Class Solidarity versus National Unity: The Origins of the Congress and the Soviet Response

The initial idea to summon a congress of Poles from abroad emerged among activists affiliated with the Union for the Defense of the Western Borderlands (Związek Obrony Kresów Zachodnich) in 1925. The Union for the Defense of the Western Borderlands was looking for an institutional setting that would promote a link between all Poles living abroad and the Polish state without undermining their loyalty to their countries of residence (Wrzesiński Reference Wrzesiński1975, 298). In this, it was inspired by a similar endeavor undertaken by its German counterpart, the Congress of Germans Abroad that took place in Berlin in the summer of 1925. The Polish authorities were also in favor of the idea, having grown increasingly alarmed by the political influence Weimar Germany was gaining in Europe by playing the minority card. Initiated by German minority organizations in the Baltic states, the First Congress of European Nationalities held in Geneva in October 1925 ran parallel to the League of Nations and was instrumentalized by Germans as anti-Versailles propaganda (Wrzesiński Reference Wrzesiński1975, 299; Smith, Germane, and Housden, Reference Smith David, Germane and Housden2019).

The Polish delegates to the congress in Geneva discussed the possibility of holding a similar meeting of Polish minority representatives. Shortly thereafter, the leaders of three Polish civic associations—the Union for the Defense of the Western Borderlands, the Polish Emigration Society (Polskie Towarzystwo Emigracyjne), and the Adam Mickiewicz Society for the Cultural Support for Poles Abroad (Towarzystwo Opieki Kulturalnej nad Polakami Zamieszkałymi Zagranicą im. Adama Mickiewicza)—formed an organizing committee to oversee the future World Congress of Poles Abroad. The committee also included representatives of the Polish government, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education, and the Emigration office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Care (Albin Reference Albin1981).

The congress was initially scheduled for May 3, 1927. An appeal to “all Poles beyond Poland’s borders” was circulated worldwide, inviting Poles to take part in the upcoming event. The appeal highlighted the cultural and historic unity of the Polish people, regardless of their country of residence, and the diaspora’s historical responsibilities to the Polish nation and state. The declared objective of the congress was to establish a permanent cultural connection between Poles living abroad and their homeland (kraj ojczysty). The invitation to the congress was accompanied with a preliminary program along with an explanation as to how quotas for each country would be calculated.

The number of delegates to the congress was established on the basis of the estimated Polish population residing in different countries, with the largest delegations coming from the United States (32 delegates representing some three million American Poles), Germany (24 delegates), and the Soviet Union (14 delegates representing the Poles of Soviet Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia). Delegates were to be elected through independent associations of Poles (związek polaków) domiciled in each country, the formation of which was based on free national and cultural self-identification, or lack thereof, facilitated by the most relevant cultural and educational organizations. Altogether, 120 delegates were expected to arrive in Warsaw from 23 countries, including the Free City Gdansk.Footnote ³

At this point, one could also ask why the organizing committee even considered inviting Soviet delegates to Warsaw, allowing for potential disruption at the congress. Mikołaj Iwanow suggests that while the organizers could not simply ignore the large number of Poles residing within the Soviet Union’s borders, the invitation was itself an attempt to provoke the Communist Party into rejecting their participation and thus provide evidence of the Soviet regime’s repressive nature. To that end, Iwanow posits that the number of seats allocated for the Soviet delegation (14 in total) was intentionally limited to provoke anger from among Polish communists across the border. Moreover, the historian further highlights that it was perhaps the first time in Poland’s history that the number of Poles beyond its eastern border had been intentionally underestimated: while calculating the quotas for national delegations, the Polish population in Soviet Ukraine was estimated to be 300,000, with a further 200,000 in Belarus and 150,000 in Russia (Iwanow Reference Iwanow1991, 260). By contrast, the Soviet census of 1926 recorded more than 780,000 Poles living across the Soviet Union (Vsesoiuznaia Perepis’ 1928, xxiv–xxvii; on the problem of the Soviet census see Palko Reference Palkoforthcoming).

In early December 1926, the editorial boards of the Polish-language Soviet newspapers—Trybuna Radziecka in Moscow, Głos Młodzieży in Kyiv, and Orka in Minsk—were contacted by the Warsaw-based organizing committee about the upcoming congress.Footnote ⁴ In early 1927, the same invitation was also sent to the Ukraine’s largest Polish-language newspaper Sierp (Sierp, June 6, 1929).Footnote ⁵ The organizers encouraged the editors to publish the committee’s appeal along with a dedicated article that would explain the significance of the event. The organizers also solicited exhibits for an expedition on the international Polish-language press that was intended to be held during the congress.Footnote ⁶

Information about the congress was immediately passed on to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, which promptly called a session to discuss the possibility of participating in the Warsaw congress. As the organizers in Warsaw had anticipated, the Central Committee’s meeting on March 11, 1927, decided that participation by Polish delegates from Soviet Ukraine was unadvisable (netselesoobraznyi). Instead, a motion was put forward to organize an alternative congress of Poles in Soviet Ukraine, where the achievements of the Polish minority in the Soviet Union would be set against the failures of Polish government’s own minority politics. However, this resolution on nonparticipation had to be confirmed by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.Footnote ⁷

