I. INTRODUCTION
E.A.G. (Austin) Robinson was a remarkably modest and generous person who was something of an all-rounder as he was a pioneer in industrial economics and economic development, editor of the Economic Journal, government adviser, and academic administrator. During a career and an association with Cambridge University that spanned nearly three-quarters of a century, he was highly regarded by those who came to know him. Geoffrey Harcourt, who has written extensively about Cambridge economics and its economists, observed that “the respect and admiration (for Robinson) was held in so many spheres (including) respect for his outstanding abilities (and) affection for him as a person” (2001, p. 149).Footnote 1
However, Robinson is perhaps more widely known for having been Joan Robinson's husband and a member of John Maynard Keynes's inner circle known as the “Cambridge Circus.” Both his wife and Keynes overshadowed Robinson (and probably everyone around them), particularly in the 1930s, given their revolutionary approaches to economics and giant personalities. Harcourt noted: “Joan was too strong a character, too original and critical, too intellectually independent ever to be a precise clone of anyone” (2001, p. 309). John Kenneth Galbraith remarked that Joan Robinson for over fifty years was a “powerfully motivated critic of the classical orthodoxy and a dominant—and formidable—presence in the English-speaking academic world.” He went on to memorably exclaim: “She rarely looked at a commonly applauded proposition in economics without taking exception to it” (1987, p. 182). This is a broadly shared view of Mrs. Robinson. She said as much about Keynes (viz., 1962, pp. 71-93)!
While Joan Robinson is cited in no less than eighteen pages of Joseph A. Schumpeter's monumental History of Economic Analysis (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954) Austin Robinson does not receive one citation. In Mark Blaug's highly acclaimed Economic Theory in Retrospect (Blaug Reference Blaug1985) Robinson is briefly cited three times with two of the citations in connection to Keynes. The third citation is found at the end of a chapter's Notes on Further Reading, whereby he is recognized for providing “the locus classicus for the notion of the optimum firm” (Blaug Reference Blaug1985, p. 495). Yet, strangely, this is a stand-alone statement with no explanation of the extent of Robinson's influence.
Nevertheless, Robinson's scholarly contributions particularly in the area of industrial economics were profoundly influential with regard to his wife's famous The Economics of Imperfect Competition (Robinson Reference Robinson1933) and Ronald H. Coase's seminal paper, “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase Reference Coase1937). Both works provide much evidence of and appreciation for Robinson's influence. In the very first page of the Foreword to The Economics of Imperfect Competition, for example, Mrs. Robinson unequivocally states: “Mr. Robinson's work on the optimum size of firms is the foundation of my treatment of competitive equilibrium and plays an important part in the Appendix on Increasing and Decreasing Returns” (1933, p. v, emphasis added).Footnote 2 In Coase's paper, Robinson is importantly cited several times with only Frank H. Knight (Reference Knight1921) receiving perhaps more attention.
Since these landmark publications in the 1930s Robinson's contributions to industrial economics have unfortunately been largely overlooked or at least benignly neglected.Footnote 3 In particular, his The Structure of Competitive Industry first published in 1931 is rarely referred to. This is unlike Edith T. Penrose's comparable volume, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Penrose Reference Penrose1959), that is widely cited in both the industrial organization and strategic management literatures. It is considered no less than a “canonical reference.”Footnote 4 Perhaps, The Structure of Competitive Industry suffers from being regarded as little more than a textbook. After all, it was part of the Cambridge Economic Handbook series initiated by Keynes and, according to Keynes in his Introduction to The Structure of Competitive Industry, these “short introductory handbooks (are) intended to convey to the ordinary reader and to the uninitiated student some conception of the general principles of thought which economists now apply to economic problems” (1931, p. v).Footnote 5 Robinson himself regarded the book as “elementary” even though it “in effect introduced to Cambridge the study of the theory of the firm” (1992, p. 210).
