Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2004
I have argued that because human sexual reproduction inevitably involves the creation and destruction of embryos, it is a problematic activity for those who believe that the embryo is “one of us.” Or, if it is not a problematic activity, then neither is the creation and destruction of embryos for a purpose of comparable moral seriousness—the development of lifesaving therapy, for example. I assume that, whereas it is possible for the very first act of unprotected intercourse to result in a live human baby, and hence not in a given case cause any embryo loss, this is a rare event and that, statistically, for every live birth from three to five embryos must be created only to die. For dramatic effect, I assume that five is a reasonable figure, giving each embryo a 20% chance of survival; however, nothing in the argument depends on any specific figures being correct.Søren Holm has been an important source of ideas for this paper. Julian Savulescu has also been very generous in commenting in detail on this paper, and I have taken account of the critique that I have received.
I have argued that because human sexual reproduction inevitably involves the creation and destruction of embryos, it is a problematic activity for those who believe that the embryo is “one of us.”1
My colleague Maurizio Mori (personal communication) gives the following account of the origin of the expression “the embryo, one of us”:
The story is the following: It was used by Prof. Francesco D'Agostino, Chair of the Italian National Ethics Committee, when he presented the result of the Report of the Italian National Committee for Bioethics to the media in 1996. He said more precisely that the Committee had stated that “the human embryo is to be treated as one of us.”
Of course, it was immediately shortened to the more famous form. There is, however, at least one book with such a title: Concetti G. L'embrione uno di noi. Rome: Vivere In; 1997.
I say “very first act” because obviously all babies that result from sexual reproduction result from a single act of intercourse. If there have been others in a different cycle, there have probably been early miscarriages. Robert Winston gave the figure of five embryos for every live birth some years ago in a personal communication. Anecdotal evidence to me from a number of sources confirms this high figure, but the literature is rather more conservative, which makes more probable a figure of three embryos lost for every live birth. See: Boklage CE. Survival probability of human conceptions from fertilization to term. International Journal of Fertility 1990;35(2):75–94. See also: Leridon H. Human Fertility: The Basic Components. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1977. Again, in a recent personal communication, Henri Leridon confirmed that a figure of three lost embryos for every live birth is a reasonable conservative figure.
Julian Savulescu thinks I am wrong about this3
Savulescu J. Embryo research: are there any lessons from natural reproduction? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13(1):68–75.
Harris argues that there is no difference between intending to bring about an outcome and merely foreseeing it. One example he gives is that it would be wrong to use a mobile phone near a pregnant woman if using that phone exposed the woman to a high chance of having a miscarriage.
For Harris, if
Harris assumes, plausibly, that we have as much reason to save an existing life as we do to bring a new life into existence. He also assumes, again plausibly, that embryo research will result in the saving of existing lives….
Harris's mobile phone example is important. The mobile phone user in his example violates a principle of nonmaleficence. Nonmaleficence is usually defined as “not harming.” But we should clarify or extend this definition to include not exposing people to unreasonable risks of harm. The moral of the mobile phone story is that we should not expose people to unreasonable risks….
It is debatable whether natural reproduction imposes any risk at all on any embryo. The risk of dying (let us assume it is 80%) is inherent to the embryo's nature. It is not as if the same embryo could have been created without that chance of dying.
Let us assume for argument's sake, however, that natural reproduction can be said in some sense to have imposed an 80% chance of dying on the embryo. This is very high. If I gave you a drug that had an 80% chance of killing you, I would be acting very wrongly. But in deciding whether this risk is reasonable to impose on the embryo, we must ask what the alternative is. In the embryo's case, the alternative is nonexistence.
These are rich passages, and many issues are raised. As Savulescu notes, “the moral of the mobile phone story is that we should not expose people to unreasonable risks.” I agree; but Savulescu assumes the following definition of reasonable risk: “risks on the embryo can be acceptable if it is the best strategy to improve the chances of that embryo having a healthy, happy life as a person.”
I agree with Savulescu that, if the alternative is nonexistence, a rational embryo would wish to run the risk of death, or less problematically, it is a risk that represents a “good bet” for the embryo because it offers that embryo's only chance of a worthwhile life.4
Like Savulescu, I am happy to ignore the problem of attributing rationality to brainless entities.
