One of the defining features of the Platonic eidos is its simplicity or incomposite nature. In the canonical passage from the Phaedo (78c6–d9), we read that what remains constant and unchanging is most likely incomposite (asyntheta, 78c7). This is true of the ousia whose being we articulate through an account (logos) – for instance, the Equal itself or the Beautiful itself. Such an entity is uniform (monoeides, 78d5; cf. Symp. 211b1, e4). Taken together, these qualifications underscore the necessity of uniqueness and uncompoundedness, precluding the divisibility inherent in composite things.Footnote 1
Yet this aspect of the eidos appears to coexist with both the possibility and the necessity that ousia receives an articulated logos – that is, a formula or definition – which introduces an internal complexity seemingly at odds with the Form’s simplicity. If we consider a basic representation of the method of division employed in Plato’s later dialogues, the eidos that emerges as the result of division is simultaneously an indivisible entity and the product of a complex articulation. How, then, should we reconcile this uncompounded and simple character of the Form?
An enduring debate in anglophone scholarship illustrates this problem:Footnote 2 Is a Platonic Form the logical subject of predication – and thus a simple object – or is it rather an intrinsically complex predicate, a definition with internal multiplicity, a formula composed of parts? This controversy arose because both positions find plausible support in the dialogues. Yet this apparent ambivalence might be resolved by acknowledging that simplicity and complexity coexist in the Platonic eidos. On the one hand, the eidos is a simple, unitary, and indivisible entity; on the other, it is internally articulated and in some sense composite.
In the aforementioned Phaedo passage, where the simplicity of ousia is explicitly asserted, Plato also insists that it must and can be given a logos. Significantly, he never retracts this claim. While the dialogues do not explicitly address or develop the tension between the simplicity of the eidos and the complexity of its logos, Aristotle was acutely aware of it, framing it as an aporia in both the Posterior Analytics and the Metaphysics (a point I will explore in the second part of this paper).
This raises two questions: Did Plato himself recognize this problem? And if so, how might he have responded? The thesis I propose is that traces of this aporia can be found in the final section of the Theaetetus, where the famous ‘dream doctrine’ is discussed. Although Forms are conspicuously absent from the dialogue, this doctrine implicitly highlights an objective difficulty for them: If Forms are uncompounded entities, how can they admit of definition or a complex logos? (One might even push the aporia further, questioning whether it is possible to attribute being to the Ideas themselves.)
I suggest that Plato was likely aware of this problem and that the Theaetetus allusively points toward a solution – specifically, through the notion of the holon: a totality, or more precisely, a unitary entity composed of multiple parts, intrinsically complete and organically articulated. If this interpretation holds, it would allow for a novel reading of the Theaetetus’ aporetic conclusion, distinguishing it from standard interpretations. The dialogue’s unresolved ending may stem (at least in part) from this very difficulty, which Plato deliberately leaves open for the Old Academy’s internal debate.
A synoptic reading of Aristotle’s references to this aporia supports this thesis, as several passages appear to presuppose the Theaetetus. Within this framework, the hypothesis that Antisthenes authored the dream doctrine must be re-examinedFootnote 3 – a conclusion further corroborated by polemical undertones in Aristotle’s texts. Antisthenes emerges as a shared polemical target for both Plato and Aristotle, and tellingly, both thinkers assess him negatively, albeit with differing explicitness: overt in Aristotle, more oblique in Plato.
Scholars advocating a holistic interpretation of Aristotle’s eidos doctrine have emphasized the centrality of the holon while often dismissing its deliberate conceptualization in Plato.Footnote 4 Against this view, I contend that Plato does possess a notion of holon, irrespective of its alleged inadequacies or its putative tension with Platonic methexis – a tension Aristotle partially exposes.Footnote 5 Crucially, claims about the inadequacy of Plato’s holon rely solely on the dialogues, whereas Aristotelian testimony hints at a more advanced level of elaboration beyond the textual record.
To reconstruct this debate within the Old Academy, we must begin with the Theaetetus’ final section (201d8–202c5). Here, in response to the thesis heard by Theaetetus that knowledge is ‘true opinion with logos,’ Socrates presents – ‘a dream in exchange for a dream’ – a doctrine asserting that the primary elements (stoicheia) composing things can only be named, not defined. These elements, termed αἰσθητά (202b6), are objects of perception but admit no predication. Their combinations (syllables or compounds), however, become knowable, expressible, and objects of true opinion. This creates an epistemic asymmetry: unknowable elements, knowable compounds.
