Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (also commonly known as De Interpretatione) was translated into several ancient languages, including Armenian, Latin and Syriac. The Armenian version of the text, together with a translation of the Categories, was formerly attributed to David the Invincible, a Neoplatonic philosopher of the Alexandrian school of Olympiodorus (sixth century) about whom little is known. This attribution has been questioned on various grounds and the Armenian translation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias is now generally considered an anonymous work. It was composed in the style of the so-called Hellenizing School (Yunaban Dproc’) and described by the English scholar F.C. Conybeare as ‘little more than Greek written with Armenian words’.Footnote 1 Although such a translation is difficult to understand without a proper grasp of Greek, it is of inestimable value for establishing the Greek text on which it is based. Indeed, the Armenian translation, which is contemporary with Boethius’ translation and the anonymous Syriac translation, is older than all the medieval manuscripts containing the Greek text of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias.Footnote 2
In some of the most recent manuscripts, the translation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias is followed by a complete commentary on its fourteen chapters. In the majority of manuscripts, though, the translation is divided into several parts (lemmata) and intertwined with the commentary so as to form a unique whole.Footnote 3 Owing to the style in which it was composed, it is not known for certain whether the commentary was originally written in Armenian or translated from Greek. The exact date of its redaction is also unknown. Its link with the Armenian translation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias suggests an early date (sixth century or earlier), as do many other factors such as its style, the originality of its structure and the absence of any references suggesting Christian authorship. Moreover, the author of the commentary is not known for sure. Some manuscripts contain the name of David, others that of a certain ‘Amelaxos’ (in which some scholars have seen a deformation of ‘Amphilochius’ or ‘Iamblichus’),Footnote 4 while others do not name the commentator. What is certain, however, is that the commentary was composed by someone highly familiar with Greek culture who had access, directly or indirectly, to Aristotelian treatises and Platonic dialogues not known to have been translated into Armenian.
Since few ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias have survived in their entirety, the anonymous Armenian commentary represents an important source of information for both the study of ancient philosophy and the history of its reception. Yet the commentary has never been translated into any modern language nor studied from a philosophical point of view. In the following pages, I intend to remedy this situation by presenting a general analysis of its structure and by studying the content of its first chapter from a comparative philosophical standpoint (an original translation will also be given in an Appendix). My intentions are not to solve the mystery surrounding the authorship or dating of the anonymous Armenian commentary but rather to situate it within the rich ancient exegetical tradition based on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias. By comparing it with the other commentaries written on the subject, we will be in a better place to judge the context in which it was composed and thus its provenance. As we shall see, a comparative analysis will reveal that the anonymous Armenian commentary was indeed written in the tradition of late antique Greek commentaries. However, its author was probably not affiliated with the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria or associated with late Neoplatonism. In fact, the anonymous commentator shared common ground with Alexander of Aphrodisias and Boethius (who admittedly followed Porphyry, a representative of early Neoplatonism), thus suggesting that the commentary may be older than previously thought or anterior to all the other commentaries preserved to this day.
STRUCTURE AND STYLE
In its modern edition published in 2016 by Aram Topchyan,Footnote 5 the Armenian commentary is presented in a bipartite fashion: the segmented translation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias is provided first, preceded by the term ‘Text’ (բան), and then follows an explanation of the text, preceded by the term ‘Interpretation’ (մեկնութիւն). The entire commentary—and thus the complete translation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias—is segmented into forty-one sections, called ‘chapters’ (or ‘lectures’ [պրակք]). These forty-one sections are further divided into four main chapters (also called պրակք):
1) chapter 1, separated in four parts, covers the first chapter of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (16a1–18) and has no specific title;
2) chapter 2, divided into two parts, encompasses the second chapter of Aristotle's text (16a19–16b5) and is entitled ‘On noun’;
3) chapter 3, separated in four parts, covers the third chapter of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (16b6–25) and is entitled ‘On verb’;
4) chapter 4, divided into thirty-two parts, encompasses chapters 4 to 14 (16b26–24b9) and is entitled ‘On sentences (բան [λόγος])’.
The division of the Armenian commentary is clearly asymmetrical: the first three chapters cover the first three chapters of the Aristotelian text, whereas the last chapter encompasses no fewer than eleven chapters.
The division of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias into fourteen chapters is a late invention, most likely inherited from medieval times. The Armenian commentary illustrates this point: the way in which Aristotle's translated text is divided reveals that the medieval division of chapters 4 and 5, 5 and 6, 8 and 9, and 12 and 13 was still not fixed at the time the Armenian commentary was written or translated. Indeed, the anonymous commentator discusses 16b33–17a15 (chaps. 4 and 5), 17a23–37 (chaps. 5 and 6), 18a12–33 (chaps. 8 and 9) and 21b33–22a31 (chaps. 12 and 13) as if they were lemmata of a continuous text that could not be further divided. Such a segmentation, which has not been observed in other commentaries, could point to an ancient division of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias predating the Middle Ages or even Late Antiquity.
Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, the oldest commentary on the subject that has been preserved in its entirety, has had a major influence on the way in which Aristotle's text was divided in Late Antiquity and medieval times. Ammonius divides the Peri Hermeneias into five parts (κεφάλαια or τμήματα): 1) 16a1–17a37 (chaps. 1–6); 2) 17a38–19b19 (chaps. 6–10); 3) 19b19–21a33 (chaps. 10–11); 4) 21a34–23a26 (chaps. 12–13); 5) 23a27–24b9 (ch. 14). Such a division was followed not only by authors of the Alexandrian School such as Stephanus but also by Syriac (Proba, George of the Arabs [in his translation]), Arabic (Al-Farabi) and Byzantine (Psellus, Gennadius) commentators. As for the Armenian commentary, it does not follow the traditional Alexandrian division of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias into five parts, which may have originated with Ammonius.Footnote 6 This could indicate that the anonymous commentator was not affiliated with the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria, or not influenced by it.
