According to Steven Wagner, Eisenhower distinguished his policies from those of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans by his philosophy of the “middle way.” While he supported an active role for the federal government in both domestic and foreign policies, he supported those that would allow the federal government to act as a catalyst for change without adding significantly to its responsibilities. Eisenhower hoped his policies would change the direction of the Republican Party and that it would continue along the middle way. This was not to be.
Wagner clearly and briefly and with supporting evidence traces Eisenhower's “middle way” philosophy throughout the major matters of his presidency. Eisenhower accepted the contributions made by FDR and Truman to social welfare. Programs were already in place, and he sought to strengthen and expand upon them. In this endeavor, he was successful. Where new programs were necessary, he was far less successful. Eisenhower sought a “middle way” between conservatives, who believed that health care and education were not a responsibility of the federal government, and liberals, who maintained they were.
Despite Eisenhower's satisfaction with the Landrum-Griffin Bill (The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959), his efforts to find a middle way in the field of labor management relations were “on the whole, unsuccessful” (410). Wagner believes that Eisenhower's failure to get the support of union leaders and business leaders in his pursuit of the middle way severely limited his achievements in the field of labor-management relations.
Agriculture was the one area of domestic policy where Eisenhower favored overturning the policies of his predecessors. He wanted to return agriculture to the free market, but he was opposed on this by Republicans from farm states and southern Democrats. Again, he sought a middle-way solution, hoping to wean farmers from government supports and by taking farmland out of production. But his plan did not work. While Eisenhower's Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, concluded that “the farm problem is largely the refusal of Democratic Congresses from 1955 on to make long-needed changes,” Wagner maintains that “what Benson failed to point out was that Republican Party Conservatives had been just as responsible for holding up the administration's programs as the Democrats” (83).
Most Americans would probably consider civil rights to be an absolute, moral issue, but Eisenhower pursued the “middle way” here just as he did in other areas. Wagner contends in the field of civil rights Eisenhower took, “perhaps the most controversial position he took in any field during his presidency [with] his refusal to state his approval of the Brown decision” (Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 1954) namely that, “in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” Eisenhower's public response was limited to statements saying the Court's decision was law and that he would abide by it.
Wagner maintains that Eisenhower's failure to show support for the Brown decision should not be interpreted as outright disagreement with the Supreme Court's verdict. Eisenhower was not a segregationist, Wagner writes. He did, however, have a “certain amount of empathy for white southern views.” Eisenhower believed that the role of the federal government in the field of civil rights should be limited to those areas where it had direct jurisdiction. He claimed that his dedication to the middle way excluded the field of “moral values.” But, Wagner says Eisenhower “failed to provide the country with the leadership it needed in the field of civil rights in the crucial years following the Supreme Court's ruling in the Brown v. the Board of Education.”
In international affairs, Eisenhower also sought the middle way between the high level of foreign aid of the Truman administration and the increased level of defense spending that might be necessary if foreign aid was eliminated. But this plan was obstructed by persistent isolationism and protectionism within his own party. Wagner contends that Congressional Republicans failed to recognize the security benefits of liberalized trade and foreign aid. Once again, he says, members of Eisenhower's own party made it difficult for him to pursue the middle way.
According to Wagner, another of Eisenhower's goals was for a number of prominent Republicans to emerge during his presidency who would be willing and capable of continuing his pursuit of the middle way. “[T]his goal also went unfulfilled.” Little had changed by 1960. “Devastating losses” in 1956 and 1958 left the Republican Party in a shambles, and Nixon was the only Republican capable of winning the nomination in 1960.
Nixon attempted to revive some of Eisenhower's middle-way policies, but Democratic and Conservative Republican “hatred” of Nixon and his extreme political partisanship and Watergate put an end to those efforts. Whatever return to Eisenhower's middle way may have accompanied Nixon's resurgence was short-lived. When the Republican Party recovered from the setback of Watergate, it looked to Ronald Reagan whose support of Goldwater in 1964 had caught the attention of conservatives.
According to Wagner, Republican presidential candidates since Reagan have been more likely to invoke his memory than Eisenhower's, despite the fact that both won two terms as president and remained popular throughout their eight years in office. The failure of Eisenhower's middle way, according to Wagner, demonstrates that the “crisis of liberalism” actually began in the Republican Party a decade earlier with the defeat of liberals within its ranks.
