A movement in crisis: internal cleavages and setback after peace

Since the women's peace movement was founded in 1994 by educated, professional women, there have been tensions between ‘uneducated/county women’ and ‘educated/Congo women’ (Fuest Reference Fuest, Ellis and van Kessel2009: 132). According to Ellis & van Kessel, the Liberian women's movement has been dominated by women from the country's elite, situated ‘at the juncture of Liberian society and its external links, most notably with the US’ (Reference Ellis and van Kessel2009: 7). Although all major women's groups have made efforts to embrace women from all ethnic, religious and socioeconomic backgrounds, to some extent, it seems that uneducated women have been ‘instrumentalised by their leaders’, as it was not elite women who were reported to be sitting on the airfield and ‘praying in the rain and sun for hours’ to demonstrate for peace (Fuest Reference Fuest, Ellis and van Kessel2009: 119, 132).

According to Williams, conflicts between elite ‘civilised’ women and uneducated poor (rural) women as well as between younger and older generations are key drivers of the women's movement's lack of vibrancy (Williams Reference Williams2008: 45). In a 2009 interview with Voice of America, WIPNET founder Leymah Gbowee explicitly explained the tension between MARWOPNET and WIPNET as a generational and a social class issue (Pedersen Reference Pedersen2010):

These particular cleavages were also visible in the disputed readings of history that came forward during the interviews, as some activists downplayed or kept silent on the role of other key activists or organisations during the peace process while overemphasising their own role. The 2008 documentary Pray the Devil Back to Hell, which depicted the role of the women's movement in ending the country's 14-year civil war is a good example of this. The award-winning documentary only contains interviews with the Christian Women's Initiative and WIPNET – organisations that were excluded from the peace talks in Accra – and shows footage of their sit-in in the conference hall, while it is silent on the role of MARWOPNET, whose members were negotiating inside the conference room, as well as on the role of organisations such as AFELL or LWI. During several interviews it became clear that this partial image has been met with great discontentment by certain groups.

Since the most pressing need for cooperation has ended, it seems that societal structures and divisions of class, religion, ethnicity and age have come to the forefront again, following similar patterns of women's movements in other post-conflict settings (Hebert Reference Hebert2005; Cockburn Reference Cockburn2007; Mojab Reference Mojab, Al-Ali and Pratt2009; Kim & Campbell Reference Kim, Campbell, Choudry and Kapoor2013). Due to the dizzying variety of women's organisations, the high poverty and unemployment rates and the limited amount of funding, there is significant competition among women's organisations. Several women's rights activists feel the women's movement has become increasingly competitive and reported that the movement is plagued by a ‘crab mentality’.Footnote ⁶ According to one interviewee, the successes of the past and lack of cohesion in more recent times can be attributed to a different communication style in the post-conflict period, as having a voice in the movement has become progressively more exclusive. Or as she put it:

This seems to be confirmed when taking into account the advocacy process behind the Gender Equity Bill. Since 2009 the Women's Legislative Caucus, a group of women parliamentarians across party lines, have been promoting a Gender Equity Bill with the aim of introducing a quota system of 30% reserved seats for women in politics. UNWOMEN supported and sponsored the process and only in a later stage was AFELL brought in to participate in the meetings and facilitate the dialogue with the Senate and the House. However, in March 2011, the bill was presented to the Senate and denied for the second time. The reasons attributed to its failure vary from weak argumentation over a sexist male dominated legislature to a confusing proposal receiving ‘little support from civil society’ (‘D’ 2011 int.). Several gender advocates, however, point out that the proposal was rejected because the process has been elite-driven and because broader consultation with women's groups as well as with common men and women across Liberia was lacking. Consultation processes and communication styles are indeed connected to social class divisions. As noted by Yarrow, ‘rhetorical skill is an important aspect in the consolidation of status and identity in a variety of West African contexts’ (Reference Yarrow2008: 338), including Liberia, and can serve as either an including or excluding force.

In Liberia, there has been ‘no forward looking vision to transform the peace activism into political activism’ (Williams Reference Williams2008: 45) and, unlike in the past, effective communication and consultation mechanisms to bridge differences and reach a common political position have not been effected. As a more pessimistic respondent puts it:

Relationship with international partners: unsustainable funding policies

As with women's movements elsewhere (Basu Reference Basu2000; Alvarez Reference Alvarez2009), a second explanation for the weakening of the Liberian women's movement can be found in the evolution of its relationship with international partners and the available funding mechanisms that come with it.

