In 1980, well before unmarried cohabitation had become socially significant in the United Kingdom, Eric Clive published a far-sighted paper: ‘Marriage: An Unnecessary Legal Concept?’. He set out to demonstrate that those legal consequences of marriage which were worth maintaining could equally well be achieved by legal means independent of the marital status. If true, it followed that the larger the proportion of cohabitants who were unmarried, the less defensible it was to confine those legal consequences to the married. And this did not even contemplate same-sex partnerships. In the same volume, Brenda Hoggett, having examined the growing approximation of the legal consequences of married and unmarried cohabitation (which she approved), concluded:
‘Logically, we have already reached a point at which, rather than discussing which remedies should now be extended to the unmarried, we should be considering whether the legal institution of marriage continues to serve any useful purposes.’ (p. 101)
Clive, a distinguished academic and Scottish Law Commissioner, stated that he was not arguing against the ‘social institution of marriage’. He saw this rather as a ‘technical matter’, although the potential injustice to unmarried cohabitants appears to be more than that. But that might be dealt with by retaining marriage, and applying those other legal means to the unmarried. In fact, this is more or less what has happened in Sections 25 to 30 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. And marriage law has effectively been extended to same-sex unions through the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Hoggett, who later became Mrs Justice (later, Lady) Hale, was pilloried in the press for being anti-marriage. But she later made clear that was not so (see Reference Hale1996, p. 45), and underlined this at the conclusion of her dissenting judgment in the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher v. Granatino: ‘Marriage still counts for something in the law of this country and long may it continue to do so.’Footnote 1
Nobody (as far as I know) is seriously contemplating the complete abolition of legal marriage (or some institution equivalent to it) in the United Kingdom. In fact, there have been signs that the coalition government elected in May 2010 may wish to give marriage special support through tax allowances. But that is as nothing compared to the marriage promotion movement in the United States. Linda C. McClain describes this in the volume under review (pp. 109–118). It seems that many policy-makers can barely restrain themselves from making marriage compulsory. And the eagerness of the gay and lesbian community in the United States to acquire the right to marry is well known.
All this makes it somewhat curious that the legal status of marriage should be questioned, and its abolition seriously discussed. Towards the end of this collection (p. 230), the editor, Anita Bernstein, admits that talk about its abolition is unrealistic. But the very vehemence of the promoters of marriage calls for the response: what is marriage really for? So this project, supported by the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion at Emory University, can be seen as a kind of thought-experiment. What would things look like without legal marriage?
If they looked like the alternative proposed in the first contribution by Martha Fineman, they would be about as scary as the aspirations of the marriage promotion movement itself. Fineman does not produce a compelling case against marriage law as such, at least in its contemporary form (for example, she says that, with its abolition, marriage ‘would no longer be considered a defense to rape’ (p. 59), though later she recognises that the defence no longer applies (p. 61)). Nevertheless, her objective is to replace marriage with ‘the caretaking family and its relationship of care and dependency as central to the objective of social policy’ (p. 43). However, the core of her proposal is that marriage would be replaced by individual contracts so that ‘sexual affiliates … would be regulated by the terms of their individualized agreements, with no special rules governing fairness and no unique review or monitoring of the negotiation process’ (p. 58). General legal rules ‘such as those found in equity (such as unjust enrichment or constructive trust), partnership, and labor law could provide rules for decisions in disputes involving sexual affiliates’ (p. 58). One consequence is that contract law would apply to all kinds of sexual activities because:
‘… there is no obvious reason that sex should be excluded from some contractual schemes (private bargaining) while it has been an explicit part of another contractual scheme (the services requirement in the marriage contract).’ (p. 61)
The ‘relationship of care’ element seems to be confined to parent-child relationships, which would remain regulated by the state.
This seems to import the culture of the workplace into the home. In Fineman's world, intimate relationships would be heavily legalised, either by contract law, or other legal categories (she suggests that they may be transformed in this context, for example, by the development of a tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm). Since contracts are always open to renegotiation as power balances change, everything within intimate relationships would be open to actual or prospective bargaining. The anthropologist, Lawrence Rosen (pp. 158–59) is concerned about wider cultural implications of changes of this type, and one might indeed wonder what effects such an environment would have on the qualities of trust, kindness and friendship within intimate relationships. Mary Shanley is also sceptical of Fineman's objectives, remarking that ‘the responsibilities and vulnerabilities that arise out of lives that are intertwined in the shared undertaking of building and sustaining family relationships exist independently of contract’ and that ‘the claims of the parties rest in the first instance upon principles of fairness and justice’ (p. 202).
