The history of early-modern Irish philosophy is divided into two almost hermetic temporalities: on one side, we have the Anglo-Irish Protestant tradition, with its hallmark institution Trinity College; on the other side, we have the exiled Catholic Irish tradition, represented by secular clergymen as well as members of regular orders such as Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits, mainly active in the vast network of Irish colleges on the continent due to the penal laws restricting Catholic education on Irish soil. Both traditions had one thing in common: a strong and peculiar linkage to France, in particular during the eighteenth century. For the Protestant tradition, it was due both to the English reception of the philosophies of Descartes, Malebranche and Port-Royal, and to the particular input of numerous French Calvinist exiles who settled in Dublin after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). For the Catholic tradition, it was a somewhat later phenomenon: whereas the first generation of Catholic exiles where mainly linked to Spain and the Habsburg territories of Central Europe, France became the central port of call for eighteenth-century Irish Catholic intellectualsFootnote 1.
For the history of philosophy, this French predicament raises a paradox: it has long been admitted that unlike its Protestant counterparts, open to philosophical novelties of the age – empiricism and experimental philosophy, Cartesian idealism and Malebranchian spiritualism –, the Catholic Irish tradition remained firmly attached to medieval Scholastic traditions and their Aristotelian conceptualismFootnote 2. And whereas most Anglo-Irish scholars from Trinity knew their Aquinas and did not neglect reading some Jesuit courses – Peter Browne for instance discusses sometimes Suárez at length – the Catholic tradition was reputed impervious to anything published in Protestant circles. In this paper, I will argue that such a stark contrast does not apply to the eighteenth century, often presented unilaterally as the ‘Golden Age of Anglo-Irish intellectual history’Footnote 3. A number of Irish Catholic scholars active on the continent were increasingly exposed to the ‘new philosophies’, and integrated Cartesian and Lockean insights into their apparently old-fashioned courses of philosophy. Some of them even managed to return to Ireland, with the progressive loosening of the anti-Catholic restrictions on educational activity.
Although scholarship on the philosophy of early-modern exiled Irish Catholics has made considerable progress, very little, if not nothing, is known about the return of this philosophical tradition to Ireland itself. At that time, Catholic education on the Irish soil was restricted to grammar schools for young boys, and almost nothing is known about the intellectual identity of the promoters of these schools. Most of them, however, had received a solid philosophical and theological education on the continent. This was the case of the Dublin-born Jesuit John Austin (1717–84), who will be the focus of this paper. While Austin's educational action is well documented and acknowledged in most histories of Irish education, we actually do not know anything about the type of philosophy that stands behind his educational enterprise. In this paper, I will attempt to reconstruct Austin's conception of philosophy as ‘knowledge of all things accessible to natural light’, as it can be found in a hitherto unknown manuscript I recently discovered and identified in a French provincial library.
1. John Austin's Career
John Austin was born in Dublin in 1717, and he received his first education in one of the grammar schools opened by the Jesuits in the northern edges of the cityFootnote 4. Like many other Catholic boys, he had to leave Ireland to pursue higher education: at the time, France with its efficient network of Irish Colleges present in major university towns seemed a prime destinationFootnote 5. Austin's first port of call was Nancy, where he entered the Society of Jesus in 1735, at the age of eighteen. He is only one of an important community of Irish Jesuits active in the French Jesuit Provinces (the country was then divided into four Provinces, Champagne, France, Aquitania and Lyons), which produced a number of famous figures, such as Bernard Routh SJ (1695–1768), often rumored to have converted Montesquieu on his death bed, as well as a number of other returnees linked to Austin and the development of private schools in Ireland, such as Thomas Betagh SJ (1737–1811, trained in Pont-à-Mousson like Austin) and James Philip Mulcaile SJ (1727–1801, trained in Paris). The emergence of France is itself a noteworthy fact of a shift in intellectual influence: it stands in contrast with the past century, when Irish Jesuits were mainly attracted to places like Salamanca, Santiago de Compostela, Seville, Lisbon, Coimbra, Louvain and Antwerp, almost all Habsburg territories. It will also explain the strong French influence in the emergence of Catholic higher education in Ireland, and it will explain why Austin would show a particular interest in discussing Descartes, Malebranche and others. After his novitiate, he followed a very classical career path for a Jesuit of his time: he enrols as student of philosophy at the Jesuit University of Pont-à-Mousson (1735–37), and then becomes a professor, first of humanities, then of philosophy, at the College of RheimsFootnote 6. He must then have enrolled for his theological education: first in Rheims for two years (1745–47) – after which he is ordained priest on 22 September 1747 –, and then in Poitiers (1747–49), probably on the instances of Thomas Hennessy SJ, the Superior of the Irish Mission from 1729 to 1750. Poitiers was at the centre of a region which counted a great number of recent Irish immigrants and refugees, but also numerous long-established families with links to the Bordeaux and Cognac wine businessFootnote 7. The Irish College of Poitiers was then an important ‘hub’ for the Irish Jesuits prepared to be sent back to the country as part of the Mission, as Austin himself documents it in his correspondenceFootnote 8. There he finished apparently his theological education and ended his French sojourn as Prefect of discipline at the Irish College. In 1750, at the age of 33, he returns to Ireland, as assistant to the parish priest John Murphy at Saint Michael & John in Dublin. It is on Irish soil that he pronounces in 1753 his fourth vow (of ‘special obedience’ to the pope regarding the Jesuit mission), the ultimate Jesuit oath after the classical vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Austin starts his educational mission in Dublin, opening a private school at Saul's Court in 1760 which would soon attract a great number of talented and prominent students – dramatist John O'Keeffe (1747–1833) was for instance one of themFootnote 9. Like all Jesuits, his action was strongly impacted by the suppression of the Society in 1773: the Irish Mission had basically always been supported by the network of Irish Jesuits active in France and Spain, and at the time of the suppression, it counted with only 19 members. Austin becomes a secular priest of the diocese of Dublin and finishes his life as reputed preacher. His life-long companion Thomas Betagh becomes vicar general of the archdiocese of Dublin. John Austin dies about ten years after the suppression of the Society, in 1784, and he is buried at St. Kevin's Church in Dublin.
2. Austin's Manuscript in the Context of Irish Diasporic Scholasticism
John Austin's scholastic legacy is a long in-4° manuscript of 319 pages, corresponding to the first part of a course of philosophy taught in 1746–47Footnote 10. It is a typical example of classroom notes, taken down by an anonymous student, clearly dated but unfortunately without any explicit reference to any place of transcription. It very probably corresponds to his last year at the College of Rheims.
Although we know a lot about Irish diasporic students in France, thanks to the work of historians such as Laurence Brockliss and Patrick FertéFootnote 11, we still know almost nothing about diasporic professors, with the exception of the few figures who managed to get their works printed – such as Michael Moore (†1721)Footnote 12 and Luke Joseph Hooke (†1796), who held one of the most prestigious Parisian chairs of theologyFootnote 13. Our documentary legacy is much more extensive for other Irish exiled traditions, in particular for the Franciscans active in the colleges of Louvain, Prague and RomeFootnote 14. For the specific case of France, all we have are a few notebooks of lectures clearly taken down by Irish students under various French professorsFootnote 15, and only three or four philosophy manuscript lecture notes effectively taught by Irish professors in FranceFootnote 16.
This documentary scarcity has a strong influence on our perception of the ‘enlightened’ or ‘counter-enlightened’ character of Irish Catholic philosophy: as both Éamon Ó Ciosáin and Liam Chambers have recalled, Irish professors in Paris were often associated with the Aristotelian reaction of Parisian college professors against Cartesian noveltiesFootnote 17. Abstruse scholastic logical distinctions and formalities were even dubbed ‘gibier d'Hybernois’ (‘game for the Irish’)Footnote 18. But a close scrutiny of newly discovered eighteenth century courses such as Austin's might well offer a different picture: the Irish professors actually closely followed the path of a typical post-Cartesian scholasticism, that had become mainstream not only in the secular collèges de plein-exercice of the University of Paris, but also in the French provinces of the Society of Jesus. From that point of view, Austin's manuscript is not just precious to understand the history of Irish Catholic philosophy, but also French Jesuit philosophy in general: whereas the French Provinces had arranged for the printing of a handful of courses of philosophy during the second half of the seventeenth century, only one complete course was ever printed during the entire eighteenth century, that of Gaspar Buhon SJ (†1726) from the Province of LyonsFootnote 19. All the rest of Jesuit teaching is kept in the form of manuscript lecture notes similar to Austin's, and with the exception of François de Dainville's seminal work on natural philosophy, none of them has ever been studiedFootnote 20. In particular, we lack precise information about the content of philosophy education in the Province of Champagne – the closest clearly identifiable manuscript course from Pont-à-Mousson I could locate related to Austin's dates back to 1699Footnote 21.