Though Plato never mentions Forms in the Theaetetus – least of all here – the dream doctrine implicitly poses challenges for the theory of eidē. Gilbert Ryle, for instance, drew such a conclusion, interpreting the doctrine through the lens of logical atomism (while sidestepping the question of its authorship).Footnote 6 Ryle argued that if a Form is conceived as a simple object or as a logical subject of predication – regardless of its ontological rank – it would be merely nameable. Consequently, it would be meaningless to inquire whether such an idea is knowable, definable, or subject to description or instruction. According to Ryle, the elements of Socrates’ dream may parallel Plato’s Forms (as propositional ‘atoms’), and Socrates’ subsequent critique of the doctrine – whether or not intended by Plato – could be read as a self-critique of the Theory of Forms itself.
However, if one accepts that the dream doctrine originates with Antisthenes,Footnote 7 then the supposed correspondence between its core elements and Platonic Forms lacks historical foundation. Moreover, such a correspondence is difficult to sustain even in principle. Ryle’s thesis was refuted by Miles Burnyeat, who nonetheless maintained that Ryle’s interpretation should not be dismissed as easily as some of the more obvious objections might suggest.Footnote 8
That said, I contend that the view according to which Socrates’ dream poses an objective difficulty for the Theory of Forms is not without merit. The problem raised by the dream – inasmuch as it applies generally to all kinds of elements (points, atoms, elementary logical units) – can be extended to various isomorphic theories. As such, it may also bear upon Plato’s Theory of Forms, should the Forms be conceived as simple entities: the underlying theoretical difficulty remains substantially the same.Footnote 9 The fact that Plato refutes the dream doctrine in the Theaetetus might lead us to think – assuming that the doctrine indeed poses a genuine challenge to the Theory of Forms – that this refutation constitutes a defense of his own theory. However, at this point, a further problem arises: the refutation relies primarily on a conflation between holon (the ‘whole’) and pan (the ‘all’). Yet, as we shall see, there are several reasons to believe that Plato does not, in fact, endorse this conflation. If so, the conflation would not be intended seriously, and the refutation would hold only ad hominem. Nonetheless, the persistent emphasis on the concept of holon may suggest that the solution to the aporia is to be sought in that very direction.
At this stage, it is necessary to briefly recapitulate the refutation of the doctrine. Socrates exploits the examples made in the dream – the letters and the syllables – as ‘hostages’ (202e3). The syllable cannot be simply reduced to the letters that compose it, since anyone who knows the syllable knows the letters as well and vice versa; but in this case there will be no asymmetry of knowledge. The problem must be put, then, in different terms: the syllable/nexus, of which Socrates provides three more or less equivalent descriptions, is a unique Form (eidos, idea) generated by the composition or the harmonization of the stoicheia, and yet different from them. For it is an eidos endowed with a single Form (idea) of its own (203c5–6, 203e3, 204a1–2). It is at this moment that there suddenly appears the concept of holon, which can be applied to the syllable and about which can be raised an analogous alternative: either the holon is (identical with) all of its parts or it is a single eidos constituted by its parts, and yet different from them. I argue that, while Plato regards true the latter alternative,Footnote 10 he leads Theaetetus to admit the former for dialectical purposes.
Theaetetus, unable to substantiate the specificity of the notion of holon through argument, is compelled to concede its indistinguishability from pan, due to the earlier identification of ‘the all’ (to pan) with ‘all the parts’ (ta panta). This concession should imply the abandonment of the thesis of Socrates’ dream concerning the asymmetry of knowledge: if the syllable is in fact nothing other than its constituent parts, then both the syllable and the parts must be equally knowable. In this case, a perfect symmetry emerges between the knowability of the elements and that of their compounds. However, since the distinction between the syllable and the letters was introduced precisely to avoid such a symmetry of knowledge, Socrates compels Theaetetus both to relinquish any account of the syllable as composed of parts (205b5 ff.) and to posit the nexus – or syllable – as an indivisible eidos, lacking internal differentiation. Yet this implies that what was previously said about the primary elements must now also apply to the syllable: it too will be unknowable. Thus, symmetry reappears – not as knowability, but as unknowability of both elements and compounds (205e2–4).
