Any reader of Descartes’s Meditations will have noticed the crucial role played by causal principles. In order to deliver the “I” from the doubtful and solipsistic conditions that still prevail early in the third meditation, Descartes invokes (by the authority of lumine naturali) the principle “that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.” For example, a stone (or the idea of a stone) cannot begin to exist unless produced by something which “contains formally or eminently all that is in the stone.” With this principle in hand, he proves that God exists, and therefore that his clear and distinct ideas are true, and therefore … well, you know the story. In the same meditation Descartes provides a second proof of God and it also depends on supposedly self-evident causal axioms, namely that everything has a cause and that the successive parts of my duration are mutually independent. Although this additional proof might seem superfluous in the context of the Meditations, its particular conclusion – that God must continuously create minds, matter, and motion – later serves Descartes well in the Principles of Philosophy, where it becomes the major premise in his proofs a priori of the fundamental laws of Nature. So it is evident that Descartes’s philosophical and scientific programs both rely quite heavily on substantive causal doctrines.
On this dimension of Descartes’s philosophy, notwithstanding his revolutionary agenda for both “first” philosophy and natural philosophy, traditional thought had an enormous impact. The requirement of formal or eminent pre-containment is taken nearly verbatim from the seventeenth-century scholastic Francisco Suarez, who in turn inherited it from Aquinas. And the doctrine of continuous creation, with its frequently attendant distinction between primary (divine) and secondary (creaturely) causality, are mainstays of late scholastic metaphysics. Descartes’s employment of these and related causal principles in his own writings encouraged the adoption of radical stances among his followers and successors, including the denial of mind-body interaction and even all-out occasionalism. Whether Descartes himself was, or ought to have been, driven to such positions has been vigorously debated since his own time. Tad Schmaltz’s rich and persuasive book advances significantly these debates by shedding new light on the origin, meaning, and influence of Descartes’s philosophy of causation. Contrary to a familiar image, and to Descartes’s own rhetoric on occasion, the “father of modern philosophy” emerges from this study as a rigorous and consistent metaphysician who, rather than supplant the Aristotelian philosophy, transforms and adapts it to his own purposes. Schmaltz’s treatment of standard Cartesian problems – mind-body interaction, the foundations of physics, sensation, human freedom – is charitable without being apologetic, and frequently as subtle and detailed as the scholastic writings he doggedly mines. Still, as I will explain below, readers committed to the more familiar, revolutionary image of Descartes (including this reviewer) will likely find certain of Schmaltz’s interpretations strained. But they are uniformly challenging, learned, and insightful. For this reason, the book will undoubtedly exert a major stimulative influence on Descartes scholarship for many years.
Schmaltz begins with the scholastic backdrop to Cartesian causation, focusing on the alternatives that were developed to medieval occasionalism and on Suarez’s version of the classical four-causes doctrine. Islamic theologians such as Al-Ghazali had forcefully asserted that the universal efficacy of God precluded finite causality, A minority of later scholastics, notably Durandus, avoided this result by holding that God merely conserves (continuously creates) the being of finite agents, leaving them to act on their own. But the standard response to occasionalism, defended by Aquinas, was that God both conserves finite agents and also directly concurs in their operations. The occasionalist and concurrentist views have each been attributed to Descartes. A major thesis of Schmaltz’s book (I believe original to him) is that Descartes is closest to mere conservationism. One respect in which Descartes (and virtually all other mechanical philosophers) departed decisively from Aristotelian orthodoxy was in privileging efficient over material, formal, and final causality. But in an analysis that is valuable even apart from the implications for Descartes, Schmaltz shows that Suarez had already defended the primacy of efficient causality and restricted final causality to intellectual agents, thereby “preparing the way” for Descartes and the other moderns.
The heart of the book is chapter 2, which takes up the two causal doctrines that Descartes introduced in the third meditation. Drawing on clear scholastic sources for the baroque principle of the formal or eminent pre-containment in the cause of the formal or objective reality in the effect, Schmaltz argues persuasively that this expresses a single deep conviction of Descartes: causes must have everything they produce in their effects. While developing an account of the vexed notion of eminent containment (e-containment), which is containment of a “higher form” than run-of-the-mill formal containment (f-containment), Schmaltz deftly tackles a number of puzzles about Descartes’s application of the principle. For example, Descartes seems to allow that minds can e-contain bodily perfections but not vice versa. Schmaltz solves this problem by arguing that e-containment requires greater relative perfection in the cause than in the effect and that Descartes considers minds to be more perfect than bodies. This explains why some things can asymmetrically e-contain others. But it doesn’t explain what exactly e-containment involves such that it can account for the power of some things to bring about perfections they formally lack. Schmaltz’s answer, shared by several other recent commentators, is that substances which e-contain a perfection φ have the power to produce φ (or the idea of φ) even though they do not f-contain φ. Here I think the analysis faces an insuperable difficulty. If e-containment reduces to power to produce, then the causal containment principle is rendered trivial. It becomes simply: A cause must either formally contain the reality in its effect or it must be able to produce that reality (or its idea). In other words, in order to cause something, the putative cause must have the power to produce it. But Descartes clearly thinks that e-containment does not merely stipulate, but actually explains, causal power. Suarez himself was sensitive to the danger of explaining e-containment in terms of causal power (as he himself tried to do): “Not that formally speaking, and in the strictness of definition, the power to bring things about is to be identified with containing them eminently: we can make a distinction of reason between these two notions, and we believe that the following causal locution is a true way of putting the matter: since it contains the perfections eminently, it follows that it can bring them about.” The only way for Descartes to avoid this problem, it seems to me, is to explicate e-containment as a kind of real containment rather than as mere power. But doing so will render mind-body (and God-world) interaction very problematic indeed, given Descartes’s strict dualism.