This last hypothesis is further supported by the absence of a proper ‘Neoplatonic’ introduction in the Armenian commentary. Alexandrian Neoplatonic commentators followed strict rules when writing their commentaries on Aristotle's logical treatises. Commentaries pertaining to the Categories, Peri Hermeneias and First Analytics would normally cover six points in their introduction: they would discuss the objective of the treatise (σκοπός), its utility, its authenticity, its place in the Organon, its title and its division into chapters.Footnote 7 As for the Armenian commentary, it contains a brief introduction (thirteen lines), but that is not part of an independent chapter; it is instead presented in the discussion of the first sentence of the Peri Hermeneias (16a1–2) and does not address all the points normally addressed by Alexandrian Neoplatonic commentators.
Some Alexandrian Neoplatonic commentators did not always follow such strict rules of composition. For instance, Stephanus’ commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias has no introduction and starts abruptly with a discussion of the first sentence of Aristotle's text. Despite this, Stephanus is generally considered a member of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria, since his commentary follows Ammonius’ division of the treatise into five parts and Olympiodorus’ division of lectures into λέξις and θεωρία (a division also adopted by David, Elias and Proba, all, most likely, pupils of Olympiodorus). The Armenian commentary thus resembles Stephanus’ commentary since it does not contain a separate introduction, but differs from it in following neither the Ammonian nor the Olympiodoran divisions so common among Alexandrian Neoplatonic commentators. This could again suggest that the anonymous commentator was not affiliated with the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria, or not influenced by its hermeneutical method.
The Armenian commentary also differs from all late antique Greek commentaries written on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in one particular respect: apart from a brief mention of Alexander of Aphrodisias (20b12–30), it names no other commentators nor does it discuss explicitly their interpretative theses. To an extent, it resembles Boethius’ first commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, which mostly adheres to the λέξις of the Aristotelian text and was composed for less advanced students. Similarly, the Armenian commentary seems intended for a public not entirely familiar with Aristotelian logic. Its main objective is to explain the Aristotelian text, not to discuss difficult hermeneutical issues. That said, the anonymous commentator is familiar with the work of other commentators, since he often follows a similar interpretative route. In other words, the Armenian commentary was not written in a cultural or intellectual vacuum. It has strong links with late antique commentaries written on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias but—because of its primary objective, which appears to be similar to modern annotated editions or commented translations intended for a general public or beginner students—it did not position itself explicitly in an interpretative debate indicative of more advanced philosophical teachings.
Unlike most commentaries written by pupils of Ammonius and Olympiodorus, the Armenian commentary does not consist of notes taken in class by students. There is no indication at the beginning of the text that it was written ἀπὸ φωνῆς (‘from the voice of …’). Moreover, it does not appear to be the work of a Christian author. Contrary to commentators such as Stephanus or David, there is no indication in the text that it was written σὺν θεῷ (‘with the help of God’). Unlike Proba, the anonymous commentator also never utilizes examples from the Bible to illustrate logical points.Footnote 8 In fact, the majority of the examples employed are taken from Greek pagan culture. These facts could suggest a pagan rather than a Christian author.
As noted above, it is difficult to establish with certainty whether the commentary was originally written in Greek or in Armenian. The writing style of the commentary suggests a translation: it is slavishly literal and resembles, to repeat Conybeare's words, ‘Greek written with Armenian words’. One example will suffice to illustrate this point. In the Armenian commentary, the author often applies a grammatical rule specific to ancient Greek. This rule, commonly illustrated by the exemplary sentence Τὰ ζῷα τρέχει, stipulates that a verb must be conjugated in the singular if its subject is a neuter-plural noun. Such a rule does not exist in the Armenian language, yet the anonymous commentator uses it several times. This strongly suggests that the commentary was the result of a literal translation from Greek to Armenian. The issue is, however, not settled: it is equally probable that the commentary was originally written in Armenian. For instance, in the commentary on chapter 2, the commentator uses examples from the Armenian language to illustrate the conventional character of language: ‘Greeks say ἄνθρωπος while Armenians say մարդ’. Although such examples could also be the result of an interpolation made by a scribe, a reader or the translator (if the commentary is indeed the product of a translation from Greek to Armenian), they strongly suggest that the commentary was written in Armenian as the commentator explicitly gave an Armenian equivalent to a Greek term. Only a thorough linguistic and philological analysis could settle this issue, which goes beyond the aim and scope of the present study.
The Armenian commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias is thus original in many respects. The analysis of its form suggests that it is probably independent from the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria. Significantly, all the extent commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias that have been preserved in Greek before the Arab conquest were linked to that particular school. As for the commentaries in other ancient languages, they were mostly tributary to the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria or influenced by it. The Armenian commentary could thus shed new light on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias and the history of its interpretation. Moreover, the commentary may have been written before the fifth or sixth century (thus preceding all the other extant commentaries), since it does not seem to be linked with the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria and does contain divisions of the Aristotelian text seemingly predating the Middle Ages or even Late Antiquity.Footnote 9 Last, the absence of a clear influence by the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria suggests that David the Invincible was not its author.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 1
Although Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias was the object of constant exegesis during antiquity and Late Antiquity, few commentaries from that period have been preserved in Greek. The extant commentaries written by Aspasius (second century), Herminus (second century), Alexander of Aphrodisias (second to third century), Porphyry (third century), Iamblichus (third to fourth century), Syrianus (fifth century), Olympiodorus (sixth century) and Philoponus (sixth century) are now lost.Footnote 10 Only the commentaries written by Ammonius (fifth to sixth century), Stephanus (sixth or seventh century?) and the Anonymous of Tarán (sixth or seventh century?) remain in Greek, completed by the Latin commentary of Boethius (sixth century) and the Syriac commentary of Proba (sixth century?).Footnote 11 How does the Armenian commentary compare with them? How can it be situated within the rich ancient exegetical tradition on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias? As we will see, the Armenian commentary shares features with commentaries written during Late Antiquity. However, from a philosophical point of view, it departs more than once from the exegesis of Ammonius and the School of Alexandria while agreeing with Boethius and Alexander of Aphrodisias.Footnote 12 The following comparative analysis will be divided into four parts, corresponding to the four-fold division of the first chapter.
Chapter 1, section 1: Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias 16a1–2Footnote 13
The first chapter begins with a short introduction in which the anonymous commentator (hereafter, the Commentator) tackles the treatise's place in the logical corpus, its objective and how it is divided. From the first sentence onwards, the Commentator informs his readers that he is not a novice: he had already taught or written about logical matters (‘we have said before that the goal of this logical discipline is to arrive at demonstrative syllogisms’ [1.1.1]). Like his peers, he firmly believes that the objective of logic is to master demonstrative syllogism, which is the object of Aristotle's Second Analytics.
