The Southern Cameroons Decolonization Debate: Existing Scholarship and Research Position

A substantial body of scholarship addresses the Southern Cameroons independence question; a comprehensive review of which exceeds the scope of this paper. However, three distinct analytical perspectives emerge, particularly regarding the relationship between the decolonization process and its outcomes. One scholarly tradition attributes primary responsibility to Britain as the administering authority for constraining Southern Cameroons’ political options, operating in tacit coordination with France in French Cameroon. Anthony Ndi exemplifies this perspective, characterizing Southern Cameroons’ history as marked by “woes and regrets originating from the duplicity perpetrated by Great Britain.” Ndi employs terminology such as “double British standards,” “the British paradox,” and “sheer British bad faith” to critique Britain’s approach to Southern Cameroons’ political future. He argues that Britain adopted this position because the Southern Cameroons Prime Minister resisted British preferences—publicly articulated since 1957—for the territory to remain integrated within Nigeria.Footnote ¹³

Victor Julius Ngoh on his part advances a contrasting interpretation—frequently contested by proponents of Ndi’s perspectiveFootnote ¹⁴ —that situates agency and responsibility primarily with Southern Cameroons’ political elite, particularly the dominant Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and its leader, JN Foncha. Ngoh contends that Foncha’s ambiguous positioning regarding the territory’s political future, combined with his rejection of what he (Ngoh) characterizes as rational counsel from Britain, UN Plebiscite officials, and the Southern Cameroons opposition to negotiate reunification terms prior to the plebiscite, predetermined the territory’s post 1961 marginalization. Within this analytical framework, Foncha and his associates were characterized as driven by naiveté, limited political sophistication, and self-interest during a critical juncture demanding prioritization of collective welfare.Footnote ¹⁵ This interpretation finds corroboration in Bongfen Chem-Langhee’s scholarship.Footnote ¹⁶

These competing scholarly analyses require systematic evaluation against the UN’s responsibilities as guarantor of the Trusteeship System under which Southern Cameroons operated, particularly regarding fulfilment of its Article 76(b) mandate. While some studies have explored UN-Southern Cameroons relations,Footnote ¹⁷ a majority have not placed a premium specifically on Fourth Committee deliberations where debates occurred, petitions were examined, testimonies heard, and resolutions formulated. In this way the international dimension of this decolonization process as debated and concluded is missed. Moreover, certain works adopt an explicitly advocacy-oriented framework, seeking to legitimatize contemporary secessionist claims by characterizing the situation as an “unfinished job” stemming from alleged non-termination of the Trusteeship and subsequent “colonization” by La République du Cameroun.Footnote ¹⁸ Such teleological approaches risk analytical bias through selective interpretation of historical sources to support predetermined political conclusions.Footnote ¹⁹

This paper thus advances a third analytical perspective addressing this institutional dimension by examining systematic UN failures in Southern Cameroons’ decolonization process through a more detached critical lens, focusing on institutional processes, stakeholder interests, and decision-making mechanisms within the Fourth Committee to understand how and why the independence option was foreclosed despite evidence of its viability. By situating local political dynamics within Fourth Committee institutional processes, this analysis illuminates how UN structures, imperial interests, regional bloc politics, and competing stakeholder agendas intersected to exclude the independence option despite recurrent evidence of its popular support. With it, a comprehensive understanding emerges regarding independence processes in Trust Territories characterized by contested consensus, such as in Togoland and Southern Cameroons.

Political Developments in the Southern Cameroons prior to 1959

In many non-self-governing territories, independence was achieved through a gradual process of political maturation. Colonial powers guided this transition by fostering local governance and preparing indigenous leaders. Central to this process was the emergence of a dominant nationalist party representing the people’s aspirations. These parties — such as the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in Ghana or the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU) in Tanganyika — were not merely political organizations but vehicles of mass mobilization, civic education, and anti-colonial resistance. Their legitimacy stemmed from deep roots in local struggles and their ability to articulate a postcolonial vision. Rather than relying on referenda, their authority was affirmed through popular support, activism, and negotiation. In Southern Cameroons, the situation evolved differently due to several factors: a sentimental attachment to the former German Kamerun, which inspired a reunification agenda; over 45 years of administrative and constitutional development within Nigeria which inspired a political agenda of integration; and the territory’s status as a UN Trust, which internationalized its decolonization; a process in which the Administering Authority was to play an important part. These, combined with differing views on the economy and the question of preserving a distinct Southern Cameroons identity by achieving independence as a country in its own right, made the Southern Cameroons case uniquely complex.