See: Harris J. Pro-life is anti-life: the problematic claims of pro-life positions in ethics. In: Häyry M, Takala T, eds. Scratching the Surface of Bioethics. Amsterdam: Rodopi; 2003.
I introduced the mobile phone example for a rather different purpose—namely, to show that the intentions of the agent do not make a scrap of moral difference and that the doctrine of double effect had no purchase on these cases. Savulescu is therefore right, but wrong, that “[t]he principle that drives intuitions about the wrongness of mobile phone use in Harris's example does not bear on natural reproduction at all.” My suggestion was that, if we know that using a mobile phone within 50 meters of a pregnant woman involves a high probability of causing miscarriage, then we are responsible for that miscarriage and mobile phone use would probably be indefensible in circumstances in which it might pose such a risk. He is right that it is unlike natural reproduction, because mobile phone use in no way serves the embryo's interests; but wrong because it does illustrate a different point about what is involved in natural reproduction—namely, that, once you know that an activity causes harm and you persist in that activity, you are responsible for the harm caused, irrespective of your intentions or hopes about whether harm will occur. This was and is a main part of my argument, and the purpose of the mobile phone example was primarily to illustrate this “truth.”
In taking me to task for my imperfect understanding of the idea of what is wrong with instrumentalization, Savulescu says:
Harris claims that Catholics and prolife advocates “are treating the 1–4 embryos that must be sacrificed in natural reproduction as a conscious (though not intended) means to have a live birth.”
This may be so. It is important to distinguish, however, between being treated as a means and as a mere means (as Harris himself has done in many of his other articles). Kant's dictum is that one should treat human beings always as an end, never merely as a means. It is only the latter that Kantians object to and that represents instrumentalization.
Here is the difference between being treated as a means (and also as an end) and being treated as a mere means:
Creating embryos by natural reproduction does not instrumentalize them as mere means even if they are highly likely to die.
Harris claims, “Given that decisions to attempt to have children using sexual reproduction as the method (or even decisions to have unprotected intercourse) inevitably create embryos that must die …” This is false. Some people fall pregnant the first time they try to have a child. These acts of sexual reproduction do not create embryos that must die. So, it is not inevitable that engaging in sexual reproduction results in embryos that must die, even if it is highly likely.
Let me deal with the point of agreement first. Savulescu is again almost right when he says:
This is false. Some people fall pregnant the first time they try to have a child. These acts of sexual reproduction do not create embryos that must die. So, it is not inevitable that engaging in sexual reproduction results in embryos that must die, even if it is highly likely.
I say “almost right” because I meant that the social practice of sexual reproduction involving, as it does, “decisions to attempt to have children using sexual reproduction as the method (or even decisions to have unprotected intercourse) inevitably create embryos that must die.” This is true even though in individual sexual practice some rare successful pregnancies occur “first time” and were not preceded or indeed followed by acts of intercourse that result in early miscarriage. This can happen, but I doubt there are many instances! The issue is not whether a successful pregnancy can or cannot result from a single act of intercourse, because obviously it can; but whether the institution of sexual reproduction is one that inevitably causes the deaths of large numbers of embryos and is therefore one that embryo rightists should think wrong.
Again, Savulescu is right when he says “it is important to distinguish between being treated as a means and as a mere means.” This is something on which, as he notes, I have always insisted. However, experience has taught me that, whereas I always insist on this distinction, those who most commonly employ it in these contexts almost never pay attention to this distinction or they use it where, as is usually the case in human reproduction, there are multiple purposes at play, some purely instrumental and others not.6
See, for example: Kahn A. Clone mammals … clone man. Nature 1997;386:119. Also, see my responses: Harris J. Is cloning an attack on human dignity? Nature 1997;387:754; Harris J. Cloning and bioethical thinking. Nature 1997;389:433.
Emphasis added.
Savulescu uses two different ideas to get at this concept. The first concerns what people want or try to achieve:
They do everything they can to help that embryo become a baby, but, alas, it dies from natural causes. They treated it as a means to having a child but also did everything they could to help it to survive, and so also treated it as an end in itself.