The Commentator then presents a list of subjects which any student must master to gain expertise in demonstrative syllogisms. This list mirrors the traditional reading order of the Organon preconized by ancient commentators. To master demonstrative syllogisms, it is necessary to acquire a knowledge of syllogism per se and all the existing types of syllogism. Such a knowledge will not only help to master the demonstrative syllogism but will also avoid errors in reasoning. Moreover, it is necessary to learn about premises or propositions, as syllogisms are composed of them. The first paragraph of the Armenian commentary suggests that the Commentator adheres to the following reading order of the Organon: 1) the Peri Hermeneias, which covers premises or propositions; 2) the First Analytics, which studies what a syllogism is and the various forms it takes; 3) the Second Analytics, which represents the consecration of the logical science, namely demonstration. The Commentator does not discuss the Categories which, according to the traditional reading order, precedes the Peri Hermeneias. Such an omission could be explained by the fact that he already taught or wrote about the Categories, as the first sentence suggests.Footnote 14
The Commentator does not explicitly present the σκοπός of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in his introduction. However, we can infer with great confidence that he believes that the objective of Aristotle's text is to teach propositions or premises (προτάσεις). He defines a πρότασις as a certain statement (λόγος) that is either affirmative or negative, thus following Aristotle's definition given in the First Analytics (24a16–7). However, he does not differentiate between a ‘proposition’ (πρότασις) and an ‘assertion’ (ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος). In fact, he seems to consider the ‘affirmation’, the ‘negation’ and the ‘assertion’ as three forms or components of the ‘proposition’ (‘the affirmation, the negation and the assertion, of which propositions are composed’ [1.1.2]). Ammonius, for his part, considered that the σκοπός of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias was ‘assertions’ rather than ‘propositions’ (4,10–12).
The Commentator concludes his short introduction by dividing Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias according to two major themes. The first concerns ‘discourse (λόγος) and its parts’ or, in other words, ‘what a noun, a verb and a sentence (λόγος) are’. As for the second, it concerns ‘propositions’ (προτάσεις), most precisely the teaching ‘about the affirmation, the negation and the assertion’ (1.1.2). From a thematic point of view, this division corresponds roughly to the Commentator's segmentation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias into four main chapters or sections.Footnote 15 Such a division differs from the one suggested by Ammonius (7,15–8,24).
The Commentator now directs his attention to the first sentence of the Peri Hermeneias and asks the following question: ‘But what is the signification of the first words: First it must be established (Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι [16a1])?’ (1.1.2). He then proceeds to define each of these three terms in a manner setting him apart from all the other commentators. The Commentator first presents two definitions of the term πρῶτον by distinguishing between a particular (‘for some people’ [τις]) and a common (‘for many people’ [πολλοί]) sense. He opts for the common sense, in which πρῶτον means ‘first before all’. Ammonius and Boethius did not comment on the signification of the term πρῶτον. As for Stephanus, he gave five different definitions based on chapter 12 of Aristotle's Categories. None of the meanings given by the Commentator corresponds explicitly to Stephanus’ definitions, which are more technical in nature.
The Commentator next defines the verb δεῖ as ‘it is appropriate’ and distinguishes between two modes of saying, one according to necessity, the other according to utility. In his opinion, δεῖ must be understood according to necessity. Neither Ammonius or Stephanus nor Boethius had bothered analysing this last term. By defining the verb δεῖ, the Commentator demonstrated that he was interested not only in categorematic terms but also—like contemporary scholars—in syncategorematic terms.Footnote 16
The Commentator lastly proceeds to define the term θέσθαι. Predictably, he opts for the same definition as Ammonius and Stephanus (‘to define’), a definition that will be generally accepted by posterior commentators. However, in contrast to Ammonius and Stephanus, he does not use the same list of definitions.Footnote 17 Ammonius and Stephanus present six definitions, five of which are identical. As for the Commentator, he offers only three: ‘the term θέσθαι is said in three ways: [first] when we talk about a place, for instance in this human world or on earth; [second] when we give a noun, since θέσις is also said of the act of naming; [third] when we give a definition’ (1.1.4). The first two definitions are original and cannot be located in other commentaries. In this passage, the Commentator seems to ignore Ammonius’ commentary (on which Stephanus depends) and privileges common definitions over the technical variety. The Commentator concludes this section of the text by reformulating the first part of the Aristotelian sentence according to the results of his linguistic analysis, substituting every term of the sentence by the words he used to define them: ‘We claim that instead of saying first it must be established …, it is obvious [that Aristotle seeks to say]: first before all, it is necessary to define …’ (1.1.4).
After this linguistic excursus, the Commentator tackles a problem also raised by Ammonius, Stephanus and Boethius. This problem concerns the second part of the first Aristotelian sentence: why has Aristotle disposed ‘negation’ (ἀπόφασις), ‘affirmation’ (κατάφασις) and ‘assertion’ (ἀπόφανσις) before ‘sentence’ (λόγος), while he observes a different order later in his book? The Commentator replies by giving two original answers, neither of which is found in the other commentaries. First, in presenting the aforementioned elements of the first sentence, Aristotle had a pedagogical aim in mind: he disposed the elements to which we are most accustomed (because of their familiar nouns: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα and λόγος) at the extreme parts of the enumeration while inserting the most difficult ones (because of their confused nomenclature: ἀπόφασις, κατάφασις and ἀπόφανσις) in the middle. Thus, ‘by the knowledge of the extremes (ἄκρα), he sought to demonstrate the ignorance of the mean (μέσον)’ (1.1.4). Contrary to Ammonius and Stephanus, the Commentator does not imply that Aristotle followed a certain order in his text, for instance one that would proceed ‘from the worse to the better’. In fact, as his second answer indicates, he believes that Aristotle intended not to follow any order at all, ‘but that he has only acted according to utility’ (1.1.4). To support his thesis, he gives only one explanation: ‘it is very clear that the terms used here are not in order because Aristotle has put the negation before the affirmation’ (1.1.4). Such an answer presupposes that, like Alexander of Aphrodisias or Porphyry, the Commentator shares the view that affirmation is prior to negation. However, he does not elaborate why this is the case.
