OVERVIEW OF THE NETWORKING: TRANSMUTATION, CONFLUENCE, AND COOPERATION

In growing ways and quantities international organized crime and terrorist groups share composition, organization, operation, roles and activities (Wang Reference Wang2010).

Generally, national security and crime and terrorism experts agree about the elements that have created and support this worrisome phenomenon. This dynamic began with the fall of the Soviet Union and the consequent drop in state sponsorship by the Soviet Union and its allies. This obliged terrorist groups to look for and find other sources for funds and material support (Dishman Reference Dishman2001).

This dynamic grew quickly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) events. Many countries, including the United States, have attempted to address it, a bit slowed down by the complexity and novelty of the situation. Several agencies of the American government have been assigned with pursuing several groups in all regions of the world, stopping the flow of funds into their coffers, and attempting to involve many other nations in counterterrorism efforts (US Center for Defense Information 2002).

The United States have applied strong pressure on various countries to stop charities from supporting terrorists financially, and has taken punitive steps on both governments and charitable organizations that have not yet stopped these activities (Goodstein Reference Goodstein2003).

As it can be expected, to replace these now missing funds and financial help, terrorist groups have been exploring other sources of financing.

Some of them have established “in-house” criminal capabilities in order to generate revenue. Very often these branches then connect with organized crime groups to set in motion the money flow needed to satisfy their financial and operational needs (Clarke and Lee Reference Clarke and Lee2008). In some cases more than others, the financial needs of the terrorist groups take precedence over their political stance and justify these groups either imitating or becoming allies of organized crime outfits that have a demonstrated track record of successfully planning and carrying out illegal cross-border activities for a considerable period of time (Benson and Becker Reference Benson and Becker2010). This is almost a perfect match: terrorist groups most often receive help from other parties to facilitate their activities; on the other hand, organized crime groups exist and operate every day to produce revenue by means of criminal operations (Makarenko Reference Makarenko2004).

In some parts of the world organized crime is so firmly established and the government is so corrupt that investigation, arrest and prosecution are simply not possible or, at a minimum, a very secondary preoccupation (McCulloch and Pickering Reference McCulloch and Pickering2005).

However, transnational organized crime does not always obtain the sponsorship of a particular state or territorial protection. Thus, it has had to structure itself virtually in order to exist and operate. This organizational approach constitutes a very good model for terrorist groups characterized by cells that are evolving and loosely defined (Levi Reference Levi, Maguire, Morgan and Reiner2007).

Actually, even terrorist groups that are supported by a state, like, for example, Hezbollah that collects significant subventions from Iran, are stepping up their dependence on transnational criminal ventures to sustain their operations and to increase their operational capacities. Also abundant income when terrorist groups may control a certain geographical area, like “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) did for a time over the oilfields and the antiquities of Iraq (Hawramy, Mohammed, and Harding Reference Hawramy, Mohammed and Harding2014; Cox Reference Cox2015), can vanish when they lose that territory as has happened in great part with ISIS.

The US Drug Enforcement Agency has linked nineteen foreign terrorist organizations to the global drug trade, and believes that up to 60% of such organizations are connected with illegal narcotics trade. Those outfits are all vying for a piece of one of the most money-making illicit trades on the planet that, according to the UN world drug report, produces $400 billion annually.