3. Austin's Introduction to Philosophy
Philosophy courses in the French provinces of the Society of Jesus were at Austin's time limited to two yearsFootnote 22, and divided into four parts: logic, ethics, metaphysics and physicsFootnote 23. Such an order departed from the classical Aristotelian-Alexandrian order, which was logic, physics, metaphysics and ethics and to which the Jesuits had long remained faithful. The presence of ethics in the philosophy course was a French peculiarity, since in many other countries, in particular in Spain and Italy, it was replaced by moral theology. The first three parts were usually finished in the first year (logic taking the biggest temporal share), while the second year was dedicated to a long physics course, which at the time integrated largely experimental physics after a general presentation of Aristotelian concepts such as matter, form, time and movementFootnote 24. From Austin, only the first part, corresponding to logic, survives. The whole course was preceded by a long section of general prolegomena (about 100 pages long), under the title Introductio ad philosophiam, and this text will be the focus of the present study.
By adding such an Introductio, the French Jesuits, to which Austin belonged, mimicked a practice that had been developed in the secular colleges, in particular at the University of Paris, such as Harcourt, Grassins, Plessis, etc. where it was a common practice since the middle of the seventeenth century. Much has been written about the important influence of Jesuit scholasticism on general university education during the seventeenth century, but since the 1720s, at least in France, influence changed sides. The new Parisian collège-philosophy of the first decades of the eighteenth century became normative and influenced the way the Jesuits themselves – as well as other religious orders in France – had to present their philosophy. French Jesuit courses of the 1720–50s resemble much more those of secular Parisian professors such as Edmond Pourchot (1651–1734), Jean Du Hamel (often confused with the more famous Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel, 1624–1706), Guillaume Dagoumer (ca. 1660–1745) and Pierre Lemonnier (1676–1757)Footnote 25, than the vast cursus philosophici of some of the seventeenth century Jesuit heroes – such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza SJ (1578–1641), Francisco de Oviedo SJ (1602–51) or Rodrigo de Arriaga SJ (1592–1661), which were all often reprinted in France and widely read during earlier decades within and outside of the SocietyFootnote 26.
Austin's Introductio is organized according to three chapters addressing the nature (ch. 1, De natura philosophiae), the existence (ch. 2, De existentia philosophiae) and the division of philosophy (ch. 3, De divisione philosophiae), with a small appendix on the history and origins of philosophy (De origine philosophiae). Most of his contemporaries treated the same matter according to a typified list of questions, inherited both of the Latin medieval reception of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics Footnote 27 and of the Roman tradition of Cicero and Quintilian, two important references in the traditional education system of the early Society of Jesus and in the scholastic tradition in general. Austin, like most of his French predecessors, proves a bad Aristotelian by starting with the quid sit questionFootnote 28. He starts by proposing his own definition of philosophy, by making three claims:
First thesis: philosophy, according to its name, is the love and the study of wisdom. (…). Second thesis: philosophy, according to reality, is the knowledge (scientia) of things that can be known by natural light. (…). Third thesis: all things that can be known by the natural light are the object of philosophyFootnote 29.
There seems to be nothing really original about this definition, but two points are nevertheless noteworthy: first, Austin follows the medieval tradition in clearly calling philosophy a scientia (the Latin scholastic rendering of Aristotle's episteme), and thus as the highest possible type of assent, as opposed to mere opinion; second, Austin insists on the fact that philosophy is based on natural light alone. During the late seventeenth century, French academic culture had been rocked by several acts of censorship, the Faculty of Theology reminding the Arts colleges that they should not dispute objects relating to theology. By insisting on philosophy as based on natural light, Austin recalls that what discriminates objects of theology from objects of philosophy is not their intrinsic nature, but the type of habit that allows them to be known: reason (or natural light), and not faith. French Scholastics thus clearly thought that God as the supreme spiritual being and the human soul were proper objects of philosophy, since they were accessible to natural reason, and could therefore be studied as part of the metaphysics section of the philosophy course. Metaphysics then usually contained a general section called ‘ontology’ (ontologia), and a special section called ‘pneumatology’ (pneumatologia), dedicated to spiritual being only, which included God and the human soulFootnote 30. We do not, unfortunately, have kept a trace of Austin's lectures on this part of philosophy, but what he says about consciousness in his prolegomena is quite consistent with the common usage of the time.