As an integral part of Nigeria, Southern Cameroons acquired the status of a quasi-federal territory in 1954 and received full regional status in 1957. With the adoption of the Southern Cameroons Orders in Council in 1958, the territory had attained most of the qualities of a self-governing territory.Footnote ²⁰ These developments followed a gradual process of constitutional evolution of the territory deliberated in conferences in Ibadan, Lagos, and London organized by the Administering Authority which saw as expected at the time, the sequential devolution of powers into the hands of the people.Footnote ²¹ They were also part of the commitments of the 1946 trusteeship over the CameroonsFootnote ²² and subsequent UN pronouncements for all nations responsible for non-self-governing people to take concrete measures to terminate colonial rule within specifically defined time frames.Footnote ²³

However, from 1956, E.M.L. Endeley’s Kamerun National Congress (KNC), the ruling party at time and to many the torch bearer of Southern Cameroons drive to independence which had gained ascendency to power through an ideology of separation from Nigeria, began to explicitly advocate integration with Nigeria. Endeley went ahead to enter into a coalition with N.N. Mbile’s Kamerun People’s Party (KPP), which had maintained an unwavering commitment to the integrationist position with support from Nnamdi Azikiwe’s National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). This coalition positioned J.N. Foncha’s Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) — founded in 1955 on a platform advocating secession from Nigeria as the official opposition.Footnote ²⁴ This partisan configuration fundamentally shaped the political landscape within which international deliberations occurred.

Through his alliance with the KPP, Endeley retained power until the 24 January 1959 elections, when he was defeated by the pro-reunification Foncha by a margin of 12 to 14 seats in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly (SCHA). Upon the House’s reconvening in February 1959, Foncha sought to use House provisions to move for constitutional changes by advocating that Britain and the United Nations should “take immediate steps to fulfil the wishes of the people and allow the new government to implement their policy of secession from Nigeria.”Footnote ²⁵ This motion, was robustly opposed by the KNC-KPP opposition alliance, which contended that the KNDP’s narrow majority did not constitute a definitive mandate from the populace supposing that the “Honourable House … should explore other and more effective means of ascertaining the wishes of the people regarding their future.”Footnote ²⁶ It is at this point that the session chair, Malcolm Milne, Acting Commissioner concluded that “both viewpoints should be expressed before the United Nations, so that the consultation process ultimately reflects the choices which the people genuinely believe to be in their best interest.”Footnote ²⁷

Internationalization of Self-Determination in Southern Cameroons

As a Trust Territory, internationalization of decolonization in the Southern Cameroons took the form of consultations at the UN especially at the 13^th, 14^th, 15^th, and 16^th Sessions. The 13^th Session gave priority to the entire (British and French) Cameroons case at the 4^th Committee of the Trusteeship Council. For the British Cameroons, Andrew Cohen the representative of the Administering Authority reiterated the lack of consensus among the political leaders in the Cameroons and the narrow margin in the January elections as motivations for the United Kingdom’s position on the holding of a plebiscite in the territory; an issue he had mentioned in the Committee in November 1958.Footnote ²⁸ Endeley and Foncha thus implicitly confirmed Cohen’s assertions by each staying resolute in their positions of integration and secession. These positions constituted what seemed to be an irreconcilable deadlock which led the Committee to concur with the administering Authority that a plebiscite was necessary. Resolution 1350 (XIII) agreed to separate plebiscites in Northern and Southern Cameroons between December 1959 and April 1960 and deferred the determination of the two plebiscite alternatives and voting qualifications to the Fourteenth Session.Footnote ²⁹

Resolution 1350 (XIII) provided the Southern Cameroons politicians with a critical interval (March to September) during which they could have reassessed their positions with four significant diplomatic and political events opening such a window. These were the Colonial Secretary, Lennox Boyd’s May 1959 visit to West Africa and his subsequent meeting with Southern Cameroonian politicians in Lagos; Governor-General and High Commissioner Sir James Robertson’s July 1959 visit to Southern Cameroons; the August 1959 Mamfe Plebiscite Conference; and a final London meeting between Boyd and the Southern Cameroons delegation enroute to the Fourteenth Session. Each venue served the unified purpose of facilitating political consensus on the territory’s future in a manner benefiting the Southern Cameroonian people but none achieved it. So, the delegation returned to New York as they had left in March.