The Al Qaeda Diamond Trail in West Africa is another example of the spread, sophistication, and reach of terrorism financial operations (Farah Reference Farah2004). This nefarious alliance can be readily grasped if we keep in mind that terrorists and traffickers have analogous logistical requirements as to materials and the clandestine movement of goods, people, and money and having to generate income. Both groups have understood that good relationships between them are beneficial to both (Evans 2017). Trafficking drugs not only produces funds for terrorist organizations, but importantly also boosts their strategic objectives. For example, some groups believe that they not only will make money but at the same time they can incapacitate their enemies by inundating their communities with addictive drugs. On the other hand, drug traffickers gain from the terrorists’ military knowledge, skills and fighting experience, access to weapons supply, and connections with covert entities. Additionally, drug traffickers may also substantially enhance their agility of movement when they act along with terrorists who control in varying degrees large swaths of territory (Farah Reference Farah, Miklaucic and Brewer2007). The same dynamics apply to the big migration phenomena that we have and are still witnessing in the Mediterranean when terrorists in Chad, Northern Nigeria, and neighboring countries may be enticing or forcing people to migrate in cooperation with organized crime. The latter, in turn, in Libya or other countries, takes care for a hefty fee of their transportation into the European Union (EU) and then also of the “welcoming” programs of housing, food, settlement, winning contracts with the state through fictitious entities and/or counting on corruption, thus generating enormous earnings allegedly described by the Italian mafia as being much more substantial than moving and selling cocaine (Politi Reference Politi2015). The reported growing and ruthless presence of Nigerian organized crime in Italy, especially controlling both male and female forced prostitution, is an illustration of how this unholy alliance of terrorism and organized crime (O’Brien Reference O’Brien2012) can manage and control an international project spanning thousands of kilometres, a sea crossing, and the logistics of living in a new country. Recall the 270 kidnapped Chibok school girls in Northern Nigeria in 2014 and another of 110 schoolgirls in the northeastern town of Dapchi in February 2018 (Matchfess Reference Matchfess2018) (In the latter case, the Muslim schoolgirls, the majority in the group, were returned following negotiations with the Nigerian government. The Christian schoolgirls were not, unless they renounced their faith.) According to reports, thousands of other girls have been kidnapped from schools, markets, through raids on villages and houses and on public transportation (BBC 2018). No doubt several of them may have been handed over to organized crime for transport to Europe for prostitution purposes. Recent investigations by the Italian police have revealed the presence in Italy of many Nigerian gangs like the Black Axe, the Vikings, the Buccaneers, the Eiye and the Maphites (Kington Reference Kington2016). With the arrival of these organized crime groups, the official number of Nigerian women arriving in Italy as refugees increased dramatically, from 1,454 in 2014 to 10,624 in 2017 (Kington Reference Kington2016).

According to the International Organization for Migration, 80% of them are forced into prostitution (News Agency of Nigeria 2017). It is estimated that in Italy alone up to 30,000 Nigerian women are coerced to prostitute themselves (CBS News 2017). Many of them are minors (News Agency of Nigeria 2017). The Nigerian organized crime groups also operate in several other European countries, especially France, Germany, Belgium, and even Russia (Damon, Swails, and Laine Reference Damon, Swails and Laine2018).

The fact that the Nigerian women forced into sex work in Italy are quite young gives credence to the link between terrorist groups kidnapping schoolgirls and organized crime taking over, transporting and controlling them in Europe (Conant Reference Conant2014; Squires Reference Squires2017). The financial proceeds are most likely shared with Boko Haram or similar groups. The heavy involvement of Italian organized crime in programs funded by the government and also by the EU to receive the migrants and resettle them no doubt facilitates and fuels these sordid arrangements (Väyrynen Reference Väyrynen2003; Ford Reference Ford2017; Tory-Murphy Reference Tory-Murphy2018).

Similar dynamics also existed in the Balkans in the aftermath of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and more recently also with migration from the Middle East into the EU. In these cases terrorists may consider massive immigration of Moslems into the EU as weakening the cultural and religious roots of Europe, thus generating a more benign attitude and evaluation of their extremist views and activities; creating a favorable cover for establishing cells to carry out terrorist activities as did happen in many EU countries, especially France and Belgium; sharpening divisions along religious and ethnic lines; and ultimately acquiring considerable political power.

WHAT FACTORS EXPEDITE AND PROMOTE THE LINKS?