The Commentator concludes the study of the first Aristotelian lemma by asking a similar question posed by Ammonius (11,1–3), Boethius (14,9–11) and Stephanus (3,13–14): why does Aristotle only mention the ‘noun’ and the ‘verb’ while keeping silent about the other parts of the sentence (μέρη τοῦ λόγου)? By ‘parts of the sentence’, the Commentator refers to the eight grammatical components of a sentence which, according to Ammonius, were ‘infamous’ in his time, namely (besides noun and verb) participle, pronoun, adverb, conjunction, preposition and article.Footnote 18 The answer given by the Commentator is concordant with that of Ammonius and Stephanus: Aristotle has proceeded in this manner because ‘the noun and the verb are the only and principal parts of the sentence (λόγος)’ (1.1.5). However, he distinguishes himself from both of these authors in a surprising fashion, contending that some parts of the sentence fall under the noun, others under the verb. For instance, ‘pronoun or adverb falls under the noun, as anyone will find on examination, and participle falls under the verb …’ (1.1.5). The fact that the Commentator believes that adverbs fall under the noun sets him apart from Ammonius and Stephanus. In Ammonius’ opinion, although the adverb can indicate a certain relation of the predicate toward the subject, it cannot act as a noun: adverbs are not authentic parts of the λόγος. The Commentator does not share Ammonius’ or Stephanus’ opinion but rather adopts a similar point of view to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Boethius. We know from Ammonius’ commentary that Alexander thought ‘that adverbs too are nouns, and that the same also holds for pronouns’ (13,19–20). More precisely, Alexander believed that adverbs could act as nouns, as they are constructed from them. As for Boethius (who is perhaps following Porphyry here),Footnote 19 he assumed that adverbs ‘are to be considered as nouns because they signify something defined where no affection or activity is meant’ (15,3–5). The Commentator does not explain why he believes that adverbs fall under nouns: he simply presents this fact as obvious (‘as anyone will find on examination’). He also seems not to be aware of Ammonius’ lengthy discussion on the adverb nor of the debate surrounding it.Footnote 20 This aspect is another illuminating example of the Commentator's independence from Ammonius.
To demonstrate that the other parts of the λόγος (that is, conjunction and preposition) are not real parts of it, the Commentator employs a nautical metaphor also found in Ammonius (12,25–13,2) and Stephanus (3,35–8): ‘for instance, in a ship, we use among other things glue and linen to bind, nails to consolidate or a red hue to enhance its beauty. None of these is said to be part of the ship, but—because of utility—they are considered as the ship’ (1.1.5). Conjunctions are used to ‘bind and consolidate the parts of the sentence’, whereas prepositions ‘complement them’ (1.1.6). This metaphor, which is used by Ammonius and Stephanus to establish a distinction between ‘parts of λόγος’ and ‘parts of λέξις’, has a Peripatetic origin, was already known by the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus in the early second century and may have as its source the grammarian Trypho (first century b.c.).Footnote 21 Although the Commentator discriminates between real parts of the λόγος (noun, verb, pronoun, adverb and participle) and inauthentic parts of it (conjunction and preposition), he never uses the distinction between ‘parts of λόγος’ and ‘parts of λέξις’. Such a distinction does not appear before Porphyry.Footnote 22
Chapter 1, section 2: Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias 16a3–9
The second section of the anonymous Armenian commentary opens with a translation of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias 16a3–9, a passage containing textual variants that were frequently discussed in later antiquity. In 16a6–8, the Aristotelian text contains four ΤΑΥΤΑ, and ancient exegetes debated over which were used as a marker of identity (ταὐτά) or as a simple demonstrative (ταῦτα). The Armenian translator agrees with Ammonius in reading the first and third ΤΑΥΤΑ as demonstratives and the second and fourth as markers of identity. The Armenian translation contains, however, an additional ΤΑΥΤΑ between the second and the third, which was not taken into account by L. Minio-Paluello in his edition: ‘the first things of which these (ταῦτα [n. 1]) are signs are the same (ταὐτά [n. 2]) for all, namely the same affections (ταὐτά [additional]) of the soul. And that of which these (ταῦτα [n. 3]) are likenesses—actual things—are also the same (ταὐτά [n. 4])’. This additional ΤΑΥΤΑ corresponds to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ reading of the passage, as reported by Boethius (37,30–38,3): ‘Now what these (ταῦτα [n. 1]) are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same (ταὐτά [n. 2]) for all men and what the same affections (ταὐτά [n. 3]) are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same (ταὐτά [n. 4]).’Footnote 23 It is thus possible that the additional ΤΑΥΤΑ contained in the Armenian translation of 16a6–8 was added to reflect Alexander's interpretation. Moreover, in 16a6 the Armenian translator read the genitive-plural adjective πρώτων like Boethius and not the adverb πρώτως like Ammonius and Stephanus.Footnote 24 Lastly, like Boethius, the Armenian translator did not translate the terms σύμβολα and σημεῖα with two different words, despite their existence in Armenian. The synonymy between σύμβολον and σημεῖον, which is also present in the commentary, appeared to be very oldFootnote 25 and was likewise accepted by Ammonius and Stephanus.
The Commentator begins the second part of his commentary on chapter 1 by stating that Aristotle's aim is to examine four specific elements—things (πράγματα), thought (νόημα), vocal sound (φωνή) and letter (γράμμα)—and to determine which are by nature or by convention. By presenting these four elements, the Commentator does not distinguish himself from Boethius (42,27–43,2), Ammonius (18,23–19,34) and Stephanus (5,22–6). However, in contrast to them, he never discusses the linguistic difference between τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ and αἱ φωναί and τὰ γραφόμενα and τὰ γράμματα. In fact, he constantly employs αἱ φωναί instead of τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ and often shifts from τὰ γραφόμενα to τὰ γράμματα as if there were no differences between them.