I am far from convinced that simply doing everything possible, at a certain stage in the proceedings, to help the embryo become a baby is nearly enough to avoid a telling charge of instrumentalization or of using the embryo as a mere means.
Suppose that reproduction worked in the following way. A cycle in which an embryo would miscarry was always followed by a cycle in which an embryo would go to term. Then, despite the parents doing “everything they can to help that embryo to become a baby,” treating “it as a means to having a child but also [doing] everything they could to help it to survive, and so also treat[ing] it as an end in itself,” it would nonetheless have been treated instrumentally—as a mere means because, despite the best endeavors and the hopes and intentions of the parents, it could not in those circumstances be other than a means. The only reason for conceiving an embryo in cycle one would be as a precursor to the subsequent successful pregnancy. This shows that willingness to do everything possible to help the embryo survive is not sufficient to exculpate the agents from the charge of instrumentalization. Indeed, it would be difficult for anyone to claim with a straight face that they did not in such circumstances fully intend the death of the first embryo.8
Savulescu (personal communication) is perhaps one exception. He claims that, provided couples would raise the first embryo as a baby and love it, if it miraculously survived, and this is their primary intention, then they are not intending the death of the embryo in the relevant sense, though they do foresee it.
Savulescu insists that in this case “the embryo is not harmed. The parents could conceive it, hoping for a miracle. It is not a mere means, whereas killing an embryo to take its stem cells to treat another embryo would constitute instrumentalization, would be using it as a mere means.”9
Savulescu J. Personal communication.
There are two issues here; one is what we mean by “harming.” Savulescu seems to be relying on the idea that harm means “made worse off than it would otherwise be.” This is a classic account of harm used most influentially by Joel Feinberg.10
Feinberg J. Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press; 1984. See especially pp. 102–4.
See: Harris J. Wonderwoman and Superman. New York: Oxford University Press; 1992:chap. 4. See especially pp. 84–92.
Savulescu J. Personal communication.
See note 12, Savulescu.
Imagine conjoined twins, Tom and Dick, who share a heart. Both will die, let us say within a year, if not separated immediately. It is equally easy to save either, but both cannot survive separation. The parents decide to save Tom, although even as Dick dies they want him to live and do “everything they can to help” him survive. His death is instrumental to the independent existence of Tom despite these heroic but futile efforts.14
This is not far from some of the material facts of a real recent case. See: Harris J. Conjoined twin non-persons. Medical Law Review 2001;9 (3):221–36. I have clarified this case in the light of comments from Julian Savulescu.
This case, like those of embryos, raises the question of how to characterize instrumentalization in cases where the individual allegedly instrumentalized is not competent to consent for himself. Where the individual can consent and does so, there is usually no scope for the claim that the individual consenting to being part of someone else's project has been instrumentalized. In such a case, they have thereby adopted their role in another's project as a project of their own. Absent the possibility of consent, we have to find another symptom or sign of instrumentalization.15
For an elaboration of this concept of instrumentalization, see note 12, Harris 1992:122–7.
Savulescu J. Personal communication.
For a precise explanation why, see note 15, Harris 2001.
So, we are left with Savulescu's second idea. This he develops in the following way:
Harris gives an example of what he believes is instrumentalization: “A woman has two fertilized eggs and is told it is certain that if she implants both only one will survive but that if she implants only one it will not survive. Would she be wrong to implant two embryos to ensure a successful singleton pregnancy?”
This is not instrumentalization. What is characteristic about instrumentalization is that it reduces the chance of an embryo surviving for some other purpose. In this case, however, there is no such reduction in its chances in this case. Both embryos have the greatest chance of surviving that they could have. Each is in this way treated as an end in itself, even if this is a means to increasing the chances of a couple having a baby.
