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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2004
For political scientists, the world of politics is often comprised of policy markets and aggregated data points. Regression models, actor preferences, and game structures are disciplinary norms. For political professionals, however, politics often has a strongly militaristic bent: It is war by other means. John Pitney analyzes political affairs in the way that political professionals commonly do, using armed conflict as a metaphor to understand complex political phenomena.
Pitney argues that “politics resembles warfare, so military literature can teach us something about political action” (p. 3). The language of politics owes much to military combat—Pitney notes “the war[s] on poverty, crime, cancer, drugs, and AIDS” along with Bill Clinton's campaign “war room” and Pat Buchanan's ringing exhortation: “Mount up everybody and ride to the sound of the guns” (pp. 8–9). Political officials, activists, and operatives see politics as a species of warfare, and “military metaphors … in turn make politics more warlike” (p. 4). The similarities between politics and war run deeper than just language. Both activities are passionate, confrontational endeavors that “expose participants to peril and uncertainty” and require “elaborate strategies and tactics” for their conduct (pp. 5–6). Politics is not exactly the same as war, but neither is politics just like a marketplace, an academic metaphor that is apt to neglect “hard-to-quantify phenomena such as duty, courage, and compassion” (p. 19).
Throughout the book, Pitney draws tight parallels between war and politics. For military and political leaders, strategy is the integration of means and ends, and political professionals and military planners attend to the tactical details of “geography and logistics” (pp. 140–59). Battle terrain opens some military options and forecloses others; political context defines the range of tactics available to political strategists and sometimes decides the location of the conflict. “The leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference targeted Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963 because they knew that city government would overreact and bare its segregationist teeth” (p. 146; see also p. 94). Martin Luther King, Jr., in the tradition of the great generals, studied the tactical contours of the battleground and planned accordingly (p. 184). Pitney's book is filled with similar anecdotes that reinforce a warfare-driven interpretation of political events.
The Art of Political Warfare is not a simplistic restatement of battle doctrine; it is a sophisticated understanding of political problems in terms of military strategy and tactics. Pitney once served as a senior researcher for the Republican Party, and he understands that no single strategy can fit all political situations. The reason for studying Sun Tzu's Art of War, Carl von Clausewitz's On War, and even contemporary military training manuals is to gain and understanding of strategy and tactics from a discipline—military science—wherein these things are matters of survival (p. 20). The prospect of war has provoked rigorous thinking about the nature of strategy. Political scientists, who study a domain of human activity that often relies on strategic principles, should not overlook the intellectual value of military scholarship.
Pitney's book serves an important function: It introduces basic concepts of military theory and demonstrates their relationship to political phenomena. Students of war examine mobilization, fatigue, intelligence, deception, and stealth. Those who study legislative politics have an intuitive grasp of such military problems as defining victory, navigating through the fog of war, and eliminating internal friction. Passage of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act resulted from “a combination of stealth and congressional fatigue” that allowed a major legislative agreement to get through both houses of Congress “even though most members were barely aware of it” (p. 191). “A military approach would draw scholarly attention to such muddy patches of the political process” (ibid.). More generally, adding the military lens to political interpretations based on games, markets, physics, ecology, medicine, theater, and education—and, one might add, written texts, human sexuality, artificial intelligence, and other metaphors current in political scholarship—“will help us understand the political battlefield'': “The picture may not always be pretty, but we can learn much from appreciating the art of political warfare” (p. 199). Pitney does not claim that warfare is the only metaphor applicable to politics; he believes that political understanding demands a broad range of scholarly approaches. Nevertheless, he argues vigorously that the military metaphor receives less attention than it deserves. By representing politics as warfare, Pitney invites political scientists to seek a more detailed understanding of military strategy. The Art of Political Warfare merely begins the conversation.
Pitney does not elaborate on the stark differences between the teachings of Sun Tzu, who sought nimble conflict, and Clausewitz, who counseled total war. He does not try to reconcile seeming contradictions: On one hand, the threat of brutality toward the conquered can hasten surrender (p. 103); on the other hand, combatants who fear violent recrimination tend to stiffen their resistance (p. 178). The delineation of military classics and the resolution of long-standing tactical disputes lie beyond the scope of the book. Its mission is more carefully focused. Writing in a discipline that does not comprehend the full value of military metaphors, Pitney persuasively argues that the literature on warfare can bring fresh insight to the study of politics.
The Art of Political Warfare is sufficiently lively and readable to suit any undergraduate course in American politics, and it would work particularly well in a graduate seminar that attempts to view the broad sweep of the political landscape. More important, the thrust of Pitney's argument might encourage some scholars of politics and government to begin studying not only David Easton and William H. Riker but also military historians, such as John Keegan and Shelby Foote. Reading Pitney's book, advocates of an interdisciplinary science of politics may find new value in the literature on warfare.
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