
The topic of sexual(ized) violence not only attracts enormous international attention but also has become a powerful discursive frame to mobilize controversial political actions in response. Whereas large-scale rape in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon, modern (post–Cold War) conflicts are treated as largely based on the employment of sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war or a tactic of terror. The existing meta-narrative of rape being an actual weapon of war has become deeply embedded in the political legitimization strategies for military intervention. Using rhetoric to fit political agendas and legitimizing military interventions, which in many cases fail to protect civilians, represents a highly problematic development. Here, the suffering of victims of sexual violence is sensationalized and highlighted at the expense of other, often extremely brutal forms of violence and human rights abuses. This article has argued that sensationalizing the suffering of the victims of sexual violence to legitimize highly controversial military interventions does primarily serve the purpose of making international interventions appear more acceptable. Critical rereading of the discourse is thus very important to prevent the reproduction of narratives strategically used to legitimize political projects.
The analysis was based on CDA, using Fairclough's dialectics combined with critical feminist assumptions on sexual violence in armed conflicts. A set of specific legitimization strategies were identified that, in practice, justify sensitive political actions. These are (1) constructing sexual(ized) violence as a weapon of war, (2) condemning concrete architects of the machinery (typically one of the conflicting parties), and (3) proclaiming the urgent need to protect the victims through all necessary means. The discursive strategies in effect reproduce Western domination in the international order, advocated through the trendy rubric of humanitarianism. The selected case study has been celebrated by academics a the successful translation of the R2P concept into practical response actions. Yet a closer look at the sources of legitimacy indicates patterns of manipulation and predominance displayed especially by Western media but also official representatives.
From a critical feminist perspective, labeling rape as a weapon represents a significant step from past popular understanding of sexual violence as a side effect and as collateral damage (leading to inaction and disinterest). Particularly in the context of the widely accepted R2P conception, the strategic nature of sexual(ized) violence became a powerful push factor for external intervention. Therefore, there is a clear tendency to interpret rape as a weapon of war while neglecting the incidents that do not fit the popular image of one-sided, politically motivated attacks. The simplification and often even misperception of the real nature of sexual violence leads to marginalization of other victims, which, paradoxically, contradicts the very principles of impartial humanitarian assistance. Finally, it privileges short-term assertive responses at the expense of more complex, bottom-up, and, most importantly, nonmilitary empowerment of women in violent conflicts.
