Let us ever more quickly
carry to the others
the certainty of doubt
Anna Kamienska, ‘Emmaus’
But what then am I? A thinking thing. – And what is that? Something that doubts . . .
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
I suspect I was invited to reflect on this theme because of something I wrote on the figure of ‘Doubting Thomas’ from the Gospel of John.Footnote 1 I will have more to say about the apostle Thomas and his legacy later, but I would like to begin with another Thomas, another doubting Thomas. Perhaps some readers will already have recognized the allusion in my title to Thomas Edward or T. E. Lawrence, better known to the world as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’. After having allegedly lost the first draft of his monumental memoir and confession, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, at Reading Station in November 1919, he rewrote it at a feverish pitch over the course of the next three months at a flat on 14 Barton Street in Westminster.Footnote 2 In an early chapter of the final version, Lawrence says of the Arabs whose revolt against Ottoman rule he was helping to orchestrate that they ‘despise[d] doubt, our modern crown of thorns’.Footnote 3 We may wonder whether Lawrence, as a representative of the British empire in what is arguably its last expansionist paroxysms, is not rather projecting onto the Arabs his own culture's failure to see the grey amidst the black and white, what he goes on to call the ‘hesitating retinue of finer shades’.Footnote 4
Be that as it may, I wish to use Lawrence's phrase as our entrée into doubt, its perils and its promises, ancient and modern. His words will carry us back to the four canonical gospels, and their different handling of that event about which Christ's disciples, then and now, have had the greatest doubts, namely the resurrection. We shall witness, and have occasion to question, the irrepressibility of doubt in the four gospels, the urgency with which doubt is felt and then quickly resolved, even banished – or allegedly so, since doubt seems never to let faith relax into certainty. Having brought this tension in the gospels to the fore, I will suggest that we step forward in time, and sideways in discipline, to consider an adjacent conversation in philosophy about the threat scepticism poses to our knowledge of the world and of ourselves – a classical ‘problem’ in the history of modern philosophy, at least since Descartes. Here I will have occasion to pay homage to one of my own teachers, Stanley Cavell, whose reframing of scepticism from a ‘problem’ to something more like a ‘condition’ will, I hope, raise anew the question of whether and how doubt really poses a threat to faith. With that, we will return to Lawrence, that very modern – more precisely, modernist – apostle of doubt.
I am conscious of, even somewhat sensitive to, the fact that I am not playing the role of a historian, although contributing to a volume published by an esteemed society of ecclesiastical historians. In her ‘Outline of [a] Presidential Theme’, however, Frances Andrews lists a number of possible areas of discussion, at least two of which I see this essay as reflecting: first, the study of the Bible and its problematic passages; second, how doubt relates to scepticism.Footnote 5 If my inquiry into these two areas seems insufficiently historical, I find some consolation in Herodotus and the fact that his inaugural use of the term ‘history’ meant just that – an inquiry.Footnote 6
So then, let us first inquire into the title: ‘doubt, our modern crown of thorns’. What does it mean that Lawrence equates doubt with that crown of thorns the Roman tormentors mockingly placed on the head of Christ during his passion? To say that the crown is ours puts us in Christ's place in that passion, and suggests that our doubt is part of our drama of suffering and salvation. That the crown is one of thorns means that it is an instrument of mockery and torture, and thus suggests that doubt inflicts us with wounds.
The irony of this episode from the passion, of course, is that Christ does deserve a crown, but not the crown the Romans think he is claiming for himself as King of the Jews (INRI), and so not the crown they place on his brow in mockery of that claim.Footnote 7 In this regard the crown can serve as a synecdoche for the entire passion and crucifixion. For the Romans, the passion and crucifixion are merely the everyday execution of a troublemaker, which gives free licence for cruelty. For the canonical gospels, the passion and crucifixion are the very glory of Christ, the suffering and death to be overcome in resurrection.Footnote 8 And so, while the Romans may have placed the crown on Christ's head, it was not really theirs to give: it was always first and foremost Christ's own crown; it was, as it were, always already out of their hands.