The cornerstone of the refutation, as clearly emerges, lies in the lack of distinction between pan and holon. Had Theaetetus been able to uphold the distinction, he might – at least in principle – have maintained the thesis that one can know compounds without knowing their elements (203d4–6), a thesis he himself describes as deinon kai alogon. Hypothetically, if knowledge were to consist solely of nexuses, he might have been able to defend the dream theory with more compelling arguments.Footnote 11 One possible interpretation of this dialogical situation may be summarized as follows: Plato refutes the dream theory by exposing the inconsistency of its central claim – namely, the asymmetry of knowledge. To this end, he introduces a thesis he holds to be true: the identity of pan and holon. From Plato’s perspective, then, the dream theory is effectively refuted, and there is no indication that he intended anything beyond what he has Socrates explicitly state. On this basis, some scholars have attributed to Plato himself the conviction that pan and holon are identical.
However, in this case, specific criteria of Platonic hermeneutics must be taken into account. It is important to recall that the Platonic dialogues are structured as dialectical investigations, and within such a framework, the conclusions reached by an interlocutor cannot be automatically attributed to the questioner. As Aristotle explains in the Topics,Footnote 12 the aim of dialectical dialogue is to explore the implications of the positions held by the interlocutor; the answers given do not allow us to infer anything about the beliefs of the one posing the questions. This means, quite clearly, that we cannot be compelled to attribute to Plato the identity of pan and holon merely because Socrates leads Theaetetus to that conclusion. In fact, to refute the dream theory, Socrates only needs to demonstrate the incompatibility between the thesis of asymmetrical knowledge and the notion that compounds are nothing more than the sum of their elements.
Yet it remains entirely possible that Plato regards both theses as false. In other words, in order to maintain that the elements are unknowable while the compounds are knowable, one would need to demonstrate that compounds are not merely the sum of their constituent elements. But this is impossible unless one can conceive of a holon as distinct from pan. This brings us to the heart of the matter: what positive reasons do we have to think that Plato does not necessarily endorse the thesis to which Theaetetus is led? First, (a) the very presence of the notion of holon, and Plato’s repeated allusions to the possibility of distinguishing holon from pan, are in themselves significant. Second, as we shall see shortly, (b) the failure of the attempt to support this distinction is due to Theaetetus committing a rather elementary fallacy. One might argue, of course, that Plato himself is responsible for the error. However, based on the well-established hermeneutic principles already mentioned, a comparative analysis of the argument suggests that Plato is staging the interlocutor’s mistake rather than committing it himself. Finally, (c) other passages in the dialogues confirm that Plato had indeed developed a notion of holon as an organic totality, irreducible to a mere aggregate of parts.
Let us begin with the final point. The notion of holon indeed plays a significant role in the Parmenides, a dialogue whose dialectical structure does not always make it possible to clearly determine the extent of Plato’s commitment to the theses being discussed. Nevertheless, the second series of deductions – concerning what happens to other things if the One is – is particularly noteworthy. In the course of a complex argument extending from 157b6 to 159b1, it is stated that the whole is a unity composed of a plurality, of which the parts are indeed parts (τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν … οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια, 157c6–7). Furthermore, the part is said to belong to a single form and to a determinate unity, which we call a whole – a complete one that has come into being out of all the parts (μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἑνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός, 157d8–e1). It is worth noting that here Plato employs the notion of a totality which, although composed of parts, constitutes a unity that is distinct from and superior to those partsFootnote 13 – regardless of whether or not he fully endorses the thesis in question.
More broadly, the doctrine of eidos/logos as presented in the final section of the Phaedo (96a6–102a1) points toward the idea of an entity whose unity is something superior to its parts: the logos of something is neither reducible to the sum of its material components nor, more generally, to its individual parts. While this does not amount to an explicit theorization of the concept of holon, the way in which duality is discussed in the Phaedo – as we shall see – makes it possible to establish a meaningful connection with the Theaetetus.