Around that time, information concerning the congress had also reached the Polish Bureau (Pol’biuro), a special unit within the Department for Agitation, Propaganda and Press, or Agitprop,Footnote ⁸ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which was responsible for Poles living in Soviet territory. At a special session summoned to discuss the invitation to the congress, a top-secret memorandum, to be sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was prepared, outlining the Pol’biuro’s position on the matter.Footnote ⁹ In the memo, signed by the bureau’s secretary, Sofia Dzerzhinskaia,Footnote ¹⁰ the congress was condemned as an attempt by the Polish government to create “a nationalist and Catholic union of Poles outside Poland” that would be used “against the Revolution, the Komintern and, primarily, against the Soviet Union.”Footnote ¹¹ The future Congress of Poles Abroad was itself perceived as an instrument of Warsaw that was designed to influence public opinion in support of any future military campaigns. Poles living en masse in the Soviet-Polish borderlands were regarded as its main targets. By cultivating a sense of political allegiance toward the Polish government, the congress, in the eyes of the Moscow-based Pol’biuro, aimed to create informal military outposts that would serve in a future Polish invasion of the USSR.

Nonetheless, the Pol’biuro were convinced that the Congress in Warsaw could not be ignored. According to them, participation by a Soviet delegation could equally yield great benefits for Moscow’s own strategic goals. First and foremost, it could potentially help the Soviet authorities develop the trust of their Polish population while also providing an international forum for Soviet propaganda.Footnote ¹² Possible domestic gains, the memo continued, included tackling widespread anti-Soviet propaganda among Soviet Poles, strengthening their class consciousness and deepening their trust in Soviet power while encouraging them to contribute to the process of the construction of socialism.Footnote ¹³

Internationally, the congress might also provide one of very few legal opportunities to agitate in favor of the Soviet Union and its ideology abroad. Soviet participation could have important political and international resonance too—during the congress, the Soviet delegation hoped to draw international attention to the negative treatment of national minorities in Poland and reject any potential support to Poland’s military plans. This might also have the added bonus of helping the Soviets gain the sympathy of Poland’s workers and peasants and of improving the Soviet Union’s image abroad. Instead, rejecting participation could also be construed as evidence of the Soviet Union’s oppression of its Polish minority, leading to even stronger anti-Soviet attitudes, both domestically and internationally.

Given the above, it was decided that the Soviet delegation would go to Warsaw to emphasize that their loyalty to the socialist cause was stronger than their connection to Poland. At the congress they would reject the congress slogan of “national unity” in favor of Soviet slogan of “class solidarity.”Footnote ¹⁴ In a way, it was a win-win situation for Soviet ideologists: either they would use the congress as a forum to promote Soviet ideology, or, if denied entry, they would present the refusal as proof of the oppressive nature of the Polish fascist regime, thus validating and reinforcing their anti-Polish propaganda narrative.

Consequently, Soviet delegation’s participation at the World Congress of Poles Abroad was deemed both important and necessary. To gain most from its campaign, the Pol’biuro encouraged a broad public discussion of the congress’ aims and objectives at all levels. The election of the congress delegates would receive widespread coverage in the local, republican, and central press, both in Polish and other languages.Footnote ¹⁵ On April 7, 1927, the Pol’biuro recommendations were approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Contrary to the committee’s decision, the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks described Soviet participation at the Warsaw congress as being “advisable” (tselesoobraznyi). Responsibility for organizing the campaign and form the delegation itself was thus assigned to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 466–467).

The Political Dimension of the Congress of Poles Abroad

Meanwhile, following the coup d’état of May 1926, Marshal Józef Piłsudski had overthrown the democratically elected government of President Stanisław Wojciechowski and Prime Minister Wincenty Witos and installed his own political movement, Sanacja. As preparations for the congress continued, so did the public debate around its ostensible objectives. Such debates exposed the lack of uniformity among the various communities of the Polish diaspora itself, especially in their assessment of the coup. Anti-Sanacja voices were particularly strong among representatives in the United States, France, and Germany, those countries whose delegations to the congress would also be the largest by a considerable margin. Moreover, Piłsudski’s supporters were still a minority within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hence they could not rely on the ministry’s compliance in organizing the Congress (Wrzesiński Reference Wrzesiński1975, 300). In addition, the congress’s proposed date of May 3, 1927, coincided with an election campaign in Poland, sparking fears that the congress could be used as a forum for antigovernment opposition during a politically sensitive time. The government therefore intended to postpone the congress’s convocation for as long as it needed to gain enough influence and support to define the event’s ideological makeup and decisions (Wrzesiński Reference Wrzesiński1975, 299). However, it was the lack of unanimity among the Polish communities abroad during the delegate elections that was presented as the formal reason for its adjournment (Albin Reference Albin1981, 68–69).

Nevertheless, Polish civic and cultural organizations did not abandon the idea of the congress. Following a broad public discussion of the importance of such a gathering, as well as the consolidation of the Sanacja regime as the dominant force in Polish politics, a new date was set: July 14, 1929. The new organizing committee this time fully reflected the dominant role of the state and Polish Catholic Church in defining the shape and course of the congress. This new organizing committee itself was established under the patronage of President Ignacy Mościcki, Marshal Piłsudski, and Cardinal August Hlond. In addition, the committee included numerous government representatives, including those from the ministries of foreign and internal affairs, religious affairs, education, labor, and social care, and the mayors of Poland’s largest cities: Warsaw, Krakow, and Poznan (Pamiętnik 1930, 20).

