Nationalist movements have strongly challenged the constitutional and institutional arrangements of liberal democratic states in recent years (Colino and Hombrado, Reference Colino, Hombrado and Tübingen2015; Mooney and Scott, Reference Mooney and Scott2015). In Puerto Rico, an “unincorporated territory” of the United States, nationalism is linked to many different political options for self-determination: independence; statehood (becoming a constituent unit of the American federation), enhancing the current Estado Libre Asociado (ELA); and entering into a “free association” with the United States. Despite this plethora of potential political alternatives to the status quo, the constitutional status of Puerto Rico has remained unchanged since ELA was proclaimed in 1952.
This article discusses how Puerto Rican nationalism fits with these various self-determination options. It also explains the obstacles faced by the political proponents of these options as they attempt to gather support for each of them. The article is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the nature of Puerto Rico's ELA status. The second section analyses the sources for Puerto Rican nationalism. The third section examines how this nationalism is linked to the articulation of several different self-determination positions by political actors. It also explains why none of these options has so far garnered a majority of support on the island. In the conclusion, we discuss how recent developments could affect support for these self-determination options in Puerto Rico.
The ELA status
Puerto Rico is an American territory. The island is not a constituent member of the American federation; rather, it belongs to it and is therefore subject to the plenary powers of the United States Congress. The United States Supreme Court stated, at the beginning of the twentieth century, that Puerto Ricans were “foreign in a domestic sense” (Duffy Burnett and Marshall, Reference Duffy Burnett and Marshall2001).
Puerto Rico was under Spanish colonial rule for more than 400 years, and it did not acquire self-government until 1897. That year, as the last pieces of its colonial empire were falling, Spain allowed for Puerto Ricans to have representation in Madrid, an autonomous government and its own constitution (Fernandez, Reference Fernandez1992). However, this moment of partial emancipation was short-lived as the Spanish-American War resulted in Puerto Rico being given to the US as “compensation” for financial and material losses incurred during the conflict. For the United States, the issue then became what to do with the island (Fernandez, Reference Fernandez1992: 4). Until 1900, Puerto Rico was under martial law. The Organic Act of 1900 provided for a civil government for Puerto Rico, although a governor was appointed by the US President with power to cancel and overrule any law voted on the island. Furthermore, with this act, Puerto Rico was given a “voice” in Congress through the creation of the position of resident commissioner.
Some clarification on the political and constitutional nature of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico came via a series of court decisions, known as the Insular cases, rendered at the turn of the twentieth century. Three important specifications were then made by the courts. The first specification was that Puerto Rico belonged to the United States but was not part of the American federation (Fernandez, Reference Fernandez1992: 92). This point came with, and from, a doctrinal innovation featuring a distinction between “incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories. Puerto Rico was deemed an unincorporated territory of the United States, which meant that not all provisions of the United States constitution automatically applied to the island (Rivera-Ramos, Reference Rivera-Ramos, Ghai and Woodman2013). At the same time, the court specified that Puerto Rico represented an “organized” territory of the United States insofar as it featured executive, legislative and judicial branches making up a government for the island. The second specification, grounded in the Territorial Clause of the United States constitution (Article IV, section 3, clause 2), was that Puerto Rico was subject to the “plenary power” of the United States Congress (Lawson and Sloane, Reference Lawson and Sloane2009: 1127, 1131). These powers, the court said, were not arbitrary and unlimited since Puerto Ricans, because they lived under the authority of the United States, did enjoy some “fundamental rights” (Rivera-Ramos, Reference Rivera-Ramos, Ghai and Woodman2013: 96). The third specification was that Puerto Ricans were not “aliens” to the United States. In 1917, the Jones Act passed by the United States Congress conferred American citizenship to residents of Puerto Rico. Through the Jones Act, Puerto Ricans were given American citizenship (and, therefore, the potential capacity to move to the mainland and immediately become “equal” to continental US citizens when they did).
The existing status of Puerto Rico was finalized after the Second World War. In 1950, Congress’ Public Law 600 authorized Puerto Rico to adopt its own constitution. In 1952, Puerto Rico's ELA was formally established after approval in a referendum and by the United States Congress. In the referendum, almost 80 per cent of voters supported the establishment of the ELA, although the participation rate was less than 55 per cent (Pantojas, Reference Pantojas-García2013: 44).