Let us now return to point (b), which concerns the triviality of the fallacy committed by Theaetetus, by reconsidering the argumentative steps that lead to the identification of pan and holon:
(1) The pan is (the same as) all its parts (τὸ πᾶν = τὰ πάντα μέρη, 204b10–d10);
(2) The holon does not differ in any way from the pan;
Therefore,
Claim (2) is established through an additional step:
Thus,
As mentioned earlier, Theaetetus initially attempts to defend a distinction between pan and holon, but is quickly compelled by Socrates’ persistent line of reasoning to concede their indistinguishability. Consequently, the praise that Socrates bestows upon him (ἀνδρικῶς μάχῃ, 205a1) appears, at this point, ironic.
Moreover, the argument intended to establish claim (2b) appears to be fallacious. According to some scholars,Footnote 14 the error lies in the definition of holon given at 205a4–5: “that from which nothing whatsoever is lacking” (ὅλον οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ).Footnote 15 The mere presence of all the parts does not in itself constitute a whole – just as the mere presence of all the pieces in a construction kit does not amount to the finished object. On this reading, the indistinction between pan and holon would be implicit in the very definition itself.
However, if one does not take this description as a strict definition, but rather as one possible characterization, there is no compelling reason to consider it erroneous. After all, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines the holon in a similar way: “that from which none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole is absent” (οὗ τε μηθὲν ἄπεστι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται ὅλον φύσει, Metaph. Δ 26, 1023b26–27, transl. Ross). This sort of characterization – while it may not exhaust the full nature of the holon – nevertheless highlights the idea that a whole is something from which none of the constitutive parts are missing, and in this respect, it does not differ from a pan (an ‘all’).
Aristotle distinguishes pan from holon on the basis of the arrangement of parts. If the positioning of the parts is essential in determining the nature of the entity in question, then a holon is said to obtain (as in the case of a threshold); if it is not (as in the case of a heap, sōros), then what obtains is a pan (Metaph. Δ 26, 1024a1–3). However, since the pan also lacks none of its constitutive parts, it is correct to say that, in this respect, pan and holon do not differ. Therefore, I would argue that the characterization given at 205a4–5 does not imply that Plato conceives the holon exclusively as a mere aggregate of parts. The fallacy committed by Theaetetus corresponds to the logical error known as a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter: because pan and holon do not differ in a qualified respect, it is wrongly concluded that they do not differ in any respect at all. Let us reconsider the passage (Tht. 205a1–7, transl. Fowler):
theaet. Necessarily.
socr. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.
theaet. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.
It is only by treating as an exhaustive definition what is in fact a simple property of the holon that one can argue for the complete identity between pan and holon. Furthermore, both Theaetetus’ hastiness in drawing his conclusion and Socrates’ rhetorical subtlety – reinforcing the thesis through an evidently fallacious argument – must be taken into account.Footnote 16 From the premise that anything lacking one of its parts is neither an all nor a whole, it does not logically follow that there is no distinction between an all and a whole. The manifest simplicity of the error committed by Theaetetus supports the view that the fallacy should not be attributed to Plato himself. This implies that, once there is evidence to suggest Plato considers the second premise false (holon and pan do not differ in any way), he could also reject the conclusion of the preceding syllogism (the identity of the holon with all its parts).
The first premise (the identity between the all, pan, and all its parts), whose demonstration is provided from 204b10 to 204e6, is, by contrast, likely accepted by him as true. My aim now is to demonstrate that Plato does not endorse some of the theses advanced in this demonstration. The argument is developed with particular attention to the case of number, which serves as an example of a pan. However, there is no reason to assume that Plato did not instead consider it a holon – or, as we shall see, that at least a certain kind of number fits this description.
