On July 3, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued an advisory opinion (AO) on human rights and the climate emergency.Footnote 1 During an activist-led panel held the next morning, speakers praised the AO as “perhaps the most important document to emerge from an international court;”Footnote 2 and “destined to become one of the most important judicial documents in the history of law.”Footnote 3 No one minded the superlatives. This moment was the culmination of a years-long transnational campaign. Rights activists had not only conceived the idea of an AO request but also lobbied for it and ghost-written the request ultimately submitted by Chile and Colombia. Through amicus briefs and oral argument, they then armed the Court with a global arsenal of jurisprudence, soft law, and scholarly writing that has, over the past decade, articulated a link between climate change and human rights law. Now, just hours after the Court rewarded their efforts with the most progressive international judicial statement yet, panelists plotted how to leverage the AO through lawsuits, committee hearings, reports, lobbying, seminars, and journal articles.Footnote 4
It is not uncommon for civil society actors to help orchestrate the work of a human rights court. Scholars have shown the important role played by transnational activists in shaping international human rights law. Yet the vignette above serves as a foil for the books on under review here. Like the panel, they are a celebration of the rise and creativity of regional human rights adjudication, showing how the practice of human rights has been transformed by judicialization. Each of these books offers an exploration of the law and politics of regional human rights courts, at times to draw lessons from the variation or convergence among them, and at times to view their work together as a single system. Collectively they show how courts leverage case law to broaden their authority and underscore the importance of judicial dialogue in regional rights regimes. They construct a compelling narrative of judicial innovation and doctrinal convergence.
For all three, and in different ways, however, the emphasis on judicial interpretation causes them to sideline important elements of international human rights adjudication. As the example of the AO shows, civil society and other non-judicial actors, including each courts’ respective commission, are also drivers of the development of rights systems and their jurisprudence, but only Laurence Burgogne-Larsen ever centers them, and she does so without theorizing their role in shaping judicial interpretation. The books, in other words, could be characterized, at different points and to varying levels, as court-centric.Footnote 5 Additionally, the emphasis on judicial actors leaves us with a limited perspective on the future of human rights in a geopolitical environment increasingly hostile to international adjudication.
It is a luxury to be able to offer such a critique. Until the publication of these books, there were few solid works that engaged the three regional human rights courts at a time.Footnote 6 The African courts in particular have been too little studied in comparative light. Read together, the books—like the courts themselves—are a study in variations on a theme. The authors write from three different continents, in three different languages, and from distinct professional identities: social scientists; high court judge; activist lawyer (the authors are also professors). Each book asks slightly different questions of the courts, draws from different sources, and speaks within a distinct scholarly literature. In the scope of one year, these books have transformed the literature on regional human rights. Through their omissions, they inadvertently point to what the next steps in the scholarship should be.
I. From Agents to Caretakers
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz have long been students of supranational integration and adjudication. The tension that drives their latest collaboration is what they call the “dilemma of effectiveness”: the more courts seek to construct an effective human rights regime, the more they curb state power, and therefore the more the state will try to clip their authority in turn (p. 18). The book examines how this struggle plays out in five regional courts: the IACtHR, the African Court of Human and People’s Rights (ACtHPR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), as well as three sub-regional courts in Africa originally created to focus on trade integration.Footnote 7 Delegation theory provides the conceptual framework. States are the traditional principals that delegate power to courts and then monitor them. International courts, however, are not the traditional agent, but rather a super-agent, or trustee: they are empowered to review the actions of the states themselves; they have compulsory jurisdiction; and, perhaps most importantly, it is difficult for states to reverse their rulings (p. 3).Footnote 8
The first chapters provide a condensed history of the courts, exploring each stage of their history—their creation, their efforts to effectuate their mandate, the responses by member states, and the courts’ counter-response—through the lenses of delegation theory and the dilemma of effectiveness. Overall, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz find that states’ efforts to curtail judicial power have failed in the European and American settings, and have enjoyed only limited success in Africa. The chapters on the European and American court are efficient. These histories are well-rehearsed in the literature, but the examples here are well chosen, and the juxtaposition is enlightening. The relatively terse discussion of the African courts, which collects four courts into one chapter, is perhaps symptomatic of the dearth of data and scholarship on these courts, as well as their shorter trajectories.