Savulescu seems to be relying on the idea that both embryos have the greatest chance of surviving that they could have to show that they have not in fact been instrumentalized. This does not seem to me to defeat the idea of instrumentalization, however. To use an individual as an instrument is to use her as a means to an end and not an end in herself. In my example, one embryo is inevitably used as a means to the survival of the second, despite the wishes or hopes of any third parties, including the parents, that she also survives and despite the fact that this is the best chance for that embryo. The woman implants two because she knows it is the best way to maximize the survival chances of one of them. She wants both to survive but, because she knows and accepts that one will die and still goes ahead, she accepts the death of one of the embryos as a price she (and it) must pay to achieve the birth of a child. It does not matter (or if it does, Savulescu nowhere shows that it does) that we do not know in advance which of the two embryos must die. This is a perfectly reasonable and sensible way of understanding instrumentalization, although it is not Savulescu's way. It is consistent with Kant's idea of using an individual as a mere means. Of course, neither Savulescu nor I think that it would be wrong for the woman to act in this way; but embryo rightists, or those who classically employ the Kantian dictum, as Savulescu calls it, often do.18
Elsewhere I have given an account of exploitation that gives more substance to Kant's ideas, but it does not apply to the case of those who, like embryos, cannot give consent or adopt the projects of others as their own. See note 12, Harris 1992:98–139. Savulescu (personal communication) objects that, even if this is the correct account of instrumentalization, it cannot be the correct account of wrongful instrumentalization. This account would imply that an artist drawing a baby or photographing an unrecognizable part of a baby's body was necessarily wrong because it was instrumentalization. However, determining if this use of a baby is wrong turns plausibly on whether its parents or legal guardians consent to it or on whether the act harms the baby.
Consider a public health measure like vaccination against a deadly disease where there is a significant death rate from vaccination but less than would happen in the population without vaccination. Here we both agree that vaccination is fully justifiable. Although the public health authorities do not want anyone to die, from their perspective the inevitable vaccination causalities are purely instrumental. They are a means to public health; they are a price deemed worth paying for the sake of the gain. What of the parents' decision to vaccinate their particular child? Here things are more complicated, but it is not clear that even here the parents are not in part treating their child instrumentally, because of the free-rider problem. The free-rider problem is this: where most people are vaccinating their children, it is in the interests of any particular child and their parents not to be vaccinated and to ride free on the backs of the beneficial so-called herd effect that protects all, because most are vaccinated. If, despite the fact that they could be free riders, individual parents have their child vaccinated, they are taking a public health perspective and to that extent treating their child instrumentally, as a means to public health, despite the fact that they are possibly also motivated by fairness to other families.
Savulescu frequently objects to my use of the term “sacrifice” in connection with embryos that die in natural reproduction. He says:
Harris frequently uses the term “sacrifice”—but no embryos are sacrificed in natural reproduction. Each gets the greatest chance it could have of living. Sacrifice implies instrumentalization—sacrifice for some purpose. However, the fact that each embryo”gets the greatest chance it could have of living” does not, as I have discussed, negate the idea of sacrifice nor the idea of instrumentalization.19
According to Savulescu, it may negate the charge of wrongful instrumentalization (personal communication).
Suppose there is a genotype that enables an embryo to go to term but that it will surely die shortly after birth, at which point its organs can be safely harvested; the baby being, let us assume, on life support long enough to effect safe harvesting. I need vital organs for my existing child and as “luck”20
I hope the irony does not need stress here.
There is an important distinction between antecedent and actual interests that is relevant here. I borrowed it from Ronald Dworkin a long time ago:
In discussing the implausibility of enforcing antecedent interests in the name of consent, Ronald Dworkin uses an interesting illustration that is germane here. He asks us to imagine something like the following scenario. If I possess a lottery ticket which I bought for one pound, it may be in my interests antecedently to the draw, to sell the ticket to you for one hundred pounds. However once the draw has taken place and I have won a million pounds, it cannot be just for you to force me to surrender the ticket for one hundred pounds even if is true that I would have consented to sell it to you for that sum had you asked me antecedently to the draw. So even judgements about antecedent interests which are conceded, by the relevant agent, to be entirely accurate, provide no adequate reason for enforcing decisions which are not in an agent's actual interests.
The natural lottery of health … is surely like this. Even if it were true that I would have consented to a particular distribution of health resources before I know what I need; it does not follow that it would be fair to enforce that particular distribution on me when I know it is not in my actual interests. There may, as Dworkin notes, be a plausible independent argument for the justice of such a distribution, but it cannot be based on presumptions of consent based on judgments about antecedent interests.21
See: Harris J. More and better justice. In: Mendus S, Bell M, eds. Philosophy and Medical Welfare. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1988:75–97.