The other causal doctrine discussed in chapter 2 is the necessity of continuous creation (or the “conservation axiom,” as Schmaltz calls it), which supposedly follows from the mutual independence of the parts of duration. Schmaltz provides a useful gloss of Descartes’s proof (set as usual in scholastic context) and then addresses a problematic consequence. Since for Descartes a substance is the same as its duration, and two things really are distinct if each can exist without the other, it seems to follow from the claim that the parts of duration are independent that enduring substances, including souls, are composed of really distinct temporal parts. David Lewis would be happy with this result; surely Descartes would not. But neither am I convinced by Schmaltz’s (admittedly clever) way of blocking the result. He suggests that the parts of a thing’s duration are merely modally distinct from one another (e.g., in the way my successive thoughts are). However, it’s not clear there is anything for the temporal parts of my duration to be modes of (any more than for the various spatial parts of my body). Moreover, if the parts of time are merely modes of an underlying substance, then the argument for continuous creation itself is undercut. For why should it follow from mutual independence of the modes of a thing that the substance itself needs to be continuously created?
Chapter 3 addresses causation in Descartes’s physics. It is here, perhaps unsurprisingly, that Schmaltz faces the greatest challenge delineating scholastic origins. Some commentators have regarded Descartes’s assertion in the Principles of Philosophy that God sustains matter and motion by his “concursum ordinarium” as strong evidence of concurrentism. But Schmaltz argues, on even stronger evidence, that concursum is simply the conservation or continuous creation of things along with their motive force. But this doesn’t mean God does everything (occasionalism), since there is variation in the material world that could not be from God’s immutable operation. Rather, in line with his mere conservationism, Schmaltz maintains that the laws of Nature, the “particular and secondary causes” of change as Descartes calls them, are grounded in forces intrinsic to matter (for example, the inherent tendencies to rectilinear motion). The problem, of course, is finding a place for such forces within Descartes’s austere geometrical ontology of res extensa. Schmaltz develops a realist view of Cartesian forces, a view originally advanced by Gueroult and Gabbey, according to which bodies have, insofar as they exist outside the mind, a ‘force of duration’ over and above their geometrical attributes. But, as Schmaltz recognizes, because for Descartes duration is an invariable “all-or-nothing” attribute of things, it seems incapable of accounting for the variable forces manifested in physical processes. Here Schmaltz fall backs on his chapter 2 view that duration is itself related to substance in a modal fashion: “[T]endencies can be said to be something in est insofar as they are simply varying modal features of the duration of moving and resting bodies” (pp. 118-9). I find it very hard to see how forces can be made to supervene on duration in this way since Cartesian duration is such a “thin” attribute – it’s simply “a mode under which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist” (Principles I, 55). As such, it seems two worlds could endure in an identical fashion while undergoing very different forces. Indeed, Descartes says that “the duration which we understand to be involved in movement is certainly no different from the duration involved in things which are immobile” (Principles, I, 57).
Chapter 4 takes up the much-discussed issue of Cartesian mind-body interaction. Schmaltz offers valuable contributions on every aspect of the problem: mind-body heterogeneity (the “Elizabeth problem”), reconciling the containment principle with mind-body causation in each direction, the mind-body union, the late doctrine of the innateness of sensory ideas, and the consistency of voluntary movement with the conservation of total quantity of motion. Contrary to occasionalist readings, Schmaltz endows both minds and bodies with robust “natures” that God conserves but does not put into action, in order to account for mind-body relations. Of particular interest in chapter 4 is Schmaltz’s very detailed discussion of Descartes’s subtle but oft-overlooked views on the relation of minds to extension, an issue that is paramount in English philosophers such as Henry More (who exchanged letters with Descartes on the matter) and Isaac Newton. Schmaltz’s appeal to scholastic precedents is especially helpful in illuminating Descartes’s position. More dubbed Descartes “Prince of the Nullibists,” nullibism being the view that minds are literally nowhere. But Schmaltz maintains that there is for Descartes a sense in which our minds are really present in our own bodies.
The fifth and final chapter concerns Descartes’s seemingly unsettled views on human freedom. Drawing, to good effect as usual, on the long and sophisticated scholastic debate, Schmaltz shows that Descartes moved significantly in the direction of incompatiblism. Whereas in the fourth meditation he had declared the indifference we experience when not compelled by reason “the lowest grade of freedom,” in later correspondence with the Jesuit Mesland he suggests that we can demonstrate our freedom by refusing to admit even a “perspicuous truth.” The problem for any incompatiblist in Descartes’s time, of course, is reconciling the power to do otherwise with divine foreknowledge and providence. Schmaltz considers all the salient aspects of the problem for Descartes including moral responsibility, the absolute freedom of God with respect to created truth, and the universal efficacy of the divine will over even human actions. Schmaltz’s mere conservationist analysis concludes that although God produces and conserves us, along with inclinations that are certain to yield various actions, God does not involve himself directly in those actions. In this sense, it is really up to us how we act.
Even if only for rhetorical purposes, Descartes on occasion acknowledged his affinity with Aristotle. For example, in the preface to the French translation of the Principles of Philosophy, he identifies Aristotle and Plato as the most important previous philosophers to pursue the surest path to wisdom; “the search for the first causes and the true principles which enable us to deduce the reasons for everything we are capable of knowing.” Schmaltz’s book demonstrates another important methodological agreement with Aristotle: grasping the principles of causation is as fundamental as anything in the search after truth. By tracing the roots and implications of Descartes’s surprisingly rich and systematic metaphysics of causation, Schmaltz has given us a vivid new conception of what Descartes intended as a philosopher, where he succeeded, and where he failed.