Next the book shifts its focus to judicial interpretation. Whereas the earlier chapters are organized by region and chronology, this section braids together the jurisprudence of the three courts, organized by types of rights and interpretive techniques. The authors venture where few political scientists dare tread and take the law seriously, treating interpretive techniques as political acts. In a tour of judicial dialogue across three continents, they show how the courts expand rights in similar directions using similar techniques, how they borrow from one another, and how judicial interpretation seems to be a one-way ratchet: interpretive tools lead to continual expansion of the sphere of activities governed by human rights law and, correspondingly, a diminution of state discretion. They place emphasis on evolutive interpretation—through which judges adapt rights to changing contexts—and proportionality analysis.
The closing chapter wraps the lessons learned into a pithy reprise of the initial theoretical questions, now paired with the findings. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz show how judges expand their purview through case law, and how it is “virtually impossible” (id.) for states to effectively respond (including the difficulty of amending treaties, the powerful shaming role of human rights law, and the accretive evolution and “stickiness” of case law, especially case law that has a transnational imprimatur). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz acknowledge that they are missing analysis of indirect state controls and non-compliance and the effects these have on the case law, due to the difficulty (perhaps overstated) of gathering the relevant data (p. 243). This is indeed a significant lacuna. It means they are missing a crucial dynamic within the Principal-Agent (P-A) relationship that they seek to understand.
Ultimately, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz conclude that the dynamics they have uncovered do not conform to the predictions of delegation theory, “including such theories involving courts” (p. 241). Delegation theory predicts that agents will not cross principals on strong preferences, but judicial trustees nonetheless do so because they “are far more concerned with their reputations as ‘good’ human rights jurists” (p. 230). The arguments have been made by the authors in earlier studies of the ECHR and IACtHR.Footnote 9 However, by showing the same dynamic in historical detail across five courts and three continents, the authors place their theory on stronger footing and make a significant contribution to the human rights courts literature.
But here is the rub. If delegation theory proves inadequate to the task, why stick with it? The authors do move beyond standard P-A theory to argue that “IHRCts are not simple agents, but rather caretakers of a set of values and norms enshrined in human rights treaties” (my emphasis) (p. 241). But this idea remains underdeveloped. It departs from the standard behavioralist assumptions on which principal–agent theory is typically based without offering a fully articulated alternative. In any case, what does it mean to be caretakers of human rights values when the law is underdetermined and those values are deeply contested? Interpreting a human rights treaty is not simply a matter of applying preexisting rules or values; it also involves discretionary processes through which judges shape and define those values. This is especially so in contentious “culture-war” domains such as reproductive rights.
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz defend their use of P-A theory on the ground that it “focuses empirical attention on questions that are central to our concerns” (p. 2). The drawback is that P-A theory’s focus on two actors creates blinders. Just as the authors overlook informal tools of control, they miss analysis of the informal impact of non-state actors and non-judicial actors on the development of case law. Case law is not just a product of judges curtailed by states, but of all the courts’ interlocutors, including CSOs and other constituencies. Transnational civil society plays a particularly salient role in human rights judicial systems. The irony of this critique is that Stone Sweet and Sandholtz were among the scholars who first directed attention to the important role of litigants and of the broader institutional context in shaping international adjudication.Footnote 10 It is not that every book on human rights courts needs to center civil society. But the failure of the P-A theory here should have prompted a more pointed development of a richer theory, and engagement with studies that do so.Footnote 11
II. Three Courts and the Raison d’État
By contrast, Laurence de Burgorgue-Larsen’s book, originally published in French as Trois Cours, vividly describes the variety of institutions and actors that comprise regional human rights systems. Echoing Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, Burgorgue-Larsen opens her study by shining a light on the struggle between raison d’état, on the one hand, and “the justice of [human rights] courts” (p. 4), on the other. But the book escapes this bipolar framing at every turn. For Burgorgue-Larsen, a judge on the Constitutional Court of Andorra, professor at La Sorbonne, and life-long student of human rights law, this 500-page treatise is an encyclopedic labor of love. She brings a comparative lens to almost every imaginable aspect of the courts, including the work of the commissions, judicial selection and biographies, interpretive techniques, concurrences and dissents, progressive and conservative NGOs, notable individuals, remedial practices, and interactions with national actors such as courts and human rights ombudspersons. Thus, whereas Stone Sweet and Sandholtz set out to write about “systems of transnational justice” (p. 1) but end up focusing exclusively on courts, Burgorgue-Larsen purports to study “the justice of the [human rights] courts” (p. 4) but instead provides a study of three human rights systems.