In the cases under consideration, it is clearly in the antecedent interests of all embryos to be part of natural procreation. However, it is only in the actual interests of those who survive to live a reasonable life. It is, therefore, clear that those embryos that die in the attempt do not have their actual interests served by the process. Of course, neither Savulescu nor I think that the embryo has any (or any significant) actual interests, so both of us think that the lottery of existence, whether sexual or artificial, is a good bet for embryos. Savulescu and I do not have to distinguish between antecedent and actual interests in these cases because for us there are no relevant actual interests. But this is not, I believe, true for those who think the embryo is one of us. They think it does have interests in life that must not be trifled with. So that, although the “business of natural procreation” might still be a good bet for embryos (a bet placed before the race is run), and a better bet (at that time) than the alternative, it is not clear that this defeats the idea that those who in fact must die to permit others to have reasonable lives are not treated instrumentally. As Dworkin has shown, their actual interests are not thereby served. Dworkin rightly observes, just as, “it cannot be just for you to force me to surrender the ticket for one hundred pounds even if is true that I would have consented to sell it to you for that sum had you asked me antecedently to the draw.”
Those who think the embryo has rights and interests from conception cannot, therefore, straightforwardly justify the deaths of the unlucky embryos by reference to what was in their antecedent interests, nor even by what they might have agreed to at that time. Although Savulescu's appeal to antecedent interests is attractive, it is flawed. There is a real sense in which these embryos are used instrumentally, despite the plausible claims about their antecedent interests. Their instrumentality is not ascertainable ex ante but only once it is clear that they must die; only at that point do they perhaps become mere instruments. However, nothing Savulescu says shows that actual instrumentality is not real instrumentality, and even if Savulescu does not think it “wrongful instrumentality,” embryo rightists certainly should because they think that at the time it dies the embryo has actual interests and they must think that these are either served or at least not harmed by the death of the embryo.
Again, I insist that, when we know that a practice involves the inevitable deaths of some, and the practice is accepted for the sake of the survivors (why else would we do it at all?22
I do not want to talk here about sexual gratification as a motive. No sex, please—we're British!
One important reason for introducing the distinction between antecedent and actual interests is to demonstrate that, contra Savulescu, an embryo would see no advantage, gain no advantage, from existence in these circumstances. True, it would not be much disadvantaged from Savulescu's (and, for that matter, from my) perspective, but embryo rightists should, I believe, think differently about this case. Although one day of life for a very early embryo is clearly not worse than nonexistence (assuming a painless death), it is not a deal that an embryo would be anxious to strike antecedently, nor is it one that those who care about the embryo would judge to be so clearly in the embryo's interests that they should grasp it for the sake of the embryo. I am certainly not assuming that a short life is worse than nonexistence; simply that in this case it is not obviously significantly better, given that embryos this early experience nothing or nothing significant. However, again it must be emphasized that embryo rightists do regard this early embryonic life as valuable and the death even of these early embryos as bad as the death of any person.
I am not saying that actual interests trump antecedent interests. Rather, I am pointing out that, for those who value the embryo, who regard it as “one of us,” the embryo's interests matter; and it is arguably their actual interests that matter, given that they are supposedly at that time full members of the moral community. This is a difficult exercise for those who do not think the embryo has any interests because they, like Savulescu and I, naturally think that they have taken the interests of the embryo into account and no interests have been harmed. Rather, we have to imagine what it would be for the embryo to have an interest in life, which was created only to be cruelly frustrated. The purpose of my paper was to try to determine what those who think like this must think consistently about both natural procreation and the creation of embryos in pursuit of other goals.
A high proportion of the early embryos that are lost as part of sexual reproduction would have been nonviable from the start, doomed to a very early death from conception because their genetic constitution is incompatible with survival. Although this fact does not make a difference to their moral status,23
Neither for Savulescu nor for I; nor for embryo rightists.
Suppose sexual reproduction worked slightly differently.24
I am grateful to Julian Savulescu for the first part of this suggestion.