The 1929 congress appeal was somewhat different from the one distributed two years prior. In 1927, the organizers had wanted to reassure Poles living abroad that their home country had not forgotten its “children” dispersed throughout the world and that it still remained responsible for them. By contrast, the 1929 petition highlighted the duty of the Poles abroad to contribute toward strengthening the Polish state. While the 1927 congress was meant to emphasize the responsibilities of the state toward Poles worldwide (such as identifying their cultural needs or supporting education activities), the 1929 congress accentuated the Polish diaspora’s patriotic obligations in supporting the new state. The congress was meant to show Poles abroad “how to be the spokesmen of the Republic of Poland and defenders of its interests in the most advantageous way for yourself and Poland” (Albin Reference Albin1981, 73).

This new emphasis reflected a more general shift in the government’s emigration policy and their attitudes toward Polonia. The ideological scope of the congress as conceived before 1926 had reflected the national doctrine of the National Democracy movement (Endecja), according to which the Polish state was seen as stemming from the Polish people and was hence obliged to extend its support also to those Poles residing beyond its borders (Wrzesiński Reference Wrzesiński1975, 297). The Sanacja regime was instead seeking to subordinate the interests of emigrant communities to those of the state, with the latter caring “for the economic and spiritual benefit of the immigrants while adjusting those to the benefit of the state,” as stated in a memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wrzesiński Reference Wrzesiński1975, 300). Particular emphasis was placed on using Polish diaspora communities as conduits for improving Poland’s international position (Lencznarowicz Reference Lencznarowicz2019, 191). To achieve this, however, a centralized organization of Poles residing abroad was needed with the congress deemed a good opportunity to discuss what such an organization might look like. As underscored by Piłsudski in his opening address to the congress, the first Congress of Poles Abroad saw the idea of “uniting all our compatriots in exile into one organized entity for the benefit of the Polish state” made manifest (Pamiętnik 1930, 50).

In mid-April 1929, the official Polish press announced that the World Congress of Poles Abroad would take place on July 14, 1929, and that invitations were to finally be sent out. Unlike in 1927, however, no official invitation was received by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did not show much interest in the event, unlike Agitprop and the Pol’buro, although they had received this information quite late and almost “by chance” (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 468). Toward the end of April, the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to establish a commission headed by the Agitprop chief, Aleksander Krinitski. It is important to note, however, that there was no unified view on the Soviet participation at the congress. Krinitski regarded the event as a great opportunity for anti-Polish propaganda both internally and internationally. Conversely, the leader of the Polish Communist Party in Moscow, Leon Purman, and the head of the Special Department of the Joint State Political Directorate, Ian Olski (Kulakovski), opposed the idea either for ideological or security concerns.

Krinitski himself was well-aware of the fact that the Polish congress was ideologically hostile to the Soviet state. In a note addressed to the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated May 29, 1929, he recognized that the congress had been summoned by the “fascist” government and would make voicing opposition to the Piłsudskiites virtually impossible, unlike in 1927. Nevertheless, he believed that Soviet participation in the congress was still “advisable” (tselesoobraznyi) and could allow Moscow to pursue several objectives. First, the forum itself could be used to uncover the fascist nature of the Polish government. Second, the Soviet delegation could refute “the rumors of persecutions on national grounds” in the Soviet Union. Third, sanctioning the participation of Soviet Poles would undermine those Poles in the Soviet Union who “have not yet rejected the nationalist ideology and remain under the influence of the priests [księża].” Finally, a state-sanctioned presence would prevent the participation of a delegation “hostile to us” (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 468). Instead, the Agitprop head proposed to elect the delegates under the close supervision of both the central and republican All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in such a way that 60 percent would be the members of the Communist Party (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 468).

In addition to Krinitski’s considerations, the decision to endorse the Soviet delegation’s participation was linked to the changing international political scene. It was believed that the formation of the second Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald in the United Kingdom on June 5, 1929, would lead to less Western support for Poland, granting the Soviet Union an upper hand in its ongoing rivalry. Consequently, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks granted its approval for Soviet participation. On June 6, 1929, a special commission of the Central Committee was established to supervise the election of delegates to the Warsaw congress. Although headed by Krinitskii, as a compromise, Olski was also included as the representative of the Special Department of the Joint State Political Directorate (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 468).

“Manifestation of Polish Fascism”: The Information Campaign

Once the official position toward the congress had been defined, the Soviet information campaign commenced. On June 3, 1929, Trybuna Radziecka featured an editorial titled “The Manifestation of Polish Fascism” (“Manifestacja faszysmu polskiego”). The same editorial appeared on the pages of the republican Polish press, the Ukrainian Sierp among them (Sierp, June 6, 1929). The editorial’s aims were twofold. First, it provided an outlet for Soviet anti-Polish propaganda. The article went on to expose the “true” intentions of the Polish “fascist” regime that had invited Poles from abroad to the congress to break the unity of the world revolutionary movement, establish fascist footholds worldwide and rally support for its government’s anti-Soviet military campaign (Sierp, June 6, 1929).Footnote ¹⁶ Second, it sought to mobilize Poles across the Soviet Union, especially workers and poor and middle-class peasants, to take active part in the election of delegates to the congress and, once in Warsaw, to voice their disapproval to the Poland’s anti-Soviet agenda. The editorial illustrated this strategy: “Our delegates will go to Warsaw to tell the whole truth about the Soviet Union. They will speak about the ongoing grand socialist construction here, the socialist building that is firmly based on the conscious active participation of the broadest masses of workers and toiling peasants, including those of Polish origin, who had fought and won in October alongside other workers and peasants, and are now building a new life” (Sierp, June 6, 1929).Footnote ¹⁷