For many authors, the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is still fundamentally colonial, although the referendum on ELA allowed the United States to have the island removed from the United Nations list of non-autonomous territories. For Berríos Martínez, “the establishment of Commonwealth was used to create the myth—both for internal and external consumption—that Puerto Ricans exercised the right to self-determination because in 1952 they accepted Commonwealth in a yes-or-no referendum” (Reference Berríos Martínez1977: 567). Recent developments discussed later in the article, namely, a Supreme Court of the United States case featuring a revealing amicus brief on the part of the United States’ Solicitor General and the 2016 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) legislation of the United States Congress, provide additional grounds to the claim that the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico is colonial.
Sources of Puerto Rican Nationalism
Nationalism in liberal democracies is multidimensional. It often draws from cultural distinctiveness, can be anchored in specific patterns of territorial political autonomy and is given shape by both political competition and the institutional context (Keating, Reference Keating2001, Reference Keating2002). As is the case for its counterparts in Catalonia, Scotland and Quebec (Keating, Reference Keating2001), Puerto Rican nationalism is constituted by cultural, economic and political forces. For Puerto Rico, however, one peculiarity is its island nature, which is a good place to start for understanding its nationalism.
The geographical source
The first source of Puerto Rico nationalism lies in its geography, that is, in the fact that Puerto Rico is an island. Recently, social scientists have started to become interested in the connection between islands and national identities. As Godfrey Baldacchino suggests, islands are “platforms for the emergence of national identity and for the affirmation of cultural specificity. As prototypical ethno-spaces, islands have spearheaded the study of the production of locality” (2006: 4)
According to Peter Hay, identity is constructed around a state of mind very much linked to territoriality: “the nature of the community—its mythology, imagination, its very soul—has been sculpted by its geographical circumstances” (Reference Hay2006: 22). “Islandness” can therefore become part and parcel of nationhood (Baldacchino, Reference Baldacchino2006, Reference Baldacchino2007; Conkling, Reference Conkling2007; Fazi, Reference Fazi, Gagnon and Keating2012; Hepburn, Reference Hepburn2010, Reference Hepburn, Gagnon and Keating2012). With regards to Puerto Rico, islandness is expressed in various forms. One is the official national anthem, “La Borinqueña.” The lyrics express the mythology and beauty of the place (and accentuate the common Western image of an island as paradise). The chorus states that Puerto Rico is “the daughter of sea and sun” (la hija del mar y el sol) demonstrating the importance of the sea and hence, of the geographical factor. Furthermore, the island is popularly known as the isla del encanto (the island of enchantment), putting first and foremost the island condition of Puerto Rico as an integral and important part of its identity.
For André Fazi and Eve Hepburn, the geographical distance between an island and the state impacts nationalist demands. Both hypothesize that the closer an island is to the state, the weaker demands for more power and autonomy (Fazi, Reference Fazi, Gagnon and Keating2012: 149; Hepburn, Reference Hepburn, Gagnon and Keating2012: 130). According to the scale offered by Fazi,Footnote 1 Puerto Rico would be somewhat far away. The physical distance between Puerto Rico and the mainland United States might help explain why self-identification data reveal that Puerto Ricans “professed a remarkable consistency and depth of fidelity to Puerto Rico. Almost as consistent was the absence of identification with the United States” (Morris, Reference Morris1995: 125).
There may also be a link between, on the one hand, size and population, and, on the other hand, national identity. For Grant McCall, a big island is more likely to have more territorial cleavages than a small island. The more territorial cleavages there are, the less people feel they are members of the same political community (Reference McCall1994: 96) Puerto Rico is a fairly compact island (9104 km2), which may have contributed to its sense of nationhood.
The cultural source
Studies of nationalist movements have long noted that observable or tangible cultural traits have often played a very important role in building the nation (Hutchinson, Reference Hutchinson1987). Among those traits, language is considered by many to be especially conducive to building nationalist sentiments (Barreto, Reference Barreto1998; Fazi, Reference Fazi, Gagnon and Keating2012; Morris, Reference Morris1995). Morris, through focus groups, explored puertorriqueñidad, or what it meant to be Puerto Rican, among supporters of the three main political parties. All pointed out to the importance of Spanish, even statehooders who promote the use of English in Puerto Rico, feel connected to the people of the island through the use of Spanish (Morris, Reference Morris1995: 82). In a similar fashion, Barreto argued that nineteenth-century elites in Puerto Rico were capable of establishing boundaries between Americans and Puerto Ricans, and therefore of constructing an “imagined community,” through the salient trait of language (Barreto, Reference Barreto2001: 23). This cultural trait is so prominent in the definition of the nation that a statehooder even told Morris: “We are not going to renounce our Spanish for anything in the world, ever” (1995: 82).