Like Boethius, Ammonius and Stephanus, the Commentator contends that things and thoughts are by nature, and vocal sounds and letters/writings are by convention (they ‘come afterward’). To determine which elements are by nature or not, he argues that Aristotle followed one simple rule, which consists in holding that ‘what is by nature is the same for all’ (1.2.2). Thus, things and thoughts are by nature because they are the same for all, whereas vocal sounds and letters/writings are by convention because they differ according to different groups. To illustrate this last point, the commentator gives a specific example: as ‘the Greeks and the Romans do not have the same letters and the same vocal sounds’, ‘it will therefore be said that [letters and vocal sounds] are not by nature’ (1.2.2). The Commentator's use of the phrase ‘Greeks and Romans’ as an example of linguistic differences, rather than ‘Greeks and Armenians’, is striking. Ammonius, who was living in Alexandria, used the example of ‘Greeks, Egyptians and Phoenicians’ (19,14–15). Stephanus, also living in Alexandria, talked about ‘Greeks and Egyptians’ (7,19–20), and Boethius about ‘Latins and Barbarians’ (38,22–4). The reference to ‘Romans’ may hint at the fact that the Commentator was living in the Roman empire or, possibly, in the Byzantine empire (since the Byzantines called themselves Ῥωμαῖοι) when he wrote his commentary.
The Commentator presents another argument to defend the thesis according to which things and thoughts are by nature. He succinctly suggests that thoughts are indeed natural, for they are parts of things, which are natural: ‘[Aristotle] shows that things and thoughts are not in the soul, but thoughts are in things’ (1.2.2). As we know from Boethius (39,25–40,9), the ‘natural status’ of thoughts was contested by Herminus on the basis that thoughts were not the same for all. The Commentator's argument, undetectable in other commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, seems to answer this last argument.
Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias 16a3–9 is famous for its description of the inner workings of meaning and has been the object of ample commentaries from antiquity to the present. The Commentator discusses Aristotle's semantic theory in only two short paragraphs. He first assimilates things (πράγματα) to original models (πρωτότυποι): they are at the basis of the signification process. As for affections or thoughts, they are imprints (τύποι) of these original models. In other words, ‘all that is seized and thought in the same way will receive the same imprint (τύπος)—[namely] affections—from the original model (πρωτότυπος)’ (1.2.3). The relation between things and thoughts is not one of similitude but one of impression (or marking). To put it in Peircean terms, it is more an indexical relation than an iconic relation (for example the relation between things and thoughts would resemble more that of a foot and its trace in the sand than Socrates and its representation on a painting). As for vocal sounds and writings, they are symbols or signs (σύμβολα or σημεῖα) of these first things, namely affections or thoughts. As affections or thoughts are in things, it appears that they can also be symbols or signs of things. The Commentator's exegesis of 16a3–9 differs from all the extant commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias. Although he later recognizes that ‘thoughts are likenesses’ (1.2.5), the Commentator is unique in discussing the relation between things and thoughts from an indexical rather than an iconic perspective. He is also unique in his suggestion that it is possible to have symbols or signs of things: ‘symbols/signs are really of things, thoughts or vocal sounds’ (1.2.3). Unfortunately, these two paragraphs are too succinct to draw definitive conclusions on the Commentator's full understanding of the workings of meaning.
The second section of the anonymous Armenian commentary ends in an original fashion. The last sentence of the lemma (16a8–9) raises two specific questions left unanswered by Boethius, Ammonius and Stephanus: 1) What are those ‘subjects [that] have already been treated’ in the ‘treatise on the soul’? 2) Which specific passage Aristotle is referring to?Footnote 26 The Commentator answers these two questions in a straightforward manner: Aristotle's ‘full teaching on the subject, [namely] how thoughts are likenesses, is comprised in the third book on the soul’ (1.2.5). The Commentator also adds one important piece of information, again missing from the other commentators: the specific discipline to which questions about the soul belong is physics (for the Peripatetics) or theology (for the Platonists) (1.2.6). The fact that Ammonius had not discussed this last issue prompted J. Brunschwig to hypothesize that he did not read ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας in 16a9.Footnote 27 Indisputably, the Commentator reads ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας in the text he is commenting (whether it is Greek or Armenian).
Chapter 1, section 3: Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias 16a9–13
Contrary to Ammonius and Boethius, the anonymous Commentator deemed it necessary to separate 16a9–13 from 16a13–18. His analysis of lemma 16a9–13 concentrates predominantly on the similarities between thoughts and vocal sounds. In his view, vocal sounds are signs/symbols of thought as they share important common elements. Indeed, both of them can be simple or complex and, dependently, have an identical truth value. Thoughts are simple ‘when their parts—even though they signify something—are neither true nor false’ (1.3.1). Similarly, vocal sounds are simple when uttered separately (when a noun is uttered separately from a verb). In that case, they are neither true nor false (1.3.1–2). This analogy between thoughts and vocal sounds can be located in all the commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias. However, only Ammonius and Stephanus designated it explicitly an ἀναλογία.
Truth and falsehood arise from combination (σύνθεσις) and division (διαίρεσις). Combination is the result of associating simple elements together, for instance a noun and a verb. As for division, it is the result of denying something of another thing (‘by denying this thing that is’) (1.3.4–6). The resemblance between division and the act of denying prompted many commentators to assimilate division with negation and, consequently, combination with affirmation. For example, in his commentary, Ammonius states that Aristotle ‘called (…) denial division, since it separates the predicate from the subject by means of the negative particle’, adding a few sentences later that Aristotle ‘call[s] affirmation combination and negation division’ (27,1–8).Footnote 28 As for the Commentator, he departs completely from Ammonius and presents a subtler analysis. In his view, it is vain to believe—‘as some have thought’ (1.3.4)—that affirmations are combinations and negations are divisions: ‘just as in an affirmation there is a combination of a noun and a verb, likewise in the negation’ (1.3.4). In other words, for the anonymous Commentator, negation does not consist solely in a division: it is rather a division of a combination (‘by denying this thing that is, he divides the content of combination of one with the other’ [1.3.6]). Once again, the Commentator diverges from the accepted interpretation of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria and shares a similar position to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who believed that every negation is not only a division but a sort of division (‘quaedam negatio’). What did Alexander mean by a sort of division? According to Boethius, it appears he meant the exact same thing as the Commentator: ‘division is of what is combined and joined together’ (47,13–14).Footnote 29 Alexander’ analysis of negation as a ‘sort of division’, namely a division of a combination, is situated in a passage where Boethius presents Alexander's arguments regarding the priority of affirmation. Alexander considered affirmation prior to negation because it was the result of a combination, whereas negation was the result of a combination and then of a division. As we have seen in 1.1.4, the Commentator also shares Alexander's view about the priority of the affirmation on the negation.