At the Fourteenth Session, the stalemate continued in the first five meetings, prompting some members of the African Delegation to engage the two leaders in a side meeting resulting in what became known as “the Agreed Statement.” In it, Foncha and Endeley agreed, subject to the approval of the General Assembly to postpone the plebiscite until 1962 and envisaged the termination of the trusteeship on 26 October 1962.Footnote ³⁰ While the formulation of the Agreed Statement substantively aligned with Foncha’s strategic objective of securing extended trusteeship, and was a demonstration of the ability of the Southern Cameroons leaders to achieve compromise, its reception in the Committee revealed asymmetrical satisfaction among members.Footnote ³¹ Cohen’s explanation that the Statement was the result of the work of the African delegates did not convince the Soviet/Eastern European and Afro-Asian bloc members. They accused the UK of wanting to sustain colonialism by proposing to extend the trusteeship and that the Southern Cameroons politicians had only been forced into it.Footnote ³² To them, it was illogical for the Administering Authority to claim that a territory was ripe for independence and still push for the extension of the trusteeship.

Apart from complaints that the Statement required legalFootnote ³³ and structural clarificationsFootnote ³⁴ which some members felt were not feasibleFootnote ³⁵ there was also the unanswered question of financial allocations if a new trusteeship agreement was to be established considering the alleged unviability of the territory which may in a very short time cause it to find itself under direct British domination and exploitation. Most importantly, what nullified the Statement was the argument that it was a significant digression from Agenda 41 which clearly limited the Committee to determining the two plebiscite questions and voter qualification.Footnote ³⁶

The Committee therefore rejected the Agreed Statement and requested the Southern Cameroonians to use the same spirit which characterised the Agreed Statement to agree on the second question to be put in the plebiscite with suggestions that considering the impossibility of an independence option resulting from the territory’s unviability and the absence of support for this option from any of the leading politicians and considering that Foncha’s ultimate aim of secession was reunification, the second question to be put to the people should be reunification with French Cameroon.Footnote ³⁷ It was also suggested that the African delegation which had been instrumental in negotiating the Agreed Statement should be involved in drafting the resolution to be put for voting. Thus, the draft resolution introduced by Miss Brooks of Liberia was the outcome of the consultations among some of the African Delegates.

Resolution 1352(XIV) invited the UN General Assembly to start preparations for a plebiscite in the British Cameroons on 30 September 1960 whose options were to be: achieve independence by joining either (a) the Republic of Cameroon or (b) the independent Federal Republic of Nigeria. Regarding the issue of eligibility, only those born in the Southern Cameroons were eligible to vote. About the option for an independent Southern Cameroons nothing was mentioned. What came out clear from the deliberations at the Fourth Committee especially during the 14^th Session was the power of regional blocks and imperialist manoeuvres in decision-making against a weak enforcement of UN objectives of human rights and self-determination; at least on the part of those who were canvassing for the inclusion of the famous third question for a stand-alone Southern Cameroons Republic.

Chem-Langhee has argued that it was still possible for the option of an independent Southern Cameroons to be one of the plebiscite questions if the Southern Cameroon government and opposition parties had insisted on itFootnote ³⁸ but the pressures in the Fourth Committee seemed to have overwhelmed them. Dr Endeley had quickly bowed to the strong Pan African pressures of Nkrumah and the African group.Footnote ³⁹ And Foncha on his part, was persuaded to accept the two alternatives. Especially as he had mentioned that the ultimate aim of secession was reunification. His consolation as he mentioned in his reaction to the draft resolution was that there would be a period of transition before reunification takes effect although shortened from what he initially had in mind when he requested extension of the TrusteeshipFootnote ⁴⁰ albeit the fact that a majority of the KNDP members had opposed immediate reunification with French Cameroons.Footnote ⁴¹

