Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the fate of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, much of it reflecting the widespread disappointment attendant upon the failure of democracy to take root in that country. Much of this literature has adopted a crude dualistic framework: Boris Yeltsin was building democracy under difficult circumstances, but when he was replaced by Vladimir Putin in 2000, the latter clearly set the country on an antidemocratic, authoritarian path. Karen Dawisha does not accept this approach. For her, the question is not about the failure of democracy but the rise of kleptocracy, and she sees this as a direct and unambiguous consequence of the drive by Putin to build a system designed purely to reward himself and his cronies. It is all Putin’s fault; he has built a system “in his own image” (p. 349).

Dawisha starts her story with the collapse of the Soviet Union, tracing the way in which in 1990–91 significant amounts of money were shifted abroad by officers of both the Communist Party and the KGB, money which was then used by those with the right connections to set themselves up in the chaotic 1990s in Russia. She then focuses upon the creation of what she calls “Putin’s circle” in St. Petersburg in the first half of the 1990s. She shows how a range of individuals, most with KGB backgrounds, became associated with Putin and engaged in a variety of business activities, many of which prospered as a direct result of Putin’s position in the city administration. This position gave him the power to use the resources of the state (not just the financial resources but also things like the power to grant or withhold licenses, and to apply or ignore regulations) in such a way as to favor his friends over others. Dawisha also argues that during this time, Putin personally prospered from his activities. She then follows him to Moscow, explaining how he brought many of his associates with him from St. Petersburg, and she charts his rise from a position in the presidential administration through leadership of the FSB (the successor to the KGB), as the prime minister, and ultimately as president. Once established as president, Dawisha argues, he then set about centralizing control in his office and doling out control over the economy to his friends. She charts this in detail up until about the end of 2000, by which time, she argues, the system was fully established.

This is an interesting argument. It is also an incendiary one given the claims of corruption it makes against Putin and those close to him, which is the reason why Cambridge University Press (in light of British libel laws) refused to publish it. One problem in making this sort of argument is that, by its nature, much of the evidence for it is opaque or inferential. Dawisha has done a good job in searching out a very large number of sources, many of them media reports and Websites, supplemented by personal testimonies of some who have broken with Putin. Given their diversity, these sources when combined do give confidence in the veracity of the picture drawn. However, this may be called into question by Dawisha’s evident desire to paint as strong a case as she can. This has led her to rely on some sources perhaps better treated with more care. For example, “US government anonymous leaks” (p. 6) and Boris Berezovsky, who was found at the London trial cited by Dawisha to be an unreliable witness and inveterate liar, do not inspire confidence. On some occasions, the points she makes have been exaggerated: For example, the claim that the repression in 2012 was reminiscent of the 1930s (p. 3) is laughable; her discussion of the Kursk sinking (p. 287) implies that Putin did not go to Murmansk to meet the relatives of the sailors trapped on the submarine when he did (albeit very late); the comparison she draws with Canada (p. 321) is called into question by her claim that the populations of both countries are roughly the same (Russia’s population is more than four and a half times that of Canada); and her discussion of the energy wars between Russia and Ukraine (p. 343) neglects to say that the Russian denial of supply occurred in the face of Ukrainian inability to pay for supplies already delivered. None of this refutes the picture she draws, but it does suggest that it is a bit more complex than she is making out.

What of her basic argument that the system is a direct product of Putin’s drive to set it up in such a way as to enable him and his cronies to leach resources out of it? Two points are relevant. First, the way Dawisha has set up the argument, one would think that Putin was the dominant influence on the shape that the system took from 1991. However the system whereby businessmen and state officials could exploit state resources for their personal enrichment was established under Yeltsin. There is little acknowledgment of this by Dawisha; indeed, the most egregious case—the loans-for-shares scheme of the mid-1990s—is mentioned in passing only in a footnote. The whole structure of patronage and corruption that the author paints was basically already in place before Putin went to Moscow. Just as the authoritarian trajectory of the system was set under Yeltsin, so too were its kleptocratic aspects pointed to by Dawisha.

Second, is it really the case that Putin only wanted power so that he could reward himself and his friends by raping the state and that he has thereby created a kleptocracy? No one can know the basic motivations of Putin, and it may be that personal enrichment was at their heart. It is certainly the case that Putin sought to centralize power in his own person. But the centralization of power and the weakening of opposition does not have to be motivated primarily by the desire for personal enrichment. There were strong political reasons for a reassertion of central control following the disaggregation of the Yeltsin years, and the Putin regime did perform many other functions than just funneling cash to insiders. For example, it oversaw a significant improvement in the economic position of a large portion of the Russian populace; it undertook major construction projects of national significance; and it rebuilt Russia’s position in the international world. In other words, the system did much more than simply reward insiders. This calls into question whether it is accurate to call Russia a “kleptocracy.” Given that Dawisha does not attempt to theorize this concept, the question is left open. This does not mean that Putin and those around him bear no responsibility for the way the system works. However, to argue that personal enrichment was the central driving force in his acting the way he did is to oversimplify what was a much more complex situation.

Notwithstanding these points, Putin’s Kleptocracy is a solid contribution and a much more detailed and convincing case than many of those other publications that have focused on the wealth of Putin and his cronies, and for this reason is to be warmly welcomed.