We now need to consider the extent to which sexual reproduction raises issues similar to those considered in “The Survival Lottery.” This is pertinent because much of the argument turns on the question of whether the fact that a risk of death that increases the chances of survival not only of the individual who dies but of the population to which the individual belongs makes the imposition of that risk justifiable.
This argument presupposed that organ transplants are a very safe procedure for all organs—the same risks as tonsillectomy. In such circumstances, wherever five people can be saved by organ transplants and no other sources of organs are available, it would be rational and prudent for a society, and all the individuals in it, to adopt the survival lottery (SL). Every member of society is given a lottery number and, where five-plus lives can be saved if one is killed and his organs distributed, a number is picked at random and the bearer of that number is killed. The SL is both rational and prudent; it is in everyone's interests because it reduces their chances of premature death. Nonetheless, most people are against it; not least because they regard it as unjustifiable homicide.25
See: Harris J. The survival lottery. Philosophy 1975;50(191):81–8. It is reprinted inter alia as detailed in: Savulescu, this issue, note 2.
The survival lottery, of course, to which I return in a moment, is different in that it depends for its plausibility on its acceptance by the community in which it would operate, on its satisfaction of the prudential and moral interests of the participants in the lottery. The exact parallel with sexual reproduction would be a survival lottery applied to children below the age of consent; for here, those who think such children are “of us” must decide what to do for them that best protects their rights and interests and gives them the best chance of life.
Savulescu concludes by saying:
Does destructive research impose unreasonable risk on the embryo? There are two ways in which we can avoid violating a principle of nonmaleficence. The first is to argue that the embryo is not the kind of being that can be harmed by being killed. This is to deny that the embryo has a moral status.
The second is to argue that the embryo that is killed has not been exposed to an unreasonable risk. I have argued, after Harris [note 2: Harris J. Survival lottery. In: Harris J, ed. Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001:300–15.], that if the embryo is a part of a population of embryos that will benefit from a practice of killing some, then killing may not be wrong [note 3: Savulescu J. The embryonic stem cell lottery and the cannibalization of human beings. Bioethics 2002;16(6):508–29.]. Whether it is wrong turns on the fraction of ART embryos that are killed and what the benefits are to that population. If stem cell therapies will benefit that population in significant ways, then this may be enough to justify killing some.
Contra Savulescu, I had attempted a third way, although I accept, and have elsewhere argued for, both of Savulescu's solutions. My third way was to attempt to show that, because natural sexual reproduction is accepted by all of those who are not attracted to the first two ways, they either have to renounce sexual reproduction or accept that sacrificing embryos for a moral purpose comparable in moral importance with that of creating a new child is also justifiable. Despite Savulescu's ingenious arguments, I still think this third way is viable and that it adds to the strength of the other two that both he and I accept and rely on.
However, when Savulescu asks: “Does destructive research impose unreasonable risk on the embryo?” and answers by suggesting that “there are two ways in which we can avoid violating a principle of nonmaleficence,” he points out (and indeed concedes) that it is also only these two ways that can rescue embryo research from the charge that it involves unacceptable maleficence. I believe that these are also the only two ways in which sexual reproduction could be made acceptable to embryo rightists, because sexual reproduction involves the voluntary acceptance of the deaths and instrumental use of embryos. Embryo rightists must, I believe, abjure sexual reproduction, find another justification for it, or concede that experiments on and use of embryos for comparably serious moral purposes are acceptable, which was precisely my claim.
When Savulescu says
I have argued, after Harris, that if the embryo is a part of a population of embryos which will benefit from a practice of killing some, then killing may not be wrong, whether it is wrong turns on the fraction of ART embryos which are killed and what the benefits are to that population. If stem cell therapies will benefit that population in significant ways, then this may be enough to justify killing some.
I agree wholeheartedly, but he has thereby conceded the very point of mine against which he has directed so much brilliance. For this is the survival lottery! And whereas I have always defended its compelling rationality, no embryo rightists nor indeed most other people (apart, dare I claim, from Savulescu and myself) are remotely attracted to it.