Chapter 1, section 4: Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias 16a13–18
In the last section of chapter 1, the Commentator continues discussing the similarity between vocal sounds and thoughts, then defines the different senses of ἁπλῶς and κατὰ χρόνον. Like all the other commentators, he links simple vocal sounds with simple thoughts and specifies that none of them can be true or false, for they are ‘separated from each other’ (1.4.1). Indeed, truth and falsehood arise from combination, for instance of a noun and a verb, and can be found in affirmations and negations. However, not every compound vocal sound can be true or false. A noun such as ‘goat-stag’ (τραγέλαφος), despite combining two elements (‘the substance of the stag and the goat’), cannot be true or false (1.4.2). An example of a valid compound vocal expression would be the sentence ‘[A] man runs’, which combines the noun ‘man’ or ‘human being’ (ἄνθρωπος) with the verb ‘to run’ (τρέχειν). Compound thoughts are formed like compound vocal sounds: they consist in a combination and can be true or false.
The Commentator's discussion of the similarity between vocal sounds and thoughts is not original in itself: it has strong links with all the other commentaries written on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias. The Commentator's discussion of the different senses of expressions such as ‘simply’ (ἁπλῶς) and ‘with reference to time’ (κατὰ χρόνον) is more innovative as it contains elements undiscussed by all commentators. Contrary to Ammonius and Stephanus—who single out only one definition—but similarly to Boethius, the Commentator presents three different significations of ἁπλῶς and κατὰ χρόνον. First, ἁπλῶς signifies the present, while κατὰ χρόνον refers to the past or the future (1.4.2). This first definition of ἁπλῶς and κατὰ χρόνον is also given by Boethius (51,19) and Stephanus (6,30–2). However, only the Commentator and Boethius discuss what they mean by ‘present’ and offer a similar explanation: present is not a time but a certain limit. Second, ἁπλῶς is said to signify the substance of things, for instance ‘Socrates is’, while κατὰ χρόνον signifies substance together with time, such as ‘Socrates is today’ (1.4.3). This last definition is absent from Ammonius and Stephanus, yet present in Boethius (51,3–16). Third, ἁπλῶς is said of verbs because verbs only express the present, whereas κατὰ χρόνον is said of inflexions of verbs, namely of past or future (1.4.4). This last definition, resembling the first which focusses on the ‘present’,Footnote 30 is not given by any other authors. Finally, the Commentator mentions nothing regarding an explanation presented by both Boethius (51,30–52,3) and Ammonius (29,12–17) according to which ἁπλῶς expresses time in an indeterminate way, for example ‘there is a goat-stag’, ‘there was a goat-stag’ or ‘there will be a goat-stag’. In presenting this explanation, both Ammonius and Boethius used the same examples.
The Commentator's discussion of the signification of ἁπλῶς and κατὰ χρόνον shares many common features with Boethius. Their interpretation of the term ‘present’ is similar and cannot be located in other commentators. Additionally, only they discuss the fact that ἁπλῶς signifies the substance of things. It nevertheless remains impossible to infer from this that the Commentator was dependent on Boethius. The Commentator and Boethius do, in fact, diverge, since they give a different third explanation of ἁπλῶς: the Commentator's explanation is original whereas Boethius’ is also present in Ammonius. The most prudent hypothesis would be that they had access to the same original source.
The first chapter of the Armenian commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias concludes with a brief ontological remark on the unchangeable character of things (πράγματα)Footnote 31 and with a reference to a passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics, unidentifiable with any certainty (perhaps the Commentator is referring to a commentary on the Metaphysics rather than to the Metaphysics itself). What is certain, though, is the Commentator's familiarity with ontological theses and his eagerness to present them, albeit in too concise a way.
CONCLUSION
The Armenian commentary was undeniably written in the tradition of late antique Greek commentaries.Footnote 32 The Commentator raises the same questions as Ammonius and Stephanus, and sometimes uses similar examples. However, contrary to Stephanus (or, in subsequent chapters, contrary to the Anonymous of Tarán), he does not follow Ammonius subserviently. In fact, despite commonalities shared with Ammonius, he often ignores his interpretation (discussion about adverbs) or his list of definitions (θέσθαι) and, more importantly, has different opinions on many subjects (σκοπός, adverbs or negation). The Commentator also shares considerable common ground with Boethius, in fact much more than with Ammonius (adverbs as nouns, negation as a division of a combination, etc.). Nevertheless, he does not follow him obediently, ignoring some of his interpretations and not seeming to be aware of some of his definitions (ἁπλῶς and κατὰ χρόνον). The Commentator may have had access to the same sources as Boethius, for instance Porphyry (on which Boethius depends) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (whom Porphyry criticizes at length in his lost commentary). This study has highlighted that the Commentator shares many common features with Alexander (the only exegete he cites by name). Therefore, it would not be imprudent to infer that the Commentator has much more in common with the Peripatetics or early Neoplatonists than with the late Neoplatonists. Given that he ignores the Ammonian division of the Peri Hermeneias into five τμήματα—which had a tremendous influence on members of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria and on posterior commentators such as Al-Farabi, Gennadius or Psellus—this suggests an early writing date, that is, a date concomitant with Ammonius and Boethius or even earlier. Although the results of the comparative analysis are provisional as they only pertain to the first chapter, they do confirm the results of the structural analysis, thus providing a foundation for further research and investigation.
APPENDIX
Anonymous Armenian Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias
Chapter 1
[1.1]Footnote 33
16a1–2: First it must be established what a noun is and what a verb is, then what a negation, an affirmation, an assertion and a sentence are.
[1.1.1] We have said before that the goal of this logical discipline (λογικὴ πραγματεία) is to arrive at demonstrative syllogisms. Since there are many errors in syllogisms, it is necessary to know each of them. Indeed, we discover the demonstrative syllogism by the knowledge of other forms [of syllogisms]. Now, it is not possible to know each of the said syllogisms if we do not first learn what a syllogism is. YouFootnote 34 say that a syllogism itself cannot be [formed] without propositions or premises. A proposition is either affirmative or negative and is a certain statement (λόγος).