The Third Option for an Independent Southern Cameroons

Apart from Foncha’s stance for secession which was ultimately tainted with his idea of “secession ending in reunification,”Footnote ⁴² elections in the Southern Cameroons since 1953 clearly revealed a third political force whose preferences warranted consideration in determining plebiscite options: the Independent Candidates. In the 24 January 1959 elections, for example, while 58,069 votes (40.4 percent) supported KNC/KPP Nigerian integration policy and 75,326 votes (52.3 percent) supported KNDP’s tacit goal of reunification, the remaining 10,434 votes (7.3 percent) were cast for independent candidatesFootnote ⁴³ “characterized by neutrality toward both dominant platforms, suggesting that 7.3 percent of the electorate explicitly rejected both ideologies of the KNC/KPP and KNDP.Footnote ⁴⁴ Their performance in such elections demonstrated substantial local support for the independence option.Footnote ⁴⁵

Following the 1959 elections and confirmation that the plebiscite would offer only two alternatives, independence advocates mobilized into distinct political parties to advance their objectives: Paul Moyongomo Kale founded the Kamerun United Party (KUP) in Buea, Chief Stephen Nyenti established the Cameroons Commoners Congress (CCC) in Mamfe with the motto “no domination,”Footnote ⁴⁶ and Chief Jesko Manga Williams later created the Cameroons Indigenes Party (CIP) in Victoria. These parties coordinated territorial-wide advocacy, petitioning both the British administration and the UN for recognition of independence as Southern Cameroons’ entitlement under the Trusteeship Agreement. Kale challenged the plebiscite’s legitimacy entirely, asserting that the Trusteeship Agreement guaranteed self-government or independence irrespective of Nigeria’s status. Manga Williams argued that transferring Southern Cameroons from trusteeship directly to an independent African state would perpetuate colonial subordination rather than achieve genuine decolonization, effectively reducing the territory to colonial status under Nigeria or the Cameroon Republic. These parties collectively demonstrated organized resistance to the binary plebiscite framework and advocated for Southern Cameroons’ autonomous independence.Footnote ⁴⁷

Apart from political parties and independent candidates, the Southern Cameroons Chiefs Conference represented an influential body in the political life of the Territory; not only in local administration but also in the shaping of opinion on the main political issues that none of the political parties proper could afford to ignore. By 1958, it was clear that their position was hostile to both integration and reunification. As in Bamenda in 1956, during the 1958 conference held in Kumba the chiefs pronounced strongly for secession of the territory from Nigeria, independence and membership in the commonwealth.Footnote ⁴⁸ This motion constituted the memorandum to the resumed 1958 constitutional conference; a copy of which the chairperson addressed to the UN Visiting Mission later that year. At the Mamfe conference, their chairperson, Fon Achirimbi II of Bafut had intimated that “French Cameroons is ‘fire’ and Nigeria is ‘water….”Footnote ⁴⁹ dispelling claims made by the visiting mission that the traditional rulers had said nothing about their position regarding reunification.Footnote ⁵⁰

Three other issues necessitated the consideration of the third option in Southern Cameroons self-determination process; the volume of petitions to that effect from Southern Cameroonians to the UN; the report by the administering authority on the administrative and constitutional maturity of the territory and the favourable position of some delegations on the third option.

From March to September 1959, the Secretary General presented to the Fourth Committee for discussion 120 petitions from the entire Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration.Footnote ⁵¹ Apart from those that declared their support for integration or reunification, there was a significant number unequivocally requesting for Southern Cameroons to be granted independence in its own right. Others talked of the inclusion of a third question in case there was to be a plebisciteFootnote ⁵² while a couple more requested the cancellation of the plebiscite all together with strong words like “the entire Cameroonians strongly oppose decision on plebiscite questions [and] request you suspend this decision [and] honour [the independence wish] of the majority….”Footnote ⁵³

At the Fourth Committee, several delegates argued that the territory should be granted independence as the only way of fulfilling article 76(b) of the UN Charter. According to Mr. U Tin Maung of Burma no dependent territory would willingly remain tied to another country, regardless of its wealth or power, nor would any people delay independence “for as much as a single day.”Footnote ⁵⁴ Mr. Zikria of Afghanistan—the sole delegate to vote against the two-option plebiscite expressed shock that independence had been “pushed into the background” and rejected economic unviability as justification. He insisted that

