The release of the Black Notebooks and selected letters to Hermann Heidegger constitute only the most recent events in a long history of coming to terms with the political thought and political action of Martin Heidegger. Even those of us who appreciate his philosophy are compelled to ask questions about how he viewed the political things. Research into this aspect of Heidegger's work has for some time remained largely of two types: (1) partial and prosecutorial studies that aim to find a smoking gun for Heidegger's Nazism (e.g., those by Farias, Faye, and Wolin) and (2) philosophically substantial deconstructive reflections that are, unfortunately, pitched at a high level of abstraction (e.g., those by Derrida, de Beistegui, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy). The former type speaks to people who are, from the outset, ready to convict. The latter type speaks to people who appreciate complexity and nuance sometimes at the expense of clarity. Alexander Duff's Heidegger and Politics amounts to a notable departure from the aforementioned approaches. First, Duff is sympathetic to Heidegger's philosophy, but wishes to understand how such philosophy can accompany the political decisions the thinker made. Second, as a political scientist, Duff has a keen sense for the importance of the impact of Heidegger's philosophical thought on political issues. In a manner that seeks neither to reduce Heidegger's thought to fascism nor to drive a wedge between that thought and the politics that ensues from it, Duff's study constitutes (to my mind) the first real engagement of Heidegger's thought of philosophical relevance for political scientists and theorists.
Duff begins the introduction to his study with a paradox: “Heidegger's thought has inspired Iranian revolutionaries; environmentalists and Greens; dissenters from the Cold War polarity of liberal West and communist East; and, to this day, European fascists. This is a disparate collection of epigoni for a thinker whose own work was never straightforwardly political and who was publicly associated with the National Socialists in Germany” (1). Put differently, what is it about the particular modality of Heidegger's “nonpoliticism” that gives rise to all these figures? And how could such a wide variety of political positions be traced back to one thinker? Rather than remain satisfied with the typical (if correct) response, to the effect that one cannot reduce philosophy to one set of political views, Duff begins the exploration: The Iranian revolutionary theorists Ali Shari'ati and Ahmad Fardid drew on Heidegger's critique of the modern West in developing their own ideas of “Westoxication” (8) and in justifying their belief in the need for a “permanent revolution” (7) in order to combat it. The Green movement, theoretically spearheaded by Arne Naess, Bill Devall, and George Sessions, drew on Heidegger's critique of technology and modern rationality in constructing their “vision of nature wherein there is no hierarchy among the beings, each life form being connected to every other in a non-dominating process of emergence and decay” (8). The Canadian political theorist and pacifist George Grant—as well as the Czech dissident, playwright, and future president Vaclav Havel—made use of Heidegger's claim that American capitalism and Soviet collectivism were “metaphysically identical” in their adoption of “rationalist, technological assumptions” (9). Finally, the Russian political theorist and ideologue Alexander Dugin (the author of four books on Heidegger) “advocate(s) for a ‘Eurasian’ counterpole to Atlanticist, Anglo-Saxon liberalism, an imperialism premised on ‘Dasein’ and ‘Ereignis,’ the event of being that emerges from the world midnight of globalization” (10). In initiating the reader into his inquiry, Duff lays his cards on the table: “We do not need to accept Heidegger's diagnosis of the West in order to accept his challenge. It is necessary, however, to understand this challenge in order to respond to it” (23). The following chapters are Duff's attempt at understanding in order to provide a response.
Chapter 1 explores Heidegger's early critique of ethics as a theoretical inquiry. Through a tour of the Marburg neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology that Heidegger was to reject, Duff examines the search for an ethical theory as both part and parcel of an assumed split between the knowing subject and the objective domain of research as if they constitute two distinct realms. Instead, phenomenology needs to account for the primordial realm of existence in which subject and object appear. For Heidegger, modern ethical and political reasoning occurs on a derivative plane to the actual existence of the inquirers. Heidegger instead seeks to bring these inquirers back to their primordial existential situatedness, which radically calls into question all the accepted modern doctrines of ethics and politics. Chapter 2 extends the discussion of Heidegger's critique of ethics to figures such as Jaspers, Scheler, Cohen, and Windelband to show that they fail to appreciate the level of distortion to which their modern theories succumb. It is here that Heidegger shows his contempt for modern culture, with its business and lack of reflectivity. In short, Heidegger seeks to subtract his own work from the project of theoretically formulating ethical and political imperatives.
Chapter 3 carries Heidegger's critique of culture over into his full-fledged conception of everydayness (in Being and Time). The conventional manner in which we live proves an obstacle to genuine thinking insofar as it manically seeks comfort in our dealings with people (and, more generally, with the world we inhabit). This conflicts with the fact that humans are not satisfied with such comfort because we are also aware of our mortality. In realizing that our essential way of being in the world is grounded in finitude, we find that our everyday comfort breaks down as we become aware of our primordial situation. This breakdown leads to anxiety. Chapter 4 explicates Heidegger's view that the perplexity and anxiety we feel during the breakdown of everydayness clears a space for a more authentic manner of living. Paradoxically, such anxiety discloses to us our own primordial connection with being. Chapter 5 extends and deepens the path from everydayness, through the perplexity and anxiety felt during the moments of breakdown, to the historical condition of nihilism (as expounded in his later works). Heidegger remains ambivalent as to whether the decay of techno-civilization will issue in a new and more creative period through which humans can freely regain the primordial dimension of their lives. It is this possibility that Duff explores in chapter 6: For Heidegger, living authentically means “regularly uncovering… our heritage in accordance with our true destiny as a people” (183), understood in the light of our radical finitude. Such authentic communal existence would always be a fragile one insofar as it could always be (again) subsumed by technology and everydayness.
This leads Duff to an insightful, if sobering, conclusion—given Heidegger's critique of modernity as technologically infused everydayness, there are two practical options: (1) permanent revolution and (2) quietism. The first is embodied by the Iranian revolutionary theorists and Alexander Dugin; the second by pacifism and environmentalism. While the second option is notably preferable to the first, both options presuppose the Heideggerian premise that humans, as finite and “thrown” beings, are not ultimately at home in the world. If we are not at home in the world, then all attempts at devising constructive ethical or political programs remain beside the point. In posing the final question, “Are we or are we not at home in the world?” (195–96), Duff impeccably and precisely compels his readers to reflect on whether parliamentary or republican democracy really is as inauthentic as Heidegger silently suggests it to be.