Several activists who were interviewed mentioned problematic issues regarding funding modalities. One difficulty relates to the general duration of projects and collaborations. Most local calls for projects are short term (e.g. six months to two years) and limited in funding, and so do not allow organisations to engage in longer-term planning or conduct more time intensive projects as they seldom offer instantly measurable results. Furthermore, some advocates felt that because of the strict bureaucratic setup, including short timeframes and short-term deliverables, the projects are too focused on reactive measures as supposed to being preventive. As one gender activist put it:

Several larger Liberian NGOs reported feeling used by INGOs to implement their agendas without any guarantees for the longer-term survival of their organisation. Some interviewees connected sustainable funding and ownership to the sustainability of peace in Liberia.

Additionally, the requested projects rarely involve capacity building. Some gender activists are worried about what will happen when the international community leaves, as many INGOs do not build the skills and capacity of local organisations. In some instances, INGOs are even temporarily pushing the local organisations aside.

Another problematic aspect is that the projects requested by international organisations are very much focused on service delivery and barely allow organisations to get involved in research, policy monitoring or advocacy. The specific content of the activities demanded by donors and international organisations is pushing Liberian women's organisations into an unsustainable and ad hoc service delivery role (‘B’, ‘F’, ‘G’ 2011 int.). Or as one respondent put it:

Almost all gender advocates who were interviewed indicated that they encounter more and more difficulties in accessing sustainable funding for their organisations, as applying for larger or longer-term funding is subject to strict financial and bureaucratic conditions (e.g. pre-acquired financial capacities and previous experience in international projects). Furthermore, proposal writing is a time-consuming process which requires women's advocates to use a certain professional language to which donors can relate and fit their proposed initiatives into successful aid industry formats (Debusscher Reference Debusscher2014). Most Liberian NGOs applying for bilateral donor funding go into partnership with a leading INGO, as many respondents reported that receiving funding directly from bilateral donors, such as the European Union or USAID, seems to be ‘impossible’.Footnote ⁷ At times INGOs and Liberian NGOs compete for the same funding. However, in competition between professionalised INGOs and less professionalised Liberian NGOs, the latter are usually on the losing side. Also, a ‘partnership’ generally means that the INGO is the leading and deciding partner. The system implies that the broad priorities of development are driven by international donors because ‘they decide whether it is HIV/AIDS or gender-based violence’ that is important for gender equality in Liberia (‘E’ 2011 int.). Although it would be a mistake to see the relationship between international sponsors and Liberian NGOs as a one-way relationship, as the latter are often creative in bridging their interests with those of donors, the unequal partnership ‘may lead organisations to adjust their programmes, agendas and agency’ (Kaufmann Reference Kaufmann2011: 167) in the interest of sponsorship. The Liberian gender advocates’ agenda may, therefore, be compromised by dominant development paradigms as the funding practices of donors and INGOs are geared towards the peacebuilding business. As donors and INGOs rely on their own understanding of ‘what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ local NGO’ (Moran & Pitcher Reference Moran and Pitcher2004: 509), as well as what they believe to be the appropriate actions to enhance gender equality in Liberia, Liberian NGOs’ room for manoeuvring shrinks as their agendas often go through a double filter – first of the donor and second of the INGO. The result is that a Liberian NGO that wants to survive needs to use ‘the discourse necessary to attract the support of external patrons’ (Moran Reference Moran2009: 23). Unfortunately, dominant development paradigms and practices brought by expatriates from other (post-conflict) settings are not necessarily relevant in present-day Liberia and create an oversimplified or even counterproductive picture of gender relations in the country (‘H’ 2011 int.). In this context it is useful to refer to Abramowitz & Moran's recent work in which it is demonstrated that ‘despite the tremendous international investments’ in gender-based violence initiatives, ‘gender violence as defined by global institution continues to be rampant’, as international and national NGOs ‘have defined Liberia's agenda on gender-based violence without reference to local populations’ definitions of gender subordination, exploitation, and abuse’ (Abramowitz & Moran Reference Abramowitz and Moran2012: 128, 131).

Relations with the State: women's associations as implementers

A related source of tension that came forward during the interviews is the degree of access to the government. Interviews revealed that some organisations have direct access to government institutions and officials, and seem to have easier access to funding mechanisms. As one interviewee put it, ‘because they [the government] have the pipe, they select who dances to the tune‘(‘I’ 2013 int.). Interviews showed tension between those who are part of or have access to the government and the legislative, and those who do not have such access. Access to and voice in the Ministry of Gender and Development and its related institutions, such as the Gender-based Violence Task Force, seemed to be on an ad hoc and personalised basis, ‘rather than based on institutional relationships between society and the state in which individuals and groups can demand access to rights as citizens’ (Gready Reference Gready2010: 642). Along this line, some interviewees complained that the Ministry of Gender has attempted to dominate the gender-based violence conversation and the activities of all organisations, showing favouritism towards some NGOs and marginalising others who express dissenting views (‘J’, ‘K’ 2013 int.). This has created resentment amongst some advocates and hindered the extent to which they have shared ideas and information with other organisations, particularly with international NGOs. However, for gender equality policies to be transformative, such ‘ad-hoc government–civil society interactions are not sufficient’ (Debusscher & Ansoms Reference Debusscher and Ansoms2013), and structured mechanisms and fora where permanent collaboration can take place on an equal footing are needed.