Austin reminds us of the integration of immaterial beings into the scope of philosophy in his chapter on the division of philosophy, which answers the classical quotuplex question. According to its objects, says Austin, philosophy is divided into one part dealing with ‘immaterial objects’, and another one with ‘material things’Footnote 31. Austin does not dedicate a complete chapter on the ‘causes’ of philosophy, but he reproduces some elements of this classical topic in his appendix on the ‘origins of philosophy’. According to a very Augustinian narrative of gift and fall, God was usually seen as the first efficient cause of philosophy, since he had impressed perfect philosophical knowledge into Adam's mindFootnote 32. But after original sin, the philosophers were needed to ‘restore’ or ‘repair’ philosophy. Austin therefore finishes his introduction with a very short history of philosophy under the title On the Restorers of Philosophy Footnote 33. He mentions the six ancient philosophical sects: Thales, Pythagoras, the Academics including Plato and SocratesFootnote 34, the Epicureans, the Stoics and the Peripatetics. The medieval Peripatetics are then presented as being the three schools of the Thomists, Scotists and Nominalists. He concludes his catalogue with the Anti-Peripatetics, among which he singles out Descartes (‘a man of sublime genius’Footnote 35), Gassendi, Malebranche, and two ‘famous Englishmen’ Locke and NewtonFootnote 36. The only Jesuit author mentioned in his catalogue is the independently-minded Honoré Fabri SJ (1607–88), commonly ranked among the Anti-PeripateticsFootnote 37.
The most interesting and the longest part of Austin's introduction is his second chapter dedicated to the existence of philosophy. It answered the traditional question an sit philosophia, which was often treated as first by his contemporaries (in good medieval Aristotelian fashion, the an sit has to precede the quid sit)Footnote 38. If philosophy is defined as the scientia of things that can be known by natural light, then such a knowledge must be possible. This section of the an sit was therefore the classical place where the early-modern French Scholastics would discuss the quality of the knowledge accessible to the human intellect: can it reach the level of absolute certitude required for scientia? If not, then philosophy in the strictest sense of the word is not possible. If yes, then one must refute those who argue that the human mind must doubt about everything or settle with probability. John Austin's presentation offers an interesting discussion of the Cartesian hyperbolic doubt at the light of traditional scholastic conceptions of degrees of certitude. As we shall see, this will lead him not so much to refute Descartes – as might be expected – but to integrate Cartesian insights into the classical scholastic framework.
4. Austin's Post-Cartesian Foundationalism
In most traditional Scholastic circles of the second part of the seventeenth century, Descartes's philosophy was perceived as a form of radical scepticism because of the argument of the hyperbolic doubt in the first Meditation Footnote 39. This certainly stands in stark contrast with our common perception of Descartes today, where we tend to see him rather as a foundationalist or as a ‘Conqueror of Scepticism’, as Richard Popkin had labelled him in his seminal book on early-modern scepticismFootnote 40. The argument that we must doubt of everything was also at the heart of two of the last condemnations of Cartesian doctrines: first, the royal anti-Cartesian formulary directed to the University of Paris (1691), prohibiting professors from teaching that one must ‘doubt everything before being certain of any knowledge’Footnote 41; and second the Jesuit condemnation of Cartesian propositions under General Michelangelo Tamburini (1706), of which the first one argues that ‘the human mind can and must doubt everything except that it thinks and consequently that it exists’Footnote 42. If we look closely at these two condemnations, the Jesuit version seems to be more restrictive than the Parisian formulation: whereas the Parisian Formulaire speaks of universal doubt before certitude, the Jesuit condemnation speaks of universal doubt with one exception, namely that we think and exist. This means that from the Jesuit perspective, even a position that excludes one's own thought and existence from universal doubt is not acceptable. If our own existence and thought were the only certain objects of natural knowledge, then we would need a divine guarantee or supernatural knowledge for all other objects. The Jesuits saw the absolute certitude of the cogito as collapsing into fideism, invalidating thereby all our natural knowledge coming from the senses or from human testimoniesFootnote 43. This is clearly the picture John Austin must have had of Descartes: he is not concerned with portraying him as an absolute sceptic, but rather as an ‘epistemic idealist’Footnote 44 who gives a too strong criterion for knowledge, so strong that it eventually discredits the task of philosophy.