Struggles for language survival in the context of assimilationist policies are especially likely to provide language with the subjective meaning necessary to infuse nationalism. In the first half of the twentieth century, US government-led initiatives were implemented on the island with the clear aim of culturally assimilating Puerto Ricans. A policy of Americanization was forcibly implemented through the school system. English became the language of instruction. However, despite these efforts, Puerto Ricans resisted assimilation and Spanish was re-established as the official language of instruction in 1949. Nevertheless, for the United States, Puerto Ricans were, early on, considered unfit to rule themselves. They would also have, as a report on the status of Puerto Rico stipulated, to “learn our customs and usages, in so far as they are better than their own, as they learn our language” (Carroll, Reference Carroll1975[1899]: 59). As Barreto has argued (2001: 24), this policy eventually helped foster and define Puerto Rico nationalism. Spanish has remained an important cultural component of Puerto Rican nationalism. Among the 3.7 million Puerto Ricans living on the island, Spanish is the lingua franca and 90 per cent of them say that they cannot speak English very well (Prensa Asociada, 2009). Puerto Rico, therefore, is a Spanish-speaking society, and this places the island in a cultural universe closer to the other former Spanish colonies of Latin America than to the United States. Religion, it could be argued, accentuates the dynamic of cultural differentiation with the United States since 85 per cent of Puerto Ricans identify as Catholic. Although Barreto (Reference Barreto2001) has argued that religion alone cannot account for the development of nationalism in Puerto Rico, the overlapping of the religious and linguistic cleavages (Lipset, Reference Lipset1960) between the island and the continental United States boosts the Puerto Rican feelings of national distinctiveness.
The literature on nationalism has emphasized that symbols represent important cultural sources for nationalism (Guibernau and Hutchinson, Reference Guibernau and Hutchinson2004). Indeed, symbols come to embody the unity of a political community and its difference from others. Much as language or religion, symbols such as flags, anthems and national holidays can be used by political elites for the purpose of nationalist mobilization (Brass, Reference Brass1991).
In Puerto Rico, the flag is a powerful symbol of national identity. The Puerto Rican flag was created in 1895 to symbolize the separation of Puerto Rico from its former colonial power, Spain. It was therefore conceived as a symbolic representation of independence. Before the current ELA status, the mere display of the Puerto Rican flag could land someone to jail. As a result, the flag became associated with a struggle for national independence. In 1952, when ELA was established, the flag gained official status, although the symbolic meaning of the colours changed. The original flag was designed with a light blue, very much akin to the blue on the Cuban flag, accentuating the revolutionary aspects of nationalism. With ELA, the blue of the flag became darker, like the blue of the American flag, symbolizing the ties with the US. The symbolic meanings of the flags still resonate today and one can identify the political preference on status depending on the shade of the blue displayed. Also, the place of the American flag on the island is a contentious question (Carrión, Reference Carrión2006) because it raises the issue of national loyalty and of the status question. Sole displays of the American flag are quite rare, which suggests that whatever political claim is made about status, it is almost always grounded in the idea of the Puerto Rican nation.
The economic source
The connection between nationalism and economic development is not straightforward as nationalist movements have developed in regions that were both under- and over-developed relative to the rest of the country (Connor, Reference Connor1984). In the case of Puerto Rico, the contrast between a fairly successful industrialization process in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and the recent economic, fiscal and debt crisis has fueled nationalism and generated more questions about the future of Puerto Rico. The seriousness of the Puerto Rican situation was highlighted by a 2013 article in The Economist entitled “Puerto Rico: Greece in the Caribbean.”Footnote 2
Until the mid-1990s, a number of fiscal and tax provisions stemming from Puerto Rico's status gave the island a competitive advantage in the world economy. Since Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the US, businesses operating and citizens residing on the island are exempt from federal taxes. Exemptions of federal taxes combined with unrestricted access to the American market led to an export-oriented industrialization process, first between 1948 and 1976 under what is known as Operation Bootstrap. This process aimed at turning an agriculture-based economy revolving around coffee and sugar into an industrialized economy. The operation continued from 1976 until 1996 with even more advantageous provisions. Beginning in 1976, Section 936 of the US Internal Revenue Code allowed American companies to operate as “possession corporations.” In other words, companies could repatriate all profits generated from operations in Puerto Rico free of federal taxes once these profits had remained for a minimum of five years in earmarked bank deposits on the island. In a way, the island functioned as a unique tax haven for US companies, and many American pharmaceutical companies in particular operated in Puerto Rico as a result of the tax incentives. The repeal of Section 936 of the US Internal Revenue Code in 1996 removed Puerto Rico's competitive advantage and left the island's economy in a difficult situation.