Mr. Zakria went ahead to expose the contradiction in colonial logic: territories once colonized for their wealth were now denied freedom for lacking it, arguing that nationhood arose from shared heritage, not economics, and that the UN was obligated to ensure self-determination. Mr. Sidi Baba of Morocco reinforced this, asserting that genuine economic advancement could only follow independence, not precede it imploring the Southern Cameroons politicians to choose “some other alternative than association and reunification.”Footnote ⁵⁶ Mr. Mattos of Uruguay warned of the consequences: by limiting the plebiscite to union with Nigeria or Cameroun, Southern Cameroons would soon face conditions imposed by whichever state they joined, losing negotiating power and genuine autonomy.Footnote ⁵⁷ Mr Zuloaga of Venezuela expressed worries on the unequal representation of delegates holding differing opinions at the Mamfe Plebiscite Conference suggesting that since agreement had not been reached on the two questions to be asked, a third question should be put to the people while Mr Diallo Telli of Guinea, one of the rare African delegates supporting an independent Southern Cameroons recommended pure and simple independence.Footnote ⁵⁸ Collectively, these interventions challenged the UN’s rationale and predicted that the two-option plebiscite would undermine rather than fulfil the territory’s right to self-determination.

An assessment of the administrative and constitutional progress of the territory by the 1958 Visiting Mission provides more justification for the UN to have conceded to the requests for a third option in the plebiscite. By 1958, the Southern Cameroons had developed sufficient administrative capacity to justify independence. The territory had established a functioning two-tier government system: local Native Authorities managed essential services (taxation, courts, schools, healthcare, infrastructure) through elected councils,Footnote ⁵⁹ while at the territorial level, a ministerial system with five elected Cameroonians in a nine-member Executive Council had been operational since May 1958. The 1958 UN Visiting Mission had concluded that self-government was “well advanced” implying that the territory possessed the institutional infrastructure necessary for independent statehood.Footnote ⁶⁰

Finally, by late 1960, mounting pressures led both major parties to reconsider the February 1961 plebiscite through the “New Approach” London meeting. UPC terrorist attacks and brutal repression in La République du Cameroun made reunification increasingly unpalatable — even Foncha downplayed it, stating reunification should not be a condition for secession and calling those who insisted on it “enemies.”Footnote ⁶¹ Meanwhile, the pro-Nigeria CPNC faced dwindling support due to anti-Nigerian sentiment and lack of backing from Nigerian parties.Footnote ⁶² Domestically, the KNDP lost its parliamentary majority when John Mondi Boja defected (creating a 13-13 tie), with rumours of further defections threatening government collapse.Footnote ⁶³ These developments, combined with the October 1960 Constitutional Order granting Southern Cameroons effective self-government, prompted both sides to agree that the population was too divided for balanced judgment.Footnote ⁶⁴ They jointly requested Britain and the UN to cancel or suspend the plebiscite, with CPNC willing to support independence if KNDP abandoned reunification.Footnote ⁶⁵ However, this “New Approach” ultimately failed.Footnote ⁶⁶ As Mbile puts it “…the round table talks ended in smoke”Footnote ⁶⁷ with the British government raising all sorts of flimsy arguments and finally, tactically throwing back the problem to the UN. Cohen had instructed from New York that the talks must be suspended and the Southern Cameroonians must return to face the plebiscite on grounds that “the UN by granting a two options plebiscite had not provided for any revision of the resolution.”Footnote ⁶⁸

The developments before Resolution 1352 provided legitimate justifications to add a third option while those after revealed a growing disinterest in the two options in favour of an independent Southern Cameroons and should have caused the UN to reverse the plebiscite decision, but the UN declined to act. In fact, the latter was to come a few weeks after the failure of the London talks. On 14 December 1960, the UN passed Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). While 1514 (XV) stipulated that “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence” 1541 (XV) stipulated the ways in which non-self-governing territories could attain self-government.Footnote ⁶⁹ The former provided an opportunity for the Southern Cameroons case to be reviewed as it had been a long drawn one in the 13^th and 14^th sessions and also because the people, only a few weeks before, had requested such a review of their case. But despite understanding how restive the Southern Cameroonians had been with the third option, the UN failed to consider re-tabling it for discussion at the Fourth Committee based on the new resolutions. The question then remains: if the third option was demonstrably popular, effectively articulated, and the original justification for excluding it was contradicted by the UN’s own subsequent resolution, why did the UN refuse to either grant independence directly or include it as a plebiscite option?