There are many other justifications and openings to facilitate and even encourage terrorist organizations to participate in typical organized crime actions as an important source of financial gains (Dishman Reference Dishman2005), or to search for ties and apportioning with organized crime entities (Antonoglu Reference Antonoglu2018).

The most powerful of them is globalization. The increasing globalization we are witnessing facilitates and even forces transformation and convergence by means of fast communication, travel, surveillance, and access to information. The existence and even the increasing number of weak or failing states strengthens this penchant (Dishman Reference Dishman2005).

The lack of the rule of law, in the past or present or at varying times, in areas such as Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and certain African countries provides the ideal environment for the interfusion of criminal and terrorist networks and activities (Steinberger Reference Steinberger2003). Shaky or faltering economies in many of these countries beget corruption and the trafficking of illicit goods, and there is little motivation, ability and mechanisms to counteract organized crime. Terrorist groups who under different circumstances might receive donations or even manage “legitimate” businesses, in these situations have little or no access to either one. Then, trafficking and other types of crime emerge as tempting and almost effortless alternatives (Roth and Sever Reference Roth and Sever2007). A pervasive criminal adroitness becomes an essential approach to support the organization.

The connection between terrorism and organized crime is made easier by the international arms market and the abundant availability especially of small and light arms that can be either trafficked for money or used in carrying out terror activities (Burkhardt Reference Burghardt2008; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017b).

For example, after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, great quantities of weapons became available in former Warsaw Pact nations. Many of them were funneled to the illegal arms market. Major lucrative opportunities for a constantly growing arms trade have been and are offered by chronic conflicts in many regions of the world. Examples are the Former Yugoslavia, West Africa, East Timor, Central, South, and Southwest Asia, Central America (Farah Reference Farah2013), Colombia and the Middle East. At times even major countries took part with the Iran Contra or Iran Gate, for a time covert operation, as one of its best examples.

The arms trade, providing substantial income for terrorist and organized crime groups, was facilitated by permeable and poorly defended borders and high levels of corruption among police officers, also poorly trained and paid, in several areas of the world.

The above trends and propitious situations have incentivized groups such as al Qaeda and its variants and Hezbollah to develop their own in-house criminal abilities (Helfstein and Solomon Reference Helfstein and Solomon2014).

They also branched out and varied their manner of acting. As an example, Hezbollah has particularly specialized in methamphetamine laboratories and in the contraband of cigarettes in the United States and Canada. Al Qaeda instead has expanded its connections with criminal outfits in Central Asia, especially traffickers in opium in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Felbab-Brown Reference Felbab-Brown2017). The same is true of the Taliban (Peters Reference Peters2009).

Colombia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), however, best exemplifies the operational link between international organized crime and terrorism. Some terrorist groups also resort to typical white-collar crimes like swindling people, especially the elderly, out of their money or using stolen credit cards (O’Neill Reference O’Neill2003; Martin and Spillett Reference Martin and Spillett2015).

The FARC’s association with the narcotics trade advanced from simple taxation to direct control of production and distribution (Otis Reference Otis2014). Financial gains from trafficking made it possible for the FARC to obtain advanced weaponry and telecommunications and to take control of 40% of the area in Colombia in the course of their warfare against the government there (Acosta Reference Acosta2016).

An area where terrorism and crime have found a very attractive opportunity for symbiosis and lucrative opportunities is maritime piracy.

Maritime piracy represents a field where terrorism and crime have an excellent opportunity for operational partnership and confluence. This has had serious negative repercussions for global military and economic safety. Taking into account the large numbers of terrorist cells, the strong pre-existing maritime criminality and the vast sea area with multiple sea lanes, it is not surprising that Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India, Somalia and Nigeria are the regions with the highest frequency of maritime piracy attacks. Particularly worrisome is the fact that criminals and terrorists not only steal high-profit cargoes, but can also take control of lethal cargoes such as chemicals, gas, arms, and specialized dual-use equipment (Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce Reference Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce2014).