The book begins with the moment of creation, highlighting the regional and global geopolitical contexts within which each court was able to emerge, and also the specific actors, individuals and institutions that played a pivotal role. From the first substantive chapter she exceeds her claimed emphasis on the raison d’état, drawing on the concept of legal diplomacy “to go beyond the notion of the state as the primary subject of international law” (p. 31). Under the heading of legal diplomacy, for example, Burgorgue-Larsen includes odes to “founding fathers” Pierre-Henri Teitgen, “a creative genius” (p. 32) of the European system and Keba Mbaye in the African, and emphasis on the work of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the International Commission of Jurists.
Next up is the institutional “evolution” of the regional systems (p. 57). In rich detail, we learn of the slow and non-linear path toward the universalization of the European system. The contrast with Africa and the Americas is sharp: Canada, the United States, and much of the English-speaking Caribbean are not party to the American Convention on Human Rights, for example, and different states have different levels of commitment. Burgorgue-Larsen also explores the adoption of protocols and specialized treaties in each system, a state-driven process of “normative expansion” (p. 152). Again, however, the discussion goes beyond the state-court dynamic. For one, the history includes discussion of the work of the commissions, including the now defunct European Commission. A section on judicial selection highlights the innovative role of civil society in creating procedures for quality control in judicial selection, and successfully pushing for greater gender representation on the bench.
Like Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, Burgorgue-Larsen zones in on the role of judicial interpretation, devoting an entire part of the book to how the three courts have broadened the scope of their purview through interpretive techniques and judicial dialogue. But where Stone Sweet and Sandholtz emphasize evolutive interpretation and proportionality analysis, Burgorgue-Larsen foregrounds a process she calls “decompartmentalization.” She shows how each court loosened the constraints of the treaties over which it has jurisdiction. In the landmark Marckx v. Belgium case, for example, the ECHR grounded its reasoning on two treaties which Belgium had not yet ratified (p. 238). Of the Inter-American Court she wryly notes that the Vienna Convention is “mentioned like a symbolic mantra, though no particular consequence is drawn from this” (p. 240). Instead, the pro persona principle coupled with evolutive interpretation has meant that “recourse to multiple external sources” would be the regular practice (p. 243). The African court is more formalist, or at least less free-wheeling, but draws on external sources, especially judgments of the European and Latin American human rights courts, “to bolster its own authority” (p. 249). Burgorgue-Larsen also identifies a counter-trend: certain judges have begun pushing back against expansionist jurisprudence, a fascinating struggle unfolding in all three regions, while conservative NGOs—some with funding from U.S. churches—have begun working from within the systems to oppose further development of LGBTQ+ and reproductive rights.
The final part turns to the interaction of courts and national actors, including the constitutionalization of international law in the three regions; and the different interlocutors of the courts. The discussion is legally specific, with close examination of Protocol 16 in the European system and the invention of conventionality control in the Inter-American System. It also describes the interactions of courts with national actors such as human rights NGOs, national human rights institutions, academics, and the work of judicial diplomacy, including judicial seminars.