This paper focuses on Robinson's influence on Coase and, in particular, his classic paper, “The Nature of the Firm.” In addressing the question “Why do firms exist?” and analyzing a firm's size it is clear that Coase benefited a good deal from Robinson's detailed insights into the firm and its internal operations. This is not surprising as Coase and Robinson were both Marshallian in their approach to studying the firm in a “world of imprecision” and not of “blackboard economics.”
II. BACKGROUND
Robinson said it was A.C. Pigou “who did the most to start me off” in an academic career, particularly between 1929 and 1939, with the study of industrial economics, as he offered Robinson a lectureship in Cambridge in 1929. Pigou, a “good Marshallian,” impressed upon him Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics as “equivalent to holy writ.”Footnote 6 Soon thereafter, Robinson, along with his wife Joan and Richard Kahn, were influenced by the lectures of Piero Sraffa, which criticized Marshall's work. Robinson found the criticism to be excessive to the point of being “irreverent.” Nonetheless, Robinson regarded Sraffa as “setting us free to rethink even the basics of our subject” (1992, pp. 207-10).
Around 1930, D. H. Robertson invited Robinson to write his first book on industrial economics, entitled The Structure of Competitive Industry and first published in 1931. The book was intended to focus on monopoly; however, Robinson thought “one could not tackle monopoly without a theory of the size of the firm, and I set out to provide it.” He was much encouraged to undertake the project as he had a “rather special interest” at the time in Joan's work on imperfect competition (Robinson Reference Robinson and Szenberg1992, p. 210). His second and only other book on industrial economics, Monopoly, was later completed in 1939 and published in 1941.
The Structure of Competitive Industry was a standard text for more than twenty years after it was first published. A revised edition was published in 1953. It was a much used, but little cited, book. According to Alec Cairncross (Reference Cairncross1993), for example, the book was written during the nascent revolution on the theory of competition. Manufacturers were observed to produce goods that differed, giving them a degree of monopoly power that was sustainable over not insignificant periods of time. Products were not simply identical commodities whereby firms would be mere price-takers. Further, markets did indeed have imperfections, allowing for firms of various cost structures, demand functions, and sizes. Consequently, economies of scale would not necessarily be available to or fully realized by individual firms. Market expansion would be limited given the continuation of inefficient firms. As Cairncross asked:
What then was the structure of competitive industry? Could competition not be relied upon to drive out inefficient firms? How was it possible, in competitive equilibrium, for each firm to be in a position to produce more below the market price and yet deliberately limit its output? . . . Did it help to explain why firms were bigger in some industries than in others? (1993, p. 45).
These questions and related ones were what concerned Robinson. He particularly focused on the question of firm size. Robinson did so using a unifying concept, the “optimum firm,” which referred to a firm under “existing conditions of technique and organizing ability (that) has the lowest average cost of production per unit, when all these costs must be covered in the long run are included” (1931, p. 15). Of course, these given conditions would vary for each firm and vary over time as circumstances changed. Nevertheless, at particular moments in time businessmen need to make the best investment decisions they can given their unique circumstances to effect the lowest possible costs. Robinson identified particular forces management needed to consider, including technical, managerial, financial, marketing, and risk and fluctuation. Robinson devoted a chapter to each of these forces. He argued the forces needed to be “reconciled” in order for an optimum (or even optima) to be determined. Indeed, conflicts will exist between the forces whereby actions of reconciliation entail costs that need to be weighed against the gains in quest of efficient growth for the business enterprise. A kind of equilibrium, a firm of optimum size, is pursued and possibly even achieved, albeit temporarily. It cannot be self-preserving in a “real world” of uncertainty and ongoing change.
It is important to explain that Robinson, in the Introduction to The Structure of Competitive Industry, begins by emphasizing the “great problem” of increasing the welfare of a country and its population as measured by the annual income (what today is called the gross domestic product or GDP). A country's income is dependent upon industrial efficiency. As Robinson states: “If we are all concerned with this great problem of how we may best increase our national income so that all may have enough, we must start from a study of industrial efficiency, the securing of the greatest results at the least cost and find to what forms of industrial structure efficiency will lead us” (1931, p. 2).