The island's bad economic performance in the last two decades has fed nationalist claims since it put in question the value of ELA from a standard of living perspective. Indeed, the median US citizen living in Puerto Rico is about 63 per cent poorer than his counterpart on the mainland (Collazo et al., Reference Collazo, Ryan and Bauman2010). While the median income in Puerto Rico in 2010 was $18,862, the median US income was $50,046 (US Census Bureau, 2011a). The poverty rate was 45 per cent, approximately triple that on the mainland (US Census Bureau, 2011b), and education and health care services in Puerto Rico are far beneath standards in the continental United States (Rivera-Batiz and Santiago; Reference Rivera-Batiz and Santiago1996; Safa, Reference Safa2011). Moreover, approximately 14 per cent of the insular labour force is unemployed, a figure double the national average (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). The GINI coefficient, measuring income inequality, is higher in Puerto Rico than in any other part of the United States and, at 0.532, is a figure more reminiscent of the developing than the developed world (US Census Bureau, 2011a). Although bad governance is often cited as a major source of Puerto Rico's economic problems (Pantojas-Garcia, Reference Pantojas-García2015), the apparent stalled development of the island has served to subject ELA to a more critical assessment than ever before.
As the economic crisis morphed into a severe fiscal and debt crisis in the early to mid-2010s, nationalism was given even more ammunition. The government of Puerto Rico sought support from Congress for the enactment of the Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act (under HR 5305 in 2014 and HR 870 in 2015), which would have allowed the island to restructure its debt using federal bankruptcy laws (something it cannot do as per the existing legal and constitutional framework). However, plans to allow Puerto Rico access to US bankruptcy protection were rebuffed by the Republican-dominated Congress. For many Puerto Ricans, the fact that the island was not given access to bankruptcy protection by the United States Congress reinforced a sense of subjugation to the United States and discontent for the institutional status quo. As one influential observer has argued, “As soon as Puerto Rico hits the applicable fiscal and economic growth benchmarks, the people of Puerto Rico should face a stark choice between sovereignty and annexation. The status quo must be discarded from the outset because it is both the source of the structural crisis besieging the island and a colonial anachronism at odds with US geopolitical interests in the Americas” (Cox Alomar, Reference Cox Alomar2015). The recent United States PROMESA legislation, which places Puerto Rico under the fiscal control of an unelected board, can only reinforce the notion that the constitutional status quo — ELA–is an unattractive option. Debates on the economic predicament of Puerto Rico are plentiful, and they are occurring in a political system already structured by nationalism and the status question.
The political source
Nationalism is a form of politics (Brass, Reference Brass1991) and, as such, it is strongly conditioned by the political and institutional environment (Lecours, Reference Lecours2000). The politics around the relationship with the United States structures the Puerto Rican party system and, in turn, nationalism on the island operates within the “status parameters” of the party system. Unlike the party system of the United States, Puerto Rico's does not feature Republicans and Democrats nor is its fundamental divide along ideological lines. Although only two parties have governed Puerto Rico since 1952, making the party system of the island a two-party system in the opinion of some (Scarano, Reference Scarano2000: 972–73), these parties are defined much more by their position on status than by their ideology: the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) promotes an enhanced version of the current ELA or a “free association” with the United States (which would be negotiated between the two nations as equals) and is often called an “autonomist” party (Lluch, Reference Lluch2011) while the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) is the statehood party and supports Puerto Rico becoming a constituent unit of the American federation as the 51st state. In addition, there is the Partido Independentista Puertoriqueño (PIP), which supports Puerto Rico's independence. Hence, “the problem of relations between Puerto Rico and the United States is at the very centre of party politics. In a sense …the party system internalizes this problem and expresses it in its various, potentially contradictory, ‘solutions’” (Anderson, Reference Anderson1965: 12). Although the political parties in Puerto Rico often attempt to direct the attention of voters to other issues, the nature of the status and relationship the island should have with the United States remains at the heart of party and electoral politics: “No one single issue stirs Puerto Rican emotions more violently than that of status. It is, in truth, the issue of issues” (Lewis, Reference Lewis1963: 409). Most important questions in Puerto Rico are therefore seen, in one way or another, through the lenses of the status question. Indeed, nationalism on the island unavoidably leads to the debate on the political and constitutional future of Puerto Rico.