As founders of the Alternatives to Marriage Project, Dorian Solot and Marshall Miller take a predictable line. They claim that marital status is a ‘key determinant of eligibility for more than one thousand federal rights and obligations’ (p. 71), which fortunately they do not enumerate. No doubt there are many. These are, by definition, unavailable to the unmarried. They describe the diversity and complexity of modern family forms, and explain that many who do not enter marriage have good reasons not to do so. The law should therefore recognise ‘people's real, privately made commitments and caretaking responsibilities’. This, they claim, ‘would be a return to a system closer to the way most people conceive of their own families, and more in line with the way families have been recognized throughout history’ (p. 77).
Whether they are correct in claiming that this would revert to earlier times is uncertain. Rebecca Probert's work (Reference Probert2009) throws doubt on their claim that it was only in 1754 that English law drew a clear line between married and unmarried relationships. Probert argues that formalities (in the sense of church weddings) were expected long before then. Nevertheless, although, as Fineman herself notices, it seems that people can and do construct as many meanings for marriage as they want to (so it is difficult to see why anyone should object to it unless they were worried about the consequences of divorce), this is not an area where logic has much purchase. There is thus a strong case that people should be free to marry or not, without incurring adverse legal or financial consequences as a result of that choice.
However, like Fineman, Solot and Miller have difficulty in coming up with a realistic alternative. Their system would start with contract (p. 78), with all the consequences of the market-place. But contract cannot cover everything. So they turn to various models used in a number of jurisdictions under which the relationships of unmarried cohabitants are given some legal recognition. They cite Norway, Sweden and ‘many Canadian provinces’ (pp. 79–80). Other examples could of course be found, for example, in Australia and New Zealand. But they think these are rather too narrow and seem attracted to a Canadian think tank definition of family as being:
‘… any combination where two or more persons who are bound together over time by ties of mutual consent, birth and/or adoption placement, and who, together, assume responsibilities for variant combinations of some of the following: Physical maintenance and care of group members; addition of new members through procreation or adoption; socialization of children; social control of members; production, consumption, and distribution of goods and services; affective nurturance, love.’ (pp. 78–79)
One can be sympathetic to arguments that definitions of dependency for the purposes of benefits or compensation should be drawn more widely than relationships defined by marriage. For example, they note how the New York Governor George Pataki expanded the scope of eligibility for compensation for dependents of victims of 9/11 beyond marriage relationships (p. 91). But of course this can be, and has been, done without affecting marriage law. It is hard to see how marriage law could be replaced by definitions of dependency. These are essentially retrospective decisions, requiring evidence that responsibilities have been assumed, or dependency has arisen, over time. They could not realistically be the basis for a system of prospective identification of a relationship (not necessarily involving dependency), which marriage is. Perhaps, however, Solot and Miller think that it is the prospective nature of marriage that is objectionable and should be abolished. But then how could some of the following present problems of the unmarried, identified by them, be overcome?
‘People are shut out of hospital rooms … are denied access to joint health insurance, pay higher income taxes, are ineligible to receive a longtime partner's Social Security benefits … have no recourse when they encounter discrimination in employment and housing, are charged extra to insure their homes or rent a car, and are forcibly separated from partners who are not U.S. citizens.’ (pp. 87–88)
You surely could not be expected to provide retrospective evidence of dependency to access all these benefits.
The later contributions are more moderate. Linda C. McClain is not opposed to the retention of marriage, or of government having a role promoting it, but is concerned that in such promotion the government should not enhance inequality, either between families (by privileging marriage) or within marriage by directly or indirectly supporting unequal gender roles. She notes that marriage has been weakened by women's expectations of equality, and that this has created a dilemma for the marriage movement (p. 125). She expresses some scepticism whether an ‘equal regard’ model for marriage is wanted by men or fully accepted by the marriage movement (p. 131), and notes that government policies tend to be neutral about equality issues, simply proclaiming that the key is good communication (pp. 132–33). She concludes that ‘arguably, government may and should go further and ensure that a commitment to sex equality is part of its educative efforts about healthy marriage’ (p. 134). This would not involve any specific model for marriage, but only propagation of the value of sex equality (p. 135).