[1.1.2] It would be convenient to first teach about the discourse and its parts, then to pass to the teaching of propositions. [This is what Aristotle] does in this treatise. Indeed, defining what a noun, a verb and a sentence (λόγος) are, he then proceeds to teach about the affirmation, the negation and the assertion, of which propositions are composed. But what is the signification of the first words: ‘First it must be established’ (Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι [16a1])? We know that the term ‘first’ (πρῶτον) is said in two ways: for some people, [when they say]: ‘it is necessary to first read the poems, then to look at their meaning’; for many people, [when they say]: ‘first before all it is necessary to acquire the poems of Homer and, after that, [the poems of] all the others [poets] who follow’. The term ‘first’ is used here in the latter case, that is, ‘first before all’.
[1.1.3] ‘It must’ (δεῖ) means ‘it is appropriate’. It is said in two ways: according to necessity or according to utility. Here, it is said according to the former: ‘it is necessary’.
[1.1.4] As for the term ‘establish’ (θέσθαι), it is said in three ways: [first] when we talk about a place, for instance, ‘in this human world’ or ‘on earth’; [second] when we give a noun, since θέσις is also said of the act of naming; [third] when we give a definition. This last sense is the one that the Ancients used the most, and it is the one that the PhilosopherFootnote 35 uses here, that is, ‘to define’. Gathering everything together, let us now see what the result of our interpretation is. We claim that, instead of saying ‘first it must be established’, it is obvious [that Aristotle seeks to say]: ‘first before all, it is necessary to define what a noun, a verb and each of the other [elements] are.’ For a knowledge of all these by means of a definition will also help us in our research on propositions. Still, why has he disposed [these elements] in this way while he later observes a different [order] in his teaching? It is perhaps not according to their order that he has here disposed the statement (ἀπόφανσις), the affirmation (κατάφασις) and the negation (ἀπόφασις) before the sentence (λόγος). Indeed, because their confused [nomenclature] is for us a source of ignorance, he has directed us towards familiar nouns to which we are accustomed, for instance ‘sentence’ (λόγος), ‘noun’ (ὄνομα) or ‘verb’ (ῥῆμα), and by the knowledge of the extremes he has wanted to demonstrate the ignorance of the mean. It is very clear that the terms used here are not in order: because [Aristotle] has put the negation (ἀπόφασις) before the affirmation (κατάφασις), we [should] not suppose that he followed any order but that he has only acted according to utility.
[1.1.5] If someone asks why [Aristotle] only mentions the noun and the verb and not the other parts of the sentence, it must be answered that the noun and the verb are the only principal parts of the sentence. As for the other so-called [parts of the sentence] that are used to teach the youngest,Footnote 36 some fall under the noun, others under the verb. Pronoun or adverb falls under the noun, as anyone will find on examination. Participle falls under the verb, while all the rest has other uses. For instance, in a ship, we use among other things glue and linen to bind, nails to consolidate or a red hue to enhance its beauty. None of these is said to be part of the ship, but—because of utility—they are considered as the ‘ship’.
[1.1.6] Now, it is the same thing for the sentence. Some [elements] such as conjunctions bind and consolidate the parts of the sentence; others like prepositions complement them (not so as to improve them, but in order to embellish them and make them shine). As for the other [parts], each has its use in the sentence, but they are not said parts [of it].
[1.2]
16a3–9: Now, what is in the vocal sound are symbols (σύμβολα) of affections of the soul and writings are [symbols] of what is in the vocal sound. And just as letters are not the same for all, so are the sounds. On the other hand, the first things (πρώτων) of which these (ταῦτα) are signs (σημεῖα) are the same (ταὐτά) for all, namely the same (ταὐτά)Footnote 37 affections of the soul. And that of which these (ταῦτα) are likenesses—actual things—are also the same (ταὐτά).Footnote 38 Such subjects have already been treated in the treatise on the soul. Indeed, they belong to another domain [of research].
[1.2.1] [Aristotle] took care in the previous passage to discuss the usefulness of his remarks. Upon reaching this section (τόπος), however, he takes some precaution to avoid mistakes. [Aristotle now] examines vocal sounds and affections that are in the soul, namely thoughts. Of four elements—things (πράγματα), thought (νόημα), vocal sound (φωνή) and letter (γράμμα)—he examines which are by nature and which come afterward.
[1.2.2] How are thoughts, which he has called affections, signs/symbolsFootnote 39 of things? How are vocal sounds signs/symbols of thoughts and writings, signs/symbols of vocal sounds? Are all these by nature or not? [Aristotle] shows that things and thoughts are not in the soul, but thoughts are in things. [Things and thoughts] are both by nature, and vocal sounds and letters come after them. From here, the whole argument [of Aristotle is to show] that what is by nature is the same for all. Now, what is the same for all is by nature, for example things and thoughts of things. Indeed, nature is not divided according to vocal sounds and letters. It is obvious that what is not the same for all is not by nature, such as vocal sounds and writings. Thus the Greeks and the Romans do not have the same letters and the same vocal sounds. It will therefore be said that [letters and vocal sounds] are not by nature.
[1.2.3] Having said once more (πάλιν) that signs/symbols really [relate] to things, thoughts or vocal sounds,Footnote 40 he returns to the beginnings [and asserts] that theyFootnote 41 are signs/symbols of these first (πρώτων), namely affections of the soul themselves. Thus all that is seized and thought in the same way will receive the same imprint (τύπος)—[namely] affections—from the original model (πρωτότυπος).
[1.2.4] Mulling over his argument (λόγος) once more, [he says that] all that has the same imprint (τύπος) and thoughts [has] for everyone the same original model (πρωτότυπος), namely things. So, thoughts and things, which may be the same for all, will be said ‘by nature’. However, it is impossible that vocal sounds and writings (γραφόμενα) are the same for all. This subject will be discussed later [in the text].
[1.2.5] Although it is not the place here to talk about thoughts, [Aristotle] had to slightly address [this issue], for it was useful for his analysis. However, his full teaching on the subject, [namely] how thoughts are likenesses, is comprised in the third book on the soul.
[1.2.6] The Peripatetics [address the topic of the soul] in their physics, the Platonists in their theology. Such a study, however, does not fall within the scope of the present enquiry.
