It is easy to think of Karl Marx and Abraham Lincoln as irreconcilables. Lincoln was, like Cobden and Bright, an apostle of free-market liberal democracy and a champion of the bourgeoisie. Marx was an intellectual, convinced that liberal democracy was merely one more phase of oppression and exploitation on the way to the eventual triumph of a working-class collective society. Yet, for one moment, the interests of the two coincided, and that moment was the abolition of slavery and the destruction of the semi-feudal slave oligarchy of the Southern Confederacy. And though they never met, Marx and Lincoln indirectly exchanged a muted recognition of each other through the First International's “Address of the International Workingmen's Association to Abraham Lincoln” (which Marx wrote) and the brief diplomatic acknowledgement which Lincoln's representative in London, Charles Francis Adams, returned to it in 1865.
It comes as a surprise to many students of the American Civil War, who often work within a narrowly parochial context, to realize how intensely Europeans watched the American convulsion (and indeed participated in it – even Garibaldi came close to adding the American Civil War to his repertoire of civil conflicts). Marx, who had himself once contemplated emigrating to America, was a close and shrewd analyst of the American scene, and had served as the New-York Tribune's London correspondent from 1852 until 1861. The Tribune dropped most of its foreign correspondents with the outbreak of the Civil War, but Marx shifted to writing about America for Vienna's Die Presse, and frankly turned himself into a one-man cheering section for Lincoln and the Union. Marx's enthusiasm for a Union victory puzzled other socialists, especially Engels, who could only see in the Civil War “a means, and a form of transition, to the social revolution,” at best (201). Marx was more sympathetic: any blow against slavery and aristocracy was, in his view, worth supporting for its own sake. Even if “Lincoln's acts appear like pettifogging conditions which one lawyer pouts to his opposing lawyer … this does not alter their historic content” (38). And Marx was willing to go so far as to claim that “the star-spangled banner carried the destiny” of the working class with it (211).
Indeed it did, but not in the way Marx anticipated. In this small volume, Robin Blackburn has assembled nineteen of the most salient documents from the Marx–Lincoln connection (four from Lincoln – the Gettysburg Address, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the two presidential inaugural addresses – along with selections from Marx's articles for Die Presse and letters between Marx and Engels), and written a hundred-page introduction which seeks to establish that “the Civil War and its sequel had a larger impact on Marx than is often realized – and likewise, that the ideas of Marx and Engels had a greater impact on the United States … than is usually allowed” (5). This will be good news to historians who increasingly want to turn public attention to global contextualization. But there is also an echo here of the old Werner Sombart question – Why is there no socialism in America? – and more than a little strenuous pulling to show that Lincoln and the Civil War opened a broader platform for social democracy than is often suspected (61).
This is not an unusual thesis. Progressive historians have, for the last century, labored to connect socialism with various domestic American strains of precapitalist or anticapitalist mentalité, from Puritan communalism to Revolutionary republicanism, and an attempt to add the Civil War to the list of “authentically American” progressive movements has a certain interpretive logic. The difficulty with this is that it was not the Union, but the Confederacy, which exhibited by far the greater hostility to capitalism. It was, after all, the Confederacy which resorted to an emergency form of “state socialism” (according to Louise Hill and Raimondo Luraghi), or “war socialism” (John Majewski) or “expedient corporatism” (Michael Brem Bonner). And all but the tiniest band of abolitionist ultras remained firmly loyal to a bourgeois economic order. A lawyer for corporations himself, Lincoln insisted that “we do not propose any war upon capital,” and he blamed working-class poverty squarely on the working class itself. “If any continue through life in the condition of the hired laborer, it is not the fault of the system, but because of either a dependent nature which prefers it, or improvidence, folly, or singular misfortune” (Lincoln, Collected Works, ed. Basler, 3:479, 4:24).
If anything, the American Civil War was a bourgeois war, a counterrevolution against what the northern middle classes feared was the real wave of the future, the renascence of oligarchy and monarchy. And if the Civil War era is an “unfinished” revolution, it was the revolution of an anti-slavery bourgeoisie who hoped to crush the snake's head of aristocracy and replace it in the conquered South with a replica of the North's bourgeois institutions, and it was “unfinished” because the transplantation of bourgeois society to southern soil was so bitterly (and successfully) resisted by the defeated oligarchs of the Confederacy. Which brings back again the question – Why is there no socialism in America? The answer may be Lincoln and the Civil War itself. Lincoln imparted to the anti-slavery cause a nobility and a moral grandeur that bourgeois liberalism has critically lacked, and even if the attempt to remake the South in that image after the war was a failure, the overall victory of the North over slavery remained a significant bolstering of the reputation of liberalism which might not have otherwise survived the post-Civil War onset of mass industrialization and working-class unrest.
It is a backhanded tribute to Marx's own humanity that he deliberately saw past this, and treated slavery as a greater human problem than even the slums of London or the belching factories of Manchester. Robin Blackburn's timely and accessible anthology of radical writings, and his skillful overview of the Civil War era and its issues is a reminder both of the world-historical importance of the American Civil War and of its place in the larger ideological struggles of Marx's – and Lincoln's – century.
