The history of the early modern and modern eras is often explained as the progress and consequences of a series of “revolutions—the Scientific Revolution, the Commercial Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and so forth.” The origins of these revolutions are typically placed in Europe. The progress of these movements and growing mastery over both physical and social environments is described as instrumental in the rise of the West and its eventual dominance over much of the world. Non-Western states and societies are often measured against the standards set by these revolutions and found wanting, with their lack of progress explained as the result of an inability to innovate or subservience to tradition. Such essentialist narratives do not always acknowledge that environments also shape actions and attitudes. Leaders and communities in other parts of the world often took very different approaches to solving political, social, and economic problems because their environments and contexts—possibilities and limitations—were very different. Effective practices could not be measured by a single objective standard. The ingredients for success were subjective, based on different—and often changing—conditions. Two recent works—Climate of Conquest by Pratyay Nath and Water and the Environmental History of Modern India by Velayutham Saravanan—clearly illustrate this dynamic and the limitations of more traditional analysis by studying the interaction of state, society, and environment in South Asia.

Nath's work confronts the construct of the “Military Revolution,” a historical narrative that describes the development of new military technology and tactics in early modern Europe and radical changes to states and societies caused both by the power of these innovations and by the effort of amassing the physical and human resources needed to produce them. Nath describes the development of the military of the Mughal Empire in the same era and argues that this process cannot simply be measured using the framework of the Military Revolution (he notes that even historians of Europe struggle to define the precise mechanics and timing of this movement). The achievements of the Mughals did not always conform to the best practices of their European contemporaries because they fought and ruled in an environment that was very different in many ways—from climate and geography to the available species of domesticated animals. Furthermore, there was no single imperial standard for technology, tactics, and operations. Mughal practices varied over time and space, as they expanded into ever more diverse environments and learned how to operate successfully in these settings.

Nath describes several radically different environments—the eastern frontier of Bengal, the western frontier of present-day Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, and the southern frontier in the Deccan. The dense forests and swamps of the east and the rugged mountains of the south and west tested a system originally built and refined during combat in the open country of northern and central India. In more complex terrain, former mainstays such as mounted archers diminished in importance, while other, previously obsolete, tactics such as war elephants used in the line of battle resurfaced. In addition to the varied geography, the Mughals also had to navigate a complex human terrain. The diversity of South Asia's environments produced a multitude of local economies, worldviews, and cultures. Nath explains how the Mughals learned to accommodate these as they built relationships with leaders and communities, controlled military labor markets, and consolidated political authority in different regions. The Mughal Empire had a highly developed political ideology for its era, based on an enlightened despot, the rule of law, and the pursuit of universal justice. Nath suggests that such a universalist approach was essential to lead such a diverse population, as the government could not afford to conform to the narrow expectations of any one group. Adaptability and flexibility are recurring themes in Climate of Conquest. Nath describes a state and a military organization that were not inferior or backward but dynamic and innovative, as effective as any of their contemporaries.

This work is wide-ranging, from assessments of technology, tactics, and logistics to descriptions of geography and physical environments and explanations of cultural and political norms. It is dense in detail, sometimes to a fault. At times, the arguments and tangents read like an attempt to compress several monographs into a single volume. Nonetheless, it is a valuable contribution to the military history of early modern South Asia, a subfield that has been understudied and underappreciated.

Saravanan's work is also situated at the intersection of “revolutionary” movements and the environment. He studies the use and management of water resources in South Asia from the precolonial era to the early twenty-first century, focusing on the region around the city of Coimbatore in southern India. Saravanan notes that this topic has been largely neglected in environmental histories of the region, which focus mainly on agriculture, land use, and the threats to wildlands, wild species, and indigenous peoples. Yet this book is interesting and important for other reasons. Saravanan explains how changes to natural waterways and aquifers—dams, flood control structures, reservoirs, irrigation canals, and wells—have enabled greater agricultural and industrial production, but at great cost. The consequences include diminished rivers, lowered water tables, pollution from agricultural and industrial waste, and limited access to clean drinking water. Once again, the natural environment shapes the political environment. Degradation of physical resources drives competition and animosity between leaders and communities. In southern India, access to water resources and regulation of their use have been the at the center of bitter conflict between states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

Saravanan notes that these problems are not simply the result of poor choices made in the recent past by national and local governments. Much of the water infrastructure in the region was developed during the colonial era, based on an agenda of exploitation, not conservation. Great Britain severely taxed the resources of its colonies to produce cash crops and other raw materials to feed its Industrial Revolution at home. States at the forefront of a revolutionary movement have a vested interest in limiting the progress of potential competitors. Yet such revolutions can also deter successful imitation not by conscious choice but by inevitably distorting environments and creating physical obstacles. Like the Mughals, the leaders of independent India found themselves constrained by their environment. In this case, the contours of that environment were not entirely natural. They had to work with and around the infrastructure—and the damage—left by a previous administration. Simply measuring their success and failure by an objective standard set by the progress of modernization in the West and elsewhere is insufficient.

Saravanan's work is rich in detail but also packed with technical terminology and statistics. It can be intimidating to a nonspecialist. Nonetheless, it is a valuable illustration of how environments, both natural and man-made, shape the progress of states and societies. Their achievements might not match the abstract standard of a “revolution,” but these differences are usually the result of adaptation to physical and social realities, not a failure of imagination.