Books about intelligence issues these days tend to be either self-serving autobiographies by former practitioners, histories of the intelligence system, or racy and sensationalist fiction. The books written by former intelligence professionals have to be reviewed by the agencies involved, allegedly to protect sources and methods, but also to blunt criticism of intelligence managers, so they tend to be heavily redacted, especially in regard to clandestine operations. The histories are sometimes distorted to emphasize incompetence or failure. The fictional works are what the public knows best. The new book by Dr. Richard K. Betts, director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, is quite different, however, and a welcome addition to the intelligence literature.
Dr. Betts has been writing about intelligence matters since the 1970s, but this is his first book on the subject. His other works have related to foreign and security policy. Dr. Betts has never been an intelligence professional in the traditional sense, but he has served as a consultant to the director of the CIA, and has been a staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the National Security Council. He has been well regarded as a researcher and writer on intelligence ever since his early work on the inevitability of intelligence failure appeared in 1982.
In his new book, Dr. Betts begins by defining intelligence success, using language that would be familiar to intelligence practitioners and laypeople alike. Success means the ability to gather data from the nation's adversaries, using a variety of techniques, from the clever exploitation of open sources to the use of technical sensors and espionage. Success also involves the ability to understand and evaluate the collected data, which may be fragmentary or wrong, and make judgments about situations and events, as well as the plans and intentions of the nation's adversary. Here, Dr. Betts breaks no new ground, although the explanation is both clear and comprehensive. Yet he adds an element to the definition of success that many overlook: the ability of the intelligence system to convince policy makers that its judgments are sound and actionable. If policy officials ignore or reject the intelligence, the other successes in the process may not be meaningful.
Dr. Betts then goes on to describe and explain the three enemies of intelligence that lie at the heart of the book. The first enemy is obviously the state or non-state actor who opposes the U.S. or its policies, and seeks to hide its secrets from discovery. The second enemy, the “innocent” enemy, includes the critics of intelligence who, after an intelligence failure, try to fix what might not be wrong. Included in this category, according to Dr. Betts, are intelligence managers who reject new thinking or innovative ideas, and politicians who seek to “constrain” intelligence operations when they seem to lie outside accepted norms of behavior. These two enemies are straightforward, according to the author, and lend themselves to what he calls linear solutions, fixes that lie within the normal thinking patterns of leaders and managers.
The third enemy is more elusive. This is the “inherent” enemy, derived from amorphous dysfunctions, based on human failings, mental limitations, and various other paradoxes and problems (12). These situations do not lend themselves to linear solutions, and often lie at the heart of failure. They are not well recognized either within or outside the intelligence system. Dealing with this enemy takes up a good deal of the following discussion in the book and makes the greatest impact, since it is a subject that gets little attention in the standard intelligence literature.
Dr. Betts goes on to reprise the work that made a great impact years ago, explaining why intelligence failure is inevitable. He calls this the “permanent enemy” of intelligence, and it is based in large part on the inherent problems he had outlined (19). It includes not just the inability of intelligence to get it right, but also the failure of policy makers to use intelligence properly.
Dr. Betts then expands on the problems with expertise and intelligence theory. Experts should be the best predictors of future events, but, he argues, in reality the non-expert may do better. He follows this discussion with a chapter on the role of the policy official, the dangers of politicization, and the tendency of political figures to use intelligence they like and ignore the rest. All of these problems played out in the intelligence failure related to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the U.S., and the subsequent, and equally damaging, flawed estimate on Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction that led to the Iraq war.
In his final chapters, Dr. Betts discusses intelligence reform and what might be done to combat the enemies of intelligence he has described. There are no ready answers, but it seems clear that the reform legislation passed in 2004 hardly goes far enough in dealing with the problems Dr. Betts has laid before us. The author does not propose specific solutions or formulas for structural change, but discusses the pros and cons of the current efforts at intelligence reform. He notes quite correctly that organizational change is not likely to correct some of the problems that are the enemies of sound intelligence analysis. He argues that incremental improvements may make it possible to keep the enemies at bay.
Dr. Bett's reluctance to propose more far-reaching reform is one of the few disappointments in the book. He might have given us more insight into his visions for the future of intelligence, especially when it seems clear that a new president in 2009 will be looking for advice on how to manage the intelligence system he or she will inherit.
Dr. Betts has written a very thoughtful and balanced treatise here. He admits that the work is a bit thin, but in fact, it offers quite a meaty text, one that requires a great deal of chewing to digest. It may not be the right book for those addicted to spy fiction, but it offers a great deal to intelligence practitioners and the growing number of academics who study this arcane function of government. Intelligence studies has become a legitimate part of the curriculum in more than one hundred colleges and universities around the country, although some traditional academics still think of the study of intelligence as more craft than art.
For those of us who teach about intelligence at the university level, the book is probably too advanced for undergraduates who are just being introduced to strategic intelligence as a function of government. For graduate students, however, or for those who study intelligence at professional schools, the work is ideally suited for more advanced debate and discussion.