Why did the third option fail?

The evidence above suggest that the UN was aware of the popularity and agitations for the Third Option in the Southern Cameroons including its strong support by some members of the Fourth Committee. The question that this section seeks to answer is therefore, why despite this awareness, was this option not included in the options for self-determination for the territory. In examining the mitigating factors, this paper has delimited the internationalization of Southern Cameroons decolonization to three primary inter-connected domains: interactions among political agencies and stakeholders within the territory, the plan of the Administering Authority regarding the future of the territory, and the UN as custodian of Trust Territories. All these converged at the Fourth Committee as the responsible UN structure. While acknowledging that other developments around the world may have predisposed self-determination preferences and outcomesFootnote ⁷⁰ —even influencing opinions at the Fourth Committee,Footnote ⁷¹ these are considered extraneous to the study and not explicitly prioritized in this paper’s scope which is based on the decisions made or facilitated at and by the UN.

The central implication of the UN is seen in its tutelage over Trust Territories with direct responsibility towards their development and advancement towards self-government and independence as stipulated in Article 76(b) of the Charter. A major clause of the Trusteeship Agreement made by the Administering Authority upon assumption of the Trust. These were discussed at the Fourth Committee, conclusions reached and draft resolutions presented to the General Assembly for adoption. It was thus expected that as a means of ensuring that the best interests prevail, decisions concerning self-determination were to be reached most objectively after a careful exploration by the UN of all available possibilities, especially as self-determination was a once off affair. Such an objective positioning would certainly represent a consideration prior to any UN resolution of the views of all stakeholders without distinction, made to compete against each other on a plain field where the people of the Trust Territory would be the final decision makers (Universal suffrage). Rather than a conscious limitation of options as was the case with the “two alternatives” plebiscite. This is the basis for which this paper implicates primarily, the UN in Southern Cameroons self-determination process; the context of the UN having the last word and not the UK. Even the UK had acknowledged that “Her Majesty’s Government was…acting under the supervision of the UN and the UK as administering authority was obliged to “the UN.”Footnote ⁷²

Consequently, with regards to the mitigating circumstances against the “the Third Option” and why the UN is implicated, it is important to examine the role of the Administering Authority regarding the future of the territory and how this helps determine the extent to which the UN exercised its supreme responsibility as final arbiter in the future of Trust Territories. This is even more important in places where the Administering Authority demonstrated open interests in the future of the territory as well which may have conflicted with the UN’s exercise of its prerogatives for the people under the Trusteeship Agreement. Britain demonstrated open preference for Southern Cameroons’ integration into Nigeria, as it had with Togoland’s integration into Ghana in 1956.Footnote ⁷³ In 1957, Britain stated that “many of the best friends of the Cameroons do not foresee a destiny more likely to promote her happiness and prosperity than in her continued association with Nigeria,”Footnote ⁷⁴ adding a threat of withholding “the key to the Bank of England”Footnote ⁷⁵ should the territory choose otherwise. Conscious of the dwindling popularity of the KNC/KPP evidenced by declining votes in 1957, Britain announced on 15 November 1958, at the Fourth Committee that it contemplated a plebiscite to determine the territory’s future and used the KNC/KPP to advance integration-reunification options,Footnote ⁷⁶ calculating that eliminating secession would favour integration considering reunification’s known unpopularity.Footnote ⁷⁷

Following the integrationist option’s defeat, Britain denied Foncha the constitutional privileges previously granted to Endeley — quasi-federal status (1954), full regional status (1957), and a ministerial system (1958)Footnote ⁷⁸ — invoking a novel “insufficient majority” principle. This departed from established precedence whereby electoral victory authorized constitutional changes, effectively channelling the matter to the UN and culminating in the restricted two-option plebiscite. Had the UN enforced procedural consistency, the protracted self-determination debates spanning the 13th to 16th Sessions would not have occurred.