At the time, Britain was in the grip of a global depression and Robinson was very much concerned with the high unemployment that plagued his country. He lamented it was “hard to foresee how those of the present two million unemployed will ultimately be absorbed” back into the workforce (1931, p. 4). However, he was confident “reabsorption” depended not on industries and their enterprises sacrificing efficiency by maintaining surplus workers producing the same products, but rather on enterprises acting entrepreneurially and investing in capital and labor in anticipating future and new demand. Hence, the purpose of Robinson's book was to provide an analytical framework (rather than model) by which to understand how the “optimal firm,” and especially its managers, can and do pursue efficiency in a dynamic manner and therefore help relieve massive unemployment and promote national welfare. Firms do so within the “structure of competitive industry” where market imperfections including product differentiation and managerial limits are recognized. Understanding the size and structure of firms can best be undertaken in the context of industry, where firms interact given their different products that are either competitive or complementary but rarely independent. (Indeed, Robinson appreciates how less easy it is to define any particular industry when heterogeneous products are recognized.) In addition, firms within the same industry will also interact in competing for inputs such as raw material, machinery, and labor.Footnote 7 Further, both internal and external economies of scale are important to understanding firms in the context of industry structure. Of course, internal economies depend on the size of the firm and the nature of available technology. External economies depend on the industry. The greater the external economies available, the smaller in size and larger in number firms tend to be. Both kinds of scale economies are dependent on available technology and management's ability to utilize it.
Cairncross regards Robinson as a “pioneer in the theory of the firm” in addition to being a “recognized authority on industrial economics” principally because of The Structure of Competitive Industry. He exclaims it is “surprising how little attention has been paid to this early analysis (that is, The Structure of Competitive Industry) of the influence of the problem of co-ordination on industrial structure.” As Cairncross further states: “It (that is, The Structure of Competitive Industry) was one of the first attempts to reflect on the interaction between what goes on inside the firm and what goes on outside” (1993, p. 48). The “problem of co-ordination” for Robinson is not so much about tidy optimal allocation of inputs, but rather a “continual coping with change” and complexity that can be highly untidy.
III. COASE AND “THE NATURE OF THE FIRM”
Ronald Coase was a most worthy recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1991 due to his pioneering work in both law and economics and the New Institutionalism, including the theory of the firm, as principally reflected in his articles, “The Problem of Social Cost” and “The Nature of the Firm,” respectively. No less an authority than Steven G. Medema asserted Coase did something even more fundamental and profound than provide a foundation for the study of law and economics with his “The Problem of Social Cost;” he provided “a treatise on the economic role of government and, more specifically, the way in which government and those economists who would undertake public policy analysis should go about determining the appropriate policy solutions to perceived economic problems” (1995, p. xiii).
Indeed, “The Problem of Social Cost” is Coase's most famous and perhaps significant paper. Unlike “The Nature of the Firm,” the influence of “The Problem of Social Cost” was significant shortly after its publication. However, as Steven N. S. Cheung contends: “I hold the ‘firm’ paper in special regard because its insights are the spring at the headwaters of his most important subsequent writings” (1983, p. 20). For Oliver E. Williamson, “The Nature of the Firm” served to no less than “change the way people think about economic organization” by posing “key questions that—both then and now—are at the heart of the research agenda on economic organization: ‘Why is there any [internal] organization?’ and ‘Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?’” (Williamson Reference Williamson and Winter1991, pp. 3-4). In addressing these key questions, Coase introduced the revolutionary analytical concept of transaction costs that Cheung, for example, believes will one day “rival marginalism in neoclassical economics” (1983, p. 21). Further, Harold Demsetz has praised “The Nature of the Firm” along with Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit as the only two works to address the theory of the firm “that have altered the perspectives of the profession” in the nearly two centuries since the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776 (1988, p. 144). Cheung, Williamson, and Demsetz were the three economists singled out by Coase in his Nobel lecture for elevating the importance of his work with their own. As Coase most graciously and humbly stated: “Without their work and that of many others, I doubt whether the significance of my writings would have been recognized” (1991, p. 3). Nevertheless, their work would not have been so remarkable and influential without the guidance and inspiration Coase offered through his writings, especially “The Nature of the Firm.”
