In this wise and witty book, Jonathan Marks, a veteran commentator on the campus culture wars, makes a novel argument for preserving liberal education. Curiously, progressives and conservatives are equally convinced that their side is losing the battle for higher education. Marks insists that both sides are mistaken: universities have not become tools of corporate power, nor have most professors abandoned inquiry for indoctrination. Marks's principal aim is to persuade fellow conservatives who are ready to defund the professoriate—or head for the STEM hills—that higher education is not a lost cause: “The left has more power on campus than it has numbers because the other stakeholders, as they say in the movies, don't want no trouble” (4). A currently silent majority might eventually push back against anti-microaggression training and other manifestations of the “call-out” culture that it surely recognizes as “antithetical to the mission of the university” (51). Marks concedes, however, that “there is little appetite for challenging conventional left-wing wisdom” and there is a real risk that “what is unsayable [eventually] becomes unthinkable” (40, 41).
One might expect a conservative case for liberal education to channel Cardinal Newman or Matthew Arnold, but its avatar is none other than John Locke, the first liberal. (A trigger warning might be in order.) Marks's touchstone is Locke's admonition that “there cannot be anything so disingenuous, so misbecoming a gentleman or anyone who pretends to be a rational creature, as not to yield to plain reason and the conviction of clear arguments” (ix). The aphorism captures the moral disposition that liberal education requires, and cultivates. A free mind progresses from its natural submission to the power of custom and prejudice to the voluntary acceptance of reason's authority and feels that it is disgraceful not to submit to it. The reasonable person paradoxically, can and should take pride in epistemic humility. This appeal to honor is a crucial element of Marks's case, one that he thinks will resonate with students who, while hardly on the Lockean gentleman track, are open to a code of respectability compatible with their egalitarian sentiments (5, 124–25). The flip side of honor, however, is disgrace, and colleges aiming to shape reasonable students who will submit only to the best argument will not be averse to some “constructive shaming” (68). The goal is to instill “the standards of praise and blame that suit a community of learners,” to get students to be “ashamed of the right things” (71, 75).
The central and longest chapter of the book explains “what makes shaping reasonable people a better aim for liberal educators” than the much-advertised “critical thinking skills,” which might otherwise be taken for the same idea, translated into eduspeak (63). Spin doctors and savvy debaters have excellent forensic skills which they deploy for the sake of victory rather than truth. In emphasizing the moral dimension of intellectual virtue, Marks grapples with a significant problem of knowledge itself. Being reasonable requires yielding to the better argument, but how does one know another's argument is best? A clever partisan prefers victory to truth, but even the partisan of truth may fail to recognize that one claim is closer to it than another. The Lockean imperative to impartially examine our own principles is doubly difficult because cognitive biases (as we would say today) afflict even the sincere truth-seeker. Finally, the intellectual freedom that requires such self-scrutiny might give rise to an incapacitating skepticism. In short, Lockean reasonableness risks turning the unremitting questioning of customary authority into a prejudice in its own right, which indeed is the default conservative suspicion of rationalism. “This is a genuine danger,” Mark admits, “particularly because a community devoted to becoming reasonable can't pretend to be neutral about the goodness of that aim” and “any teaching can harden into orthodoxy” (76).
Let's Be Reasonable never suggests that shaping reasonable people is the whole of liberal education, but neither does it waver from the conviction that it is “a worthy and inspiring aim” consistent with those of “nearly all conservatives” (25, 26). The climax of the book thus arrives when Marks takes up “a conservative challenge” to his conservative case for liberal education (104). The intramural dissenter is Patrick Deneen, who accuses “liberalism” (which he associates, not unreasonably, with Locke) of undermining liberal education by attacking culture itself in the name of a deracinated autonomy. The result, Deneen argues, is not the free human being envisioned by traditional liberal education, but the merely private person (Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed [Yale University Press, 2018]). Marks prepares for the confrontation by making a concession. “Locke is not [his] man in every respect” (85), primarily because books (including great ones) are only incidental to his project to reform the mind. Like his own teacher Allan Bloom, Marks believes students should be willing to give themselves up—at least provisionally—to a book like Plato's Republic or Rousseau's Emile. “Lockean readers” approach even great books in a different spirit, as if they were merely “collections of observations and reasonings auditioning for acceptance on our terms” (86) rather than potential agents of our own transformation. Still, Locke might be forgiven because in his time veneration of ancient authority obstructed the advancement of learning, whereas today, as Marks drolly observes, “reverence is . . . not our problem” (88). Even where great-books education endures, students (and professors) are inclined to believe that the enterprise consists in “contextualizing” a Plato or a Rousseau—learning about them rather than from them.
Lockean reasonableness cannot substitute for liberal education, yet Marks is prepared to stand by his man since Locke's case for epistemic humility is “mostly sound” and badly needed (86). Moreover, holding every author accountable for evidence and argument is hardly incompatible with taking ancient books seriously, even if Locke himself might have unreasonably discounted their worth. Deneen, however, will have none of it. For him, Lockean “reasonableness” is the engine of an immoderate liberation, not merely from “prejudice,” but from any limiting condition of selfhood. In Deneen's view, liberalism requires that human beings live detached from tradition and culture as such. Marks shifts the focus from “liberalism” back to liberal education and the university's role in conserving our intellectual inheritance; and he finds it odd that a conservative would side with those on the left who seek to supplant academic freedom with “academic justice,” or view liberal education as an impediment to rethinking the trajectory of modern thought toward the expressivist self.
Although Marks finds Deneen's standard for being a conservative “exacting” (109), he declines to pursue any further matters of “high theory” which Let's Be Reasonable deliberately brackets (25). Some readers will be disappointed by the announcement that this book is not the place “to have it out” (110) between conservatives seeking to conserve liberalism and those like Deneen who would roll it back. Marks nevertheless makes a persuasive case that conservatives of all stripes should unite around preserving liberal education in an increasingly fraught environment. The greatest challenge is that many students are seeking very different things than their professors want to give them—although who can really argue against becoming reasonable?
Whether or not liberal education (to say nothing of conservatism) has a future, this splendid book demonstrates that it deserves one. Conservatives, meanwhile, can hope for the day when higher education is well and truly dominated by Marksists.