According to Aristotle (Metaph. Δ 26, 1024a7–10), number cannot be a holon because the arrangement of its parts makes no difference: in any number, the positioning of the parts is irrelevant. It would be nonsensical, for instance, to speak of a diathesis (disposition) of the units constituting a number. This view finds support in Aristotle’s treatment of ‘mutilated’ (kolobon) entities in Metaph. Δ 27: only a holon can be mutilated, though not every part-removal results in mutilation (i.e., not just any missing part makes a whole ‘maimed’).Footnote 17 Importantly, number cannot be mutilated (“The number 2 is not mutilated if one of its 1’s is taken away … nor is any number mutilated in general”; τά τε γὰρ δύο οὐ κολοβὰ θατέρου ἀφαιρουμένου ἑνός … οὐδʼ ὅλως ἀριθμὸς οὐδείς, Metaph. Δ 27, 1024a12–14). When a number loses one or more of its parts (its units), it does not become a ‘diminished’ version of itself but rather a different number (e.g., ‘two’ minus a unit is not a mutilated ‘two’ but simply ‘one’). In other words, the ousia (essence) does not persist – a necessary condition for something to qualify as mutilated.Footnote 18
Apparently, Plato – in this section of the Theaetetus – also treats number as an all (pan), given that, as we have seen, he uses the example of number to demonstrate the thesis of identity between ‘the all’ (to pan) and ‘all the parts’ (ta panta merē). The core argument, developed from 204b10 to d1, can be summarized as follows: whether we enumerate six consecutive units (‘1+1+1+1+1+1’), express it operationally (‘twice three,’ ‘three times two’), or break it into sums (‘four and two,’ ‘three and two and one’), we are always referring to the same number – six.Footnote 19 In each case, we are also referring to all the units that constitute six, meaning the units are identical to that ‘all’ (i.e., the six itself). Thus, every number is identical to the units composing it.
However, the argument becomes more nuanced in a subsequent passage, which is explicitly demarcated from the preceding reasoning (“Here is another way of approaching the matter”; ὧδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν, Tht. 204d4, transl. Fowler). Despite its distinct formulation, this section aims to reinforce the same conclusion.
Here, Socrates employs examples of measures or measurable entities that are not perfectly homogeneous – such as the fathom, the furlong, and the army. The core proposition of this argument is: “the number of the fathom and the fathom are the same” (204d4–5, 7), and the same applies to all other cases.
Since the ‘number’ of each thing is simply its parts (204e1), it follows that each of these entities is nothing other than its parts. Drawing on Aristotle’s earlier claims, we might paraphrase Socrates’ reasoning as follows: to the question ‘What is a fathom?’ one could answer ‘so many meters’ – which, in a sense, captures the essence of the fathom. If a meter is removed from the fathom, the result is no longer a fathom but a different measure (e.g., a shorter length). In this context, the number constitutes the entire being of the entity in question. Here, number is clearly treated as a sum of units: its essence is identical to the units that compose it (“the essence of the number is the same as the units which constitute it”). These theses advanced by Socrates are, in several respects, paradigmatic.
However, in the Phaedo, when Socrates justifies abandoning his inquiry into nature for an investigation of logoi, he advances a thesis that appears both distinct from and incompatible with the latter view. Consider the question: Why is something ‘two’? One cannot answer that the cause of being two is either (a) the addition of one unit to another or (b) the division of a unitary whole into two parts. In such cases, being two would result from opposite processes (composition vs. division). Instead, the only valid explanation is that the cause of being two lies in ‘participation in duality’ (τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, Phd. 101c5).
This implies, for Plato, that being two in itself cannot be reduced either to all the parts of two or to their mere sum. The duality in itself constitutes a unitary entity, yet – qua duality – it must also admit internal differentiation (i.e., distinguishable parts). Crucially, however, its being two is not exhausted by the sum of these parts. Analogously, returning to the Theaetetus example, the six must not be understood simply as ‘four and two’ or ‘three and two and one’ – as if its being were merely aggregative – but rather as something transcending its constituent parts.Footnote 20
The apparent discrepancy between the theses of the Phaedo and those of the Theaetetus may perhaps be traced back to the distinction – attributed by Aristotle to Plato and other members of the Old Academy – between ideal number and mathematical number. In this framework, the ideal number would correspond to a holon, whereas the mathematical number would correspond to a pan. In light of the Phaedo, it can thus be argued that Plato conceives of number – likely the ideal number – as a holon rather than, as Aristotle does, a pan. However, there remains the mathematical number, which serves as the object of mathematical operations and, at this level, coincides with the sum of its constituent units.
If we apply the conceptual framework developed in the Phaedo to the arguments presented in this section of the Theaetetus, we arrive at the same conclusions that are deemed absurd in the Phaedo. Socrates asserts (204b10–c2) that whether we say ‘one and two and three’ (etc.) or ‘twice three’ or ‘three times two,’ we are always referring to the same number: six. Consequently, the number six would appear to arise from different causes – first, through the addition of four units to two, and second, through the doubling of three units, and so on.