By figuring doubt as our modern crown of thorns, Lawrence suggests, first, the coincidence of faith and doubt, and that such a coincidence is both our greatest torment and our greatest glory; and second, that this coincidence of faith and doubt is peculiarly modern. One way to test both suggestions is to revisit the ancient Christian gospels, and the heightened anxiety around faith and doubt that Christ's resurrection prompts.
* * *
I turn now to examine what we might call the dialectics of doubt and faith in each of the canonical gospels, beginning with the earliest of the four, the Gospel of Mark.Footnote 9 Many New Testament scholars will tell you that Mark's original narrative ends abruptly in the sixteenth chapter without any appearance from a risen Jesus.Footnote 10 Instead we read that on the first day of the week, three women go to Jesus's grave to anoint his body. They find instead an open tomb, and inside a young man ‘dressed in a white robe’ (16: 5). They are ‘amazed', we read, and so he says to them, ‘Do not be amazed; you seek Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified. He has risen, he is not here; see the place where they laid him. But go, tell his disciples and Peter that he is going before you to Galilee; there you will see him, as he told you’ (16: 6–7). The women flee the scene and, in fear and trembling, do not tell of what they saw.
A reader might very well have doubts about this narrative, first and foremost because it fails to explain how the story was ever circulated: it effectively calls itself into question by saying that the women ‘said nothing to any one’ (16: 8). Even if we were to glide over that gap, we are faced with precious little evidence of a resurrection, only a pair of testimonies. No one has in fact seen Jesus risen from the dead; an anonymous young man has told three women that Jesus has, and they have told no one. Did they even believe him? Why should we? Sensing how deeply unsatisfactory this ending was, that the gospel read as if unfinished, two ancient readers chose to append their own endings to the narrative. The first, and shorter, version does little more than close the narrative gap by explaining that the three women did after all tell ‘Peter and those with him all that they had been told'.
It is in the longer version (16: 9–20), however, that we must take an active interest, for here we see the persistence, the irrepressibility, of doubt. In a rather spare narrative, we read that the risen Jesus does in fact appear to Mary Magdalene, and that she does in fact tell the other disciples straight away. But they do not believe her, just as we might be inclined to doubt the young man's single testimony. The drama is heightened when Jesus next appears ‘in another form’ not to a single woman, but to two of his male disciples. They too straight away tell of what they saw, but again their fellows do not believe them. The tension surrounding doubt or ‘unbelief’ (apistia) is now mounting: how are the disciples, never mind we readers, ever to find faith? Jesus appears now a third time, this time to the eleven disciples (including the two who saw him before, but not including Mary). We read that ‘he upbraided them for their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they had not believed those who saw him after he had risen’ (16: 14). To reinforce his point, Jesus goes on to promise a reward and issue a threat: ‘He who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned' (16: 16). This third and final appearance, together with the promise of salvation and the threat of condemnation, seems to do the trick: there is no further mention of the disciples’ doubting. But neither is there any explicit mention of their all coming to believe, although this is what the author of this longer ending seems to imply in the final verse: ‘And they went forth and preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by the signs that attended it. Amen’ (16: 20).
With this ‘Amen’ the author has sought to bring closure to this narrative and the unsettling persistence of doubt. But has he? His silence on whether or not the disciples believe that Jesus is risen from the dead is a crack through which doubt can slip back in. That crack widens as we wonder how it is that a third appearance should decisively resolve the matter. Everything we have read in this longer version suggests that those to whom Jesus appears believe instantly in what they see: that he is risen from the dead. But everything we have read also suggests that the natural reaction of those to whom he has not appeared, but who only hear (or, by extension, read) about his appearance from such witnesses, is to doubt. So how does either the final appearance to the eleven or their faith presume to resolve the lingering doubt for others, for us? How can their faith spill over to those others of us who were not witnesses? Is Jesus's promise of salvation and threat of condemnation supposed to secure the faith of those of us who are destined only to hear, or to read, about his appearances and his words?