Burgorgue-Larsen’s study is the first to offer such an in-depth analysis of the three courts, combining attention to legal doctrine as well as political and socio-legal dynamics. It should be the first stop for any comparative research on the three courts, be the researcher a social scientist or a lawyer. Each section is rife with potential comparative research projects: one analyzes regional variation in treaty denunciation; another compares the rights enshrined in the three founding regional human rights treaties; and another analyzes the different civil society actors that engage the courts. Each would make a rich project. Additionally, hers is one of the first comparative works to give equal time to the African Union human rights system. While Burgorgue-Larsen notes that it can be difficult to find materials on the African system, her work stands out for the extensive research, including interviews, that she conducted. There is more research to undertake, and it would be interesting to have a comparative work drawn from the perspective of the African system, with its concerns front and center, but this book comes closest to giving Africa its due. Finally, the work draws on a wealth of French-language sources on the African and European system, but also the Inter-American. This linguistic breadth is welcome, as the field typically cites disproportionately to English sources.
The book does not itself, however, do much theoretical work in framing the comparisons it makes or defining and developing the concepts it employs. As noted earlier, Burgorgue-Larsen, like Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, begins the book by emphasizing the paradox of human rights justice: it depends on the support of the very states that it seeks to discipline (p. 1). Throughout the work, she returns to the theme of “irreducible sovereignty,” or raison d’état, and how it plays a role in shaping the regional systems. But unlike Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, she does not sustain this inquiry. Instead, she introduces an extensive array of actors and institutions and dynamics that lie beyond this focus without ever tying them back in. Where Stone Sweet and Sandholtz offer a slim volume tightly focused on a single argument, Burgorgue-Larsen offers a sprawling tome that touches on many important facets and actors that Stone Sweet and Sandholtz overlook, without offering a theory of international human rights courts.
A confusing aspect of this book is that the concepts used to organize the sections are not always well developed. Under the heading “shaky legitimacy” the author discusses the adoption of new protocols and specialized conventions, differing regional approaches to economic, social, and cultural rights, and the processes of judicial selection. However, she does not explain how and whether these factors contribute to the legitimacy of the courts. The translation adds to the difficulty. While the text flows and captures Burgorgue-Larsen’s spirited style, the word-choice for key concepts can be non-intuitive. The term “decompartmentalization” will feel clumsy if not obscure to an audience of native English-speakers. There must be a more accessible term. A similarly non-intuitive example is the contrast between “persuasive synergies” and “partial synergies.” As a result, the table of contents is opaque. It took several re-reads before some of the organizing concepts became clear, even as the underlying ideas were familiar.
Ultimately, perhaps this book is not meant to be the exploration of a particular thesis or an exercise in conceptual innovation. Insofar as its aim is “to study the effective jurisdictional mechanisms that are evolving on three continents” and to show their “remarkable similarities” despite considerable differences (p. 5), it is a vibrant success.
III. An International Human Rights System?
Aside from being a former IACHR commissioner and a law professor at Universidad Andres Bello in Caracas, Carlos Ayala Carao is a life-long human rights lawyer whose strategic litigation has helped shape the Inter-American corpus juris. But discussion of cause lawyering is almost entirely absent from Hacia una Justicia Constitucional Internacional de los Derechos Humanos [Towards an International Human Rights Constitutional Justice]. Like Burgorgue-Larsen, Ayala is a civil law lawyer trained in a formalist scholarly tradition. But whereas Burgorgue-Larsen breaks out of this mold and calls for more socio-legal analysis within the French academy, Ayala’s project is different. The book seeks an answer from within the law to the framing question of whether we are witnessing the formation of a “system” of international human rights justice (p. 40). It is not asking about the regional systems as separate actors, but about the joint production of a multilevel, transnational constitutional rights system (p. 20).
Or at least that is how the introduction purports to frame the book, with each of the four parts examining a different aspect of this overarching thesis. The book begins with only a brief history of the emergence of the three regional systems and the universal human rights system. It then delves into how the three regional systems protect rights and interact with domestic courts, highlighting the mutually constitutive processes of the constitutionalization of international law and the internationalization of constitutional law. In these sections Ayala ably weaves together a procedural analysis of the three courts in furtherance of the argument that they represent a type of supra-constitutional order.