[1.3]
16a9–13: Just as in the soul there is a thought without truth or falsehood, and [one] that is necessarily true or false, so too in the vocal sound.Footnote 42 For truth and falsehoodFootnote 43 are concerned with combination (σύνθεσις) and division (διαίρεσις).
[1.3.1] Aristotle shows in the following way that vocal sounds are signs/symbols of thought: just as thoughts are sometimes simple, sometimes complex, vocal sounds receive the same form: they are sometimes simple, sometimes complex. Thoughts are simple when their parts—even though they signify something—are neither true nor false. They are complex when they are necessarily one or the other.Footnote 44
[1.3.2] It is the same for the vocal sound. When the noun and the verb, which are parts of the uttered speech, are uttered separately from one another, they do not appear to be true or false. However, [when they] are combined together and thus form a sentence (λόγος), they are necessarily true or false.
[1.3.3] Are vocal sounds really said [to be] signs/symbols of thought since the uttered speech (προφορικὸς λόγος) reveals what is in the mindFootnote 45 and displays what kind of opinion someone has? In fact, notions are known through such a speech (προφορικὸς λόγος), if they are sure or false, for an individual to form an opinion.
[1.3.4] And that the parts of thoughts and uttered vocal sounds are neither true nor false, [Aristotle] shows it himself [by saying] that truth and falsehood have to do with a combination and a division. What has not yet been combined or divided does not signify either truth or falsehood. Indeed, combination is the result of associating together simple elements, as [Aristotle] has said about the noun and the verb. Being in themselves neither true nor false, the noun and the verb do become true or false by their interweaving. However, combination and division are not, as some have thought, affirmations and negations. For just as in an affirmation there is a combination of a noun and a verb, likewise in the negation. Consequently, it is vain to believe that these nounsFootnote 46 refer to affirmation and negation.
[1.3.5] But it is clear that [Aristotle] wanted to show that discourse (λόγος) is in the mind when [he says that], just as in the vocal sound there are affirmations, so too in the mind there is something that gives evidence. We gather parts of discourse and combine them, so that truth and falsehood necessarily follow.
[1.3.6] Just as negation is in the vocal sound, so too division is in the mind. Indeed, by denying this thing that is, he divides the content of combination of one with the other, and again truth or falsehood [arise]. Just as in the vocal sound affirmation or negation necessarily reveals truth and falsehood, so too in thought combination and division necessarily reveal truth or falsehood.
[1.4]
16a13–18: Thus nouns and verbs in themselves appearFootnote 47 as thoughts without combination or division, for example ‘man’ or ‘white’, when nothing further is added: they are not yet falseFootnote 48 nor true. A proof of that: even ‘goat-stag’ signifies something, but it is not yet true nor false, unless ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is added, either simply or with reference to time.
[1.4.1] [Aristotle] adds these words in order to show that vocal sounds derived from thoughts—and as we have thoughts, it is necessary that [there be] vocal sounds. Having separated the discourse (λόγος) in the mind, he says that some [of it] is by combination, other by division. He calls ‘simple thoughts’ parts [that are] separated from each other. He states that, just as in the act of pronunciation, the discourse [uttered] is a sign/symbol of that discourse [in the mind], so too the parts of this [uttered] discourse are parts of that discourse that is in the mind. As [Aristotle] says it himself, [simple vocal sounds] are similar to simple thoughts: just as simple thoughts are neither true nor false, so also nouns and verbs uttered separately are neither true nor false; just as simple thoughts can be combined, so also [simple vocal sounds]. Indeed, when combined, the noun and the verb [help us] distinguish the truth, and are said according to affirmation or negation.
[1.4.2] Ιt seems that ‘human being or white’ (τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκόν [16a14–15]) expresses substance (τὸ ὄν). Thus, when someone says ‘human being’ (ἄνθρωπος), it seems that this vocal sound is true, even though it is not the case. Even a different noun formed by opinion and [pronounced] externally that is not simple but compound has the substance of a certain being. Indeed, the goat-stag (τραγέλαφος) has the substance of the stag and the goat, but expresses neither truth nor falsehood. For if the compound noun seems to be a sign/symbol of something, it is still neither true nor false. As for simple nouns, they will be very far from meaning something true or false. Aristotle has said earlier in the Categories that the combination (συμπλοκή) of substances, for example ‘human being’ (ἄνθρωπος) and ‘to run’ (τρέχειν), makes truth or falsehood.Footnote 49 This is why he adds here ‘unless to be or not to be is added, either simply or with reference to time’ (ἐὰν μὴ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι προστεθῇ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ κατὰ χρόνον [16a17–18]). ‘Simply’ (ἁπλῶς) seems to me to signify the present. Indeed, the present [refers] to a small [period of time], namely to the beginning or the end of a period, but is not a time, while ‘with reference to time’ (κατὰ χρόνον) has to do with the past and the future.
[1.4.3] [Second,] ‘simply’ is said when the verb is added to the noun: it will signify only the substance of things but not the time. For example, ‘Socrates is’ only means that Socrates is. However, when you add to Socrates ‘is today’, ‘is this month’ or ‘is this year’, the substance is signified together with time.
[1.4.4] Third, as he himself says [in this treatise] when he teaches us about the verb, the verb only expresses the present.Footnote 50 As for the past and the future, they are not verbs but inflexions of verbs. [Aristotle] says that inflexions of verbs, namely past and future, [are] ‘with reference to time’, but that the verb in the present tense is ‘simply’. For other times, it is necessary to add the past or the future.
[1.4.5] Since his research focusses on the truth or falsehood of parts of speech (λόγος), it also deals with thoughts and vocal sounds. [Aristotle] says not only here but also in the Metaphysics (ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικά) that truth and falsehood have their origin in thoughts and then appear in vocal sounds.Footnote 51 Indeed, it is impossible that things (πράγματα) are unsettled by what is also such: at all times, the one (τὸ ἕν) isFootnote 52 unmoved (ἀκινήτως), ordaining this (τοῦτο) by itself.Footnote 53 Thus truth and falsehood arise in composition, but not in simple vocal sounds. After that, [Aristotle] goes on to teach about the noun, the verb and all the other subjects he mentioned.
