The Empire of Habit identifies itself as the most thoroughgoing application of Michel Foucault's understandings of modern disciplinary power and governmentality to John Locke's liberalism. Building on the earlier Foucault-inspired scholarship of James Tully, Uday Mehta, and others, John Baltes contends that we have yet to come to grips with the extent to which Lockean liberalism is grounded less in consent, contract, or the rights of the individual than in modern techniques of power—a power that manifests itself, above all, in the shaping of liberal citizens who then become capable of contractual relations. Prioritizing Locke's 1693 treatise Some Thoughts concerning Education over his more famous Second Treatise of Government, and reading the Essay concerning Human Understanding as a seminal development of a “disciplinary” epistemology (4), Baltes argues that liberalism's much-vaunted liberty, in the sense of autonomy, is deeply flawed as an ideal. It is an illusion we cling to at the expense of acknowledging our constitution through discipline, or our unchosen and fundamentally unreflective habituation into liberal virtues. As Baltes puts it, “My central claim is that the Lockean (and indeed liberal) subject is deeply disciplined and thoroughly normalized, and as a result, governed more by habitual virtues than rational reflection or autonomous calculation” (42). This is not to suggest that the liberal subject has no agency: according to Baltes, he has agency but not autonomy, though agency means strictly “the capacity to limit oneself to the habits of virtue” (90).
Baltes develops this argument across four fairly compact chapters. In chapter 1 he suggests that Locke's critique of innatism in the Essay renders him a precursor of sorts of genealogists such as Nietzsche and Foucault. Like these later antifoundationalists, Locke recognizes that mind and subjectivity are products of custom and habit—the “law of fashion”—a recognition that militates against the natural-law foundationalism of the Second Treatise. What the Essay reveals, according to Baltes, is that individuals become capable of inhabiting a liberal polity not because they have access to God-given powers of reason but because they are creatures of discipline and convention. Locke's recognition that “blank slates accept whatever characters are written upon them” (45) accounts for his interest in education, the subject of Baltes's second chapter and the crux of his study. It is here that Baltes makes his fullest case for characterizing Foucault as “the ideal partner” (15) for understanding Locke. On this reading, Locke's Some Thoughts concerning Education represents a virtually textbook exemplification of the panoptical power Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish. Like Foucault's prisoners, the sons of the gentry, whose education is the topic of Locke's book, are to be isolated, “frozen in place, located and made present to the educative gaze by the brick-and-mortar architecture of the house and the command of the parent” (50). As in the panopticon, power is invisible: Locke advises parents to replace corporal punishment with “gentler” methods of correction, which ensure a more far-reaching internalization of parental standards. The results of Lockean education are precisely those of the panopticon, with the child becoming a self-policing subject. Locke shows parents how to “co-opt an initially unruly, undisciplined subject and entangle him in a mechanism of power and discipline of which he becomes the bearer” (45).
Chapters 3 and 4 of Baltes's study further justify the reading of Lockean discipline developed in chapter 2. In chapter 3 Baltes argues that Locke seeks to shape not only England's ruling elite but also the poor, who must be disciplined into conformity with the requirements of a liberal polity. Chapter 4 urges Locke's readers not to be surprised by his disciplinary commitments given his fundamentally “aristocratic and oligarchic” politics (20), which Baltes describes as identical with those of Locke's influential patron, the first Earl of Shaftesbury (incorrectly identified as the third Earl, 93). On Baltes's reading, then, Locke's is not only a “disciplinary liberalism” (18) but also a fundamentally “inegalitarian liberalism” (112).
The Empire of Habit productively highlights early liberalism's investment in questions of character, virtue, and socialization, and to that extent serves as a salutary rejoinder to the communitarian critique of liberalism. But Baltes's characterization of this investment as disciplinary or panoptical relies on a number of problematic assumptions. To begin with, his reading of the Essay overemphasizes the interest of the blank-slate metaphor within that text and Locke's writings more generally. Locke's empiricist critique of innate ideas is not the same thing as a critique of inborn powers of reasoning, which, the Essay indicates, are readily corrupted by the law of fashion but which are, nonetheless, susceptible to improvement. Notwithstanding its fragility, reason, for Locke, remains a vital inner resource that individuals can and should sharpen to question and even contest communal values. “Habit” in the Essay includes not only habits imbibed by unreflective socialization but also habits of reasoning, of associating ideas in better or worse ways—a process itself contingent upon education, not only at the hands of others but also through one's own efforts. This latter point is considerably elaborated in Locke's second major work on education, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, originally intended as an addition to the Essay but published posthumously as a self-standing work. Ironically, while Baltes takes the title of his book, “the empire of habit,” from the Conduct (as he himself notes in a footnote), Locke's second educational treatise gets no airtime in his reading of the latter's liberalism—an elision that is particularly puzzling because the Conduct is in explicit and extended dialogue with the two texts, the Essay and the Thoughts, that Baltes wants students of liberalism to prioritize over the Second Treatise. The Conduct crystallizes a key insight of Locke's empiricism: that socially embedded subjects are not without internal resources for fighting their “entanglement” (to borrow Baltes's metaphor) in systems of power and opinion. This insight is also present in the Essay, in that work's interest in how ideas and patterns of association acquire integrity, as well in the Thoughts, which identifies children as interactors in a far more reciprocal exchange with their educators than the panoptical paradigm indicates. Locke imagines education to be a multitiered process, each stage of which is determined by the child's budding reason, and the whole of which is shaped by the child's innate capacities and temperament. As Locke indicates, “God has stamped certain characters upon men's minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps be a little mended but can hardly be totally altered and transformed into the contrary” (Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov [Hackett, 1996], 41). The child is not, as Baltes argues, a “tabula rasa upon which a tolerant, self-governing citizen may be written through techniques of discipline” (65), but brings a distinct set of capacities to the scene of instruction—a “natural genius and temperament” (Thoughts, 41), as Locke puts it—which the educator must respect. Further, Locke enjoins that respect for the child's reason and rights as a child must also shape the exercise of parental power, which is by no means as invisible as Baltes asserts. According to Locke, children should obey their parents but parental commands must, in turn, be reasonable and increasingly capable of rational justification to children. Hence, “there is no virtue which they [children] should be excited to nor fault they should be kept from which I do not think they may be convinced of, but it must be by such reasons as their age and understanding are capable of” (Thoughts, 58).
Baltes's superimposition of Foucault onto Locke elides important currents of the latter's thought. Locke emerges as an oddly reduced figure on this account, as can be seen in the startling judgment Baltes makes towards the end of his study when he argues that Locke “was not an academic, but rather a political operative and pamphleteer” (104), and further, that to ignore Locke's complicity in inegalitarian political schemes “is akin to ignoring the political activity of James Carville or Karl Rove when they speak or write about politics” (105). Is the Essay concerning Human Understanding a pamphlet? Is Locke really reminiscent of Karl Rove or James Carville? Locke the philosopher vanishes under this judgment, but so too, I would suggest, does Baltes's justification for using his writings as the intellectual grounds of a new understanding of liberalism.