The 1920s-1930s was an exceptional period of time for books addressing the organization of industry, and one that had a profound influence on Coase and his writing “The Nature of the Firm.” In addition to Alfred Marshall's Industry and Trade (1919), Coase identified Robertson's The Control of Industry (1923), Willard L. Thorp's The Integration of Industrial Operations (1924) and, of course, Robinson's The Structure of Competitive Industry as primary examples of books “dealing in detail with the organization of particular industries.” Further, “they were all characterized by an interest in how industry was organized, in all its richness and complexity.” He added: “It was certainly works such as these which gave me my view of the subject of industrial organization” (1972, p. 61, emphasis added).Footnote 8
The industrial organization literature, for decades subsequent to the thirties, largely focused on application of traditional microeconomics to oligopolistic industries out of concern for public policy. Coase complained that this study of market structure was “almost certainly too narrow” (1988a, p. 59) as it ignored examining how markets function and what firms actually do. Alternatively, in “The Nature of the Firm,” Coase reminds the reader of Robertson's most vivid depiction of firms in relation to the market as “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation, like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk” (1923, p. 84; quoted in Coase Reference Coase1937, p. 388). Indeed, Coase was inspired to examine the firm vis-a-vis the market and specifically address the existence and extent of the firm. To quote Coase: “Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy” (1937, p. 390).Footnote 9
Coase established early in his paper that firms exist because there is a cost to using the market. The price mechanism is indeed an efficient means by which to allocate resources within the market. However, within the firm resources are authoritatively directed by an “entrepreneur-co-ordinator” and ipso facto market transactions are overcome, implying there is a limit to the price mechanism's efficiency.Footnote 10 As Coase famously states: “the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism” (1937, p. 389). Yes, there are costs to using the market, but what are they? In particular, organizing production involves search, negotiation, writing contracts, and exchange.Footnote 11 By introducing an organization and an “entrepreneur-co-ordinator” with authority to internally allocate resources, suddenly the costs of using the market are reduced or even overcome. Of course, the core assumption behind this analysis in explaining why firms exist is the recognition of uncertainty. Without uncertainty, the costs of search, negotiation, etc. are saved. As Coase boldy states: “It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty” (1937, p. 392, emphasis added).Footnote 12
Coase then logically proceeds to address the crucial issue of factors that determine the extent or size of a firm. Indeed, the entrepreneur will operate at the margin and undertake incremental transactions or activities within the firm until its costs exceed that of the market. This “make or buy” decision concerns the relation between efficiency and size, one that Knight regards as “one of the most serious problems of theory.” In addition, Coase recognizes that Knight does not believe that the factors determining the size of a firm are scientifically treatable. In fact, Knight is further quoted as dismissively stating that such determinants are “a matter of personality and historical accident” and therefore well beyond the boundary of economic analysis (Knight 1933, Preface to the Re-issue; quoted in Coase Reference Coase1937, p. 394). Coase, of course, regards this as a challenge and one that he confidently undertakes and does so in more than half the paper. In doing so, he very much relies on Robinson.
IV. ROBINSON'S INFLUENCE
Robinson's influence by way of The Structure of Competitive Industry is well recognized by Coase throughout his classic paper.Footnote 13 First, Coase credits Robinson for providing “a more thorough discussion” of “diminishing returns to management,” a principal underlying explanation in determining the size of firms. He regards his own discussion as “brief and incomplete” (1937, p. 395n). Coase proceeds to cite Robinson several more times in ways suggesting Robinson is most influential on this prominent issue of firm size. Even the central idea of the “make or buy” decision attributed to Coase is credited to Robinson. In particular, a firm's size is limited as more ultimately disparate transactions are undertaken and with greater spatial distribution. In sum, firm growth entails increasing complexity that is increasingly costly. Such growing complexity will test the limits of management qua “entrepreneur-coordinator.” Of course, Coase acknowledges that there are technical factors (viz., inventions) which may account for the size of the firm. Again, he promptly credits Robinson for “the importance of the treatment of the technical unit” (1937, p. 397n). Further, Coase acknowledges that organizing transactions that were previously undertaken in the market fall into two categories, “combination” and “integration.” These types of firm expansion refer to horizontal and vertical integration, respectively. Once again, Robinson is recognized, as Coase states: “A firm can expand in either or both of these ways. The whole of the ‘structure of competitive industry’ becomes tractable by the ordinary technique of economic analysis” (1937, p. 398).