To challenge the congress’s intentions, the editorial declared that Poles living in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia had only one “socialist motherland” and they were ready to defend it from “international and Polish imperialists” (Sierp, June 6, 1929).Footnote ¹⁸ Soviet Poles would go to Warsaw to reject the slogan of “national unity” and instead call for international workers’ solidarity and proletarian revolution. The editorial note published at the end of the article concluded with the following proclamations: “Long Live the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, the motherland of all toilers”; “Long Live the Union of Soviet republics—the only motherland of the working masses of the whole world”; “Long live a future proletarian Poland that would stride hand-in-hand with the Soviet proletariat”; and “Long live Komintern—the headquarters of the world revolution and its section—the Polish Communist Party” (Sierp, June 6, 1929).Footnote ¹⁹

From June 6 onward, all the major newspapers in the Soviet Union, including the central state and party organ, Pravda, had daily features dedicated to the elections of congress delegates in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. This coverage condemned Poland and its national policy, lauded Lenin’s nationality strategy and the Soviet minority regime, acknowledged the social and economic development of the Polish minority in the border republics and highlighted the leading role of the party as a purveyor of modernity among its Polish communities. Newspapers also published dedicated features on party activists, privileged rural workers, teachers, and medical professionals of Polish origin who condemned the intentions of the Warsaw congress and highlighted their loyalty to the Soviet regime (Pravda, July 2, 1929). Needless to say, such voices represented the strata of Polish population that had benefited the most from Soviet power and its preferential minority regime.

The coverage produced by the central authorities did more than spread information, however. By outlining a list of concise themes, they focused popular debate and provided discussion materials for bottom-level election conferences. They also offered rhetorical tools on how to speak about the Warsaw congress and communicate with the party. Most importantly, the Soviet press encouraged Poles to participate in the wider public discourse and express opinions for or against the party line. Meanwhile, party officials meticulously recorded their answers and opinions.

“The Soviet Union Is Our Only Motherland”: The Election Campaign

With the approval of the central party leadership, the republican Pol’biuro launched the election campaign. On June 17, 1929, an all-Ukrainian Public Committee was established and tasked with organizing and supervising the election of delegates to the all-Ukrainian congress, scheduled for July 2, 1929. The committee’s presidium consisted of the director of the Kharkiv Miedviediev factory named Buivan; the editor-in-chief of Sierp, Vyshnevsky; a worker at the Kharkiv Sierp i Molot factory, Shved; a worker at the Kharkiv Profintern factory, Smarchevsky; and the editor of the Polish Section of the Central Publishing House for the People of the Soviet Union, Sovinsky. Sovinsky was appointed the head of the committee but was later replaced by Buivan.Footnote ²⁰

Altogether, 150 delegates were to be elected to the congress in Kyiv during the first election stage. This calculation was based on the number of Poles residing in each province, with the largest delegations representing Volhynia, Kyiv, Shepetivka, Korosten, and Kam’ianets provinces (okruhy).Footnote ²¹ Elections were organized at the provincial (okruh) (Volhynia, Shepetivka, Korosten, Berdychiv, Kyiv, Proskuriv, Kam’ianets, Vinnytsia), regional (raion) (Mohyliv, Uman, Kherson, Melitopol), and city (Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kam’ianske) levels. In every province, a separate public committee was formed to supervise local elections and collect donations toward the travel expenses of the Ukrainian delegation to Warsaw.

The regulations received from the Warsaw organizing committee stipulated that each delegate sent to the congress should be elected through an independent association of Poles. In the Soviet context, however, these elections had great political importance and could not be simply entrusted to non-party organizations, let alone that there were actually none. Instead, control over the election process was in hands of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine. This body instructed that “in order to ensure appropriate political supervision of the election campaign, each election commission should consist of three members: a member of the party committee, a secretary of the Pol’biuro and a head of the Special Department of the Joint State Political Directorate.”Footnote ²² Detailed instructions on how to prepare, guide, and shape public debates; gauge popular reactions among Poles toward Soviet power; and, last but not least, select the “appropriate” delegates were designed centrally and handed down to local organizers. As part of the process, party and state officials encouraged deliberation of Polish and Soviet politics among candidates. Overall, the election campaign was an opportunity to explore whether the Polish population, well known for its hostile attitude toward the central authorities, had accepted the Soviet regime and whether party efforts to sovietize its minorities had been successful.

It is worth noting that delegates to the congress were elected under the Soviet constitution and Soviet electoral law, according to which certain Poles were disfranchised. According to the data on the 1925/26 elections to village soviets, for instance, 0.7 percent of Ukraine’s Poles were denied the right to vote based on their social status. During the 1926/27 elections, the disfranchised comprised 3.7 percent,Footnote ²³ while in 1929, the number of Poles deprived of voting rights had grown to 3.8 percent.Footnote ²⁴ By applying this law, the party could ensure that the delegates to the Warsaw congress would be elected by and among those deemed most trustworthy: workers and poor and middle-class peasants, thus minimizing the influence of wealthier peasants (kulaks) and Catholic priests (księża) over the election process.

