Afghanistan and Pakistan are at the front and center of global politics today. The war in Afghanistan is the longest war in American history. The US-led NATO alliance is looking for face-saving options in Afghanistan even as the real problem has shifted to Pakistan. A government unable to control large parts of its territory, a military in disarray, loss of control over nuclear assets, radical Islamists intent on acquiring WMDs—it is the stuff of nightmares. And Pakistan's current turmoil is causing jitters around the world precisely because the nightmarish scenario evoked above might just come to pass as Pakistan's political institutions prove themselves inadequate to deal with the scale of the challenge facing the nation. For long, the United States and the West have viewed nuclear weapons in South Asia with dread because of the possibility that a conventional war between India and Pakistan might escalate into a nuclear one. But since September 11, 2001, the nature of the problem for the West has changed insofar as the threat is now more of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal being used against the West by radical Islamists if they can lay their hands on it. This being so, the world has come to view the problem in the region through the lens of “Af-Pak.”
This book provides a Pakistani perspective on the conflict in Afghanistan and examines the roots of Pakistan's ambiguous policy—supporting the United States on one hand and nurturing Afghan Taliban on the other. Written by a former foreign secretary of Pakistan, Riaz Mohammad Khan, this book traces the evolution of Pakistan's Afghan policy even as it situates the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship in the larger context of regional and great-power politics. As the author himself acknowledges, this is not a work of scholarship, but by elaborating on a practitioner's account of Pakistani foreign policy, this book is able to shed some refreshing light on a problem that is widely viewed as highly complex. Khan has had prolonged experience dealing with Afghanistan, which has defined Pakistan's geopolitical ambitions and exacerbated its domestic crises since the late 1970s. His first book, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal, examined the diplomacy surrounding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan at the end of the decade-long occupation.
On the other hand, Pakistan has viewed Afghanistan as a good means of balancing out India's preponderance in South Asia. Good India-Afghanistan ties are seen by Pakistan as detrimental to its national security interests as it is flanked on both sides by the two states. A friendly political dispensation in Kabul is viewed by Pakistan as essential to escape the strategic dilemma of being caught between a powerful adversary in India in the east and an irredentist Afghanistan with claims on the Pashtun-dominated areas in the west. Given its Pashtun-ethnic linkage with Afghanistan, Pakistan considers its role to be a privileged one in the affairs of Afghanistan. While Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was the main supporter of the Taliban, India, along with Russia and Iran, threw its weight behind the Northern Alliance. As a consequence, Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan peaked with the coming to power of the Taliban in 1996. It viewed Taliban as a means of controlling Afghanistan and undercutting India's influence. Pakistan has long believed that it can gain “strategic depth” vis-à-vis India by influencing the domestic politics of Afghanistan, something Islamabad felt it achieved during the 1980s and the 1990s.
The perceived gains of those two decades have come under threat since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. After the terrorist attacks in the United States, Pakistan's then president Pervez Musharraf had to choose between support for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and its “war on terrorism” or isolation as a backer of radical Islamist extremism. But having focused exclusively on the Taliban, it is struggling to abandon it now and the tendency in the higher echelons of the Pakistani government and military to turn a blind eye to jihadist violence if that violence is focused outward on Afghanistan, Kashmir, or other parts of India remains as potent as ever. Until recently, the Islamist militant groups nurtured by Pakistan's military and intelligence apparatus were focused on external conflicts, especially the dispute over Indian Kashmir, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s, and the presence of US-led forces in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. In the past few years, however, extremist groups along the Afghan border have turned inward, spreading violence and religious fanaticism among the ethnic Pashtun populace in Pakistan's northwest. The increasing pattern of insurgent assaults against high-profile government and civilian targets in other regions of the country—especially in Punjab, the traditional home of Pakistan's armed forces—suggests that militancy has spun out of the government's control.
The first two chapters of the book deal with the state of play in Afghanistan since 1989 when the Islamist groups, after driving the Soviet forces out of the country, failed to provide political governance. The following chapter traces the trajectory of US military intervention in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, and its consequences for Afghanistan and Pakistan, underlining the deep mistrust between Pakistan and the United States as they tried to cooperate on fighting the regional insurgency. The first section ends with a discussion of the interests of major regional powers in Afghanistan.
Part 2 of the book deals with Pakistan and raises some of the most interesting issues in the book. The author talks about an intellectual crisis that has gripped Pakistan, suggesting that “the intellectual and psychological environment that surrounds the discourse on religious extremism not only sustains and tolerates religious extremism and obscurantism, it is resistant to modernizing currents in the society.” Over the years, Pakistani society, instead of confronting the growing encroachment of conservative Islamism, gradually ceded intellectual ground to activist religious orthodoxy.
The final part of the book presents the author's own suggestions and policy prescriptions to deal with the challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this is where the author disappoints. No doubt, the book is emphatic in its assessment of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy as a failure and underlines the dangers of breaking up with the US and becoming one of the most public supporters of the Taliban. Khan is also clear that the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan can only be resolved by peaceful means and that there is a need for Pakistan to focus on regional economic cooperation. But there is reluctance in this book to confront the roots of Pakistan's present predicament—the unholy nexus between its security establishment and violent religious extremism. It is not readily evident from Khan's conclusions what the best way is to deal with this fundamental challenge that has wreaked havoc not only on the region and the world but also on Pakistan itself. Khan is right that in order to overcome the challenge of extremism, stabilize the region, and align Pakistan's development with the contemporary currents of modernization, intellectual clarity is essential. This book takes a few steps in that direction but fails to go all the way.
