Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T17:23:03.362Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

WIESER’S UNITY OF THOUGHT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2015

Natsuka Tokumaru*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Japan.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In his attempt to improve Carl Menger’s economics, Friedrich von Wieser frequently discussed methodological issues. This paper proposes that Wieser’s epistemological position can be understood as the result of a reformulation of the empirical position that Menger (1871) developed in his Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre. This paper proposes four ways of interpreting Wieser’s concept of “experience”: i) experience stored in language, ii) experience as introspection, iii) experience as a mental experiment, and iv) experience as observation. Because Wieser applied the concept of “motivational power” derived from psychological induction in order to explain observable social phenomena, this paper calls his position “methodological motivationalism.” This particular position can help explain his later shift to sociological studies.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The History of Economics Society 2015 
Figure 0

Table 1.Marginal utility and causality

Figure 1

Table 2.Structure of Wieser’s Empiricism