During the three-week election campaign, 37 regional conferences with a total of 1,100 participants were organized; in addition, a total of 1,219 participants attended 17 provincial and city conferences. At each meeting, a protocol reporting on the process of electing candidates was prepared. Such protocols followed a prescribed script throughout, although some were written in Polish and others in Ukrainian. These local meetings had a similar agenda: providing an overview of the international situation, introducing the aims of the First Five-Year plan, discussing the goals of the Warsaw Congress of Poles Abroad, electing delegates, suggesting messages for the elected delegates to pass on to the congress, and gathering voluntary donations. At each conference, the ideology of “fascist Poland” was rejected, while the party’s leading role was recognized. For example, the protocol of the committee meeting in Uman from June 19, 1929, read as follows: “We do not recognize fascist Poland where toiling masses and national minorities are being oppressed. The Soviet Union is our only motherland. Here, all power belongs to the working masses, and all national minorities, including Poles, enjoy equal rights. We wish that the proletariat in Poland achieve the same rights as we already enjoy here in the Soviet Union.”Footnote ²⁵ The protocol from the committee meeting in Hrudka from June 16, 1929, followed a similar line: “We would like to contrast the slogans from fascist Poland with those of fraternity among the proletariat from all countries and the poor and middle-class peasants regardless of nationality in their common fight against capitalism around the world.”Footnote ²⁶

Local organizing committees were also expected to solicit private donations to fund the Soviet delegation’s participation at the Warsaw congress. Indeed, during the election campaign more than 10,000 rubles were donated overall.Footnote ²⁷ The subscription lists feature numerous donations ranging from a mere 5 kopecks to 1 rubel.Footnote ²⁸ Very few attendees were eager to donate, however. As seen from the reports, prepared by the party officials sent to supervise the election process, local conference participants were reluctant to sign subscription lists or even have their names mentioned in the meeting report, fearing that their signatures might later be used against them. In Korosten, for instance, one party representative attempted to explain the low number of signatories by referring to an incident during the civil war, when those who had signed a petition against Soviet power were promptly executed.Footnote ²⁹ Others feared that in case of war with Poland, their signatures would be deemed as proof of collaboration with the Soviet state.

Secret reports compiled during the election campaign also suggest that the Polish population was anticipating another war. In the village of Petrovka in Nyzhniosirohozky raion, for example, delegates to the local conference warned, “War is imminent. Poles will come and execute those who have signed”Footnote ³⁰ and “There is no need to sign the protocol. Anyway, Soviet power is doomed, the war with Poland has started already, and those who sign will be in trouble.”Footnote ³¹ Conversely, participants used the rhetorical and political tools provided by these new public forums to influence the outcome of the election and negotiate with officials. In Korosten, northwest of Kyiv, one Pole had even pledged 15 rubles from each household in exchange for “their own candidates to be elected to the Congress”.Footnote ³² While these reports were used to justify the lack of social activism among Ukraine’s Poles, they also exposed the discrepancy between the specific vision the party had for the campaign and its reception at the local level.

“Let Poland Take over Ukraine Faster”: Public Opinion toward Soviet Power

Newspaper articles written by the authorities created an image of all-out support for the Soviet state and its minority policies. However, secret reports detailing the course of these local discussions exposed a wide array of opinions that belied the propaganda slogans. Top-secret letters of explanation (dopovidna zapyska) sent by the provincial party committees to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine often reported on low attendance at conference meetings and a general lack of public interest in the elections. Limited social activism reflected the low level of political and civic education among the Polish minority while also suggesting poor preparatory work on the ground. This was linked to the low standard of party work in Polish village soviets. In the border provinces, the Soviet state was underrepresented, often having no party cells or party organizers at the local level. Those party activists who did work in these villages were accused of failing to reach out to a broader audience and not making party propaganda known to those communities without access to a Polish-language press. Weak party organization at the local level resulted in granting the “broadest democracy” to the masses.Footnote ³³ Consequently, kulaks, priests, and members of the Catholic church committees entered regional organizing committees and were elected as delegates to the provincial and republican conferences.Footnote ³⁴

The campaign involved collecting and accumulating popular comments. These opinions often contradicted the goals of the central leadership. One party investigator, who had been sent to perform agitating work and supervise the elections, observed a certain indifference toward public matters. Sceptics even questioned the fairness of the elections with one concluding that “They will choose their own candidates and will not listen to us”;Footnote ³⁵ others doubted that their concerns would be taken seriously: “Why should we bother, no one will believe us anyway.”Footnote ³⁶ The focus and concern of central officials, however, was about the loyalties of the Soviet Polish population. Public opinion, the reports suggested, was often in support of Poland.

As seen from the popular comments, political propaganda often resulted in the opposite of the intended effect. Extensive press coverage aimed to stir up fears of Polish subversiveness, instead kindled hope of swift political change among the Polish minority. Poles in the western provinces, whose livelihood was repeatedly threatened by adverse weather conditions and little assistance from the state, hoped for a better life under the Polish government. Comments ranged from those encouraging the election of pro-Polish sympathizers as delegates to the Warsaw congress (“We need to choose good delegates, who will tell how we live here in the free Russia”Footnote ³⁷ ) to open calls for a military invasion (“Let Poland take over Ukraine faster, then we will have more potatoes”;Footnote ³⁸ “Maybe Poland wants to take over Ukraine and this is the reason for calling the congress? If Poland takes over Ukraine, life for us will become easier”Footnote ³⁹ ).