Especially vulnerable and centrally important are waterways like the Straits of Malacca, the Suez and Panama canals, or oil commerce-intense traffic places like Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura terminal (Young and Valencia Reference Young and Valencia2003). A successful hijacking and, even worse, sinking of a ship there would have disastrous repercussions (Teo Reference Teo2007).

The enormous tankers that ply these waters are staffed by a minimal crew, thirty or fewer, and there are no significant armed and trained guards to discourage raiding pirates. A supertanker sunk in one of these places could unleash major economic problems. Tracking down suspect or hijacked vessels can be quite a challenge especially because the registration and/or documentation of ships are not trustworthy due to corrupt and fraudulent practices. Somali pirates have been very active and successful in this business. Al-Shabab, or “the Youth,” an Islamist insurgent group based in Somalia which still constitutes a significant challenge in the area, has profited handsomely from ties with piracy, kidnapping and other racketeering activities like charcoal (despite a United Nations ban) and sugar smuggling (Musandu Reference Musandu2011; Leuprecht and Hall Reference Leuprecht and Hall2013; Council on Foreign Relations 2018).

Another example of how deeply the lines between crime and terrorism are overlapping has been the kidnapping of Westerners for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf Group, also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Philippines Province, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front operating in Mindanao, Philippines. In the United States, terrorist organizations and their factions have designed different mechanisms to generate considerable gains by means of illegal enterprises (Hutchinson and O’Malley Reference Hutchinson and O’Malley2007).

For example, in Detroit, a follower of Hezbollah was illegally shipping low-tax cigarettes from North Carolina for reselling them in high-tax Michigan, with net earnings in the tens of thousands of dollars (Emerson Reference Emerson2007). A similar scheme was used in North Carolina, where the Lebanese-born brothers Mohammed Yousef Hammoud and Chawki Hammoud sold cigarettes illegally and then used the earnings to purchase and ship to Hezbollah specialized military equipment like night-vision goggles, mine detection instruments, laser range finders, blasting caps, and other tightly controlled military hardware (Emerson Reference Emerson2007). According to Chris Swecker, Assistant Director (retired), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Investigative Criminal Division: “This case is significant because of the breathtaking organizational depth of sophistication, scope and reach of this group, their military training and the ease with which they manipulated the U.S. financial system” (Swecker Reference Swecker2006).

Actually, in the United States, when it comes to the amount of consumer expenditure on illegal goods, illegal cigarette smuggling is second only to narcotics (Levitt Reference Levitt, Giraldo and Trinkunas2005). The most common and rentable wellspring of earnings for terrorist groups still is the narcotics industry. They vindicate their criminal activities by underlining the financial exigencies of the organization and, additionally, the destructive impact of narcotics in undermining Western society. As is well documented, Hezbollah members and their supporters are much engaged in illegal methamphetamine production and distribution (Chalk Reference Chalk2000).

This was revealed when the US Drug Enforcement Administration in its Operation Mountain Express arrested many persons (Krikorian Reference Krikorian2002).

The symbiosis between terrorist groups and organized crime is fueling the worrisome growth in the cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan after the Taliban regime was toppled in December 2001. In 2017 there was an 87% increase in production compared to 2016, according to the 2017 Afghanistan Opium Survey of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017a; also see Bewley-Taylor Reference Bewley-Taylor2013).

The most frequently used, most moneymaking enterprise of organized crime adopted by various terrorist groups is drug trafficking. Groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al Qaeda, and Hezbollah have all been quite involved in this area.

Moreover, terror organizations have become involved in several types of crimes ranging from minor thievery to excavating and trading so-called conflict or blood diamonds in the African continent and internationally (Badi Reference Badi2017).

JUNCTIONS AND INTERCHANGES

There are many organizational and operational parallels and overlaying undertakings between organized crime and terror groups (Anderson Reference Anderson2000; Calvani Reference Calvani2001; Dishman Reference Dishman2001; Makarenko Reference Makarenko2003; Picarelli Reference Picarelli2012):

• Both generally act rationally.