Coase acknowledges that some economists (for example, Maurice Dobb Reference Dobb1925) argue that a reason firms exist is due to the division of labor. However, Coase, with the cited support of John Bates Clark (Reference Clark1899), states that the integrating force behind the division of labor is the price mechanism and not the entrepreneur. In explaining his position, Coase makes significant use of Knight (Reference Knight1921). Essentially, Coase shows that Knight argues that an ideal system devoid of uncertainty would require managers to only act in routine ways and “without responsibility of any sort.” In a world of uncertainty, however, managers have the “primary problem or function (of) deciding what to do and how to do it” (Knight Reference Knight1921, pp. 267-68; quoted in Coase Reference Coase1937, p. 399) that according to Knight does not apply to the division of labor. In Knight's (and consequently Coase's) view, the division of labor is a given or exogenously determined whereby managers acting beyond the routine (that is, as entrepreneurs) are not necessary. In addition, Coase states that since “a large proportion of jobs are done to contract” which “does not involve any direction” by managers, only that of the price mechanism matters (1937, p. 401). Therefore, according to Coase, Knight argues correctly (though incompletely) that the division of labor does not account for the existence of firms nor “does Knight give a reason why the price mechanism should be superseded” (1937, p. 401).
Interestingly, at this point, Coase does not recognize Robinson's (Reference Robinson1931) treatment of the division of labor. Perhaps it is not surprising since Robinson persuasively elaborates on how the division of labor is endogenously and dynamically determined in a firm. He begins by reviewing Adam Smith's (Reference Smith, Cambell, Skinner and Todd1776) pin factory illustration and Smith's three reasons for the division of labor making for more efficient production. The reasons include: (1) job specialization allowing for greater dexterity; (2) saving time in moving between disparate activities; and (3) inventions (viz., machines which replace labor). Robinson effectively argues these reasons could well be attributed to the internal operations of a firm as directed by the entrepreneur or even directed by the workers themselves. For example, in terms of Smith's third reason, introducing more productive machinery, Robinson explains that this could well be the result of a machine operator manipulating the machine in a more efficient manner as the result of experience. As Robinson states:
The boy who pulled a string controlling the valve of one of the first engines discovered how, if he tied it to a certain part of the engine, his absence might pass unnoticed, and by doing so invented valve gears. Many of the small inventions which have done much to simplify machinery, or to make them more nearly automatic, have been the work of operators who, during the hours of tending a machine, have consciously or unconsciously analysed their own part in the rhythm of the operation, and have found a way of throwing yet another task on to the machine itself (1931, p. 23).
Further, the machine operator may well share this information with other workers and managers, thereby promoting ever-greater efficiency. Naturally, managers would be keen to keep this innovation within the firm as it would be regarded as a source of competitive advantage or monopoly profit.