Pro-Polish sympathies, the reporters summarized, depended on the social origin of the participants. In the region of Markhlevsk, according to the report, “all working-class Poles were against the counter-revolutionary plans of the Warsaw congress.” Similarly, poor peasants and most middle-class peasants had rejected the Polish opieka (care).Footnote ⁴⁰ Richer peasants, instead, welcomed the Polish move, as presented by the comments from the village of Nikolaievka, Velykolepetyskiy raion: “I wish our own delegates went [to the congress] and told them everything. Perhaps life here would become easier for us.”Footnote ⁴¹

The reports also commented on the negative influence of local priests who were actively involved in the campaign. In some instances, priests urged their parishes to boycott the elections and other party initiatives linked to the congress. In others, they encouraged people to exploit the elections for their own benefit. In one reported instance, a ksiądz in Novohrad-Volynsky had emphasized that “mother Poland is calling her children to shelter under her wings, she has not forgotten us” and encouraged his parishioners to take active part in the elections.Footnote ⁴² In Kytaihorod in Korosten region a local ksiądz, a certain Bredytsky, encouraged others to vote for “our own” candidates who would tell “the truth” about the Soviet Union. If this was not possible, he suggested writing letters to the organizing committee in Warsaw, informing them about the conditions facing Poles in Ukraine and initiated a fund-raising campaign in support of such initiatives.Footnote ⁴³

Top-secret reports highlighted how participants had taken advantage of the public discussion, and the state’s own language, to bring to their grievances and disagreements with government policies. A telling example comes from the Polish Markhlevsk Autonomous district, the first and only Polish national region in Soviet Ukraine established in 1925, some 120 kilometers east of the Polish border. One S. Marchevsky, head of the Politbiuro of the Volhnnia provincial party committee, was appointed to supervise the elections in the province. He reported that peasants in Volhynia remained very much under the influence of the kurkuli (rich peasants) and had little regard for the Soviet authorities. In the villages of Velyki Kosyri and Nerash of Pulyn raion, Marchevsky noted that “kurkuli spread rumors that a man came from Warsaw to take all Poles to Poland.”Footnote ⁴⁴ Marchevsky also referred to a complaint by a young middle peasant from the village of Hremiache (Korvyn village soviet) as exemplifying the attitudes of the Volhynia Poles toward the Soviet state, its policies, and its strategies of ethnic identification. He further observed that the villagers:

The reports also exposed a deep distrust of the party and its activists, who even after a decade of Soviet rule where not regarded as, to use Stalin’s expression, “near and dear” to the local population. In the village of Nerash, the local residents were taken aback by the presence of a party representative, whom they regarded as an outsider: “Look! A representative was sent to us; but is he ours? Can you hear how he sings Communist [poet po-kommunisticheskomu]?”Footnote ⁴⁶ Another report showed that people were generally opposed to the communists and did not want to take part in any initiatives linked to the party. At one local village conference, the participants had even asked the head of Volhynia province Pol’buiro if he was a communist. Following his responding in the positive, the villagers retorted that “he has sold his Catholic religion for money.”Footnote ⁴⁷

These reports showed that public opinion among Poles at the local level was often contrary to that expected by the state with local interpretations of the Warsaw congress and its aims often being in opposition to the official party line. While Soviet newspapers encouraged Poles to condemn the Polish congress and express loyalty toward the union, many welcomed it as a sign that the Polish government had not forgotten the Polish population across the eastern border and would come to ease their lot. While the party allowed and even encouraged popular participation, hoping to elicit public support, the public debate exposed the weakness of the party at the local level. Overall, a wide array of opinions expressed by the local Polish population, particularly those suggesting deeply rooted sympathies for the Second Polish Republic and skepticism of Soviet achievements, amplified the preexisting anxieties of the Moscow leadership over the perceived disloyalty of their minorities.

Pursuing “Destructive Tasks and Political Goals”: The Rejection of the Soviet Delegation

On July 2, 1929, 150 delegates from across Soviet Ukraine arrived in Kyiv for the all-Ukrainian Conference of Poles. During this second election stage, five candidates were to be elected to attend the Congress of Poles Abroad in Warsaw. The meeting followed the prescribed script, with its program being preapproved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine. Delegates acknowledged the success of the Soviet regime, especially the industrialization and collectivization campaigns, and the Moscow’s nationalities and minority policies (Visti VUTsVK, July 5, 1929, July 6, 1929; Pravda, July 2, 1929, July 4, 1929). The conference participants also approved the text of a greeting telegram to be sent to the head of Ukraine’s Executive Committee, Hryhori Petrovsky, in which the Polish population expressed full support to Soviet power and its policies (Visti VUTsVK, July 13, 1929). In addition to this, the delegates were called upon to vote for two open letters to their fellows in Poland. The first of these, composed by the Polish Soviet pioneers, was addressed to “The children of the toiling masses in Poland,” urging their comrades to help their parents and older siblings “in their revolutionary struggle against the fascist yoke.”Footnote ⁴⁸ The second letter, “To the toilers in Poland,” invited Polish workers and peasants to come to Soviet Ukraine where they could witness the advances of Soviet minorities firsthand (Visti VUTsVK, July 6, 1929). The respective visit of the Polish delegation, composed of representatives of different national minorities residing in Poland, took place in August 1929 (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 470–471, 473–474). Poles from Soviet Ukraine also invited their counterparts from Soviet Belarus and Russia in order to participate in a socialist competition to rebuild Polish villages that included a campaign to eradicate illiteracy in three years, full collectivization and increased crop yields (Visti VUTsVK, July 5, 1929; Pravda, July 4, 1929).