Besides, the UN did not allow for an objective study of the 1958 Visiting Missions Report which had very important conclusions especially as it had the mandate to observe and inform on the manner of consultation of the people regarding their future. These included nearly no mention of reunification in the territory except those of the OK/UPC who were clearly distinguishable; the independent candidates who advocated independence; the administrative and constitutional maturity of the territory and an economy which, the British presented as not able to sustain a governmentFootnote ⁷⁹ but which the Visiting Mission had concluded that with minimal improvement would off-set any imbalances.Footnote ⁸⁰ Ensuring an itemized reading and discussion of the 1958 Visiting Mission’s report by the UN would have not only exposed the contradictions presented by the Administering Authority’s economic situation but would have led to more rational and inclusive conclusions on the matter for which the visit was undertaken. This would have brought to light many of the revelations which validate the availability of the desire for independence or a consideration of the third option.

While the leading politicians in the Territory are often blamed for holding obstinately to their positions, there is evidence that they attempted to come to a compromise regarding the future of the territory twice; the October 1959 Agreed Statement and the November 1960 New Approach. The first instance flopped because the Afro-Asian Bloc, African Delegates and the Soviet/Eastern bloc rejected it on grounds that it was a British ploy to sustain colonial occupation in the territory and sought to sustain their interest of seeing all territories still under colonial occupation liberated at all cost. On the other hand, the latter which “offered the best of the last chances to have the Southern Cameroons conundrum amicably resolved” was blocked by the Administering Authority because, in the words of Cohen, Britain had to “stick to [its] original plan”Footnote ⁸¹ of ensuring that a two options plebiscite holds. Besides, as argued above when a few weeks later, on December 14 1960, the UN passed Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) which sort of opened a window for the possibility of a re-examination of the Southern Cameroons case in view of the agitations for a third option, both the UK and the UN failed to consider re-tabling it for discussion at the Fourth Committee based on the new resolutions even with their awareness (from the failed London talks) that the Southern Cameroonians desired a future within the context of that resolution. It is in this context that the UK support for the Agreed Statement is viewed at best as hypocritical.Footnote ⁸²

The UN could be said to have also fallen short of its role in ensuring that the outcome of self-determination in the Southern Cameroons should be based on a rational selection from all representative interests and positions in the territory. It did not take into account the over 120 recorded petitions between March and September 1959 clearly expressing third option positions. The UN also failed to ensure that there was a rational representation in the Mamfe Conference and did not send an observer to such an important event. Although some Committee members questioned the imbalanced selection of delegates to the conferenceFootnote ⁸³ and some petitioners reporting that it was convened and dominated by the Administering Authority and the ruling party members and that those with contrary views were not invited or chased away,Footnote ⁸⁴ the Fourth Committee failed to invalidate the conclusions of the conference as not representative of all sheds of opinions in the territory. The conference should therefore not have been considered by the UN as an objective forum for the galvanization or pre-test of all positions in the territory with regards to their future. The UN also failed to invite at least one representative of the parties advocating the Third Option or the chiefs who were reported to be playing “a part in shaping of opinion on the main political issues-which none of the political parties [could] afford to ignore.”Footnote ⁸⁵ Instead the UN limited the fate of Southern Cameroonians to a Committee, a majority of whose members had very limited knowledge of the contextual political realities of the territory.

Even worse is the fact that when Britain foiled the meeting proposed by the UN Secretary General Mr Dag Hammarskjöld involving all protagonists in the Southern Cameroons case including Nigeria and French Cameroon in March 1960,Footnote ⁸⁶ there was no follow up as to the reasons for its flop. An even greater weakness and a course for controversy today was the fact that the UN did not supervise the post plebiscite negotiations for a reunified Cameroon. It allowed for Resolution 1608 to be phrased in a manner that gave the Administering Authority and the Government of La Republique du Cameroun the responsibility of terminating the trusteeship; a prerogative which was expected to be performed only by the UN.Footnote ⁸⁷ A brainchild of the Afro-Asian Bloc and the African Delegation, it was not surprising that Britain, rather than the UN was to play this role in Resolution 1608.