Indeed, at Theaetetus 204d1–2, Socrates merely asserts that, in the case of number, the all (to pan) is identical to all its parts, ta hapanta) – “Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?” (Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα) – without suggesting that ‘three for two,’ ‘two and four,’ or ‘three and two and one’ are the cause of being six. However, that the nature of number is reducible to the sum of its parts appears to follow from the more stringent claim at 204d10–11: “in each of the mentioned entities, all the number is all the being” (ὁ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὂν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστιν). Given the identity between τὸ πᾶν and τὰ ἅπαντα, this implies that the nature of entities such as the fathom, the furlong, or the army is reducible to the sum of their constituent units. Extending this reasoning to number, one would conclude that number, in itself, is nothing more than the sum of its parts. The term pan exhibits some ambiguity in phrases like ‘all the being’ (τὸ ὂν πᾶν), where it is difficult to interpret ‘being’ as a mere aggregation, and ‘all the number’ (ὁ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς), which is synonymous with ta hapanta. In the latter case, the being of such entities – in its totality – is identical to the total sum of the units composing them.Footnote 21
What inclines us toward an allusive reading of this section is the fact that Plato, in a context where he ostensibly seeks to demonstrate the identity between pan and holon, primarily employs examples of pan that would have evoked the notion of a holon – a whole irreducible to the sum of its parts. This observation lends further support to the hypothesis that Plato not only recognizes the distinction between pan and holon alluded to in this part of the dialogue but also does not endorse the conclusions to which Theaetetus is led by Socrates.Footnote 22 Consequently, Plato reveals that Theaetetus is unable to articulate this distinction – or rather, as we have seen, that the very impossibility of formulating such a differentiation is inherent to the dream doctrine itself. By using examples that appear questionable when compared with other dialogues (and certainly with the debates within the Old Academy), Plato suggests that the eidos of entities such as numbers or syllables cannot be simply identified with the sum of their parts.Footnote 23
However, the underlying problem remains. What Socrates reveals is simply a contradiction internal to the dream doctrine itself – specifically, the tension between the thesis of the asymmetry of knowledge and the idea of knowledge as the enumeration of elements. If one accepts this allusive reading of the final section of the Theaetetus, insofar as it offers a way out of the problem, then a possible resolution to the aporia might lie in the numerical structure of the eidos: number provides paradigmatic evidence of multiplicity within unity – that is, of a holon in which certain parts can be individuated, but which is not reducible to the mere sum of those parts.
This hypothesis appears to be supported by the passages in which Aristotle confronts an aporia concerning definitions. The aporia is formulated in the Posterior Analytics (ii 6, 92a30–31): why is man defined as a “terrestrial animal” and not as “terrestrial and animal” (διὰ τί ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πεζὸν ἀλλ’οὐ ζῷον καὶ πεζόν;)? It is then repeatedly taken up in the Metaphysics with similar formulations: “in virtue of what is one the thing of which we say that the formula is a definition?” (διὰ τί ποτε ἕν ἐστιν οὗ τὸν λόγον ὁρισμὸν εἶναί φαμεν, Metaph. Ζ 12, 1037b11–12). Why is man one and not many – that is, both animal and biped – if this is indeed his logos (b13–14)?Footnote 24
A similar aporia is addressed in Metaphysics Η 3, 1043b23–32, and is attributed to the followers of Antisthenes. Although they are described as “uneducated” (apaideutoi, b24), the aporia they raise is nonetheless regarded as “somehow plausible” (ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, b25). According to their view, “it is not possible to define essence” (οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρίσασθαι, b25), since a definition is a “long formula” (μακρὸς λόγος). As a result, one can only account for the quality (poion, b26) of something; for example, it is possible to say that silver is “such as” (hoion, b28) tin. Hence, while it may be possible to define a composite substance, no such definition can be given for the primary elements of which it is composed.