The second half of the book examines two doctrinal developments in the Inter-American system that illustrate the construction of an international rights order. The first concerns the practice of conventionality control, whereby domestic courts review national law—including constitutional provisions—for compliance with the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Curiously, Ayala chooses a negative example. In recent years Latin American presidents have invented yet a new way to challenge term limits: the claim that such restrictions violate their political rights under the (ACHR). Drawing on Rosalind Dixon and David Landau’s concept of abusive constitutionalism, Ayala labels this gambit “abusive conventionalism.” This example might be seen as showing that expansive readings of rights are vulnerable to abuse. But for Ayala there is no ambiguity: the ACHR yields a single correct answer. He traces the evolution of these claims across domestic and Inter-American jurisprudence, highlights where courts and other actors have misapplied the Convention, and concludes with his own interpretation grounded in the Court’s Advisory Opinion on Indefinite Presidential Re-election in Presidential Systems (June 7, 2021).Footnote 12
The second doctrine Ayala spotlights is procedural rather than substantive: the practice of issuing precautionary measures and provisional measures. These forms of injunctive relief are granted by the Inter-American Commission and Court, respectively, when there is an urgent need for protection before there is time to convene a hearing through the regular procedural path. It is here that Ayala’s background as a human rights practitioner shows. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz and Burgorgue-Larsen barely mention these orders. But they hold a vital place in the Inter-American System, and it makes sense that Ayala, who lives under an authoritarian regime, would understand their significance. Through them the Court and Commission can protect human rights defenders and other vulnerable people from imminent harm. Ayala argues that the Inter-American System has transformed these measures into an international amparo, referring to the Latin American tradition of having a special constitutional writ whereby individuals can directly vindicate their fundamental rights before a court. The writ of amparo first appeared in the Constitution of Yucatan in 1841, and holds a special place in Latin American constitutionalism. By likening the precautionary and provisional measures to amparo, therefore, Ayala reinforces his broader argument that the Inter-American system has evolved into a type of supranational constitutionalism. The argument unfolds entirely through doctrinal analysis. He shows how these measures have expanded over time to protect not only individuals but groups, including prisoners and indigenous and tribal peoples, and even similarly situated people united only by the common threat they face, and where not every individual is identified.
Ayala’s doctrinal arguments are rigorously laid out in the manner of a treatise, showing his mastery of the doctrine. Further, he contributes to the scholarship the concepts of the Inter-American amparo and abusive conventionalism. But the argument about the construction of an international human rights system is less steady. Despite the title and framing, and despite gestures toward comparative analysis in Parts I and II, the bulk of the text focuses exclusively on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. There is a certain epistemic justice to this move. It used to be that authors would claim to be doing comparative work when in truth their main focus and love was the European human rights system. Now the tables are reversed, but with the African system still suffering from neglect.
A deeper problem is that Ayala never really defines what he means by a “system,” and thus it is impossible to know in what way the examples he focuses on are indicative of such a system. The first part, which shows similarities in how the regional human rights systems have evolved toward a more constitutional role, clearly speaks to this claim. But the latter part of the book fails to draw comparisons with the other systems, for example by discussing the evolution of interim measures before the ECHR. Nor does Ayala show how the IACtHR cites to other human rights courts and is cited by them in turn. He makes a strong argument that the Inter-American system is akin to a constitutional system, but the analysis does not take the step of showing how it participates in a global human rights system.
One way to understand the three books is to place them along a spectrum. At one end is the lawyer’s perspective. Ayala writes from the internal point of view of the law to promote a progressive interpretation of human rights law in the style of interpretation Stone Sweet and Sandholtz might describe as “expansive development” (p. 186) and Burgorgue-Larsen as “rebellious decompartmentalization” (p. 237). At the other end are the social scientists. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz delve into the details of proportionality analysis and the pro persona principle not to advance a particular reading of them but to understand how courts construct and exercise power. Burgorgue-Larsen occupies the middle of the spectrum. It used to be that civil law lawyers treated law as determinate and interpretation as largely mechanical, leaving little room to recognize its discretionary—and thus political—dimensions. While Ayala only occasionally acknowledges the political significance of interpretive techniques, Burgorgue-Larsen embraces legal realism, situating interpretation within a political understanding of judicial behavior. At times she expresses discomfort with the more expansive interpretive practices she describes, yet she clearly recognizes that judges exercise discretion in ways that are inherently political. At the same time, her objective when she examines doctrine is not to answer questions of judicial power in general, but to trace the rise and evolution of the three human rights courts.