Finally, it is important to mention the Fourth Committee’s disregard of the semantics of secession and reunification and its consequences on the determination of the future of the territory. Electoral patterns from 1953 demonstrate that secession, not reunification, drove political support. Dr Endeley’s 1953 landslide victory, winning 12 of 13 seats, stemmed from his “benevolent neutrality” platform perceived as secessionist advocacy, while his electoral decline in 1957 (6 seats) and 1959 (12 of 26) correlated with abandoning secessionist policy. On the other hand, Foncha’s ascendancy was derived from perceived secessionist objectives with reference to reunification as a post secession project. This fact was confirmed by the 1958 Visiting Mission when it asserted that popular opinion predominantly favoured secession from Nigeria, with reunification remaining a non-immediate issue except among integrationist KNC/KPP factions.Footnote ⁸⁸ These notwithstanding, Resolution 1352 (XIV) falsely portrayed the electorate as divided between integration and reunification, entirely omitting secession despite its sustained centrality to Southern Cameroons nationalism discourse. The Fourth Committee substituted “reunification” for “secession” without conceptual clarification: it made no attempt to determine whether secession advocates understood it as complete independence, a transitional process toward reunification, or merely synonymous with reunification. This semantic ambiguity conflated distinct concepts and eliminated the territory’s genuine preference. It once again demonstrated the prevalence of interests; this time, that of the Afro-Asian bloc and the African delegation fighting the end of colonial subjugation and the further amputation of Africa by granting independence to small states like the Southern Cameroons as the third option would have implied.

These facts demonstrate substantial British and Afro-Asian bloc influence in determining Southern Cameroons’ future at the UN, excluding those advocating the Third Option. Had the UN considered all political opinions rather than accommodating these interests and alliances, a more acceptable self-determination approach would have emerged, mitigating complaints about mismanaged trusteeship termination. This reflects a weak UN dominated by imperial interests and regional blocs confirming Mazower’s position that the UN merely represents an association of states anchored by imperial interestsFootnote ⁸⁹ — an imperial internationalism dating to the League of Nations, where Britain routinely protected colonial policy against League interference.Footnote ⁹⁰ This imperial bias persisted in the UN Trusteeship Council, evident when it endorsed France’s 1959 approach to Cameroonian independence despite ongoing nationalist war and petitions requesting UN-supervised elections.Footnote ⁹¹ This prompted French Cameroonian nationalists to conclude: “we had been fooled into thinking that the UN watches over the entire world, but now we come back to our certainty that the two — French and British authorities are the ones who watch over subordinate nations.”Footnote ⁹² For Third Option advocates like Kale, Nyenti, Manga Williams, and their supporters in Southern Cameroons, this reality came too late.

Conclusion: Rejects Now Regrets?

In a Plebiscite campaign speech Dr EML Endeley warned that “If you vote for the Cameroun Republic, you will invite a new system under which everyone lives in fear of the police and army… a country where the lot of the Southern Cameroons children will be servitude.”Footnote ⁹³ with the benefit of hindsight the warnings of Dr Endeley could be said to have come true in the complaints about marginalization and demonstrations for equal treatment in the Union which Anglophones have expressed from time to time. In the heat of those in 1990, Foncha, the architect of reunification had lamented that the “Anglophone Cameroonians, whom I brought into the union, have been ridiculed and referred to as ‘Biafrans,’ ‘enemies in the house,’ and “traitors. … the 1961 Federal constitutional provisions which protected [them] have been suppressed and their voices obscured.”Footnote ⁹⁴ In 1995, radical Anglophones seeming frustrated with such treatment formed the Southern Cameroons National Congress (SCNC) and began agitating for the secession of the Southern Cameroons from the Republic. In 2016, the two Anglophone Regions were once again caught up in a wave of protests ignited by lawyers and teachers of these regions which by 2017 had grown into an armed insurgency for the establishment of an independent Southern Cameroons.

When one looks at the contemporary developments in the territory, it is hard not to see them as a tacit reminder of Mr Zabloiski’s 1959 warning to the UN that “the result of an unpopular choice [of plebiscite questions] on the population of the Trust Territory would be catastrophic for their political future”Footnote ⁹⁵ and clear evidence of the failure of the internationalization of decolonization. They also expose a critical paradox: the body mandated to dismantle colonialism operated as a mechanism preserving imperial influence. When decolonization occurs within frameworks privileging the powers from which territories seek liberation, genuine self-determination becomes structurally impossible. The UN’s failure to transcend these asymmetries renders it directly accountable for Southern Cameroons’ partisan decolonization and ongoing Anglophone challenges. More importantly for this paper, it validates the decolonial position that there was and is still no United Nations but a body of “hierarchized states” monopolizing internationalization through Permanent Seats and Veto Power and significantly shielding decolonization and de-imperialization.Footnote ⁹⁶