Glenn Most's book Doubting Thomas was immensely helpful to me in my first attempt to write on that apostle, and has again proved helpful as I now return to doubt. He says of this longer version in the Gospel of Mark:
the very excessiveness of the means of conviction that the interpolator's Jesus is compelled to deploy – his repeated appearances, his angry rebuke of the doubters, and his explicit linkage between disbelief and damnation – suggests just how virulent the malady of skepticism is that he must combat . . . For the doubt [the longer version] introduces seeps beyond its apparent intended function and goes on to infect a story that must be cleansed of it repeatedly, and by ever more drastic means.Footnote 11
The Gospel of Matthew adorns Mark's rather spare narrative with dazzling details. The women are met at the tomb not by an anonymous young man, but by an ‘angel of the Lord' whose ‘appearance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow’ (28: 2, 3). Having received much the same message as they did in Mark's Gospel, the women straight away run to tell the disciples. But before they can deliver their message to the doubtful disciples, they are stopped in their tracks by the risen Jesus himself, whose feet they take hold of and whom they worship. In Matthew's narrative, the women are not said to doubt the angel's words – how could they, for those words are straight away confirmed. Nor are the disciples said to doubt the women's testimony, as they did in Mark and as they will do again in Luke. The disciples’ doubt seems to have been successfully banished from the narrative, and the slow spread of faith secured. We go on to read, however: ‘Now the eleven disciples went to Galilee, to the mountain to which Jesus had directed them. And when they saw him they worshipped him; but some doubted' (28: 16–17). ‘But some doubted.’ Mind you, these eleven men now see the risen Jesus before them, back from the grave. This sort of ‘autopsy’ or ‘seeing for oneself’ was, for Mark's Gospel, always sufficient to secure the witnesses’ faith. But now even the authority of autopsy begins to waver, for them certainly, and by extension for us. Matthew does not tell us who doubted, or why, what exactly they doubted, or whether or not they were ever convinced – only that they doubted. And so Matthew's narrative, which prior to this had seemed to succeed so well in banishing the disciples’ doubt, reintroduces doubt – without explanation or resolution – in its very final verses.
Glenn Most remarks that ‘the words “but some doubted” tear open a wound of disbelief in the body of a text whose sole aim is to induce belief in its readers’.Footnote 12 The obvious question, then, is ‘why?’ Why would the author of this gospel choose to reintroduce doubt at just this moment, seeming to sabotage his own efforts to banish it from the narrative? Most speculates that the most plausible answer is that the author had to do so, in other words, that there was a tradition, a memory, that some of Jesus’ disciples had in fact doubted, even when seeing him risen from the dead.Footnote 13 According to Most, then, the author was obliged to include that tradition or risk jeopardizing his own credibility. In other words, in order that he might make his narrative believable, he had to put belief once again at risk from doubt.
This is, indeed, a plausible and insightful interpretation. But I wonder if we might do well to question the assumption that the ‘sole aim’ of the text in hand, Matthew's Gospel, ‘is to induce belief in its readers’.Footnote 14 I would question that assumption by pressing gently on two embedded assumptions. First, the easier of the two: can we really say that any text, or for that matter any author, has a sole aim? Is this how a text or an author in fact intends, so singly? Second, what exactly do we mean when we say ‘induce belief’? If we mean that to induce belief is to establish it in someone in such a way that it is certain, secure – as it were, without a shadow of a doubt – then it is hard to say that this is the ‘sole aim’ of this text, since it quite obviously and explicitly reintroduces the shadow of doubt in its final verses. It would seem to me that in order to understand why the Gospel of Matthew includes the phrase ‘but some doubted', we will have to jettison one or both of these prior assumptions. Perhaps the text does not have a sole aim, in which case it can be said to be at cross-purposes with itself: inducing belief, on the one hand, and undermining belief, on the other. Or perhaps the aim is singular, but singularly ambivalent, in which case to induce belief is not to banish doubt, but rather to acknowledge doubt's persistent purchase, even (perhaps especially) its inexplicable purchase, that the shadow or spectre of doubt arises for reasons we cannot finally know. To pinpoint doubt – who doubted, what they doubted, why they doubted – would then run the risk of participating in the fantasy that we could locate doubt, contain it, even excise it. Rather than a wound that tears open the body of this text, then, I would suggest that with the phrase ‘but some doubted', doubt falls like a shadow over the whole of the narrative. But it is up to us to decide in any circumstance whether shadows are the source of an unknown threat or rather a refuge. Can shadow be shade?