Nationalism and the Debate on Status
On November 6, 2012, Puerto Ricans were asked for the fourth time in a little over forty years to speak to the political and constitutional future of the island in a referendum.Footnote 3 For the first time, a majority against the status quo was expressed in answer to a first question asking Puerto Ricans if they agreed with the present form of territorial status. No clear majority for an alternative status emerged from the second question, in part because supporters of an “enhanced Commonwealth” (led by the PPD) pointed out that their preferred option was not on the ballot and advocated a boycott. Indeed, there are many status options in Puerto Rican politics and, although their natures are wildly different, their politics are shaped, or affected, by nationalism on the island. For promoters of each of these options, however, there are important obstacles in convincing Puerto Ricans to support their preferred form of change.
Independence
The relationship between Puerto Rican nationalism and independence is the most straightforward. The idea of Puerto Rico as a nation subjugated by an empire and seeking emancipation began in the Spanish colonial era but transitioned easily after the 1898 Spanish-American War. Repression of the independence movement, which began under Spanish colonial rule (Bosque-Pérez, Reference Bosque-Pérez and Colón Morera2006: 15–16), continued with the American takeover. The creation of the Nationalist party of Puerto Rico elicited particular attention from the FBI and other intelligence agencies. When Pedro Albizu Campos became leader in 1930 and the party soon thereafter abandoned electoral politics to adopt a strategy of armed struggle instead, American repression of the independence movement intensified. In the 1930s alone, members and sympathizers of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico were killed during peaceful protests and marches at the University of Puerto Rico (the “Río Piedras massacre”) and in Ponce (the “Ponce massacre”). In 1935, Puerto Rico police chief E. Francis Riggs said that if nationalist agitation continued, there would be “war to death against all Puerto Ricans” (Denis, Reference Denis2015: 121). The Puerto Rican flag, viewed as a symbol of the independence movement, was declared illegal. Puerto Rican nationalists were undeterred and major nationalist uprisings developed all over the island in 1950, only to be violently quashed by the police and the National Guard, including the bombing of the town of Jayuya (191–208). Still in 1950, two Puerto Rican nationalists attempted to assassinate President Truman, which led to Albizu Campos being arrested and imprisoned for the second time. Albizu Campos spent virtually the rest of his life in jail, where it is suspected he was tortured through irradiation (240–41).
The beginning of the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 gave new incentives for the United States not to tolerate secessionist activities in Puerto Rico. The Nationalists were often linked to Communism by their opponents, including by the first democratically elected governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz Marin (208). Therefore, for the United States, the fight against the Puerto Rican independence movement also became a struggle against Communism, and the prospect of Puerto Rico's becoming “another Cuba” considerably raised the stakes of politics on the island. Moreover, Puerto Rico was considered by the United States government to be a crucial geopolitical asset, as demonstrated by the important American military presence on the island. This military presence, especially in the Puerto Rican islands of Vieques, spurred important protests (Murillo, Reference Murillo2001) which contributed, along with the changing geopolitical climate, in the United States Navy leaving Vieques in 2003.
The harsh repression of the Puerto Rican independence movement during several decades may explain in part the contemporary weakness of this option. Indeed, it is rather striking that all the referendums on status showed very little support for independence. Indeed, independence garnered 0.6 per cent of the support in 1967,Footnote 4 4.4 per cent in 1993, 2.6 per cent in 1998, 5.5 per cent in 2012 and 1.5 per cent in 2017Footnote 5 .
The repressive history of the United States government towards supporters of Puerto Rican independence alone cannot, however, explain such low support. The value of American citizenship is most likely crucial in accounting for the weakness of the independence option. Contrary to the current ELA (enhanced or not), statehood, and perhaps even the more recent option of a “free association,” independence would entail a loss of American citizenship. As most Puerto Ricans believe “they are better off being citizens of the United States” (Pantojas-García, Reference Pantojas-García2005: 165), leaders of the independence movement have had a very difficult task making the case for independence. The value of US citizenship for Puerto Ricans stems in part from the perception it offers a form of financial and economic security linked to (partial) access to US social programs and the size of the US economy. From this angle, the Puerto Rican independence movement has faced similar obstacles to its counterparts in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia. An additional, and extremely significant, issue is that the economic disparity between the continental United States and Puerto Rico (the island remains poorer than the poorest state in the American federation, Mississippi) (Pantojas-García, Reference Pantojas-García2005: 172) has led to millions of Puerto Rican to move to the mainland where they can work or study. This “flying bus” (Pérez, Reference Pérez2002) highlights that many Puerto Ricans want to keep the option of moving to the continental United States, and US citizenship is what allows them to do that fairly easily.