During the all-Ukrainian Conference, five delegates from Ukraine were approved to travel to Warsaw. These were Karolina Khimska, a peasant from Hrechany (Proskuriv province); Sierp’s editor Konstantin Vyshnevsky; Roman Sheviatovsky, a worker from the First Berdychiv State Tannery; Karl Shymansky, the head of the village soviet from Shepetivka province; and Frantsishek Rakovsky, a worker from the Felix Kon porcelain factory in the Polish Markhlevsk region (Visti VUTsVK, July 6, 1929). They subsequently received international passports and were instructed to apply for entry visas into Poland (Visti VUTsVK, July 13, 1929).Footnote ⁴⁹

On July 2–3, a similar conference took place in Minsk, where another five representatives were elected from among 114 delegates. On July 3–4, a Congress of Poles of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic elected another four delegates. These arrived in Kyiv on July 12, 1929, where they formed a joint Soviet delegation to participate at the congress in Warsaw. Two of Russia’s delegates from Moscow—a worker named Ia. Lesnevski and a writer named B. Pshybyshevski—became its chairman and secretary, respectively (Pravda, July 11, 1929). Shortly after this, all 14 delegates were approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Ken and Rupasov Reference Ken and Rupasov2000, 471–472).

The information campaign surrounding the election of the Soviet delegates was closely monitored by the congress organizers in Warsaw and the Polish diplomats in the respective Soviet republics. As early as June 17, 1929, the Polish legation in Moscow prepared a report to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed by the Polish envoy, Stanisław Patek. The report analyzed the propaganda campaign surrounding the elections to the Warsaw congress in the Soviet press. According to the communiqué, the party had consistently interfered in the process of electing the Soviet delegates (Khrenov and Tsesliak Reference Khrenov and Tsesliak1967, 393–397).Footnote ⁵⁰ Moreover, the delegates had been chosen from among party activists, who shared the Communist ideology and thus were hostile to the Polish Republic. Polish diplomats in Moscow also believed that the Soviet government was intending to use the Warsaw congress as a legal forum to pursue its “destructive tasks and political goals.”Footnote ⁵¹ In addition to this, the report continued, participation by the Soviet delegation could strengthen local communist and radical left forces. This also posed the risk of exacerbating Poland’s own domestic tensions, since the Soviet delegation would bring money to fund these groups’ future activities. In summation, the participation of the Soviet delegation at the Word Congress of Poles Abroad could be “destructive politically … even more so, it could lead to general disturbance; and it could even impede the entire course of the congress.”Footnote ⁵² The Moscow consulate also suggested that the organizing committee in Warsaw inform the Soviet organizers that the invitations for the Soviet delegates could not be sent. This would provide the consulate with a formal reason to reject its members’ visa applications.Footnote ⁵³

The communication from the Polish legation in Moscow was received in Warsaw on June 17, the same day that the all-Ukrainian public committee initiated Soviet Ukraine’s election campaign. On June 28, 1929, at the height of the election and propaganda campaigns in the Soviet republics, the congress’s organizing committee sent a letter to the All-Russian Public Committee in Moscow informing them about the decision to reject the Soviet delegation’s participation at the World Congress of Poles Abroad. The letter was signed by the chairman of the organizing committee, marshal of the Senate, Professor Julian Szymański, and its general secretary, Stefan Lernatowicz.Footnote ⁵⁴

The letter explained that the decision to reject the Soviet delegation stemmed from the fact that the elections had been held in contravention of the organizing committee’s stipulations. The coverage in the Soviet press had proven that the delegates were not elected by the free choice of the Polish population or through independent associations of Poles within the country; the letter accused the party of control over elections and manipulation. Moreover, many Poles were not able to participate in the elections since they were disfranchised under Soviet law. In fact, the Consular Section of the Polish Legation in Moscow suggested that only 30 percent of the Polish population could participate in the elections.Footnote ⁵⁵ The organizing committee therefore believed that the delegates approved to the congress would not represent the Polish population of the Soviet Union. Instead, they would arrive at the congress having been tasked to disrupt its work and publicly reject its approved aims. Given these circumstances, the organizers did not consider the participation of the Soviet delegation either possible, or necessary (Stepien Reference Stepien1999, 106–107).Footnote ⁵⁶ The same letter was received by Ukraine’s organizing committee and the General Consul of the Polish Republic in Kharkiv.Footnote ⁵⁷

Warsaw’s decision, nevertheless, initially remained confidential (Życki Reference Życki2007, 111), and the Soviet organizers continued their preparation and information campaign regardless. The fact that the Soviet delegation would not be allowed to travel to Poland became widely known only after its members had already submitted their visa application to the Consular Section in Moscow on July 9, more than 10 days after Warsaw had informed Moscow of its decision. This official rejection galvanized the anti-Polish campaign in the Soviet press. Republican conferences of Polish delegates were now used as a means of showcasing the social and cultural achievements of the Soviet Union and its numerous minorities. They also provided Soviet ideologists with an opportunity to slander the Polish “fascist” government that had rejected the Soviet delegation “out of fear to hear the truth about Soviet achievements.”Footnote ⁵⁸ Polish organizers, Soviet officials continued, had disregarded the will of 98 percent of the Soviet Polish population and instead sided with that 2 percent who had not been eligible to vote (Pravda, July 11, 1929).Footnote ⁵⁹ The rejection of Soviet delegation’s participation at the Congress in Warsaw was thus further proof of the event’s true intention: to mobilize the Polish diaspora for a future war with the Soviet Union (Visti VUTsVK, July 13, 1929; Pravda, July 11, 1929; Komunist, July 5, 1929).Footnote ⁶⁰