Savulescu and I agree that, if something will benefit a particular population in significant ways, then this may be enough to justify killing some members of that population for the benefit of others. So, although sexual reproduction does not involve the direct killing of embryos, the deaths of 80% of the embryos that are created in sexual reproduction are justified, according to both Savulescu and myself, because those deaths benefit the population of embryos in significant ways. If killing some members of the relevant population would be justified, then a fortiori creating similar numbers who must die prematurely is justifiable. The only remaining question is whether this instrumentalizes those created only to die. On this point Savulescu and I continue to differ.
In the survival lottery, something that can legitimately be characterized as deliberate killing, and also as instrumentalizing those who die for the benefit of those who live, inexorably takes place. Of course, sexual reproduction is different. Savulescu is trading on the idea that, because none of the candidate population will exist without the practice of sexual reproduction, and one-fifth of those created will survive, it is, like procreation in conditions of high infant mortality, fully justified. I agree with Savulescu that it is fully justified and justifiable conduct, but then I have no reason to disagree with him about this—after all, I invented the survival lottery! The question, however, is whether it is justifiable conduct for those who think that deliberately creating a life to protect other lives, or deliberately creating a life that will not come into being as a human person but is destined only to die, is justifiable. As I have noted, embryo rightists usually object to IVF and to the creation of “spare” embryos for just this reason, so they should consistently object to the creation of spare embryos as a result of sexual procreation.
I believe I have shown that sexual reproduction is like other unacceptable (to many) practices that involve instrumentalization and a forbidden type of killing (or of the deliberate ending of the lives) of the innocent. My main point has been that sexual reproduction creates doomed spare embryos in ways sufficiently analogous to assisted reproduction technology (ART) to make sexual reproduction unacceptable if ART is unacceptable. Savulescu's response commits him to the view that “if the embryo is a part of a population of embryos that will benefit from the practice of killing some, then killing may not be wrong. Whether it is wrong turns on the fraction of ART embryos that are killed and what the benefits are to that population.” Again, I agree. But, whereas Savulescu insists that in sexual reproduction no embryos are killed and that this makes it different, I insist that sexual reproduction does involve deliberate sacrifice of embryos and, therefore, that it amounts to the same thing. We disagree in that Savulescu thinks that, because it is not an unreasonable risk of death for the embryos, it is not somehow deliberate sacrifice of embryos in a way that embryo rightists, in other contexts, disapprove of. The beautiful woman26
For Savulescu and the properties of beautiful women, see: Savulescu, this issue.
Let me finish by discussing three fairly exact analogies to sexual reproduction that I believe Savulescu is already committed to accepting or that he ought (morally and logically) to accept. None of these analogies is acceptable to embryo rightists. The first is a survival lottery for children below an age that they can make autonomous decisions for themselves. If the assumptions of the survival lottery are right—that all who participate would, because of their participation, have a better chance of living to a ripe old age than they would in a community without the survival lottery or with parents that did not enter them in the lottery—then not only is the lottery in all those children's interests, but it is also obvious that a caring and good parent would be right to include their child in the lottery and wrong not to. The SL for kids is ethical and passes the Savulescu test that I adapt here: If the child is a part of a population of children that will benefit from a practice of killing some, then killing may not be wrong, whether it is wrong turns on the fraction of children that are killed and what the benefits are to that population. I think this is the situation with natural reproduction and therefore that embryo rightists, if they maintain their commitment to sexual procreation, must consistently accept the survival lottery for children, or, more likely, if they reject the SL for children, they must renounce sexual reproduction.
The second analogy is one I considered in my earlier paper. Here, I adapt it slightly so that the numbers cohere with the ratio I have been using, but again nothing turns on the precise ratio so long as it is advantageous.
In normal sexual reproduction, embryos must be created only to die so that a sibling embryo can come to birth. Arguably, it is in each embryo's interest that reproduction continues because it is its only chance to be the one that survives. Embryos (if they had rationality) would have a rational motive to participate (albeit passively) in sexual reproduction. By contrast, so it might be claimed, embryos produced specifically for research would not rationally choose to participate for they stand to gain nothing. All research embryos will die, and none have a chance of survival. If this argument is persuasive against the production of research embryos, it is easily answered by ensuring that the production of research embryos to some appropriate extent mirrors that of the production of embryos in normal sexual reproduction. One would simply have to produce more embryos than were required for research, randomize allocation to research, and ensure that the remainder were implanted with a chance to become persons. To ensure that it was in every embryo's interest to be “a research embryo,” all research protocols permitting the production of research embryos would have to produce extra embryos for implantation. For every, say, 100 embryos needed for research, another 20 would be produced for implantation. The 100 embryos would be randomized (80 for research, 20 for implantation), willing mothers would have been identified in advance, and all embryos would have a chance of survival and an interest in the maintenance of a process that gave them this chance.