This conclusion appears justified, if it is true that a definitional formula states “something of something” (τὶ κατὰ τινός, b30–31), and that within such a formula, one part functions as matter and the other as form. The aporia is presented as a consequence (hōste, b23) of what has just been said, and should thus be linked to the first part of the chapter, setting aside the digression at b14–23. It is precisely in this earlier section (1043b4–8), where Aristotle endorses the view that a syllable is not merely the sum of its constituent elements and of their synthesis, that one may detect a possible reference to the Theaetetus.Footnote 25
Furthermore, as Aristotle observes, it is not correct to say that man is ‘animal and biped’; rather, there must be something which exists besides these, if they are matter (hylē, 1043b10–11). The interpretation of the subsequent lines is highly contested. Aristotle’s critique is most likely directed at the conception of definition as a mere aggregation of parts – according to which, for example, the definition of man would amount to nothing more than the sum of ‘animal’ and ‘biped,’ just as the syllable AB would be seen as nothing more than the sum of A and B. In such a view, ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ would constitute the material components, and the definition would express only the hylē, without capturing the ousia.Footnote 26
This explains why, shortly thereafter, Aristotle concedes that there is something appropriate in the Antisthenic aporia:Footnote 27 the impossibility of defining the ti esti stems from the fact that the definition, being a lengthy formula, is necessarily a composite of parts – and thus cannot reflect the nature of what is truly simple, which by definition must be partless.Footnote 28
All of this presupposes, on the one hand, a naïve conception of the simplicity of essence, as if it were point-like, or reducible to the kind of simplicity attributed to an element. On the other hand, it presupposes the inability to identify a way to preserve the simplicity and unity of the definitional formula that expresses essence, while at the same time reconciling these features with the presence of parts within the logos. Aristotle’s point seems to be that this difficulty arises either (1) from a failure to grasp that, in something composed of parts, there can exist a holon that transcends the parts themselves, and/or (2) from conceiving of definition as a mere aggregation of elements. These two errors can be seen as related – or more precisely, the second may result from the first, as is likely the case with the Antisthenics, who are accordingly described as ‘uneducated’ (apaideutoi). Their failure to recognize the possibility of a holon beyond its constituent parts underlies their understanding of definition: a definition can be given only for what is composite (where it amounts to a sum of parts), but not for that which is simple in the sense just described. In the latter case, one would only be able to say ‘of what quality’ (hoion) the thing is.Footnote 29
The subsequent discussion in the text (b31–32) concerning matter (hylē) and form (morphē) as components of the definition cannot plausibly be ascribed to the Antisthenics. Instead, it merely transposes the aporia into Aristotelian conceptual frameworks – a methodological approach, it must be noted, that Aristotle frequently employs.Footnote 30
The Platonists, on the other hand (if it is true that the opening of the chapter refers to the Theaetetus, expressing approval of their theses on the syllable), seem to have grasped the first point, intuiting the concept of a holon beyond the parts, but they did not resolve the problems related to the second; in other words, they failed to explain the unity of the definition. Until this task is accomplished, the aporia remains unresolved: it retains its plausibility precisely within the framework of the Platonists’ theory of definition. Here and elsewhere, Aristotle emphasizes the Platonists’ failure to provide satisfactory solutions to the aporia in question – specifically, the problem of why the thing of which we say that the logos is a definition constitutes a unity (cf. Metaph. Ζ 12, 1037b11–12; Η 6, 1045a7–8) – or, in Antisthenic terms, how essence can be defined if a definition is a complex formula composed of parts, whereas essence is a simplex (Η 3, 1043b23–26).
What follows is particularly noteworthy (Η 3, 1043b32–1044a11), as Aristotle, in a rather striking move, draws an analogy between definition and number. However, he rejects the Platonic grounds for equating the two, asserting instead that “a definition is in a sense a number” (ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἀριθμός τις, b34).Footnote 31 It is, like a number, divisible into indivisible parts, since logoi cannot proceed infinitely. However, it is not a number in the Platonic sense – that is, an ousia composed of monads. Furthermore, the same principle applies to both definitions and numbers: subtracting a unit from a number does not yield the same number minus one, but an entirely different number (see p. 59). Similarly, removing any part from a definition does not produce the same definition lacking a component; rather, it results in a wholly distinct determination (Η 3, 1043b33–1044a2).
