My hope is that Alan Audi's important and necessary intervention represents a turning point in “cultural property argument.” In Parts I and II of his critique, Audi expertly uses the tools of “legal semiotics” to do exactly what those tools were designed to do: demystify the language game of legal argument to reveal the “irreducibly antinomal”1
Balkin, “Promise of Legal Semiotics,” 1837.
My concern, of course, is with where Audi is leading us. What other “field” of argument will serve our ends better? Among the standard criticisms of the legal semiotic approach are first, that it generates cynicism or even “nihilism” (whatever that is); second, that it fails to recognize the degree to which the grammars of legal and political argument are the same; and third, and closely related to the second, that it fails to recognize the degree to which every language game, every system of meaning production, is hopelessly antinomal and dialectical in nature. The criticism is that for all of its efforts to lead us to an authentic discourse, the legal semiotic approach merely removes us to “moral, ethical, or political grounds,” to borrow Audi's phrase from Part III of his article, even more mystifying—and quieting—in their structuralism than the legal field we left.2
The criticism has force, and some may read Part III of Audi's article, registered in a completely different key from the article's previous parts, as good evidence in support of it. There is not space here to develop Balkin's “postmodern” and, to my mind, persuasive response.3Balkin, “Promise of Legal Semiotics.”
Even so, if we are to fall back to a field of “moral, ethical, and political” argument, we should fully expect to confront there the same structural problems that legal semiotics identified in legal argument. Our challenge is to develop modes of analysis that allow us to work through these problems. Legal semiotics have so far failed to do so. As with most modes of critique that analogize their methods to Saussurean sign semiotics, the primary failing of legal semiotics is that it offers no account of change, of genealogy. In an effort to master synchrony, it defers diachrony; more generally, it defers narrative. Quite frustratingly, legal semiotics typically speaks of new arguments and counterarguments as simply emerging—out of what material conditions and why is rarely explained. But as Audi rightly notes, our task now is to induce new arguments and counterarguments—new “values,” in an ethical and Saussurean sense—out of the material conditions in which we find ourselves, conditions primarily of postcolonialism and perhaps of North Atlantic imperial decline more generally. This may be why Part III of Audi's article, the peculiar supplement to his “legal semiotic” project, has nothing to do with legal semiotics and everything to do, one hopes, with the future of cultural property argument.