A different shadow of doubt falls over our third gospel, Luke's. When the three women tell the eleven disciples of their experience at the tomb, they are again met with doubt: infamously in the verse, ‘these words seemed to them an idle tale, and they did not believe them’ (24: 11). Following the pattern of Mark's Gospel, Jesus next appears to two of the disciples, this time on the road to Emmaus. ‘Their eyes were kept from recognizing him’ (24: 16), we are told, until such time as he had heard their version of recent events, rebuked them for their foolishness, interpreted the Scriptures concerning recent events (including himself), and finally blessed and broken bread with them. Just as the scales fall from their eyes and they recognize him, but before he could eat any of the bread, he vanishes. The two hurry back to Jerusalem to tell the others.
From Mark's narrative we expect their fellows to meet them and their story with incredulity, but Jesus in fact intrudes into the narrative before the other disciples have had a chance to voice any doubts. Jesus appears before them, but in contrast to Mark and in complement to Matthew, the disciples have questions, doubts even, about who or what they are seeing. They are ‘troubled' because they seem to think that Jesus is a ghost (pneuma), not a person brought back to life and with a body. Jesus tries to persuade them, saying: ‘See my hands and my feet, that it is myself; handle me, and see; for a spirit (pneuma) has not flesh and bones as you see that I have’ (24: 37–9). Note that the disciples do not accept Jesus's invitation to touch his body: this will be crucial for understanding Doubting Thomas in the Gospel of John. Instead, we read, ‘they still disbelieved out of joy, and wondered' (24: 41). Here the shadow of doubt has a different opacity than it has in either Mark or Matthew: doubt follows not on despair, but on joy. What does it mean to doubt out of joy? We have seen how the gospel characters regularly doubt each other's testimony, and doubt whether the man they are seeing is in fact who he appears to be. In both cases the doubt seems oriented outward, towards either the witness whose testimony one is weighing or the appearance whose reality one is discerning. But to doubt out of joy is to doubt oneself, that is, to doubt one's own desires and their role in constructing one's testimony and perceptions. It is not another person's words or the external world that is called into question with this kind of doubt, but rather that complicated storm of desires I harbour within myself, that mix of desires frustrated or fulfilled that might cloud my judgement. In this case I am the object of my own doubt. This is the last mention of doubt in Luke: as in Matthew, it is never explicitly dispelled. Certainly the narrative ends triumphantly, with the disciples ‘return[ing] to Jerusalem with great joy, . . . continually in the temple blessing God' (24: 52–3). But if we read the gospel closely, that great joy is tinged with doubt, that blessing of God with a questioning of oneself. By way of anticipation of Cavell, and in the words of Emerson, I ask: is that such an unhandsome condition?Footnote 15
We have come now to our fourth and final gospel, John's, where the tension between faith and irrepressible doubt plays out in an exchange – unique to this gospel – between the risen Jesus and the apostle Thomas, who was also (so we are told) ‘called the Twin’ (20: 24). We catch up with the narrative just after Jesus's appearance to Mary Magdalene, who does not at first recognize him but mistakes him for the gardener. Only when he calls by her name do the scales fall from her eyes, and she bursts out, ‘Rabboni!’ Jesus quickly tells her, ‘Do not touch me’ – famously noli me tangere in Latin – ‘for I have not yet ascended to the Father’ (20: 16–17). How different from Matthew's Gospel, where Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of Jesus not only touch Jesus, but ‘take hold' (ekratēsan) of his feet; and how different, at first glance, from Jesus's invitation to Thomas, soon to come, to touch him.
