In the beginning of modern German diplomacy is the Wilhelmstraße, the seat of the Foreign Ministry building in Berlin. With many Wilhelmstraße diplomats serving both the Weimar Republic and seamlessly transitioning into serving Hitler's Third Reich from 1933 to 1945, their service to the new postwar “Bonn Republic” was tainted. Thomas Maulucci's comprehensive analysis is both a study in continuities and discontinuities in post-World War II West German foreign policy and a deeply researched prosopography with mental maps of the Wilhelmstraße veterans in the Federal Republic's newly created Foreign Office in March 1951. This fine study belongs in every research library.
Maulucci's book is also a subtle study of Konrad Adenauer's indomitable role in the genesis of postwar West German foreign policy and his gargantuan struggle to wrest increasing powers for his government from the occupation powers. This moment came on May 5, 1955, when West Germany had its full sovereignty and equality restored (minus some Allied “reserve powers” on German reunification and in Berlin). Adenauer relentlessly maneuvered through the growing Cold-War tensions. His reliable anticommunist policy managed to anchor the Federal Republic (FRG) in the west. His policy of “Westbindung” resulted in the FRG's integration into a rapidly unifying Europe (West German membership in the Marshall Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Economic Communities), as well as rearmament and NATO membership only ten years after the end of the devastating defeat in World War II. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, Germany was “treated as an equal in an international forum” for the first time (not in the Schuman Plan, as the author suggests [p. 111]).
West German officials began to plead for the right to negotiate trade missions and payments deals as a first step toward wider “foreign policy rights” (p. 49). The spring 1948 London decisions led to closer coordination of trade policies in the western zones and the consolidation of policies leading to the founding of the FRG in 1949. Wilhelmstraße veterans, denazified with “Persilscheine,” came crawling out of the woodwork and began to operate in “shadow” foreign offices (p. 51) such as the Marshall Plan administration and the Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen. British diplomats early on agreed with the “old gang” coming back for reasons of expertise and efficiency, as long as the “notorious ‘bad hats’ are kept out” (p. 52).
The Wilhelmstraße veterans used a strategy of “creating a plausible collective history” (p. 79) to exonerate themselves from the taint of collaboration with the Nazi regime. In this tale of “two Foreign Offices,” the bad Nazis responsible for criminal activities operated out of Ribbentrop's foreign ministry, while the career Wilhelmstraße veterans stayed on after 1933 to prevent the worst; they had little to do with policy making and many opposed the Hitler regime. This master narrative prevailed in the new postwar Foreign Office, yet these myths were regularly contested. Top diplomats such as Ernst von Weizsäcker were put on trial. The Neue Zeitung posited the collective guilt of all German civil servants who served the Nazi regime (p. 80). The communist and socialist press condemned the restoration of the “reactionary clique” of diplomats (p. 86). The Frankfurter Rundschau published a series of articles that impugned Wilhelmstraße veterans who served in the FRG's new Foreign Office with participation in Nazi war crimes and cast doubt on their resistance activities (p. 161).
Meanwhile the new chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, seized the foreign affairs agenda as the occupation powers handed over more power to the West Germans. In June 1950 a new Office for Foreign Affairs was created in the chancellery run by Herbert Blankenhorn, also a Wilhelmstraße veteran (p. 97). Blankenhorn failed to expunge Adenauer's deep mistrust of the “old gang” in the Foreign Office. In 1950-51, Adenauer gave numerous interviews condemning the occupation powers' discriminatory practices against West German diplomacy but also emphasizing his commitment to western integration and rearmament. The secretive and increasingly isolated old man (“Der Alte”) failed to keep the West German parliament and top officials in the Auswärtiges Amt informed. Adenauer benefited from growing Cold-War tensions; the Occupation Statute was revised and the FRG received more foreign policy rights, including the right to set up a Foreign Ministry. Maulucci is keen in showing the differences among western occupation powers—the British being the most eager to return powers to the West Germans and the French the most reluctant.
Maulucci's brisk narrative slows down when discussing the organization of the Auswärtiges Amt, the leadership question (Adenauer's refusal to quit his role of foreign minister and sharing of power), as well as the unending debate about Foreign Ministry personnel policy and senior positions for the Wilhelmstraße veterans. The book analysis culminates in the fascinating chapter about the career diplomats' disagreements with Adenauer's strict policy of Westbindung—his lack of interest in reunification. Some career specialists on eastern Europe advocated a policy of maneuvering between east and west; others criticized the chancellor for missing the opportunity to test the sincerity of Stalin's notes of 1952, offering to neutralize and reunify Germany. Adenauer was highly aware of the western powers' “almost pathological” fears of a new “Rapallo” and a West German deal with the U.S.S.R. (p. 227). Wilhelmstraße veterans developed “disengagement” plans for central Europe (e.g., the eventual retreat of occupation armies, leading to a reunified neutral Germany). Blankenhorn suggested to the British at the July 1955 Geneva Summit a plan to offer “German neutrality in return for unification” (p. 239). Maulucci fails to connect these ideas with Kennan's disengagement plan for Germany and with the successful neutralization of Austria in 1955, serving as a model for German foreign policy strategists. Maulucci demonstrates that Wilhelmstraße veterans' thinking on West German foreign policy options was more open than Adenauer's inflexible Westbindung suggested at the time.