Unlike the past, Liberia's present gender equality policy seems to be the result of intense cooperation between government, the UN, donors, the international community and certain civil society actors. Indeed, once the national government realised the potential of civil society to attract funding and to develop projects and programmes for the implementation of public policies, it started considering civil society organisations as implementers of governmental politics and as technical experts rather than as a counter-balance to its policies and politics (‘L’ 2013 int.). In practice, this means that women's organisations leave their political agenda behind and collaborate with governmental structures to execute projects on ‘women issues’ for which international funds and assistance have been deployed. One of our interviewees reminded us of the fact that ‘the government works directly with WONGOSOL and has a de facto power of choosing the organisation and the individuals they will work with to implement their policies’ (‘L’ 2013 int.). The primary consequence is that although there is a lack of trust and tensions, both parties know they need each other, particularly when it comes to accessing funding and gaining international attention. However, with the exception of a few women's organisations, civil society's gender activists seem to be largely side-lined in the debate on the promotion of gender equality in Liberia. Several important women's groups complained about being marginalised in strategy meetings and not getting a real voice in policymaking. Practices, such as only receiving 24 hours to give feedback on an important five year planning document on gender policy, seem to be commonplace (‘H’ 2011 int.). It was also mentioned that the utilisation of consultation mechanisms, such as the Gender-Based Violence Task Force, is heavily dominated by the UN and the Ministry of Gender and Development (‘G’ 2011 int.). For their part, women political leaders complain about the lack of involvement of women's organisations and blame them for not directing their concerns and suggestions to women in office (Reaves 2013 int.). The executive branch of the government offers a similar type of discourse. An official working at the Secretariat for the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 at the Liberian Ministry of Gender indicated that the lack of engagement with some women's organisations is due to the fact that certain organisations are not to be trusted and that there is a lack of accountability mechanisms to ensure that funds allocated are spent according to contracts and expectations (‘M’ 2013 int.).

Mutual blaming and lack of collaboration are common to other post-conflict contexts (Mazurana et al. Reference Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, Parpart, Lautze, Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart2005; Cockburn Reference Cockburn2007; Tripp et al. Reference Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga and Mungwa2008; Roces & Edwards Reference Roces and Edwards2010). However, in 2009 this chasm between Liberian gender activists from civil society and from the state reached a climax unseen in other countries when the Ministry of Gender and Development founded the Rural Women's Structures – a rural women's organisation with divisions in every county and a national president at the top. According to the Ministry, the new structure would allow it ‘to have a better grip’ (‘A’ 2011 int.) through the counties and to have better campaigning opportunities. Within the Ministry this was seen as an important advantage to bring more women to office in the 2011 elections, as ‘in 2005, advocacy was mainly done by women's organisations’ who ‘did not have a strong hold on the women in the counties’ (‘A’ 2011 int.). However, the founding of the Rural Women's Structures has angered activists as they argue that there are existing long-standing non-governmental rural women's organisations and that the new structure ‘divides rural women’ (‘N’ 2011 int.; ‘O’ 2013 int.). What is more, activists point out that it is now impossible to get support for rural women who are not part of the Rural Women's Structures and that the existing grassroots organisations are being marginalised (‘P’ 2011 int.; ‘Q’ 2013 int.). The Ministry is, therefore, very influential in deciding which organisations survive and which ones are condemned to disappear because of a lack of funding. Moreover, the Ministry also appoints the local leaders of the Rural Women's Structures in Liberia's 15 counties (Duncan-Cassell Reference Duncan-Cassell2012: 2), This has drained the existing rural grassroots groups, taking away the few skilled leaders they had. In 2010, several of these organisations joined a Coalition of Civil Society Women in Liberia to protest against the ‘go-it-alone’ Ministry and the founding of the Rural Women's Structures. The issue was brought to the level of President Johnson-Sirleaf, and senior gender activists tried to mediate between the Coalition and the Ministry, but without effect (‘N’ 2011 int.). The result is a tense situation where loyalties based on gender are fading and where the cohesion of the movement is becoming more compromised. The following testimony from a Liberian activist now working for an INGO complements this finding by pointing out that the international community which is supporting the Rural Women's Structures is, in fact, prolonging this rift while not generating real impact on the ground:

The interviewee highlighted the politicised nature of the Rural Women Structures pointing to the fact that its leaders are appointed directly by the government and priorities are determined by the Ministry of Gender and Development. According to the interviewee, this is the reason why, even if a lot of national and international resources and efforts have been put into it, there have been no results. Indeed, as put by Weldon, if the feminist movement is too contained by the state, its ability to ‘challenge the existing order of priorities’ and draw attention to issues that are not on the agenda, may be curtailed (Reference Weldon2012: 37).

