Talbot Imlay and Martin Horn have produced an ambitious work that contributes to the debate on the nature of the Nazi economic exploitation of occupied France during World War II. The monograph has numerous goals. The authors seek to examine the arguments regarding the nature of industrial collaboration in France through a case study of Ford SAF, the French subsidiary of Ford Motor Company. Imlay and Horn suggest that the case study allows an analysis of how the French carmakers operated within rearmament and wartime economic environments. The work focuses upon the interaction of Ford SAF with the bewildering layers of French planning groups and German supervisory bureaucracies in Occupied France and Vichy. The Ford SAF study also permits the authors to examine the role of U.S. firms in Europe in the run up to hostilities and then during actual war. The scope of the work is so broad that Imlay and Horn themselves question whether they achieve their objectives.

They largely do. The work offers a fascinating and detailed investigation into Ford SAF and its complex relationship with French politicians and German customers. It is more a study of wartime political economy than a business history. The book nonetheless provides insight into Ford's French subsidiary, the history of which generally attracts less attention than do Ford's other European firms. The micro- and macro-level approaches result in a dense narrative suitable for academic readers. However, the use of similar sentence structure and numerous repeated phrases referring readers to previously mentioned concepts, arguments, and people give the text a repetitive feel. The six chapters, long in page length, are defined more by chronology than by themes. The abrupt treatment of Ford SAF following the war and the truncated conclusion leave the reader wanting more. Unquestionably, the superb research is the strength of the work. The numerous citations feature material from government and company archives located in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Secondary sources are equally exhaustive and well utilized. Future scholars of the occupation must consult this authoritative list of references.

Imlay and Horn feature Ford SAF in the study since the firm faced many of the same challenges as French firms during the 1930s and 1940s. Its association with Dearborn, Michigan, also gave Ford SAF a reputation for design and production efficiency. The image was enhanced by the company's managing director, Maurice Dollfus, whose wily antics and overoptimistic predictions were better suited to playing politics within the Ford European network than to generating annual profits. The company had struggled with production problems since its founding in the late 1920s. As war neared, the trucks and V8 engines that Ford SAF built attracted attention from French, and later German, authorities. Dollfus convinced politicians that the company, which had constructed a large plant in Poissy featuring U.S. machine tools, was French enough to participate in rearmament. The government contracts produced hefty annual profits. However, the swift Nazi victory created considerable uncertainty for Ford SAF and the other French carmakers.

The analysis of the nature of the occupation is the highlight of The Politics of Industrial Collaboration. Ford SAF and the other carmakers could not simply shut down in the new German-dominated economy. The Germans, in turn, wanted to exploit French industrial capacity. Accordingly, Ford SAF and the others accepted German contracts to produce vehicles and parts. The Germans relied upon negotiation and large profit rates rather than force to entice French cooperation. The occupiers had no choice. Pointing to significant information asymmetry, Imlay and Horn note that the Germans had limited understanding of the operations of the French firms and therefore little leverage in the relationship. The companies, assisted by protective French bureaucrats who bargained with the Nazis, exploited their advantages. Imlay and Horn convincingly argue that the period from 1940 to 1942 was the height of industrial collaboration. Cognizant that a German victory was possible, the tactics were also designed to preserve French companies and vehicle designs in the postwar vehicle market. The Germans prized Ford SAF for its truck designs and facilities. Moreover, the Nazis believed that the potential for cooperation and rationalization existed between Ford SAF and German-based Ford-Werke. Indeed, Dollfus deflected a takeover bid by the German rival, but agreed in 1943 to participate in a Europe-wide truck-building program for the Wehrmacht headed by Ford-Werke. As in the past, Ford SAF's output and quality levels failed to meet targets. Was its performance the result of resistance or incompetence?

Imlay and Horn find existing arguments for resistance or accommodation unsatisfying. In spite of reorganizing the oversight apparatus and raising financial incentives, the increasingly frustrated Nazis could not coax higher levels of badly needed output from the French economy at a critical time in the war. Why? The authors concede that by 1943, output at Ford SAF and the other car firms were constrained by pervasive shortages of nearly all factors of production. Poissy had suffered damage in an air raid. More important, they argue, the shifting military situation created an even greater asymmetry in information. Therefore, French firms in general, and Ford SAF in particular, exploited the situation to deliberately pursue a policy of underproduction. Imlay and Horn note that the German authorities complained that French firms failed to address the shortages and chronic production and product-quality problems. In short, the underproduction policy marked the end of French interest in industrial collaboration with the Germans. A new postwar future was possible. The policy did not make Dollfus a resister, according to Imlay and Horn; he and his rival managing directors never opposed working with the Germans.

Liberation soon followed. So, too, did recriminations and reconstruction. Dollfus used underproduction to fend off accusations of collaboration. Ford SAF emerged from the war with bright prospects—which, again, it could not fulfill. A frustrated Ford headquarters sold the firm to SIMCA in 1954. In the end, Imlay and Horn concede that they may not have seamlessly integrated business history with their analysis of the wider issue of collaboration. They also admit that their case for deliberate underproduction is not clear-cut. Clearly, then, this fine work invites future scholars to compile a more comprehensive study of Ford SAF and perhaps a more concrete explanation of industrial collaboration during the occupation.