The scene shifts from a single woman in a garden tomb to a group of men huddled in a dark room. Into this room Jesus suddenly comes, greeting the disciples, ‘Peace be with you’, and breathing the Spirit over them, and with it the right to retain or forgive sins (20: 19). And ‘when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his side’ (20: 20).Footnote 16 For reasons we are never told, Thomas is away at that hour. When he returns, his fellows share the unbelievable good news that they ‘have seen the Lord' (20: 25). He replies, however, with a defiant conditional: ‘Unless I see in his hands the print of the nails, and place my finger in the mark of the nails, and place my hand in his side, I will not believe’ (20: 25). As in the Gospels of Mark and Matthew, the appearance of the risen Jesus seems sufficient to secure the belief of witnesses: none of those who were present have any doubts. But Thomas doubts, and in an entirely new register: he demands not only ‘autopsy’, that he see for himself, but that he confirm with his fingers that Jesus has a body bearing the wounds of his passion.
Jesus had shown the disciples his hands and his side (20: 20), and presumably the wounds therein. They must have told Thomas of these exact wounds, for he demands to see them: the wound in his side from the spear (19: 34), and the holes in his hands from the nails (19: 18), but not the holes in his feet, or the wounds from his scourging (19: 1), or even the wounds from the crown of thorns (19: 2). First, why are these particular wounds (the hands and the side) the grounds for belief, why this the condition to defeat his doubts? In other words, what is the relationship of faith (or doubt) to wounds, these wounds? Second, why does Thomas insist not only on seeing the wounds, but touching them? Touching seems a natural enough reaction when I am reunited with someone I thought I had lost, as Mary and Mary grasp Jesus's feet in Matthew's Gospel. But why does Thomas seem to want not only to touch the wounds, but through them to reach inside Jesus? In other words, what is the relationship of faith (or doubt) to touch, especially when Jesus has just told Mary, who has already believed, ‘do not touch me’? And what is at stake for faith (or doubt) that the touch reach inside its object?
John's Gospel does not directly address these questions about the relationship of faith (or doubt) to wounds and touch. But it may be said to address these questions indirectly by raising and directly addressing others. The narrative skips ahead eight days, and finds the disciples still huddled in that dark room, but this time with Thomas present. The doors shut, Jesus nevertheless appears in their midst, addressing them all first, ‘Peace be with you’, before turning to Thomas. To the Twin he says, ‘“Put your finger here, and see my hands; and put out your hand, and place it in my side; do not be faithless, but believing.” Thomas answered him, “My Lord and my God!”’ (20: 27–8). There is so much to say about this brief exchange, but let me begin with what I will not say, at least not here. I will not rehearse what I have argued elsewhere – which, perhaps alone among the things I have written, I regard as indisputable – namely that the gospel is very clear that Thomas does not touch Jesus, as he is invited to do.Footnote 17 Why the exegetical tradition – both in text and image – has largely understood Thomas as having touched Jesus's wounds is a fascinating question, but one I will not take up now.Footnote 18
One thread of my reading of this episode from John's Gospel, however, I must repeat here, as it bears directly on the dialectics of doubt and faith. The question is this: why, upon hearing Jesus's invitation to touch him, does Thomas immediately drop his defiant conditional and acclaim him ‘My Lord and my God'? Here is how I answered that question in my last attempt to make sense of doubting Thomas:
When Jesus appears to Thomas the week after he appeared to the others, he preemptively and freely offers Thomas precisely what Thomas had earlier insisted he would demand of his Lord. But the point is that it is precisely the invitation to touch him – not the act of touching him – that elicits Thomas's faithful acclamation, ‘My Lord and my God!’ Or, to be even more precise, it is the fact that his Lord's invitation includes the demand Thomas uttered privately, if defiantly, to his fellows behind closed doors a week before. Thus, the Gospel of John turns on its head Thomas's insistence that certain conditions be met before he recognizes Jesus: for it is Jesus who first recognizes Thomas and, moreover, recognizes him by knowing and naming his most ardent desire. Only by realizing that this episode is about Jesus's prior recognition of Thomas can we appreciate how it forms a diptych with Jesus's appearance to Mary in the garden. In both episodes, a human can only recognize a God if that God first recognizes him or her. If, indeed, this is the point of John's narrative, as I believe it is, then Thomas cannot have touched his risen Lord. When Jesus recognizes Thomas's ardent desire and defiant condition, when he names them in the free offer of his open body, the recognition and offer together fulfill a different desire Thomas had not known he had – namely, a desire to be known – and annul his defiant condition by rendering its satisfaction irrelevant.Footnote 19
I stand by this reading; I do not wish to amend it here so much as put my weight on a different part of it. Thomas's acclamation is the only place in the New Testament where Jesus is called ‘God', and to it he adds the possessive ‘my’: ‘my God'. What could explain this startling acclamation if not the inversion I mentioned already, that the divine act at work here is not so much that a man has come back to life but that he has known his disciple's deepest desire, a desire hid most especially from the disciple himself, namely a desire to be known? In other words, to be fully known by another is to feel and so to exclaim the intimate presence of the divine.Footnote 20 It is the reach of the risen Jesus into Thomas that explains the exclamation, my God, that is, the God who knows my desires, who knows me. This, of course, only compounds the inversion, because whereas earlier Thomas demanded that he reach inside Jesus through his open wounds, he now discovers that he himself has already been breached, his desires already reached, and in their having been reached, reformed.
