Yiğit Akın sets the tone of When the War Came Home: The Ottomans’ Great War and the Devastation of an Empire by opening with Yaşar Kemal's impressions of how ordinary people remembered the conflict, so far as this could be perceived through Anatolian laments and ballads—“war is described in these accounts as carnage that includes blood, tears, fear, pain, and sorrow, but not heroism or pride” (1). Much like these folk memories, there are no heroes to be found in When the War Came Home, either.
When the War Came Home is an engaging and richly sourced social history of the Ottomans’ Great War. It opens with a lengthy prelude. The first chapter discusses the impact of the Balkan “disaster” and the second focuses on mobilization through the declarations of war. Together, these chapters emphasize how the Unionists came out of the Balkan experience ready to “adopt a more coercive stance towards society and implement new measures to exercise state power in more direct and diversified ways” (22). Perceived weaknesses were addressed with the drive to devote more human and material resources to the military, a process accelerated by an uncompromising Enver Pasha becoming war minister. These chapters also suggest a tight alliance between the government and the fourth estate, which actively reinforced Unionist interpretations of the defeat and echoed the shift in how the constituency was regarded. With Ottomanism giving way to an Islamized discourse and class biases being revealed, the “rhetoric of equal distribution of sacrifice” (64) was already undermined by the time jihad was declared on November 14, 1914. Akın follows this run-up to the war by laying out the severity of the “devastation” inscribed in the title of his work.
The chapter titled “Filing the Ranks, Emptying Homes” focuses on the conscripts and government unpreparedness for war. Inadequacy revealed itself in the failure to properly feed, clothe, shelter, transport, and tend to the injuries of those taken into the ranks. When numbers inevitably depleted, Unionists did not hesitate to replenish with those previously considered too young, too old, or too traumatized to serve. Nor did conscription unfold in the same manner for all; Akın explains how non-Muslims were humiliated by being disarmed, stripped of uniforms, and exploited for manual labor, for example. Under such discouraging circumstances, the government relied on intensified propaganda efforts to maintain consent. “Feeding the Army, Starving the People” shifts to how total war “obliterated the distinction between the battlefront and the home front” (143). Those left behind were made deprived and vulnerable when boys and men—even sole breadwinners—were taken for the war effort. But requisitioning, which gave the government a right to their homes, beasts, and fruits of labor, combined with the effects of the empire transitioning from importing basic necessities to sudden self-reliance (e.g., for coal and flour) had a dismal impact on morale. The grim new reality was hunger and breadlines, famine and epidemics, agricultural downturn and currency depreciation. The following chapter, “In the Home: Wives and Mothers,” directs the reader's attention to the war's transformative impact on the relationship between the state and female members of society. This became more direct and demanding and the change came in tandem with women being forced to carry the burden of new weights—among others, the duties of absent and conscripted men, the loads of requisitioned beasts, and the weight of those who beat and raped them in their own homes. Sexual exploitation and violence are an uncomfortable and less-spoken aspect of the war that Akın brings the readers’ attention to. Finally, “On the Road: Deportees and Refugees” demonstrates how the Balkan Wars’ imprint on the Unionist's outlook, which Akın had devoted so much space to in his prelude to the war, came to impact those who were displaced by it. He reiterates how “the forced deportation of Armenians and the flight of Muslim refugees from the enemy were two categorically different forms of population displacement” (163) and explains how Unionist investment in the welfare of each “differed fundamentally” (164) by elaborating on how the government took wartime conditions as an opportunity for demographic engineering and deprived Armenians of the kinds of precautions that were taken to prevent Muslim refugees from perishing, and often overlooked or itself perpetrated violence. The author concludes by reemphasizing the trauma of the war, and the people's loss of confidence in the government.
When the War Came Home is a welcome contribution to a growing body of literature that has flourished with the war's centennial. Taking its place among works that seek to reevaluate established narratives and grant more complexity to the Ottoman engagement in the conflict, Akın helps us better understand the impact of the war on ordinary people. He does not write of valor or great figures. Nor does he glorify Gallipoli protagonists or demonize Arab Revolt antagonists. On the contrary, he humanizes desertion—both moral and physical—and presents a history that speaks of death and destruction. Akın pins the figure of Mehmetçik, with all his “altruism, courage, modesty, and, most important, a sincere willingness to sacrifice in the name of the greater Ottoman cause” (93) against the rhymes of the dear ones left behind. In poverty and sorrow, they lamented over seventeen-year-old boys who were gathered to die. The newspaper declaration that “soldiers who rushed to the borders to defend religion, chastity, honor, life, and property of the nation […] should not be concerned with the needs of their families” (157) is contrasted with revelations that these were the very things trampled upon in the homes that soldiers left their wives and mothers in. “Devastation” weighs heavier with each juxtaposition between official and civilian versions of the war, even if, despite the author's best intentions, the folk reminiscences still overwhelmingly animate the experiences of the core constituency rather than the whole population. This does not detract from the book, however. When the War Came Home is not a comprehensive history but an examination of hitherto neglected dynamics between the people and the state, and it successfully presents “a new perspective on the disintegration of the empire” (196). The damage is foreshadowed in an unnamed Damascene's reaction to aggressive deforestation that was meant to compensate for the coal shortage: “the hungry locomotives had to be fed, even if the country will bleed for years to come” (128). Such impulse and lack of foresight can be extended to Akın's interpretation of how Unionist policies led to disintegration. Exploitative measures and “ruinous wartime policies” (196) created a sense of resentment and eroded the government's legitimacy. The author thus persuasively makes the case that at the end of the war, the Ottoman government had not only lost the contest to opposing belligerents, but also to its own people.
