Closing off the Persian Gulf to the passage of oil tankers will be “easier than drinking a glass of water,” according to Iran's top naval commander. Since the world, poor and rich, relies on the Gulf for some 70% of its exportable oil and natural gas, this (exaggerated) statement by an Iranian military spokesman must be taken seriously, and it is, by the world and by the United States.
The authors of this book would probably not disagree about the urgency of providing adequate security for the oil supply or even that the US Fifth Fleet anchored in Bahrain is relevant to the provision of this security. The authors, however, do not start their analysis from this strategic imperative regarding oil security, apparent though it is to all importing nations, large and small. Rather, their first chapter states their claim that the United States is a hegemon or imperial state seeking first of all to expand its power and only secondarily to provide a collective good of security for the world's oil supply. They ignore the reality that the United States, still the most powerful state in the system by a wide margin, has been in decline on its cycle of relative power since 1970. Their contention is that the United States and other unmentioned “core states” first and foremost are attempting to defend the capitalist order.
In the final chapter, the authors clarify their concern that the United States and its allies are not sufficiently attentive to democracy. Yet the active role that these states have played regarding the Arab Spring surely belies the plausibility of this concern. How could the United States, Britain, and France, for example, have made their actions as well as their words any plainer to the demagogues and dictators that have run these Moslem countries for so long?
The book is nicely crafted. Its argument is consistently framed by the Wallersteinian perspective that the world is divided into sectors, the core states and the periphery, and that the liberal, capitalist order is oppressive to the developing world. Yet surely China, India, and Brazil, for example, have benefited extraordinarily from their interdependence with the rich countries. Moreover, international politics is now so multifaceted and subject to the complex forces of political equilibrium that any simple dichotomy between “hegemon” and “challenger,” or between hegemon and periphery, could only awkwardly fit the international system and then with huge distortion.
Any book written from such a strong ideological bent may transmit a sense of certainty and conviction for those who share the ideology, but for others many questions will arise. Washington and New York, after all, were attacked in an unprecedented way. The United States may have overreacted and even misconstrued the nature of the threat, but American “imperial” reach did not instigate the challenge on 9/11 in any immediate or direct way. Governments like those of Russia and China did not oppose US actions in Afghanistan, for instance, because they were fearful of Islamist extremism in their own populations. The United States pulled the Russian and Chinese “chestnuts out of the fire,” so to speak.
Alternative interpretations of the events leading to the Iraq intervention call into question the simple imperial explanation offered in this book. Fear of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, neoconservative anxiety about the security of Israel, concern that another oil supply interruption would occur, this time triggering a much larger war—none of these alternative explanations is anywhere examined extensively by the authors.
Likewise ignored is the diversity of political administrations in the United States: The Obama administration is not the George W. Bush administration. When political scientists Kenneth N. Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt joined the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy in 2003, they were worried about a tendency for the first Bush administration to become imperialistic. By the second administration it had surely shed these impulses. Barack Obama eliminated any remnants in policy and rhetoric. If the United States was motivated preponderantly by an imperial impulse, then the contracts awarded to oil companies in Iraq at the end of the war suggest how disappointed the proponents of empire must be. The first and richest contracts went to the Iraqi national oil company and a national oil company from China, not to Exxon-Mobil or Chevron.
Global Energy Security and American Hegemony is smoothly written, well organized, and essentially correct that the security of the oil supply is central to American interests (and to the interest of virtually every other country in the system). Likewise, the American concern, shared with its allies first and foremost, that the liberal trade order be preserved, that democracy prevail wherever its roots prosper, and that major war be avoided are objectives for which no scholar or policymaker must apologize. Indeed, the authors, notwithstanding the ideological position that shapes their analysis, would be hard put to dispute the validity of these concerns broadly shared with other nations about energy security, the liberal trade order, emergent democracy, and war over the oil fields that could get out of hand—very human principles indeed.