Jesus then asks a question: ‘Have you believed because you have seen me?’ Had he asked it of the other disciples, their answer would be ‘yes’. But he does not ask it of them, only of Thomas. And Thomas's answer must be ‘no, that is not why I have believed', because Thomas has believed, has overcome his doubts, not by any ‘autopsy’, not by seeing for himself, but by being completely seen and known by someone else.Footnote 21 Jesus's final line, ‘Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe’ (20: 29), is often understood to signal to the readers of this gospel that they are blessed if they believe without seeing, that is, if their faith in the risen Jesus is not conditioned on seeing him. This serves as something of a rebuke to the other disciples, and suggests that the readers stand at something of an advantage: they can believe without seeing. But what might make readers believe? What might silence their natural doubts? This verse suggests that the gospel wishes the reader to be so convinced by its own narrative that it induces faith without sight, never mind touch.Footnote 22 I wonder, though, if a reader of this gospel might draw a different lesson from this narrative. If Thomas believes because he is known, because he is known from within, because his very own desires are known, then might a reader reasonably expect that this is the proper condition for belief? Might a reader expect to be known in just the way Thomas was, named in just the way Mary was? If this is right, then the reader waits on the fulfilment of this condition, waits to be known and named, and so waits on faith. I would suggest, then, that while John's Gospel does not leave the reader's faith undone by doubt, it does leave the reader waiting on faith, weighing his doubts, waiting for those doubts to be named and known, reached and reformed. It puts the reader in Thomas's place for those eight long days in darkness, waiting defiantly with his desires and demands, waiting to have them rendered irrelevant.
My reading of the gospels is that however much they may wish to induce faith in their readers, they leave their readers with an understanding of faith dappled with doubt, and doubt of different kinds. The Gospel of Mark: is doubt a threat that cannot be fully protected against, and thus a source of anxiety? And how do we, can we, should we live with this anxiety? The Gospel of Matthew: is doubt a shadow that falls over us, with no obvious whence or whither? And do we, can we, should we experience this shadow as shade? The Gospel of Luke: is doubt less about an external object and more about our own desires, frustrated and fulfilled, and their role in shaping our faith? And do we, can we, should we doubt out of joy, bless God while questioning ourselves? Finally, the Gospel of John: is doubt a defiant conditional we place between faith and ourselves? And how do we, can we, should we live waiting for that doubt to be named and known, reached and so reformed? These are the questions that make up the dialectics of faith and doubt in the four gospels. They seem ample evidence of a lively, ancient appreciation for the irrepressibility of doubt, for the coincidence of faith and doubt.
* * *
As promised, I propose that we now step forward in time, and sideways in discipline, in order to consider this ancient dialectic of faith and doubt from the perspective of a perennial problem in modern philosophy, namely the problem of scepticism. Ever since Descartes sat by a warm fire and began to doubt systematically the existence of everything around him, including himself, modern philosophers have been much agitated by scepticism's challenge to our knowledge of the external world, and our knowledge of what is often called ‘other minds’.Footnote 23 To put it simply, the problem has not been solved. I wish to invoke a teacher of mine, Stanley Cavell, a name that may not be well known among contemporary ecclesiastical historians. Cavell is an American philosopher who has spent nearly his entire career at Harvard University, and under whom I studied as an undergraduate.