Austin proceeds in two steps. First, to ascertain the possibility of philosophy, he argues that if philosophy is a scientia, and since scientia entails, in good Aristotelian fashion, truth and certitude, then we must admit that at least some form of certitude is required in order to practice philosophy. Austin argues that at least two things can be considered as absolutely certain:
There must exist some infallibly true knowledge (existit aliqua cognitio infallibiliter vera). Proof: a judgment in which nobody can be fooled (falli) is an infallibly true; and there exists some judgment in the natural order in which nobody can be fooled. There are two such judgments: first, I think; second, Nothingness has no properties. In those two judgments nobody can be fooledFootnote 45.
The first example of certitude given by Austin is the Cartesian ego cogito. The second is an example that has been regularly used since the seventeenth century, nihili nulla est proprietas (‘nothingness has no properties’): this means that there cannot be thought – a property – without a thinker, or a mode without a substance, and thus a property without some existence that sustains itFootnote 46. During Austin's time, both axioms were clearly identified as properly Cartesian, even if most Scholastics were aware of patristic and medieval forerunners, especially for the certitude of internal acts. The explicit juxtaposition of both axioms had also been a commonplace, especially since Malebranche, whose works enjoyed an even wider readership in scholastic circles than Descartes’:
Nothingness has no properties. I think. Therefore I am. But what am I, I who think, at the time when I think? Am I a body, a mind, a human being? As yet I know nothing of all this. I know only that, at the time I think, I am something that thinks (Malebranche, Reference Malebranche and Scott1997, p. 6)Footnote 47.
Austin does not mention neither Descartes nor Malebranche by name, but we clearly have here an interesting testimony of the evolution of philosophical references within eighteenth century Jesuit scholasticism. It is striking that Austin does not here use the classical first principle the scholastics had always opposed to the cogito, namely the Aristotelian Principle of Non-Contradiction. According to one of its formulations, it uses the language of properties: ‘It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect’ (Aristotle, Met. IV 3, 1005b19-20). The medieval Aristotelian commentators have extracted this principle from its initial semantical context (‘if you say A, you cannot mean –A’) in order to make it the first and firmest principle of metaphysics: since a substance cannot, for instance, have two contradictory properties at the same time. During the entire seventeenth century, scholastic readers of Descartes had systematically opposed this objective Principle of Non-Contradiction to the subjective cogito Footnote 48. To give an Irish Jesuit example, one may recall the testimony of Richard Arsdekin SJ (1620–93), professor in the Flemish-Belgian Province at the colleges of Louvain and Antwerp, who compiled a list of all the classical philosophical axioms taken for certain in his Tractatus de idea scientifica, which is a useful summary of seventeenth century scholastic epistemology. Among them, he recalls of course the Aristotelian Principle of Non-Contradiction, and the classical earlier Jesuit Renaissance commentators on it, of which he singles out Pedro da Fonseca SJ (1528–99), and adds: ‘this is most evident for everybody, except Descartes (quod cuivis evidentissimum est, praeter Cartesium)’ (Arsdekin SJ, Reference Arsdekin1687, p. 270)Footnote 49. Austin belongs thus clearly to a different generation: he is not concerned with portraying Descartes as a sceptic negating Aristotelian principles. On the contrary, Austin clearly seems to endorse Cartesian and post-Cartesian principles as sources of infallible knowledge.