Robinson also explains that the size of the firm is a function of the extent and kind of division of labor. Large firms may likely have more elaborate production processes requiring more specialized labor, whereas small firms would likely have more “rudimentary” processes where workers (including managers) undertake multiple tasks. However, the size of the firm may be decisively determined by the entrepreneur or manager rather than the market. A market with uncertainty would no doubt permit firms of various sizes; however, a market with certainty could still permit firms of various sizes given the differences in the abilities and proclivities of management. Indeed, Robinson emphasizes the division of labor in terms of management, what he called the “managerial division of labour,” in comparing the differences between large and small firms. The larger the firm, the more activities are divided between managers engendering enhanced specialization and more elaborate managerial division of labor. “The actual form which the organization takes will, of course, vary with the particular circumstances of individual firms, and different products,” resulting in various levels or even kinds of optimal efficiency (1931, p. 38, emphasis added). Robinson illustrates:
In our ordinary work-a-day world, few people possess the whole of this catalogue of virtues. One man is a splendid organizer, another a technical genius, a third has a flair for finance. The first firm will get the goods made in the right quantities at the right time, but they are a trifle old-fashioned, not exactly what his customers want. The second firm can turn out a beautiful piece of work, but you never know when you will get delivery . . . The third firm is prosperous enough for the time being. Its costing office is a model of refined organization but there are whispers about the quality of the goods . . . If we could combine the three firms, we could use the best qualities of each of the three (1931, p. 37).
Robinson goes on to assess the important problem of coordination. In particular, extension of the division of labor naturally requires a coordination of inputs, including labor and activities that are not a matter of mere routine. For Robinson, the division of labor is an ongoing, dynamic feature of business organization.Footnote 14 As Robinson articulates: “Every time that a further division of labour is introduced, every time that a job which was previously done by one man or one group of men is divided into two or more parts, the problem of coordinating the work of the now separated groups or individuals begins to arise” (1931, p. 44).
In sum, the extent of a firm's growth or size is dictated by the ability of management to coordinate the various departments and specialists within the firm. Of course, the coordination problem differs between the small and large firms. As Robinson explains:
In order that the large firm may be more efficient than the small, the individual parts of the large firm have got to work more efficiently as members of a large firm than as members of a small . . . All sorts of problems of organization and co-ordination arise because the unit to be controlled is now large instead of small, is out of ear-shot, takes time, space, and forethought to manage (1931, pp. 44-45).
Robinson recognized that a different, perhaps more elaborate, kind of knowledge is required to operate a large firm as opposed to a small one. As Robinson later said, “The larger the field in which co-ordination is being attempted the greater must be the knowledge which ought to be in the minds of the co-ordinators. But man's mind is limited” (Robinson Reference Robinson1934, p. 254). Further, knowledge that is firm-specific is often tacit and embedded in management whereby knowledge and capabilities are ipso facto not easily transferable to or replicated by other firms in an industry.Footnote 15
Coase concludes his paper by coming full circle with his expressed concern at the paper's outset for assumptions being both “manageable” and “realistic.”Footnote 16 He does so by emphasizing that the size of the firm is directly determined at the margin, where “the costs of organizing within the firm will be equal either to the costs of organizing in another firm or to the costs involved in leaving the transaction to be ‘organized’ by the price mechanism.” Though static equilibrium is achieved, it is a “moving” or transient one as “it is clear that the dynamic factors are also of considerable importance, and an investigation of the effect changes have on the cost of organizing . . . explain why firms get larger and smaller” (Coase Reference Coase1937, p. 405, emphasis added). Indeed, Coase, like Robinson, was concerned with the size of firms and management's ability to “react to price changes” and “rearranging the factors of production under its control.” Unlike in Robinson, such “rearranging of factors” was not, however, fleshed-out by Coase. Hence, William Lazonick, for example, regarded Coase's treatment of management's integration of a firm's activities as being “crude” and the firm's internal structure as simply an “authority relation”Footnote 17 and with “no conception of organizational capability” and its development (Lazonick Reference Lazonick1991, p. 169). This is somewhat harsh, as Lazonick seems not to recognize Coase's many acknowledgements of Robinson's influence.
Interestingly, while Lazonick does recognize Robinson for carefully articulating the activities, capabilities and limitations of management, Lazonick claims Robinson did not provide a true dynamic theory, as he was steadfast in his regard for “optimal” firm sizes and “managerial limits.” Lazonick observes that even though Robinson argues that “the managerial limit can be altered by building a managerial structure, he still couched his arguments in terms of optimum sizes.” He adds: “Many, if not most of the particulars, of Austin Robinson's analysis . . . are consistent with the dynamic scenarios that I described. But he neither advocated nor conducted a dynamic analysis” (Lazonick Reference Lazonick1991, p. 164).