One of Cavell's singular contributions is his insistence that scepticism is not a problem admitting of a solution as much as a chronic condition requiring care. I do not think he would regard this as his own contribution per se, but rather that of the early twentieth-century Viennese philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, especially the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Vexed by philosophy's inability to answer the sceptic's question, some early twentieth-century philosophers responded by arguing that the question itself was meaningless, that the sceptic's calling knowledge into radical doubt is merely a perversion of language, nearly beyond recognition. By attending to how language actually works, these ‘ordinary language philosophers’ sought to cut the sceptic's question off at the pass, to refuse it the purchase it claimed to have. Rather than argue for or against scepticism, they thought it deserved no such hearing at court. One of Cavell's own teachers, J. L. Austin, was among those who regarded scepticism as resulting from confusion in language.
Wittgenstein is sometimes thought to have believed the same, that scepticism arises out of philosophy's misuse of our words. And so if we would but use our words properly, such questions would not arise. For this reason some credit (or debit) Wittgenstein with ending philosophy. But Cavell reads Wittgenstein differently, that on the contrary there is a deep ‘truth of skepticism’: its truth is, in Cavell's words, ‘an experience or sense that one may know nothing about the real world'.Footnote 24 This is not a doubt about this or that, but instead a profound sense of alienation from one's own words, and from one's own world: I do not know it, I do not even know myself. If such scepticism results from confusion, from misuse of our words, from the gap between saying and meaning, then, Cavell insists, it is an entirely ‘natural' result of our being the sorts of ‘creature[s] complicated or burdened enough to possess language at all'.Footnote 25 What we call ‘philosophy’ is then the acute articulation of this natural result, of this chronic condition of being language users. By putting this experience of alienation (from words) into words, philosophy diagnoses our condition, names it. Philosophy does not err by diagnosing our condition, but by misdiagnosing it as something that can be cured, as if our alienation were truly alien rather than constitutive. When Wittgenstein says in the Philosophical Investigations that we ‘bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’, Cavell takes him to mean that we return scepticism from being a metaphysical problem allegedly begging solution to it being an everyday condition, by which is meant not an experience we have every day, but an experience to which we are open because of what we do every day: we live.Footnote 26
I am reminded of a line from one of Cavell's favourite plays, Samuel Beckett's Endgame: ‘You’re on earth; there's no cure for that!’Footnote 27 This is Cavell's understanding of scepticism: there is no ‘cure’, no ‘escape’, no answer to scepticism; instead, there is a ‘response’, even a ‘therapy’.Footnote 28 The problem with some ordinary language philosophy, in this view, is that it fails to let the severity of the sceptic's situation take hold, and thus in effect denies the condition both in symptom and in root; the problem with traditional philosophy, in this view, is that while it recognizes the severity of the sceptic's situation, by looking for a cure it fails to recognize it as a chronic condition requiring care, or therapy. Cavell understood Wittgenstein to be one of philosophy's great therapists, and his Philosophical Investigations a text designed to diagnose and treat someone gifted with the affliction of language.
Why have I cited Cavell and his contribution in this discussion of the dialectics of doubt and faith? Just as doubt is traditionally understood as inimical to faith, as threatening it, so scepticism is traditionally understood as a threat to our knowledge of the world. With Wittgenstein's help, Cavell invites us to consider whether instead scepticism might be a condition of knowledge, a ‘condition’ both in the sense of something from which we suffer as if from a chronic illness, and in the sense of that which makes knowledge possible at all. In other words, knowledge is constituted by its ‘vulnerability’ to scepticism.Footnote 29 To pretend otherwise, to disown scepticism, is in fact, for Cavell, to disown knowledge, and so to disown ourselves as those creatures conditioned to know, that is, to share a language in which we strive (and fail) to mean what we say.Footnote 30
What if we were to view doubt and faith along similar lines? What would it mean to treat doubt not as an illness to be cured, a cancer to be cut out, but as a condition of faith, as both a chronic condition needing ongoing care and the very condition that makes faith possible at all? What would it mean to understand faith as constituted (rather than threatened) by its vulnerability to doubt? What strikes me is that these are questions pressed upon me, made urgent, both by ancient gospels and their diverse witness to a tense dialectic of doubt and faith, doubt's irrepressible purchase on faith, and by very modern debates about scepticism and the conditions of knowledge. Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote: ‘I take the evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition.’ Cavell entitled his book on Emerson, for which this quotation is the epigraph, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome.Footnote 31 In doing so he questions just how unhandsome this condition is: if unhandsome to clutch and so let slip, then perhaps handsome to let go and so hold fast. I can imagine Doubting Thomas saying something like that.
