Recent years have not been kind to Congress. Fiscal cliffs, a government shutdown, and frequent filibusters leave many asking if the Legislative Branch can function effectively, if it can function at all. In 2013, public approval of Congress averaged only 14 percent, the lowest level of support ever recorded (http://www.gallup.com/poll/166196/congress-job-approval-drops-time-low-2013.aspx). Within political science, the study of polarization and its deleterious effects on Congress is more than a growth industry; it is approaching monopoly status within the field. The provocative title of Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein’s recent book on congressional dysfunction, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks (2012), captures the sentiment.

Cutting against the grain of popular and scholarly opinion, E. Scott Adler and John D. Wilkerson argue in Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving that most of the time Congress acts in a responsible way to address the needs of the nation. Furthermore, the authors argue, Congress is structured in a manner that enhances the problem-solving capacity of the institution and its members. If they had included a subtitle for this book, it might read, “It’s Actually Better Than It Appears.”

How can this be? One answer is that we tend to focus on conflict rather than consensus. As one congressman lamented, “The House could be passing 15 things, all close to unanimously. But the one that is highly fought is the one that gets 100 percent of the [media] attention” (Jared Polis, D-CO, quoted on p. 209). As Adler and Wilkerson point out, the vast majority of lawmaking takes place through bipartisan compromise rather than partisan conflict. In order to explain why, they offer a problem-solving perspective on Congress at work.

The book is divided into four parts. In Part I, Adler and Wilkinson show that there is an electoral connection to problem solving. Survey research suggests that the public does care about institutional performance: Congressional approval is related to perceptions of problem solving. Moreover, the authors argue, there is a connection between perceived problem-solving capacity and electoral outcomes. Whereas the electoral effects of congressional performance fall mainly on the president’s party under unified government, during divided control the burden of performance falls on both parties equally. In other words, individual members are rewarded or punished at the polls in part on the basis of the overall functioning of Congress in the eyes of the public.

In Part II, Adler and Wilkinson turn from the electoral connection to the internal structure and working of Congress. In contrast to mainstream approaches that downplay or ignore the policy consequences of the committee system, they argue that committees enhance problem-solving capacity through policy-oriented jurisdictions that guide bill referral. Furthermore, Congress frequently acts through temporary legislation, measures that require renewal or reauthorization at some future date, in order to avoid termination or a reversal of policy to some previous state. Together, committee jurisdictions and temporary legislation create incentives for members to invest in problem solving; committee work offers members recurring opportunities to claim credit for legislative accomplishments.

In Parts III and IV, the authors explore the empirical implications of these insights across several important domains of congressional activity. Marshaling a wealth of data and employing a range of sophisticated statistical tests, they reach a number of novel conclusions. First, whereas previous scholars argued that congressional reforms merely codified past practice, Adler and Wilkinson show that the reforms of the 1970s reordered committee jurisdictions in ways that enhanced the problem-solving capacity of Congress (Chapter 6). Second, in contrast to accounts that highlight the role of legislative entrepreneurs, they show that committee members exercise the greatest influence over legislative outcomes, particularly on compulsory issues, such as recurring legislation and pressing problems (Chapter 7). Third, in contrast to scholarship that emphasizes changes in partisan control and other macropolitical factors, Adler and Wilkinson find that a key predictor of the congressional agenda and actual policy change is the need to address expiring provisions of law (Chapters 8 and 9). In other words, Congress responds to the problem-solving demands of the policymaking process.

This book is an important corrective to the bulk of scholarship that neglects the policy consequences of lawmaking. Yet in some ways, it presents an overly sanguine view of Congress. Adler and Wilkinson show that much of what Congress does is focused on renewing temporary legislation. But is keeping the machinery of government (barely) running the same thing as problem solving? Perhaps so, but then it is a problem largely of Congress’s own making (given its preference for temporary measures). Put differently, problem solving as the authors define it may not be the same as solving problems if the latter includes a range of pressing issues that Congress appears unwilling or unable to handle.

A second reason to be cautious is that the bulk of the empirical tests used to demonstrate the problem-solving capacity of Congress relies on data from the 1980s and 1990s. This begs the question whether the conditions Adler and Wilkinson describe still hold. The authors address this point in the final chapter, concluding that even in a time of partisan polarization, Congress usually figures out a way to work together. Some readers may remain skeptical, however.

Third, the focus of Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving is almost exclusively on the House of Representatives. As Adler and Wilkinson admit (p. 209), the book does not address the Senate or the consequences of bicameralism for the legislative process. Previous work, however, shows that bicameralism does matter for addressing public problems. As Sarah Binder (2003) documents in Stalemate, differences between the House and Senate are an important source of legislative gridlock; moreover, bicameral roadblocks to addressing the most salient issues of the day increased markedly in the late 1990s. Further evidence comes from Adler and Wilkinson’s own Congressional Bills Project (www.congressionalbills.org), an incredible archive of more than four hundred thousand bills introduced in Congress. In the 110th and 111th Congresses (the most recent complete data available), more than half of bills passed by the House failed to become law due to Senate inaction.

In the years to come, scholars and students will discuss and, in some instances, disagree with Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving. Yet Adler and Wilkinson unquestionably show that Congress frequently acts in a manner that addresses the practical demands of lawmaking and legislation. Political posturing for partisan gain surely takes place, but a closer look reveals that Congress and its members face strong pressures (and structured incentives, accordingly) to get things done. Scholars of the institution are well advised to keep this basic insight in mind.