The common thread is that all three explore how human rights courts have built up expansive readings of rights through interpretive techniques. Doctrinal evolution is understood as a vital process that allows the courts to achieve a modicum of relative autonomy. The following two parts argue that the next steps in human rights scholarship should be to move beyond courts and judges.
IV. The Future of Human Rights Courts Scholarship
Since 2023, four international courts have issued groundbreaking opinions on states’ legal responsibilities in face of climate change. Two of these came from human rights courts, the ECHR and the IACtHR. Additionally, the ACtHPR is currently deciding whether to accept a similar advisory opinion request.Footnote 13 Together these opinions will mark a significant addition to the global rights juris— and a significant imposition of new legal duties on states. One would be hard put to explain this new activist stage in the regional human rights courts jurisprudence without at least some consideration of the role of civil society. KlimaSiniorinnen v. Switzerland was submitted to the ECHR by the Climate Seniors Association and financed in part by Green Peace Switzerland.Footnote 14 The advisory opinion request before the ACtHPR was submitted by an NGO coalition led by the Pan-African Lawyers Union. The impetus to have Chile and Colombia submit an advisory opinion request to the IACtHR also began with civil society, which then proceeded to provide arguments and scientific data to the IACtHR. Of the 263 amicus briefs submitted to the IACtHR during the AO process, thirteen came from states or state organizations, and 160 from non-state actors, including Indigenous peoples, NGOs, and academics.Footnote 15 In the Court’s hearings in Bridgetown, Manaus, and Brasilia, states made only 13 of 185 oral presentations. By their own admission, some of the judges knew little about climate change law as the advisory process began. But on July 3, 2025 the majority went so far as to declare the obligation not to cause irreversible damage to the environment to be a jus cogens norm.Footnote 16 The advisory opinion will now be leveraged by these same civil society actors to push for climate-friendly policies through litigation and non-judicial arenas at the national, regional, and international levels.
None of this would surprise the authors of the books under review. Yet the framing concepts—P-A theory for Stone Sweet and Sandholtz and “irreducible sovereignty” for Burgorgue-Larsen—sidelines these key actors. Burgorgue-Larsens’s is by far the most well versed in civil society’s role in the regional rights system. She writes that no human rights system can survive without a civil society ecosystem (p. 392) and that “without the strategic activism of NGOs, the inter-American system would never have gained the stature it has today” (p. 395). Further she includes entire sections devoted to civil society actors, most notably the role of Center for Justice and International Law and the Due Process of Law Foundation in the Inter-American System, and the European Centre for Law and Justice in the European system (p. 340). But Burgorgue-Larsen misses the opportunity to explore or further explain the link that she avers between civil society and the “stature” of the Inter-American system. Instead, she returns again and again to the mantra of “irreducible sovereignty” even as she points to all the factors that have, indeed, reduced the domain of sovereignty.
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz are also aware of the salient role of civil society and other constituencies. The first prong of their definition of effectiveness in a regional human rights court is their ability to “attract” important disputes (p. 11), which implies an important link between the court’s effectiveness and the choices made by litigants. They also acknowledge that international human rights courts are “watched closely by a wide range of stakeholders (in civil and transnational society)” (p. 241). However the authors’ chosen framing relegates the role of NGOs to the periphery of their analysis, and there they stay despite that theory’s inability to explain the study’s findings, and despite their own prior writing. Despite having been a cause lawyer, Ayala does not mention civil society. Admittedly, to do so is to step out of the internal view of the law, and that is not Ayala’s project. However, consideration of the diverse roles played by transnational non-judicial actors could help in answering his avowed question of how human rights works as an international “system” (and though he does single out the role of domestic and international judges in working together to construct an international constitutional human rights system (p. 712).