This is a true parallel with natural reproduction (the exact numbers are unimportant). Here, it is in the ex ante interest of all embryos not otherwise created for reproduction to be part of the population of research embryos. It is in all their interests because it is their only chance of having a life. Of course, it is not in the actual interests of those not implanted. Embryo rightists will (and do) object, but if and when they object, they are inconsistent with their views on natural procreation. In consistency and by parity of reasoning, they must object to natural procreation if they object to this variant of the creation of research embryos.
Embryo rightists would reject any such proposal because, apart from the unacceptable direct killing, in a real sense it instrumentalizes the entire population of embryos. All are created for a purpose, and the survival of the 20% implanted does not defeat the instrumentalizing motives for which they were created; although, of course, they are not exclusively a means to those ends but ultimately become ends in themselves.
The third, slightly imperfect analogy is the survival lottery as originally conceived. This analogy is imperfect because, given that it applies to all members of the society, it includes a large proportion of people who can and must consent to its implementation.
These three cases are relevantly similar to sexual reproduction, and all share with sexual reproduction the fact that they pass the Savulescu test for permissibility—namely, that just as “natural reproduction gives every embryo the greatest chance it could have of becoming a baby,” so in each of these cases the members of the relevant population are given the greatest chance they could have of survival. Each case is like sexual reproduction in that the relevant practice involves the voluntary creation and/or destruction of individuals for the sake of some greater good, and hence in each case those who do such a thing are responsible for the voluntary (though not necessarily intentional or enthusiastic) bringing about of those deaths. Significantly, I believe, of the four cases only sexual reproduction is currently acceptable to embryo rightists, although it is my contention that this involves an inconsistency that must be resolved. In each of the four cases, the deaths are in a real sense instrumental, necessary for the greater good, envisaged, foreseen, and voluntarily countenanced for that very reason. In each case, of course, there are survivors who become ends in themselves. In none of the cases is membership of the population “at risk” in the actual interests of those who die; although in all cases membership of the population is in the ex ante interests of all. Those who think that in each case all members of the population at risk have interests in life that must be respected, have or should have problems with the practice independently of the issue of instrumentalization. Only the original survival lottery can, through consent of the at-risk population, partially mitigate the claim that their interests in life are thereby violated. Even in the case of the original survival lottery, though, this will not be enough for those who think that life is intrinsically valuable and who believe that this value cannot be voluntarily forgone.
Finally, of course, most embryo rightists would differ from Savulescu and me in that they deny that there is any so-called direct killing involved in sexual reproduction. Of course, neither is there necessarily in the creation of spare embryos as part of ART (they may simply die because they are not implanted or not cryopreserved), although embryo rightists nonetheless object, and not solely, I believe, on the grounds that instrumentalization is involved. It is worth ending by remembering a scenario envisaged in my original paper. Suppose the use of IVF had been perfected to the point where only one spare embryo was required for every live birth, which gives a much more favorable survival ratio than sexual reproduction. In such a case, we will suppose that only one spare embryo that would not survive was required for every live birth via IVF whereas the survival ratio for sexual reproduction remained one in five. Such an improvement in IVF would seem to make using IVF mandatory for embryo rightists, even though they would still be doing wrong according to their own beliefs! It is interesting that embryo rightists are not investing heavily in IVF to this end in the hope that sexual reproduction could be replaced by an embryo-sparing method of reproduction.27
Of course, embryo rightists should abjure sexual reproduction altogether; but if they did judge the creation of doomed embryos as justifiable in pursuit of the creation of new life, the embryo-sparing ART would seem to be the best. Here again, Savulescu would differ, believing that embryo rightists would only be committed to improving the survival chances of an individual embryo by interventions in that particular embryo.