This is a well-researched book about the birth and demise of the national government of the autonomous republic of Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945–46. Through his discerning and informed use of abundant Russian, Azerbaijani, Iranian, and Western documents, many of them cited for the first time here, Jamil Hasanli sheds new light on less well-understood areas of the beginning of the Cold War. The author provides a penetrating account of the ideas and goals of Stalin, Molotov, Truman, and other political leaders at that time, and he presents convincing evidence to argue that the Iranian Azerbaijan crisis—the three-way tug-of-war between the United States, the USSR, and Britain that enveloped Azerbaijan as it sought autonomy in 1945–46—formed the nexus where the rift between the USSR and the West first emerged.
This study also considers Iranian Azerbaijani leaders, notably, Seyid Jafar Pishevari, who, believing that their territory had suffered disadvantages and discrimination under the central Iranian government, were determined to achieve independence for Iranian Azerbaijan. According to the author, they were driven by “pure passion” to realize their independence (p. xi).
The USSR, however, keenly aware of the vital strategic importance of oil and eager for concessions in the northern part of Iran, stepped up its territorial pressure on the Iranian government. There being no possibility for the USSR to compete with Britain and the United States for Middle Eastern oil by peaceful means, the Soviets supported the Iranian Azerbaijan separatist movement and, contravening an agreement to withdraw after the war, did not evacuate more than token units of its army right away. Not a few Iranians, concerned to defend their territorial integrity, felt a threat in the Soviet military presence.
Hasanli's work analyzes the practical ambitions of the USSR, which figured in the decision to ignore the international agreement on military withdrawal with the United States and Britain. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA) was a Communist party; at the same time, it was a nationalist-leaning organization. As he examines the role of the Azerbaijani people in the Iranian constitutional revolution of the early 20th century, Hasanli perhaps exaggerates somewhat the DPA's nationalistic tendencies. In this regard, readers may wish the author had given greater voice to Iranian Azerbaijani people under DPA administration. We learn, for example, of the episode when Jafar Pishevari met with religious leaders in Azerbaijan, but what those leaders wanted of Pishevari and what they talked about with him is not clear. What religious leaders and ordinary Iranian Azeris thought about Pishevari's movement is also not mentioned. Hasanli insists that “the Iranian Azerbaijanis yearned to be united with Soviet Azerbaijan in a single nation” (p. x). Yet I am left wondering who the “Iranian Azerbaijani people” were.
At the Dawn of the Cold War argues that Jafar Pishevari was not blindly obedient to the Soviets; he was too much of nationalist to ever become a mere puppet. The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviets exerted enormous pressure on Pishevari to make concessions to the Iranian central government, but Pishevari resisted. He refused, for example, to allow the Azerbaijan national army to disband. At the same time, as Hasanli points out clearly, Pishevari and other leaders of the autonomous Azerbaijani state depended heavily on the continued presence of Soviet troops stationed in northern Iran. Pishevari's concern was that if the Soviet army withdrew from Iranian territory, the Iranian government would dispatch its own army to Azerbaijan to destroy their young nation and suppress nationalist aspirations.
According to a letter to Stalin from Azerbaijan Communist Party leader M. J. Bagirov dated 13 May 1946, all “democratic circles” in Iranian Azerbaijan openly regretted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, and this stratum of the population was extremely anxious about the fate of democratic movements in Azerbaijan (p. 294). In his presentation of this letter, Hasanli shows strong sympathy with the DPA movement, a sentiment that surfaces again in his use of the expression “reactionary elements” for Iranians who opposed the DPA movement (e.g., p. 295).
Reading this book, we realize again that Stalin was not seriously sympathetic toward the independence of Iranian Azerbaijan. Stalin said, “There is no profound revolutionary crisis in Iran, and there are few workers in Iran and they are poorly organized. . .You could have counted on a success in the cause of the struggle for the revolutionary demands of the Azerbaijani people had the Soviet troops continued to remain in Iran. But we could no longer keep them in Iran, mainly because the presence of Soviet troops in Iran undercut the foundation of our liberationist policies in Europe and Asia” (p. 299).
Stalin was already thinking about the escalating competition with the United States and Britain after World War II. The Americans had dropped atomic bombs over two cities in Japan; this was the time when the United States was beginning to demonstrate military superiority over the USSR. To Stalin and other Soviet leaders, the specter of rising American military power demanded that the Soviet Union expand its own national power. The DPA movement in Azerbaijan was, essentially, very similar to the communist movements in Eastern Europe, but Stalin had never fully supported the Communist government in Iranian Azerbaijan. Instead, he gave priority to negotiating with the Iranian government. The Soviets were optimistic that the Azerbaijan situation could be settled peacefully and still allow them to attain their strategic goals. This optimism brought about the demise of the Azerbaijan national movement. Hasanli argues that the failure to keep troops in Iran and shore up the communist movement was the determining factor in the consolidation of American power in the Middle East.
Even though Iran has turned decidedly against the United States since the Iranian Revolution, some Iranian nationalists still express admiration for the American role in the demise of the Azerbaijani nationalist movement for autonomy. Hasanli contests those views, claiming that Ahmad Qavam, the Iranian prime minister in 1946, was a Soviet stooge. Qavam gradually changed his position, eventually turning to the United States.
Although At the Dawn of the Cold War analyzes the Iranian Azerbaijan crisis in considerable detail, it nevertheless places too much emphasis on the role of the DPA without closely examining the cause of its failure. The book fails to address, for example, the claims by some scholars that the DPA's radical land reform and language education were not supported by large segments of Iranian Azeris. In addition, there were differences between the way Iranian Azerbaijanis and Soviet Azerbaijanis viewed historical developments, which engendered different emphases in the national feelings held by each side. Hasanli's work fails to adequately explore the variegated range of feelings held by Iranian Azerbaijanis, nor does it help us understand how much the DPA's Communist ideology was supported or understood by the Iranian Azerbaijanis or how far they supported the Soviet presence. Iranian Azerbaijanis in general were not as impassioned about nationalist or separatist goals as were Pishevari and the DPA. It remains to be determined how far Pishevari's movements were or are supported by Iranian Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijanis in other Iranian areas. The extent and intensity of these feelings have an immediate and hugely important bearing on the stability of the Islamic republic of Iran.
Despite some areas in this work that would benefit by more elaboration and analysis, it adds significantly to the scholarship on the Azerbaijan crisis and makes an important contribution to our understanding of that crucial time and place.