• Both utilize considerable, even excessive, violence and the menace of reprisals and revenge.

• Both oftentimes practise kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion.

• Both generally operate in secret. Sometimes they may operate publicly in friendly territory.

• Both are antagonistic to the state and the rule of law (except when the state is the sponsor).

• For a member to leave either group is uncommon and, if done, often with fatal consequences.

• Both constitute an asymmetrical threat for the United States and other countries.

• Both have leaders and trained operatives in reserve, should the group be “decapitated” by competitors, law enforcement or the military.

• Both furnish and support social and welfare services. Terrorist groups do it much more frequently than organized crime.

The truck bombings of the Embassy of Israel and of the Jewish Cultural Affairs Center in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 are a valuable illustration of the convergence of terrorism, state support, and the mafia.

Iranian-supported Hezbollah members were the material authors. They staged their attack in the “Triple Frontier,” the region where three countries Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet, not far from the Iguazu waterfalls and still known today for being quite a lawless area. Outfits like Hezbollah, Hamas and Gamaa al Islamiyah have established themselves in this region well known for illegal activities and markets, and especially for money laundering and trafficking in drugs.

According to Argentine intelligence officials, the trucks and the explosives utilized in these bombings were acquired and assembled in the Triple Frontier area, and then transferred to the capital of Argentina, with the help of the criminal net (Filkins Reference Filkins2015).

Both organized crime and terrorist groups can be found and operate in the same outlaw circles, needing and using the same instruments, like false identification, false shipping documents, same operators, transportation nets, and counter-surveillance (Cox Reference Cox2015). In these dynamics, often it is terrorist outfits starting to launch their income-producing activities that come into contact (and this can at times be hostile) with organized crime already well rooted and with stable flows of revenue.

There are other examples of partnership between terrorists and organized crime (Curtis and Karacan Reference Curtis and Karacan2002). A well-known one is the technical assistance provided by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to the FARC in Colombia to build gas-cylinder bombs (Cusack Reference Cusack2015) and other urban warfare tools that had been tested and used in Northern Ireland. According to security experts, some of this assistance is a “one-off,” a temporary, one-time or one-project alliance designed for a specific operation or need (Horgan and Taylor Reference Horgan and Taylor1999; Morris Reference Morris2001).

DIVERGING DIRECTIONS

Not all is easy and smooth for criminal and terrorist groups getting closer and sharing strategies, tactics, and resources. There are major stumbling blocks to reach deeper synergy.

First of all, there are considerable cultural, operational, and pragmatic dissimilarities between the two groups. Normally, organized crime groups are not based on religious or ideological tenets, while the very foundations of terrorist groups like al Qaeda or Hamas are religious beliefs and inspiration (Benson and Becker Reference Benson and Becker2010).

For example, a keen objective of many terrorist groups is to defenestrate secular and corrupt leaders. The extremist and puritanical regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan is an example. However, on the other side, the very existence of these corrupt leaders is central to the survival and activities of most organized crime groups.

There is, of course, potential for confluence between the two camps, based on the relative gains for each side from consolidated operations while maintaining at the same time operational security (Hutchinson and O’Malley Reference Hutchinson and O’Malley2007). However, important differences make it hard to attain a stable mutually beneficial arrangement. For example, organized crime groups want and need to operate in secrecy, under the radar. They do not look for or seek the limelight. Once they find or reach a good fit, they conservatively want to maintain the status quo—that is, to keep the system set up to their benefit. On the contrary, terrorists normally want media coverage for maximum impact of their exploits, while organized criminals eschew it. Additionally, terrorists often hasten to assert authorship of their actions, while organized criminals do not (Dishman Reference Dishman2001).