In a second step of his discussion on the existence of philosophy, however, Austin formulates his own criticism of Cartesian method: if only such very abstract primary principles as those mentioned above could yield certitude, then the scope of philosophy as natural knowledge would be very limited. It is therefore necessary to investigate further what the conditions of certitude are, and Austin does so in a section entitled De regulis veritatis, ‘on the rules of truth’. This Patristic expression had been revived by Descartes himself in the Meditations Footnote 50, in order to qualify his assumption that ‘everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is true’Footnote 51. Austin's key argument is that the absolute or infallible type of certitude produced by the above-mentioned two axioms is the only possible type of certitude. Corporeal and social knowledge can also yield forms of natural certitude: they might be weaker than infallible certitude, but they can still be considered as certitude. This entails that we might well have degrees of certitude, rather than one absolute a priori certitude on one side and mere opinion or conjecture for the rest. Austin uses here a classical Scholastic distinction between three types of certitude:
There are three types of certitude (certitudo)Footnote 52: metaphysical, physical and moral. Metaphysical certitude is about what cannot be falsified in any possible way (quod non potest subesse falsum), not even by God. Physical certitude is about what cannot be rendered false, with the exception of God's [intervention]. Moral certitude is about what in the absolute could be rendered false, but that would only be the case if all honest men became liarsFootnote 53.
This tripartition is a late-medieval heritage: similar divisions could already be found in authors fourteenth- and fifteenth-century authors such as John Buridan, Peter of Ailly, Jean Gerson or John Mair, and it was a common staple of seventeenth century Jesuit philosophy coursesFootnote 54. The expression quod subesse potest falsum was common in medieval epistemology: the highest level of certitude, metaphysical certitude, cannot be about something false. Metaphysically certain propositions cannot be falsified by anybody, not even by God. This was the degree of certitude granted since the fourteenth century to the classical axioms of metaphysics, such as the Aristotelian Principle of Non-ContradictionFootnote 55. Austin chooses to illustrate this level of absolute certitude by means of the Cartesian cogito. But this absolute type of certitude does not entail that all other forms of epistemic attitudes would simply be considered uncertain, and of no value for philosophy: Austin admits also the existence of ‘physical certitude’, which corresponds to the normal course of natural events, perceivable by our sensesFootnote 56, and which only divine intervention could falsifyFootnote 57. The same reasoning applies for the third type of certitude, moral certitude, which corresponds to our everyday beliefs: the classical example was the love of mothers for their children – they ‘almost’ all do love their children. The origin of this type of certitude is human authority or more generally testimonial knowledge. Austin says it can be produced by the testimony (testimonium) of a small number of wise men, or of a great number of ‘prudent and honest men’Footnote 58. Such knowledge is certain, and could only be rendered false in the very unlikely hypothesis that all honest men become liarsFootnote 59.
The distinction between these three types of certitude was a very common philosophical theme in seventeenth century Jesuit textbooksFootnote 60, as well as in French secular college philosophy. It was also rapidly imported into post-scholastic English-language philosophy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both among Protestant and Catholic authorsFootnote 61. Diderot, a former student of Pierre Lemonnier in the 1730sFootnote 62, reproduces them in the Encyclopédie, and Austin's 1746 lectures were thus perfectly in the spirit of the time. But what remains relatively original is the way he understands the motive of metaphysical certitude. Austin identifies two distinct sources or motives capable of yielding metaphysical certitude. The first is evidence (evidentia), the second is ‘consciousness’ (conscientia), two sources that were again not commonly used in this context among earlier seventeenth century Scholastics, even within the Society.