Of course, Robinson was very much influenced by Marshall in believing that the details of business reality can be (and should be) explicitly treated within a constrained optimization context, albeit a state of partial equilibrium (which is Lazonick's quibble).Footnote 18 However, no less an authority than Gavin C. Reid argues that Marshall's analytical approach was “dynamic, even biological.” To quote Reid:
To some modern industrial economists, Marshall is just “another neoclassical economist, and a not very special one at that because of his love of the partial equilibrium method. In fact, free competition “of Marshall is not perfect competition of the neoclassical type, as so widely thought in the industrial organization literature, but rather a set of trading relationships in which each firm has its special market by virtue of established relationships with customers and suppliers. Far from being a static view of industry equilibrium, Marshall's was dynamic, even biological (Reid Reference Reid1987, pp. 4-5).
Robinson anticipated Coase in that a “moving equilibrium” or dynamic optimum theory extends traditional economic theory by recognizing and appreciating the changing and limiting realities of the business world, including managers or entrepreneurs. Coase's “moving equilibrium” is consistent with Robinson's unifying concept, the “optimal firm.” Indeed, both rigor and relevance are the hallmarks of Robinson's and Coase's complementary works.
V. CONCLUSION
Robinson's influence on Coase's writing of “The Nature of the Firm” through his The Structure of Competitive Industry is both obvious and significant. This is understandable, as Robinson and Coase both embraced and looked to extend the Marshallian tradition with these noted works.Footnote 19 They sought to directly engage the real world of business as they were keenly interested in how firms actually behave, and why. They pursued answers to very fundamental questions: Why do firms exist? and, To what size? In addition, the study of firms and their industries requires a variety of considerations if effective decision-making by the firms’ managers is to be properly understood. In Cairncross’ fine biography of Robinson, he noted the brilliance of Robinson was his ability “to look at problems from different angles, against an historical background, taking in technology, organisational considerations, political feasibility” (Cairncross Reference Cairncross1993, p. 164). Much the same could be said about Coase.
Empiricism mattered at least as much as theory in advancing the economic study of the firm in relation to its industry and, indeed, the market. For Robinson and Coase, firms vis-à-vis the market are “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk” (Robertson Reference Robertson1928, p. 84). They were both interested in applying simple, yet compelling, economic concepts and theory such as scale economies, substitution at the margin and, of course, transaction costs. Further, it was important for them that economic analysis be grounded on realistic assumptions; theory that depended on fabricated assumptions to ensure tractability and even elegance should be largely avoided. Moreover, mathematics should not be the sine qua non of economic theory. Unfortunately, formalism and a priori theorizing emerged in the 1930s (given such influences as Robbins, Pigou, and even Joan Robinson) to dominate, if not define, mainstream economics, including the treatment of the firm. As a result, Coase and Robinson arguably became “outsiders” as Medema (Reference Medema1994), in his equally fine biography, concludes about Coase.
For nearly thirty years after the publication of The Structure of Competitive Industry and “The Nature of the Firm,” the theory of the firm very regrettably maintained a “purely theoretical slant,” thereby preventing “an examination of facts pertaining to firms” (Demsetz Reference Demsetz1995, p. 1). After all, price theory dominated. Examining the particulars of a firm in relation to its environment and viewing the firm as a “problem-solving institution” understandably entails managed coordination. Hence, there is a “supersession of the price mechanism” that recognizes benefits from management and costs of using the market. Finally, Demsetz effectively agrees with Robinson and Coase that management and its limited ability or diseconomies need to be addressed in determining the particular kind of existence and extent (or size) of the firm. As he declares: “Clearly, our understanding of firms can be improved by recognizing that management is a scarce resource employed in a world in which knowledge is incomplete and costly to obtain” (Demsetz Reference Demsetz1988, p. 147).