Trapped in the Peacemaker Label

As in other contexts, Liberian NGOs often ‘adjust their programmes, agendas and agency’ (Kaufmann Reference Kaufmann2011: 167) to the interest of sponsors, and hence become compromised by dominant development paradigms. Since the end of the civil war and the need to implement the UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, donors in Liberia have been ‘overwhelmingly focused on sexual violence’ (Shepherd Reference Shepherd2008; Olonisakin et al. Reference Olonisakin, Barnes and Ikpe2011), and more specifically on rape. This has created a situation where other forms of gender-based violence, such as domestic violence (Medie Reference Medie2013: 391) as well as its economic and structural causes (Abramowitz & Moran Reference Abramowitz and Moran2012) have been mostly ignored. On this agenda, Liberian NGOs have turned out to be the perfect partners, as soon they have learnt to consciously use their identity of victims of war in need of protection (Charlesworth Reference Charlesworth2008; Kouvo & Levine Reference Kouvo and Levine2008; Pratt & Richter-Devroe Reference Pratt and Richter-Devroe2011) and of ‘brave and tireless women’ and peacemakers (Rehn & Sirleaf Reference Rehn and Sirleaf2002: 75), with which they have gained the attention of media and donors – most notably after the Mass Action for Peace movement was displayed in the documentary Pray the Devil Back to Hell.

Under the framework of the agenda on Women, Peace and Security and the need to empower grassroots women, the creation of the so-called Peace Huts has been one of the biggest projects funded by UNWOMEN and several INGOs, and put in place by WIPNET, the local partner. The Peace Huts are community-led peacebuilding groups where women meet every week and try to solve problems in the community, acting as mediators in conflicts such as land disputes, (sexual) violence or conflicts of an ethnic or religious nature. The idea of mediation-through-women as an approach to reconstructing social relations and building civil society is naturalised through the use of Peace Huts which, as a matter of fact, are organised through the National Rural Women Structures of Liberia and, therefore, through the national government. However, the problem is that the complexity of the security situation for women on the ground is reduced or framed through concepts that resonate with global audiences and donors in order to maintain funds and media attention. What is more, other newer forms of women's activism that do not involve the peacemaker or women-as-victim label, which has been so profitable up until now, are side-lined or silenced. For example, there seems to be no campaign for the enforcement of the Liberian inheritance law, which gives equal inheritance rights to women and men. A staff member of an INGO explained that, although there have been discussions on the need to work on the issue, no organisation was doing so (‘S’ 2013 int.). This is problematic as international companies are increasingly buying land from local communities for the exploitation of mineral or agricultural resources. Most often, these local communities are represented by a local council consisting exclusively of men which (re)generates unequal outcomes for women and discrimination in decision-making. This example illustrates how coordinated post-conflict development aid supplies the language and institutional discourse for advancing a certain development agenda without challenging the patriarchal structures of the societies that are being ‘reconstructed’ and how the Liberian women's movement has become absorbed in this process (Hudson Reference Hudson2009, Reference Hudson2013).

Two years after our first round of interviews, the situation in Liberia is the same: a non-coordinated women's movement trapped inside a peace heroine's identity, a government suspicious of a civil society with better implementing capacities than its non-performing institutions, and disappointed international donors dealing with results that clearly do not match their previous expectations. Perhaps, as one of our interviewees explained, the problem simply has to do with perceptions and labels. Due to the political opportunity structure, at both national and international level, the Liberian women's movement has remained a crisis movement, unable to escape its limiting peacemaker label, and with little experience in other areas. This has rendered it unable to develop into a broader, coherent and professionalised movement capable of producing all-round results. As put by one Liberian respondent:

In hindsight, too few investments have been made after the war by the international community to professionalise and develop the capacity of national civil society organisations and enable them to participate in the international arena and hold their government accountable. Indeed, although the democratic space for freedom of association and speech has opened up after the war, civil society has not yet had the opportunity to develop the new skills needed to realise this responsibility.