Evidence, as the first source of metaphysical certitude, is defined by Austin as the natural ‘relationship’ certain ideas have with each other, and of which we have a clear and distinct perceptionFootnote 63. Whereas medieval uses of the certitudo were both subjective and objective (one could speak of the certitudo of a thing)Footnote 64, early-modern Scholastics have tended to restrict certitudo to the subjective attitude of the mind which firmly adheres to a proposition without any possibility of doubtFootnote 65, as opposed to the objective ‘motives’ that yield this attitude. The property of a proposition provoking a certain ‘clear and distinct’ judgment was then called ‘evidence’ (evidentia), instead of certitude (Descartes’ regula veritatis), and Austin says that such a clear and distinct perception ‘forces the assent in an invincible way’ (invincibiliter rapiat assensum)Footnote 66. This distinction between objective evidence and subjective certitude was a typical Jesuit doctrine: and Austin is here clearly in line with the Scholastic tradition of the Society which defined evidence as certitude plus clarity and distinction stemming from its object. This leads Austin to distinguish further between objective and formal evidence, using a propositional language: the realm of evidence is constituted by sets of ‘evident’ propositions, where objective evidence will express the necessary relationship between the terms of the proposition, and formal evidence the act of judgment which is necessitated by this relationship:
Evidence is either objective or formal. Objective evidence is the relationship (habitudo) of one term with the other; formal evidence is the clear and distinct perception of this relationship. Formal evidence comes either from a true or direct judgment, either from a rational or reflexive judgment. The first corresponds to the immediate perception of the relationship (habitudo) between two terms, for instance when I say ‘human being is rational’; the second is the immediate perception of the relationship between two or more judgments, as for instance when I say ‘I think therefore I am’Footnote 67
Medieval Scholastic authors often referred to these ‘evident’ propositions as per se nota, ‘known by themselves’, i.e. propositions of which the knowledge of the definition of the term would immediately entail a true assent to the proposition itself – and the medieval example of an analytic proposition such as homo est animal rationale is still used by Austin to illustrate a ‘true and direct judgment’. In a later paragraph, he also gives geometrical and mathematical axioms: totum est maius sua parte, bis duo dant quatuor (Austin, PPP, p. 58), classical Scholastic examples of ‘evident’ propositions provoking metaphysical certitude, still used by many influential Jesuit logic courses of the previous centuryFootnote 68. What is striking and somewhat original in Austin's presentation, is the unproblematic use he makes of a classical Cartesian proposition, or more exactly of a Cartesian inference (cogito ergo sum) in order to illustrate the formal evidence of a reflexive judgment. Obviously, he was certainly not the first to do so: secular college professors in Paris had already associated Aristotelian and Cartesian axioms in their definition of certitude since the 1670sFootnote 69, but it took time to be fully accepted by Jesuit authors to make the same use, and it does not appear in any of the classical printed courses that were used in France, only in manuscript notes.
Austin's post-Aristotelian endeavour is even more clearly illustrated in his presentation of the second source of metaphysical certitude, namely conscientia. Certitude is here not produced by a judgment of evident propositions, but by an ‘interior sentiment (sensus interior) which testifies what happens within our soul and thereby signifies the existence of modifications of the soul.’Footnote 70 This definition of conscientia corresponds to what is rendered in English as ‘consciousness’, rather than ‘conscience’. The complex process which led to use a term initially dedicated to speak of the practical intuition of right and wrong (the Patristic synderesis) to label the internal acts of the mind has been well documentedFootnote 71. Austin's Latin is here clearly in line with this new understanding of conscientia as self-awareness, and its remote source is once more the Malebranchian definition of conscience, which had been a common staple of Jesuit learning since its integration into the Dictionnaire de Trévoux in 1704Footnote 72. It is interesting to see Austin clearly differentiate consciousness from evidence as two different sources of metaphysical certitude, whereas earlier Scholastic secular authors simply associated them under the name evidenceFootnote 73. Within the Society of Jesus, enshrining the sensus intimus or interior as a source of metaphysical certitude had already a long history, even anterior to its popularization in the vernacular Traité des premières vérités (1724) by the Parisian Jesuit Claude Buffier SJ (1661–1737)Footnote 74 – who is not mentioned by Austin. Unlike Buffier, Austin does not restrict the object of this intimate sentiment or feeling to the awareness of one's existence, but opts for a more reflexive approach: we do not primarily perceive our existence, but the ‘modifications of our soul’, such as thought (cogitatio), pain (dolor) and joy (laetitia) (Austin, PPP, p. 68). These modifications resist divine intervention, they are ‘mine’ in such a certain way that they can produce absolute certitude.