* * *
Let us return to our ancient apostle: we could say that in the Gospel of John the character of Doubting Thomas shifts the problem of doubt from a problem of our knowing something to a problem of our being known by something. One of the dangers in such a reading, however, is the temptation to see Thomas as having solved once and for all the problem of doubt, at least for himself, when he is known in that moment and acclaims the risen Jesus ‘my Lord and my God'. If we readers are put in the place of Thomas, and so left waiting to be known, we wait on a moment of being known, such that we can dispel our defiant doubt, and attain an unblemished faith. But what is this moment of being known and the attendant, instantaneous acclamation within an entire lifetime? Is it enough to have been known once? Do we not change? Do our desires and demands not shift under us, within us, from moment to moment, from day to day, from year to year? What good is it if I was once known, if I am now unknown?
The gospel does not narrate Thomas's life, whether and how his faith continues to be constituted by a vulnerability to doubt. Here is where Cavell's handling of scepticism as a condition seems urgently pertinent. For Cavell, following Wittgenstein, the very condition of knowledge is scepticism. There are inalienable moments of alienation from knowledge, and the issue at hand is not so much how we solve the problem as how we live from moment to moment, such that our life is open and responsive to scepticism. Our challenge is not to secure our certain knowledge, but to be faithful to the condition of our knowledge, responsive to our vulnerability, such that when the question of scepticism comes we do not deny its purchase or existence, but acknowledge it and work to lead it home. If Cavell is right, then Thomas and (more importantly) we readers of John's Gospel are waiting on the dissolution of doubt, on a moment of being known that is crowned with a pious acclamation. But that moment is not invulnerable, which is to say it is open, open to the future, when we will have changed, and when we once again wish to be named and known, reached and reformed.
Speaking of ancient Thomas, we should return in closing to his modern twin. I suggested earlier that T. E. Lawrence's phrase – ‘doubt, our modern crown of thorns’ – invites us to ponder the relationship of doubt and faith, of doubt as both our greatest torment and our greatest glory: a condition handsome and unhandsome. In an earlier version of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the so-called Oxford Text, the line read differently: ‘doubt, that modern crown of thorns which some western thinkers wore with such a grace’.Footnote 32 Following his ancient apostolic namesake, and anticipating Wittgenstein and Cavell, Lawrence could be said to define faith as a life crowned with doubt, worn gracefully. To disown doubt, then, is faithless and disgraceful. Whereas John's Gospel does not narrate the life of Doubting Thomas, Lawrence narrates his own, one of doubt-riddled faith: from Seven Pillars of Wisdom's tortured exploration of his doubts about everything, chiefly himself, to his later memoirs of enlisted life in the service, entitled The Mint, where Lawrence attempts to find a faith in fraternity. Few people know that when Lawrence died, untimely, from a motorcycle accident, he was planning a new book, something that would incorporate The Mint but reframe it, retitle it: a Confession of Faith. We have some hints as to what this projected book would have looked like. The final sentence of the book it was meant to incorporate reads: ‘I can't write “Finis” to this book, while I am still serving. I hope, sometimes, that I will never write it.’Footnote 33 Whatever faith was for Lawrence, then, and whatever its relationship to doubt, it was something to which he hoped we would never write, ‘Finis’ (‘conclusion’ or ‘end'). To that I say, ‘Amen’.