Statehood
The relationship between nationalism and statehood is complex. Statehood leaders have tended to see the United States as their nation and Puerto Rico as their patria, thereby differentiating between political-legal and cultural-subjective communities. For statehooders, calling Puerto Rico a nation could be a liability to their ultimate objective, thus the references to patria or nationality to characterize Puerto Rico (Ramos Méndes, Reference Ramos Méndez2007). Nevertheless, statehooders consider Puerto Rico to be the primary community of Puerto Ricans and see themselves as part of a movement, puertorriqueñismo, that is constitutive of all status politics on the island (Ramos Méndes, Reference Ramos Méndez2016). They argue that the island becoming a constituent state of the federation is completely coherent with this puertorriqueñismo because it would mean that Puerto Rico would exercise its right to self-determination to finally decolonize and acquire a dignified status offering Puerto Ricans full formal equality with other American citizens.
Statehooders, thus, offer harsh criticism of ELA. In his testimony to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the United States Senate in 2013, then Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi from the PNP spoke of the “three fundamental defects of the territory status” (Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 2013: 19). These “defects” represent the essential of the argument in favour of Puerto Rico's national self-determination through statehood.
The first argument in favour of statehood is that it would grant Puerto Ricans the totality of political rights they should expect as American citizens. Statehooders argue that not having any voting representation in the United States Congress nor voting rights for the American presidential election while being subject to American federal legislation means Puerto Ricans are, collectively, second-class citizens. The prospect of full political equality through statehood is compatible with at least some form of nationalism on the island because it promises equality between Puerto Ricans and continental Americans. As Puerto Rico Senator Artur Ortiz Toro expressed it in 1963: “I cannot envisage a greater spiritual enjoyment and patriotic happiness than to feel the warmth of statehood blessing, with all its attributes of security and freedom” (Wells, Reference Wells1969: 245).
The second argument is that statehood would end the discriminatory policies of the United States towards Puerto Ricans on the island. Indeed, statehooders argue that, as a result of this lack of political power of Puerto Rico within American political institutions, policies of the American federal government, particularly social welfare policies, shortchange Puerto Rico. Resident Commissioner Pierluisi has argued that “The territory receives fewer federal funds per resident than any state or the District of Columbia. In 2010, Puerto Rico received about $5,300 per capita from the federal government, which is half the national average” (Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 2013: 18). In addition to appealing to national pride and dignity when making the argument about accessing American social welfare programs, statehooders also emphasize the material benefits that would come with being a constituent unit of the American federation. From this perspective, statehooders argue that “statehood is for the poor” (Romero-Barceló, Reference Romero-Barceló1978).
The third argument for statehood is that it would help the island's economy. Indeed, statehooders view the current status as the major culprit for Puerto Rico's severe economic and fiscal problems. They believe that ELA creates an “unequal playing field” with the continental United States as it places Puerto Rico under American federal law without its residents having any chance to shape it (Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 2013: 19). Here again, there is the notion that Puerto Rico is the victim of discrimination, which can be resolved by national self-determination through statehood in the American federation.
Although statehooders argue that puertorriqueñismo is fully coherent with their project, the stronger notion that Puerto Rico is a nation distinct from the United States represents a major obstacle for convincing a majority of Puerto Ricans the island should become the fifty-first state of the United States. As PIP leader Rubén Berríos Martínez put it: “You want to become a State of the Union you have to become Americans [sic]. You cannot maintain your separate identity in the long run” (Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 2013: 34). Indeed, the main weakness of statehood as a status option for Puerto Rico is that it might appear threatening to Puerto Rico's nationhood. The fact that three-quarter of Puerto Ricans consider Puerto Rico their nation and that they see Spanish as a crucial marker of the national identity (Lluch, Reference Lluch and Lluch2014) make statehood unpalatable for many. In other words, many Puerto Ricans are not convinced that a Spanish-speaking Caribbean nation could become an American state without experiencing linguistic assimilation and an erosion of identity. The PNP argues that the increasingly important number of Spanish-speaking American citizens on the mainland bodes well for the integration of Puerto Rico within the American federation, but they all likely miss an important point: the United States may have tremendous diversity but it is also a mononational federation that probably would not tolerate the notion of a nation within a nation (Lluch, Reference Lluch and Lluch2014). This type of concern explains in part why the United States Congress never enacted legislation that would automatically grant statehood to Puerto Rico should that option receive a plurality of votes in a referendum (Passalacqua, Reference Passalacqua1994: 103).