The double criterion of evidence and consciousness, as sources of metaphysical certitude, can be found in several other later courses, both within and outside the Jesuit traditionFootnote 75. The result of Austin's discussion of degrees of certitude – summarized in the above graph – is a peculiar blend of late medieval vocabulary with early-modern Cartesian and Malebranchian insights. From the late medieval Scholastic tradition, he takes seriously the idea that certitude does not need to be absolute, but admits degrees; from the early-modern philosophical tradition, he looks at certitude from the point of view of the mental acts of the thinking and feeling mind. By putting these Regulae veritatis at the core of his general introduction to philosophy, one can also understand how his entire logic course is organized, and how it departs from the late medieval tradition. The proper object of early-modern Scholastic logic are not terms and inferences, as in late medieval terminist logic, but mental concepts, called perceptions or ideas, mental judgments about them (iudicia), and finally reasonings associating judgments (discursus and methodus)Footnote 76. Ideas (or ‘perceptions’) can be clear and distinct, or obscure and confused; judgments can be metaphysically, physically or just morally certain. No trace of Austin's metaphysics course survives, but we can be pretty sure that its object and method can be deduced from what he says in the introduction about evidence and consciousness. Since the 1730s, the object of French Jesuit metaphysics courses was not the common being (ens commune) of the classical Suarezian tradition (existence and essence, possibility and actuality), but exclusively ‘spiritual’ or ‘immaterial’ being, including God, the angels, and the human mind (mens). The discussion of metaphysical certitude was therefore essential to provide solid proofs for the existence of the human mind, as separate from the sensory experienceFootnote 77. Austin's course stands clearly in the tradition which ‘psychologized’ both logic and metaphysics within the Scholastic tradition, in a way largely compatible with Port-Royal or the Lockean tradition.
5. Conclusion
Does all this make Austin the ‘first Irish Catholic Cartesian’, as suggested in the title of this study? John Austin was certainly not the first Irish Catholic exiled professor to have embraced various elements of Cartesian and post-Cartesian epistemology. As we have seen, Cartesian and Malebranchian insights had penetrated almost all schools of traditional Scholastic philosophy during the first decades of the eighteenth century. In 1732, another Irish exiled scholar from Prague, the Franciscan Peter Arcedeckne (†1738), claimed that in ‘France and Belgium’, philosophy had become Cartesian, whereas in the rest of Europe, it remained ‘Aristotelian’ (Arcedeckne OFM. Reference Arcedeckne1732, p. 49).Footnote 78 In spite of being schooled in Scotism, Arcedeckne was himself also strongly influenced by French college philosophy, in particular by Dagoumer and Pourchot, and could thus also compete for the title of ‘First Irish Catholic Cartesian’. This shows that we should always be very careful when appreciating Scholastic temporalities: during the ‘Golden Age of Anglo-Irish Philosophy’, even Catholic courses of philosophy did not correspond to the received image of ‘Aristotelian’, ‘Thomistic’ or ‘Scotistic’ textbooks of earlier decades. They all integrated to a various extent innovations that had been developed by non-Scholastic thinkers such as Descartes, Malebranche and Locke. This integration of early-modern philosophy into the textbooks was facilitated by the fact that the classically trained Scholastics such as Austin could recognize, within the philosophy of the ‘Anti-Peripatetics’, a great number of elements that were compatible with the late-medieval tradition. Their discussion of the degrees of certitude perfectly illustrates this possibility, by relating the cogito or the sensus intimus with the traditional Scholastic discussion on the grades of certitude and the knowledge of our interior acts, which goes back to late-medieval Augustinianism.
One may finally argue that there is nothing really ‘Irish’ about Austin's philosophy, and that he is just a typical example of French post-Aristotelian scholasticism. Unlike the Franciscans, who kept a proper Irish Province and greatly contributed to the preservation of the Irish language and the study of its pre-reformation history, the Irish Jesuits were all part of foreign provinces and hierarchies. Once back in Dublin, Austin was not even able to teach Scholastic philosophy, but divided his intellectual activity between lower education and religious preaching. But as a typical representative of the Irish diasporic scholasticism in France – which attracted about three quarters of Irish exiled clerics during the eighteenth century – (Whelan, Reference Whelan2009, p. 310), Austin's integration of modern philosophy and traditional scholasticism has nevertheless contributed to shaping the intellectual identity of Irish Catholic culture. One of Austin's most prominent students in Dublin was the young Patrick John Plunkett (1738–1828), who would follow his master's footsteps and acquire further philosophical and theological education in Paris, before being consecrated bishop of Meath (1779). This strong French predicament explains why so many themes typical of the French brand of the Catholic Enlightenment could later be found back in Dublin as well as in the curriculum of Saint Patrick's College in Maynooth – almost exclusively staffed by Irish returnees from France and exiled French clergymen fleeing the RevolutionFootnote 79. The scholastic language of ‘rules of truth’, of degrees of certitude, of ‘objective and formal’ evidence, etc. became a hallmark of the very rationalistic philosophical education that would survive well into the nineteenth century and even beyond in the tradition of Catholic seminariesFootnote 80.