In addition, mass rallies took place on industrial sites and at state institutions across Soviet Ukraine were Polish workers expressed their outrage over Warsaw’s decision. Meanwhile, in Minsk, some 15,000 people marched through the streets toward the Polish consulate, where a note of protest was presented to the consul himself. Another rally in support of the Soviet delegates took place in Leningrad on July 17 (Iwanow Reference Iwanow1991, 265).

The Communist Party also used their proxies in Poland to broadcast their protest to audiences across the border. At the beginning of July, “The committee demanding the acceptance of the Polish workers’ and a peasants’ delegation from the Soviet Union to the Congress of Poles Abroad” was formed in the Polish Sejm. The committee was composed of members of the Polish Communist Party and other Soviet sympathizers. It issued an appeal to the Polish Sejm objecting to the organizing committee of the Warsaw congress’s decision on the grounds that it was motivated, according to the text, by the desire of the Polish government to hide the truth about the achievements of the Soviet Poles, all while the toiling masses in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Lithuanians and Jews, continued to be oppressed by Polish fascists. The appeal was signed by the leader of the Communist faction in Sejm, Konstanty Sypuła; the representative from the Ukrainian Peasants’ and Workers’ Socialist Union Sel-Rob, Kyryło Walnyćkyj; and a representative of the Belarusian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union, or Hramada, Ihnat Dwarczanin (Visti VUTsVK, July 11, 1929).

“The Miserable Bankruptcy of Polish Fascism”: Propaganda Continues

The first Congress of Poles Abroad commenced on July 14, 1929 with a celebratory mass in the Holy Cross Church in Warsaw and a march to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Afterwards, Marshal of the Senate Szymański officially opened the congress at the Sejm building. Overall, 98 delegates from 18 countries and the Free City of Gdansk participated. Some seats remained unoccupied—a symbolic reminder of the Polish population in Lithuania and the Soviet Union that, albeit for different reasons, were not represented at the congress (Pamiętnik 1930, 44). The absence of delegates from Lithuania and the Soviet Union was used as an occasion for propaganda speeches, in which the speakers spared no effort in seeking to attack the respective governments for not allowing their Polish populations to freely exercise their cultural rights and join the congress at Warsaw of their own free will.

In his opening address, Szymański linked the rejection of exit visas for Lithuania’s Poles to Kaunas’s raison d’etat, whereby the Lithuanian authorities feared that a few delegates representing a Polish population that had resided there for centuries could pose a threat to the entire country. Conversely, he continued, it had been the congress’s decision not to allow the Soviet representatives to attend. The organizers could not permit the event to be used as a forum for spreading Bolshevik slogans. Moreover, their participation in this “family gathering” was not welcomed since, as the available sources had suggested, Soviet Poles did not view themselves as part of Poland, instead acknowledging the Soviet Union as their true motherland (Pamiętnik 1930, 46).

In his closing remarks, Lernatowicz, on behalf of the organizing committee, maintained that Poles in the Soviet Union were not able to act independently and freely develop their cultural rights (Pamiętnik 1930, 87). A special resolution on the absence of the delegations from the Soviet Union, in which Moscow was condemned for its repressive policies and disregard of minority rights, was also voted upon:

At the same time, the Soviet anti-Polish propaganda campaign continued apace. As the Pol’biuro’s leaders had predicted back in 1927, the rejection of the Soviet delegation became a running feature, enabling the party to accelerate its anti-Polish campaign, albeit mainly for internal use. On the congress’s opening day, Soviet newspapers vehemently criticized its aims, as well as the Polish government more broadly. Because the Soviet delegation was not allowed to travel to Warsaw, the main content of its intended presentation appeared in the press. On July 14, a long front-page editorial, “The Miserable Bankruptcy of Polish Fascism,” appeared in Pravda. The article glossed over negative political developments in Poland since 1926 coup, while pointing out the deepening social and economic crisis in the country (Pravda, July 14, 1929). Instead, it detailed far-reaching social and economic developments in the Soviet Union and the role of minorities in the construction of socialism. The main points covered included the situation of Polish laborers in the Soviet Union; the achievements of the Polish Markhlevsk region; solutions to the land and peasant questions in regard to Soviet Poles; development of the village cooperative system; advances in women’s rights issues; the development of Polish national culture, education, book-publishing, and literature; and the international relations of the Soviet Union (Pravda, July 14, 1929). A few days later, on July 19, another article appeared in Pravda, drawing an official line under the anti-Polish campaign. This was an appeal by the joint Soviet delegation of Poles addressed “To our Polish workers and peasants in the Soviet Union, in Poland and around the world,” that once again reiterated the jaded formulae about the rejection of the Soviet delegation, and Soviet Poles being ready to reject Polish fascist ideology and rally their forces to build a new socialist society (Pravda, July 19, 1929).