Free association
The notion of a free association between Puerto Rico and the United States as a status option for the island is more recent than statehood or independence. Although not formally on the ballot at the 1993 referendum, the idea of a “bilateral compact” was presented by some PPD politicians as coherent with the ELA option offered to voters (Passalacqua, Reference Passalacqua1994: 104). Free association (Estado Libre Asociado Soberano) was a formal option for the first time at the 1998 referendum where it received virtually no support (0.3%). In the 2012 referendum, however, free association received 33 per cent of votes cast. This constitutional model is completely coherent with nationalism since it involves building a “nation-to-nation” relationship with the United States. As the label for the free association option in the 2012 referendum indicated, Puerto Rico would no longer be a territory of the United States. Rather, Puerto Rico would be “sovereign,” and it would negotiate an association agreement with the United States.
Free association is really independence. Indeed, it first requires ending the current ELA by severing the island's political and constitutional ties with the United States. This option is very reminiscent of Quebec's Parti Québécois’ proposal for sovereignty-association or sovereignty-partnership with Canada. The main difference seems to be rhetorical; whereas in Quebec the political focus of the proposals was independence (referred to as “sovereignty”), with the association/partnership occupying a small discursive place, in Puerto Rico more importance is given to the association component as a way to reassure Puerto Ricans for whom independence appears a very risky scenario.
The 2011 report of the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico states that free association is a “permissible” status option (2011: 24), which suggests that the United States’ government could be willing to negotiate an association with a sovereign Puerto Rico should a referendum produce a majority vote in favour of free association. The report cites the United States’ relationships with the Marshall Islands, Palau and Micronesia as examples of what a free association between Puerto Rico and the United States could look like (25). The report notes that “The United States provides defense and various forms of economic aid to these countries and exercises control over their defense and security policy. Their citizens may work and attend schools in the United States, but they are not US citizens” (25). This last point is the greatest obstacle in convincing Puerto Ricans to support a free association with the United States. Indeed, while this status might allow Puerto Rico to fully express its nationhood in the context of a nation-to-nation compact, as well as to presumably reap some security and other types of benefits from an association with the United States, the loss of American citizenship represents a prospect that many Puerto Ricans are loath to contemplate.
“Enhanced” ELA
The idea of enhancing, or developing, ELA is almost as old as the ELA status itself. In 1954, Luis Muñoz Marín was already saying that ELA was “not perfect” and that Puerto Ricans were “desirous of finding, at the proper time and after calm study, means of perfecting it within the association which is a basic part of the concept” (Wells, Reference Wells1969: 251). Nearly a decade later, Muñoz Marín wrote to President Kennedy that it was time to grow ELA, to which the president replied that he saw no reason “why the Commonwealth concept, if it is the desire of the people of Puerto Rico, should not be fully developed as a permanent institution in its association with the United States” (254). In the first referendum on status in 1967 where ELA won with 60.5 per cent support, much of the PPD's campaign stressed that the association with the United States implemented in 1952 would be further developed (260).
The idea of increasing autonomy while at the same time preserving some of the security of existing constitutional and institutional arrangements is typically a popular option put forth by nationalist movements (Keating, Reference Keating2001). In Puerto Rico, the idea of acquiring more autonomy by enhancing ELA can suit nationalism without raising fears linked to a substantial change such as independence, statehood, or even free association. Therefore, there have been substantial discursive advantages for the PPD to promote enhanced ELA as a status option. The PNP has understood that enhanced ELA would probably win any referendum on status and it therefore did not present it as an option in 1998 and 2012, leading to the PPD's call to vote for “none of the above” in 1998 and to leave the second question blank in 2012.
