In this new study, Robert Cord sets himself a formidable task with a double purpose. His task is to revisit three, contemporary, business-cycle theorists—John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich A. Hayek, and Michal Kalecki—working in the 1930s and attempting to set up their own research schools in Cambridge, London, and, later, in Oxford, respectively. The purpose of this exercise is primarily to explain why Keynes succeeded more than the others in setting the research and policy agenda of the times by applying a new framework of analysis from the research school literature. This framework, based on the work of Jack Morrell and G. L. Geison, “identifies a range of sociological, technical, intellectual and financial factors” (p. i) to explain why one school was successful while the others failed. But, behind this simple reading lies a bolder plan, and this is to transport this framework of analysis from the natural sciences into economics. Therefore, the author uses as a case study the business-cycle debates of the 1930s in order to illuminate one of the most complex episodes in the history of economics, and, in parallel, assess the strengths and weaknesses of this interpretative scheme. This scheme uses a set of fourteen criteria as self-contained compartments that disentangle and organize the complex socio-economic conditions in which research schools are founded, so that the real reasons for the success of a research program are uncovered. These criteria are wide-ranging and are meant to cover all aspects of the research program and its environment. They include issues relating to the leader of the school—for example, his character, his research reputation, and his leadership style; institutional characteristics—for example, the potential of recruiting students and control of publication output as well as availability of funding; and, finally, issues relating to the nature of the research program itself—for example, how focused it is, in what way it creates a new research field, or its use of new experimental techniques.
In his application of this framework in the macroeconomic debates of the 1930s, the author argues that Keynes and his school fulfil most of the criteria, and this is why he was more successful than the other theorists in defining a research program and exporting it to other academic and policy-oriented institutions. Almost all the reasons identified in this study are, to some extent, known to researchers. However, the novelty of this work is not diminished by this fact, as the author’s contribution is to organize this material in a new way and in a rigorous fashion by applying the aforementioned rubric. He does this with a skill and an organizational capacity that, I think, cannot be surpassed, creating a narrative that is both convincing and tightly held together without veering into unnecessary digressions. His language is plain in a sophisticated manner, and avoids cumbersome terminology. This makes his book accessible to a more general readership interested in the debates of the 1930s or in using this framework of analysis in further research.
This leads me to consider two interlinked but distinct questions that lie at the center of this research endeavor. First, how successful was the application of this framework in this case study? Second, what does this tell us more generally about the formation of successful research schools in the field of economics? I will attempt to answer these questions in turn.
As this framework was primarily devised for the natural sciences, the way research schools function in economics or, at least, did in the 1930s is, in some aspects, quite different. This makes the fit of the framework with the case study less than perfect. For example, issues of funding are substantially different in the two fields. As the author notes, “the successful establishment of a Keynesian research school was probably less dependent on funding compared with the predominantly laboratory-based disciplines examined by the likes of Morrell and Geison” (p. 88). But these are only minor issues, and the core framework seems to sit well with the case study chosen with only minor adjustments and allowances. At least, this is true of Keynes and Hayek, because Kalecki, and the special place he usually occupies in narrative histories of the period, cannot easily be created in this scheme. However, even this is in some way instructive, as it shows the limits of this scheme, and that the framework is not an algorithm to be applied mechanically across case studies, but needs to shape and, to some degree, be shaped by what is investigated.
Nevertheless, there must be limits to this flexibility; otherwise, the case study cannot lead to abstract findings on how research schools in general succeed in this discipline. On this point, it is easy to argue that some contributing factors important in the 1930s are of equal importance today; for example, control of prestige publication outlets was central to the coalescing school of Keynesians then as it is to any successful research school today. Similar arguments can be made for how focused the research is, whether it really opens up a new research field, or applies new statistical or other techniques. Interestingly, Keynes’ ambiguous relation to the then-new, developing, accounting and statistical methods has been captured well in this study. Keynes gave his active support to new work in national income accounting, such as Colin Clark’s The National Income 1924–1931, and, at the same time, was highly critical of the new econometric methods that were developing at the time. His attack on them is manifested in “Professor Tinbergen’s Method.” However, this behavior was not arbitrary and cannot simply be boiled down to base motives of the form of accepting only statistical findings that are in support of his theory and furthering his research program. It is based on deeper beliefs with respect to the use of econometric testing, and its relation to economic theories. Keynes asks, “Can the statistical test, nevertheless, prove a theory to be incorrect?” and, after Tinbergen’s broadly affirmative answer, he adds, “But is not this going too far?” (1987, XIV, p. 307). This view concerns the link between research programs in economics and the social factors that they attempt to explain. How this link fares in different epochs of economic theory and between different research programs remains an open discussion to this day.
The fact that this framework, at least as it is used in this study, cannot genuinely engage with these deeper methodological questions of coherence between competing research projects, or of the relation between the new, developing research schools and events in the social sphere is, to my mind, its only substantial flaw. This link has been the domain of more traditional methodological work—for example, by Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos—and this work is surveyed briefly in the third chapter. Not going down this path has some advantages, as complicated and unresolved questions relating to growth of knowledge in economics can be sidestepped. For example, the author does not need to defend his use of the term ‘Keynesian Revolution,’ as his use is not open to an attack of the form that Kuhnian-type revolutions cannot be “stories of short lived triumphs” (Leijonhufvud 1976, p. 84). His use of the term appears more generic, relying partly on convention, as the author makes, it seems, no specific semantic reference to any broader theory of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that these methodological questions, complicated and contentious as they are, cannot be avoided.
In summary, then, this book breaks new ground in the literature of the Keynesian revolution and what happened in the 1930s. It occupies a unique place by unifying and codifying a substantial amount of information on the period and its main actors, thereby contributing to a ‘thick’ historical narrative. It is, however, ‘thin’ in relation to traditional methodological work, and it cannot, therefore, deal with a range of interesting questions. For example, are we today, after the recent financial crisis, at the verge of a new revolution in the discipline? If yes, why? if not, why not? The criteria identified in this study are part of the answer, but cannot by themselves lead to the whole answer.
Finally, it is worth noting that the author and this book signify the end of another research school in Cambridge. Robert Cord dedicates the book to Geoff Harcourt, and he was Harcourt’s last PhD student in Cambridge, before Harcourt returned permanently to Australia. Any researcher who has worked under Harcourt’s guidance will know of his unique style infused by the oral tradition of the post-Keynesian school he has come, for some of us, to embody. This style, verbal but also formal, wide-ranging but also precise, is captured extremely well in this book. In fact, here we find something more important than an interview in a video or on stage where this style is exhibited in vivo. We find the end product; a treatise written by an academic who has found his own voice through years of conversation. For this, and for providing us with this unique piece of scholarship, the author must be congratulated.