Another major difference is that crime syndicates, for example, build, cultivate and maintain systemic arrangements for illegal transportation; bribe or threaten customs officials, politicians, judges, police and intelligence officials, and, especially in the case of failed states, they have in some cases even reached some form of understanding with a host country. It has been said they have even “bought” small countries, as was rumored of some Caribbean island.

However, adopting this modus operandi would be quite risky for al Qaeda or Hezbollah leaders and financiers. They would most likely quickly appear on the radar of law enforcement and intelligence and be targeted. This is especially perilous taking into account the strong pressure that the United States (and other countries) place on other nations to join the global war on terrorism (Ryan, Gowen, and Morello Reference Ryan, Gowen and Morello2018). Many countries that might otherwise turn a blind eye to organized crime, on the contrary feel compelled to go after terrorists, even though the long-term sustainability of such US pressure may be questionable.

Another key differential is the reason why, the motive, the incentive. Generally, terrorist groups want to be included politically; are looking for reparation for their grievances, or the complete regime destruction. Organized crime syndicates instead want favorable business environments, avoiding upheavals and crises. In other words, ideology, religion and politics are the bedrock of most terrorist groups, while pure profit spurs criminal organizations (All Answers 2017).

Another important divergence is that terror groups are more inserted, mimetized into the community. Thus, they blur the difference between “terrorist” and “freedom fighter.” This is especially true when the terrorist group is socially engaged in and provides social, educational or medical services to the community or advocates on its behalf.

In this respect, ironically, terrorist groups can at times vie with the official government for popular support and recognition. One can think of Hamas versus Al Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (Flanigan Reference Flanigan2006). Organized crime normally does not do that, at least openly. However, there are some cases when major drug traffickers, for example, have committed some of their earnings to provide needed services for their community. An example is Pablo Escobar, a major Colombian drug lord (Long Reference Long1988; Bowley Reference Bowley2013). Also, terrorist groups are by and large less discriminating about whom is victimized by their activities (e.g. bombing a crowded market) in contrast to organized crime that normally targets specific individuals (Williams Reference Williams2012).

There is versatility too. Criminal groups may use terrorism as a “tactic,” while criminal activity may be necessary on a continuous basis for terror groups that do not have sufficient funding. Consequently, in reality, there exists a stronger probability that terror organizations will become hybrid outfits. Criminal groups, instead, limit attacks of a terrorist type only if and when it is needed. However, even if terrorists and criminals do not join into an alliance, some may mutate into true hybrids (Makarenko Reference Makarenko2004). It is reasonable to anticipate the possibility that we will soon see or discover in operation international criminal–terrorist cartels that dwarf the Colombian and Mexican cartels and the al Qaedas/ISIS of today. The celebration of the demise of ISIS may be premature. These multinationals could even attain political influence and enough power to take over weak or “uncooperative” states. The reported secret and silent manipulation of the US 2016 elections vastly influencing voters and exacerbating divisions among Americans could be used by terror and organized crime hybrids to gain control of a country, cause a split and demands for autonomy and independence and create favorable legal conditions for conducting their nefarious activities (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi Reference Mostafa and Al-Hamdi2007).

THE COUNTER REPLY

Many countries are presently fighting solid threats to their well being on two fronts: terrorism and organized crime. Theoretically, since the two are allies or imitate each other, it would be advantageous for governments to evaluate and take into account what we have grasped from fighting each one of them (Knox Reference Knox2012).

Actually, though, the peril is constantly fluctuating and mutating. For example, both organized crime and terrorist groups are taking stock from their past blunders while at the same time also probing and testing the latest defense tactics adopted by threatened nations. They are regularly testing the slow, state and geographically focused responses to their asymmetrical, supple, quickly changing tactics and approaches. While hierarchical governance is used by some terrorist groups, especially those with a military structure, the prevalent structure now is cell-based, local, and amorphous, like that of al Qaeda, with considerable power and authority in the hands of autonomous or semi-autonomous groups operating in dozens of countries. This makes it more difficult to combat these groups (Mullins, Wither, and Monaco Reference Mullins, Wither and Monaco2016).

Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are under great pressure to pinpoint and eliminate cell-based and horizontally organized terror and organized crime franchises (US Department of Justice 2008). This, however, demands considerably deeper and current local intelligence than what is presently at hand and a sharper analysis of situations, political and cultural trends, modus operandi and financing. Unfortunately, the record to date of the efforts of many countries, including the United States, aimed at eliminating drug and people trafficking does not translate easily and well into ways to stopping terror groups also involved in the drug trade (Kenney Reference Kenney2003).

EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL INTERVENTIONS

There have been a number of officially engineered initiatives seeking to effectively understand and combat organized crime and terrorism (Bibes Reference Bibes2001). As an example, the Southeastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center, its Regional Cooperation Council and the Southeast Europe Law Enforcement Center based in Bucharest, Romania support common trans-border crime fighting efforts of member countries. The SECI Center has an Anti-Terrorism Task Force assisting member states neutralize the link of organized crime and terrorism. This vividly reflects how the phenomenon of transformation and convergence between terrorism and organized crime has metastasized in the Balkans. Since the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia and other countries in the region have turned into a major conduit of people and smuggled goods originating in several areas of the Middle East and Africa directed to Western Europe (Van Duyne etal. Reference Van Duyne, Jager, von Lampe and Newell2004).

A combination of weak economies, at times corrupt governments, poorly equipped and organized border protection favored a quick and effective operational connection between organized crime and terrorism in that part of the world.

Awareness of human trafficking has grown in recent years as stories and photographs of women and children in the tens of thousands have crossed this region, often forced into prostitution (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2012). Lamentably, human trafficking in its various forms has not been rapidly recognized by many leaders both in the United States and in Europe as part of a larger, more complex security challenge. The same car or truck crossing the Balkans with women from Eastern Europe destined to prostitution could just as well be carrying drugs, a nuclear shell, precursor materials for weapons of mass destruction, or some motivated terrorists.

Other organizations tackling the links between organized crime and terrorism are the UNODC through its Global Program on Terrorism and against Transnational Organized Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) based in Lyon, France and its Fusion Task Force.

In general, terrorist and organized crime outfits react more rapidly and with greater flexibility and capacity of adaptation than governments and multilateral organizations. Thus, they are often well in front and ahead of the authorities (Goodman Reference Goodman2015).

Just as the walls separating organized crime and terrorism have been downsized or eliminated, so should those between law enforcement and intelligence and even between intelligence agencies be eliminated as the United States learned was urgently needed after the September 11 tragedy (Hillison and Isaacson Reference Hillison and Isaacson2016).

This mission, however, is easier said than done in a combat area. Counterterrorism activities have political and practical requirements that can constitute obstacles to impair the connection linking organized crime and terrorism.

On the battlefield, this task has proven to be easier said than done. This is because the political and practical demands of tactical counterterrorism operations can stand in the way of breaking the link between organized crime and terrorism. The US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan have become quite aware of this (Rollins and Wyler Reference Rollins and Wyler2013). For example, the mission in Afghanistan against the Taliban and some new incarnation of al Qaeda or ISIS depends considerably on the goodwill and information provided by local strongmen and warlords. They are also those involved in the poppy fields and in the opium/heroin production and smuggling them abroad, thus producing their wealth (Meredith, Villarreal, and Wilkinson Reference Meredith, Villarreal and Wilkinson2010). Some of that money may also be shared with the Taliban (Bewley-Taylor Reference Bewley-Taylor2013). Destroying poppy fields and burning down opium warehouses would not be a good move to obtain cooperation and intelligence from the local people on the Taliban and other terrorist groups (Costa Reference Costa2008). On the other hand, turning a blind eye to narcotics production and smuggling may come back to haunt NATO and the United States some day soon, especially if a terror group and its allies will take control of the business, thus joining once more terrorism and organized crime.