The constitutionality of an enhanced ELA has often been questioned (Lluch, Reference Lluch and Lluch2014; Report of the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status, 2011: 26). In a 2013 letter to Resident Commissioner Pierluisi, Senators Wyden and Murkowski of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee wrote that “non-viable status options such as ‘enhanced Commonwealth” should not be considered, as they confused the debate and undermine efforts to resolve this issue of great importance to both Puerto Rico and the United States” (Wyden and Murkowski, Reference Wyden and Murkowski2013). This newly enunciated position, if it remains consistent, will complicate the political promotion of enhanced ELA and may force PPD politicians to defend the status quo, something which only a small minority of the party supports. It is therefore no surprise that the senators’ letter was not well received by the PPD as some argued it constituted an affront to the Puerto Rican nation's right to decide of its own future. For example, former PPD Governor Rafael Hernández Cólon argued it went “against the right of self-determination of the Puerto Rican people” (Reference Hernández Cólon2013: 7).
In any case, simply enhancing ELA might not be satisfactory to a majority of Puerto Ricans in light of two recent developments. First, in a 2016 criminal case at the United States Supreme Court, the United States’ Solicitor General presented a brief reaffirming that Puerto Rico as a US territory is not “sovereign” (US Department of Justice, 2016: 15). This simple affirmation runs contrary to the traditional discourse of the PPD who always opposed the notion that Puerto Rico's status was that of a mere territory.Footnote 6 Second, in reaction to the recent and ongoing dire financial and fiscal crisis that compromised the ability of the Puerto Rican government to meet its debt servicing, the United States Congress passed PROMESA, a legislation that effectively takes away power from the island's democratically elected institutions to make budgetary decisions. Indeed, the presence of an oversight board composed of members appointed by the United States government with virtually no connection to Puerto Rico gives credence to the idea that ELA, in any form, is colonial.
Conclusion
Nationalism in Puerto Rico is at the centre of the politics of status. The islandness of Puerto Rico, its Hispanic nature and the resonance of symbols such as the flag spur status options such as independence, free association and enhanced Commonwealth. Nationalist feelings of political subordination as well as economic marginalization also feed support for a change in status, including statehood. The idea of decolonization is a major force in Puerto Rican nationalism. Colonial power, which used to be associated perhaps most strongly with the military use made of Puerto Rico by the United States during the Cold War, is now linked to the limitations stemming from the plenary powers the United States Congress exercises over the island as it faces a serious economic, fiscal and debt crisis, for example, in the recent creation of an oversight board. In this new context, one could expect that nationalism could bring about change. Indeed, the idea that ELA involves a colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico seems to have been validated by the 2016 amicus brief specifying that Puerto Rico held no sovereignty and by PROMESA, yet there are important obstacles standing in the way of each alternative to the status quo. Independence and free association are perceived to involve a very high cost: the loss of US citizenship. As American citizens, Puerto Ricans can live and work on the mainland United States, a right that has perhaps become more important than ever in the context of the current economic crisis. Statehood, the status option that now seems favoured (Pantojas-Garcia, Reference Pantojas-García2013: 49–50), poses the question of the fit of a Caribbean Spanish-speaking nation within the American federation. Each of the multiplicity of status options for Puerto Rico has its own perceived shortcomings and so far limited the capacity of nationalism to bring about constitutional change. However, in 2014, the United States Congress legislated an appropriation of $2,500,000 for Puerto Rico to organize another referendum that would resolve the status question, and which would offer Puerto Ricans a choice between statehood and independence/free association (thus, no status quo or enhanced ELA option). Such referendum took place on June 11 2017. However, due to pressures from opposition parties and the United States government, the existing ELA status was added to the ballot. As a result, both the PIP and PPD called for a boycott of the referendum. On a sunny Sunday, Puerto Rico, which is used to long line-ups of people at voting station, saw a very low turnout as less than 23 per cent of eligible voters went out to vote. The results (97% supporting statehood) (Comisión estatal de elecciones, 2017) are hence quite misleading. Although the governor has stated he will take the case to Congress, how the results will be received by the United States government remains to be seen. In the past, the passive and ambiguous position of the United States government on the matter of Puerto Rico's status increased uncertainty about the political and constitutional future of the island.
Indeed, a fundamental difference between nationalism and self-determination in Puerto Rico and in communities such as Catalonia and Scotland was that Puerto Ricans who wanted change (a majority, as expressed in the 2012 referendum) have had trouble getting the attention of a government that ultimately has power over them. For example, in its 2016 report, the Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico was vague and non-committal on the constitutional future of the island, recommending that if another referendum was held “Congress analyze the result of this plebiscite with care and seriousness of purpose, and take any appropriate legislative action” (84). Puerto Rico is and has always been extremely peripheral to the United States; somewhat paradoxically, being “foreign in a domestic sense” has greatly complicated the politics of national self-determination.
