A former military attaché in Beijing and one of the United States’ most experienced observers of China's defence establishment, Larry Wortzel assesses the improvements defence modernization programmes are making in the war-fighting capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as the services and branches are collectively named, and the implications for the United States. He sees two core drivers for these programmes. First, Beijing views the United States as China's most capable potential adversary thereby requiring the PLA to counter, but not match, the recognized superior capabilities of US armed forces in essentially all warfare domains. Second is Beijing's drive for the military capacity to protect the expanding national interests that have accompanied China's burgeoning dependence on imports and greater engagement with the world. Extending the PLA's reach is a consequence of both drivers.
Employing a comprehensive exploration of Chinese and secondary sources, Wortzel's assessments concentrate on the PLA's progress in acquiring the tools of contemporary warfare where military operations go beyond the land, sea and air domains. Individual chapters on C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems), space war and space control, and information war accompany those evaluating the ground, air, naval and strategic missile forces capabilities. In a particularly unique contribution, Wortzel includes a chapter on information operations run by the PLA General Political Department.
Emphasis is correctly placed on the integration of advanced technology systems into the revisions of doctrine, operational concepts and training undertaken by all three services and the 2nd Artillery Force commanding China's strategic and conventionally-armed missiles. Wortzel is careful to lay out PLA deficiencies in these realms, primarily that it does not have an extensive body of personnel capable of operating in an advanced technology environment. He stresses that China's military leaders recognize this limitation and are intent on developing a deeper pool of personnel by 2020 capable of planning and conducting joint military operations, maintaining advanced technology weapon systems and platforms, and managing information systems and cyber technologies.
The PLA's current global reach is assessed as limited to its space, cyber, missile and nuclear forces. The conventional forces are not yet able to conduct sustained combat operations for any extended period much beyond China's periphery, including the Yellow, East and South China Seas. The PLA Navy's dependence on ground-based air cover limits its ability to conduct sustained combat operations much beyond these peripheral waters. The commissioning of the Liaoning aircraft carrier and the construction of larger amphibious warfare and underway replenishment ships suggest the intent to develop future naval expeditionary forces unrestrained by air power limitations. The single area where the PLA is evaluated as reaching world-class level is in the cyber domain. Here it has been able to engage in cyber operations on a global scale. Again, this capability does not penetrate deeply into the ranks of the PLA, but Wortzel judges it is adapting its concepts to the capabilities it has and plans to develop.
The concluding chapter focuses on the implications of the PLA's improving capabilities for the United States. Although not anticipating a Sino-American war, Taiwan and North Korea are identified as potential flash points together with maritime territorial disputes where the United States could become involved because of its security treaties with Japan and the Philippines. In essence, Wortzel argues that that the military edge the United States holds over China's forces is no longer as robust as it was 20 years ago – a conclusion also held by Admiral Locklear commanding US Pacific Command. China's nuclear deterrent is becoming more credible and when the latest SSBNs receive their missiles will become even more so. The conventional-armed missiles of the 2nd Artillery Force can now strike critical US and allies’ bases in the region. Aided by China's advancing C4ISR, US Navy units will soon be subject to attack by anti-ship ballistic missiles adding to the threat presented by the PLA Navy's large and growing force of conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines. US space systems will become ever more subject to degradation by Chinese anti-satellite capabilities. In short, it will become increasingly hazardous for US forces to operate on China's periphery opposing the strategy known by China as “counter intervention” and the US as “anti-access/area denial.”
Where this reviewer does have a reservation is Wortzel's failure to assess the extensive and nuanced discussion of deterrence found in The Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA Academy of Military Science that he cites several times. After a lengthy discussion of the multiple elements necessary for effective deterrence strategies that go beyond strategic nuclear deterrence the authors conclude the “more powerful the war-fighting capability, the more effective the deterrence.” Wortzel's focus on war-fighting suggests he underestimates the deterrent component of China's strategy and defence modernization programmes.
With this limitation in mind, Wortzel's book is a definite contribution to our understanding of the PLA's current and emerging capabilities. As such, he provides both those newly interested in China's defence establishment and experienced PLA-watchers a book well worth reading and retaining.