Mary Lyndon Shanley examines the various options. She opposes extending marriage to gays, not because marriage should remain uniquely heterosexual, but because it would not transform marriage and promote diversity (pp. 194–98). In this she is in danger of allowing the best to become enemy of the good. She advocates a civil union of a kind suggested by Tamara Metz of a ‘universal caregiving partnership’ (p. 204). But she runs against the same problem as Solot and Miller: ‘what groupings or associations should receive recognition as civil unions?’ (p. 205). She suggests one could look at ‘all laws whose objectives involve taking relationships into account, and construct relational definitions in a way that does not rely on status alone’, such as those who may be compensated for relationship harm as a result of accident or death; or those who may be sponsored under immigration law (p. 205). Yet these could hardly be a general basis for creating a prospective civil union: would a case of potential dependency need to be made out in each case?
It seems to be an oddity of the American marriage promotion movement that, according to Fineman (p. 37), it suggests that marriage is essential to democracy. Marriage may well be a consequence of democracy (though not if Fineman's ideas prevail), but it certainly appears to have little to do with encouraging it, as its prevalence both historically and presently in undemocratic societies shows. It is however probable that the nature of marriage reflects prevailing political norms. The American linking of marriage and democracy may be influenced by the fact that, because slavery destroyed the family life of its victims, marriage was one of the benefits most sought after by former slaves on attaining liberty, as described by Peggy Cooper Davis in Chapter 5. Perhaps that is why the right to marriage is so widely acknowledged in human rights instruments.
The editor, Anita Bernstein, concludes by roundly, and rightly, dismissing as propaganda claims that social science proves that marriage in itself has beneficial consequences for individuals and society (pp. 224, 233). But it is a shame that the research is not more directly challenged, although McClain does cite Mavis Hetherington's warning that the harmful effects of divorce have been exaggerated (p. 120), and Solot and Miller refer to the selection effects which undermine most of the claims (p. 85). Bernstein concludes by making a thoughtful case for marriage (it is not clear in what form) as a status that can give individuals a sense of continuous identity, and connect them with wider kin, both past and present: ‘If marriage and comparable statuses were to disappear, the individual would flutter from transaction to transaction, contract to contract and encounter to encounter’ (p. 227).
Some individuals do flutter from relationship to relationship; sometimes from marriage to marriage. But many do not, and, given the benign legal nature of contemporary marriage in Western societies, and the fact that individuals can attribute to it as many meanings as they wish, it is hard to see how society would gain by losing it. Rosen (p. 157) refers to the role of culture in legitimising behaviours. In the case of marriage, ‘legitimising’ might be too strong an expression. The alternatives may not be considered as illegitimate but rather as of no or little consequence. A better expression could be ‘acceptance’. Perhaps the most important effect of civil partnership (or marriage) for same-sex couples is that they demonstrate that the community accepts and embraces these relationships. In marriage, therefore, the state, through its officiating officer, demonstrates that the community accepts and welcomes the relationship. This is surely not a negligible event.
It does, however, leave open the issue of other forms of relationship. Are these not also to be accepted and welcomed? Well, perhaps not all. There are issues of age, biological relationship, multiplicity of parties. Subject to these (not insignificant) factors, these other relationships can, and should, be treated in law in similar ways to marriage without abandoning marriage. South Africa provides a remarkable example of actual and potential inclusivity of this kind. The following types of relationship are either recognised now or could be if various proposals are enacted:
(1) Opposite-sex monogamous marriage: Marriage Act 1961.
(2) Opposite-sex monogamous or polygamous marriages entered into under various customary law systems: Customary Marriages Act 1998.
(3) Opposite and same-sex monogamous marriages or civil partnerships: Civil Unions Act 2006. (The legal consequences are in all cases the same as for marriages under the Marriage Act 1961.)
(4) Opposite and same-sex registered domestic partnerships, between two people aged 18 and over, with the same consequences as marriage except for the property regime: Domestic Partnerships Bill 2008.
(5) Opposite and same-sex unregistered domestic partnerships, between two people aged 18 and over, with virtually identical consequences to registered domestic partnerships: Domestic Partnerships Bill 2008.
(6) Monogamous but possibly polygamous marriages entered into in accordance with religious formalities, regulated according to religious law: Recognition of Religious Marriages Bill 2005.
The South African scene is still work-in-progress. One wonders whether it takes complexity beyond reasonable bounds and whether a similar result could not be achieved by a single base institution, with some fundamental requirements (perhaps just the number, age and genetic relationship of the parties), subject ultimately to the civil courts, but within which the parties can choose a range of variants (and names) to suit their circumstances. No parties would be less favoured than the others, not even those who exercise no option at all. But the South African example shows that the issue of real practical concern about marriage in many societies is not one of abolition, but how to deal with religious diversity. The volume under review does not really address this. But it does give food for thought.