In sum, there is a rich literature on the way in which transnational civil society actors and other compliance constituencies shape international law. As a next step in the comparative inquiry into regional rights systems, it would enrich our understanding if these theories were brought into play.
V. The Future of Human Rights Systems
There is a certain nostalgia in these books. The authors seem to celebrate how judicial dialogue has created a realm of relative autonomy from politics.Footnote 17 But they do so at the very moment the courts are threatened by a rising wave of authoritarianism. All three books close with handwringing for the future. The “single most important factor” driving the creation and success of the courts has been constitutional democracy, write Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (p. 254). What then will happen if constitutional democracy continues to recede? Along with Ayala, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz close by saying that the only way to move forward is to center the rights of the human person (Ayala, p. 714) and “shore up democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, p. 255). Which is to say, they offer little guidance. Drawing on Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, however, one might add that the very redundancy and loose ordering of human rights systems –they are overlapping, and multi-leveled, with horizontal as well as vertical orderings, and jurisdiction over states with opposing and constantly shifting politics—could prove to be an ingredient in their survival. Another intriguing possibility—suggested by international courts’ climate turn and these books’ emphases on judicial dialogue—is that the courts will work together to address certain issues, such as climate change, on which there is widespread popular consensus, boosting their sociological legitimacy (or “caretaker status”) regardless of state compliance. In some ways this is similar to strategies used in the early years of the Inter-American Court and the African courts. For Burgorgue-Larsen, “the major challenge in the coming years will be to hang on to the gains that have been made” (p. 476). Helpfully, she offers advice for each court tailored to its political context. The other key factor she highlights is the courts’ strategic allies. NGO activism “can do a lot to preserve regional systems for the protection of human rights” (p. 479). But a robust NGO network itself relies on some of the same boundary conditions as human rights courts: liberal democracy.
What the authors largely overlook is that the future locus of human rights work may not reside primarily with the courts. Looking ahead, it is not just that CSOs and other non-court actors should be brought into the comparative study of human rights courts, but that courts may need to recede as the central focus in analyses of regional human rights systems. A symptom of the courts’ success over the past decades is that we have come to see human rights as a body of law, and human rights systems primarily as venues for litigation. But the politics of human rights preceded the “justice of the courts” (Burgorgue-Larsen, p. 4). Prior to the judicialization of human rights across three continents, human rights claims were advanced through diplomacy, lobbying, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, country reports by commissions, boycotts, books, protests, and Amnesty International’s famous letter-writing campaigns, to name a few. By the time the Inter-American Court decided its first contentious case, the Commission had already established a reputation for defying military dictators. Even today, non-judicial actors within regional human rights systems—those operating outside the individual petition process—continue to shape both the legitimacy of the courts and the actions of state and non-state actors on the ground. The Inter-American Commission’s recommendations, reports, standards, and rapporteurships generate a large percentage of what is referred to as the juris interamericano. Further, it serves as the first line of rights protection through mechanisms such as the ad hoc Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts established in 2014 to promote the investigation of forty-three disappeared students in Ayotzinapa, Mexico.
As the three regions become less democratic, attention may once again shift to non-judicial avenues for promoting human rights. Even if the courts revert to what Burgorgue-Larsen calls “loyal justice” (p. 479) and recreate their case law in a more deferential key, the commissions can conduct their work outside the individual petition system, including through country visits and reports. In this sense, the Inter-American and African systems, with their commissions, have more flexibility and potentially more resilience than the European. Going forward, scholarship should pay closer attention to these historical practices, with an eye to non-judicial actors as well as to the structural conditions that facilitate or obstruct rights promotion.
In reflecting on a post-human rights era, Ingrid Brunk argued that the proliferation of legal human rights in international law had made international law weaker and less able to generate compliance.Footnote 18 The flip side of this argument is that the more the human rights movement identifies itself primarily with law and judicial institutions, the weaker its ability to create counter-hegemonic change, particularly in a world of authoritarians and populists.Footnote 19 For these reasons, too, it is important to look beyond the courts as the next step in comparing the judicialized regional rights systems.