The underlying concept here – though not explicitly named – is that of ‘being mutilated’ (kolobon), which we have previously mentioned. A mutilated entity is a divisible whole (holon) deprived of one of its parts, where the ousia persists. Yet, the mere removal of any part from a holon does not necessarily produce something mutilated (Metaph. Δ 27, 1024a22–23). Crucially, no number can be mutilated, since the subtraction of one or more units means it is “no longer the same number” (οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτός, 1024a16).
At first glance, the connection between this analogy and the preceding discussion of the Antisthenics’ aporia is unclear. One plausible interpretation is that the aporia leads Aristotle to recall the Platonic thesis that ousia is a number – a thesis that could, in principle, resolve the puzzle. The number, as a unitary entity containing multiple discrete units, well exemplifies the coexistence of unity and multiplicity. Yet how this numerical structure of the eidos should be understood remains a deeper problem, touching on broader debates about Plato’s unwritten doctrines. Some scholarly reconstructions may indeed offer a solution to the aporia, particularly by emphasizing the role of dihairesis.Footnote 32 Notably, Plato’s use of this method begins in dialogues following the Theaetetus – precisely where, as previously suggested, this aporia is first introduced and examined.
In this context, it must once again be emphasized that Aristotle reiterates the inability of the members of the Academy to resolve the aporia, and accordingly, he considers some of the solutions they propose to be ineffective. The Academics are unable even to articulate on what grounds a number is one (Η 3, 1044a1–6); that is, they cannot explain the relation between the plurality of the constituent monads and the unity of the number. In the same passage (Η 3), Aristotle refers to another response offered by the Platonists, apparently distinct from the previous one: “the ousia is one as a monad or a point” (μονάς τις οὖσα ἢ στιγμή, 1044a8). In this case, its simplicity appears to be of a punctiform nature. Clearly, this conception fails to account for the intrinsic articulation of the ousia and contrasts with the earlier position, which likely gives more consideration to this aspect. In Metaphysics Η 3 as well, Aristotle presents different, and at times conflicting, views held by the Platonists.
Later, in Metaphysics Η 6, 1045a7–25, Aristotle returns to a previously discussed aporia: what is the cause of oneness (τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι) in definitions and numbers – that is, in entities composed of several parts, in which the whole (to pan) is not a mere aggregate, but rather a holon that transcends its parts. Aristotle observes that following the standard method of definition and explanation neither resolves the aporia nor accounts for the unity of ousia (substance) and definition. Once again, the example he gives is that of ‘man,’ who, under this method, would not be one but many – namely, ‘living’ and ‘biped.’Footnote 33 Here, Aristotle offers his solution, grounded in the distinction between matter and form, and their correlation with the pair potentiality–actuality. The absence of such conceptual tools among earlier thinkers explains Aristotle’s emphasis on their inability to resolve the aporia, even though it is clear that they had sought a solution.Footnote 34
To summarize: If it is correct that the theses on the syllable in Metaphysics Η 3 refer to the Theaetetus, and that the author of the dream doctrine should be identified as Antisthenes, then it is possible that Aristotle, by referencing the Antisthenic position within the discussion of the aporia of unity, is in fact drawing a connection between this aporia and the final section of the Platonic dialogue. Accordingly, it seems likely that the aporetic character of the Theaetetus is, at least in part, related to this difficulty.
Moreover, the passages from the Metaphysics considered so far suggest that this aspect of the problem had already been addressed within the Old Academy. Yet, Aristotle likely thought that the refutation of the dream doctrine offered by Socrates in the Theaetetus, while a useful starting point, ultimately failed to resolve the issue. This evidence opens the way for a new interpretation of the dialogue’s aporetic nature: Plato may be staging a debate within the Academy about a genuine philosophical problem, present in Socrates’ dream, whose solution lies in the concept of holon. However, against the unnamed proponent of the doctrine – who lacks this conceptual tool – even an unsatisfactory refutation proves sufficient.
Aristotle adopts a similar stance toward the Antisthenics: though lacking formal education, they had identified a real problem that the Platonists, despite being closer to the right solution, had not managed to resolve. In this respect, the notion of eidos as holon – inherited by Aristotle from Plato – proves decisive for him as well. Yet this notion is reinterpreted within Aristotle’s own ontology, according to categories that, in his view, alone allow for an adequate explanation of the unity both of the object of definition and of the definition itself.
